Perhaps the reason there is so much curiousity and handwringing over monopsony in economics these days is that tenure-track researchers themselves are employed within an extremely monopsonistic market:
Let’s take the findings at face value, and say that all faculty at the various stages of tenured and tenure-track academic appointments work within a monopsonistic market. Let’s also accept that it is reducing not just wages, but total compensation inclusive of all benefits and compensating wage differentials. What’s the solution?
I mean, so much of the monopsony literature circles back to the policies and industrial institutions that researchers, wonks, and advocates think will improve worker welfare. Well, if *we*, the researchers in question are so confident in our findings, our models, and our policy recommendations, what have we done to improve our own market? Have we done anything? Can we do anything?
I heard someone in the back yell “We unionized!” Okay, that’s great. I just I could say “More unions” and end the post, but I’m not confident that this is a problem that unionization, absent additional innovation, is going to solve. Don’t worry, I have an idea.
Release sheets. I’ll explain.
At the moment, the majority of academics opearate under administrative regimes that think the best way to keep faculty costs down is leverage employee exit costs to the absolute hilt. That means, more than anything else, that the only way to get a non-trivial raise is to have a formal letter offering you a job at another university, with a start date, salary, and benefits all enumerated. Only then will the department/college/university consider offering you a “retention” raise. The administration’s hope is the the cost of pursuing an outside offer combined with the cost of moving to a new area (“local” outside options are almost non-existent in academia) will deter you from pursuing them, reducing the probability of receiving one.
The problem with this tactic is that it discourages faculty from contributing, participating, and investing in all of the public goods that make a department and university successful. Every investment ties the researcher to the school and community, raising their exit costs and, in turn, lowering their expected probability of pursuing and receiving an outside offer. Contributing to public goods reduces expected future wages. “Retention raises only” insititutions undermine the mission of their own faculty by incentivizing their faculty to be as independent, aloof, and myopically selfish as possible.
Now, the obvious solution here for universities is to simply preempt the market by raising salaries to better match their market value, but that would require both having a clear and unified vision of what their product and mission are (good luck) and not giving in to the overwhelming temptation to capture rents on labor wherever they can (fat chance). If there is one unifying attribute of bad managers everywhere, its conflating rent maximizing with profit maximizing. Yes, I know there is definitional overlap, but we’ve all known a manager that confuse percentage returns for absolutes, acting as if paying $3 for $5 of marginal labor product is better than paying $8 for $11.
If you want faculty to contribute to public goods, you’re going to have to give them something as compensation for their higher exit costs. I suggest exchanging reduced asymmetric information for enduring higher exit costs. How? The two-part release sheet.
The idea is actually pretty straight forward. Part one: every employee contract includes a release sheet that includes a retention ceiling that the university promises it will not make a retaining offer in excess of. If you have a retention ceiling at $200k a year, then another school can come and offer that with absolute confidence that they will have a real shot at landing the employee. This encourages rival schools to make the investment in scouting and recruitment. It lowers the cost of making offers that will raise someones income. More offers, more raises, less rents.
Part two: the merit raise ladder. Between the employee’s current salary and their retention ceiling is a schedule of merit raises. At each step of the ladder, the department evaluates the employee’s revealed productivity since their last evaluation and decides whether to give a raise. The tartgeted amount of the raise is pre-determined. If the employee receives an amount less than the pre-determined full target raise amount, the difference is subtracted from their retention ceiling. Let’s go through an example:
Contract A: $150k/ year. 6 year contract. $10k raises at years 2 and 4. Retention ceiling: $225k/year.
That means that after year 2, the department can give a raise. If they raise their salary by $7k a year (total 157k), then their retention ceiling is lowered (7-10 = -3) to $222k. After 6 years the two parties have the option to renegotiate the whole package. If both parties can’t agree, then they simply project the old schedule forward, $10k every two years, differences lowering the retention ceiling. If salaries are frozen it’s entirely possible for the retention ceiling to drop below their actual salary.
I see a lot of benefits here, and not just for faculty. Everyone benefits from reduced assymetric information. A high retention ceiling doesn’t actually bind anyone’s hands – a rival university can still show up with any offer they like, the current employer simply retains the right to make an equal or higher retaining offer. Failure to keep up with employee market value, however, will quickly result in the vultures circling your best employees. At the same time, employees have greater incentive to continue contributing in every possible way to the department, and not just those that are visible on the outside. Departments will know that they have to keep salaries commensurate with total productivity or they will forfeit their right to make competitive retention offers.
We already have a central hub in academic economics: the AEA-JOE. We post job openings and vitaes on the JOE, we coordinate letters of references. Posting our retention ceilings alongside our vitaes would be a nearly costless addition.
Would their be other consequences? Almost without question. This is a blog post not a theory paper. But if we’re going to complain about monopsonistic markets, we should probably consider taking steps to fix our own.
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