Sympathy for the Sauds

I’ve always been confused by the US alliance with Saudi Arabia. Its a state with values abhorrent to many Americans, and it seems like we don’t get much practical value out of the alliance.

This essay on Saudi history, politics, and economics by Matt Lakeman makes the situation more comprehensible. I still don’t know that I want the alliance, but I can now see how so many US presidents have continued with it without necessarily being stupid, crazy, or corrupt. In short, they think that most of the realistic alternatives are worse. Some highlights:

Before starting this research, I had the same perception as Wood that the Saudi economy is essentially what he calls a “petrol-rentier state.” Basically, Saudi Arabia sits on top of a giant ocean of easily-accessed oil which they suck out of the ground and sell at enormous profit to prop up the rest of their extremely inefficient economy and buy the loyalty of their own people and foreign powers. Saudi Arabia is the wealthiest large state in the Middle East today by sheer virtue of geographic luck rather than any innovation or business acumen on the part of its people.

And after doing my research, all of the above is… basically true.

But all of that should also be true of Iran, Iraq, Venezuela, Libya, and a few other countries which are also situated on giant oceans of oil but are far poorer than Saudi Arabia.

Economically, Saudi Arabia deserves little credit for its success. Politically, Saudi Arabia deserves a tremendous amount of credit for enabling its economic success. 

Dealing with the resource curse is always challenging, and foreign ownership is an additional challenge. How did they manage it?

the Sauds struck a clever balance between being too aggressive and too placating of the foreigners operating their oil wells. If the Saudi state had been aggressive and tried to nationalize its oil quickly, Saudi Arabia could have ended up becoming another Venezuela or Iran with lots of external political pressure from hostile Western countries and a low-efficiency oil industry. But if they had nationalized too late, they would have ended up like a lot of African nations who have all their natural wealth siphoned away by foreigners.

Instead, the Sauds executed a patient, and most importantly, amicable assertion of power over Aramco, which did not become fully owned by Saudis until 1974. At the very start of Aramco, the company was entirely owned and operated by Americans aside from menial labor. However, the Saudi government inserted a clause into their contract with the corporation requiring the American oil men to train Saudi citizens for management and engineering jobs. The Americans held up their end of the bargain, and over time, more and more Saudis took over management and technical positions.

In addition to carefully negotiating the balance of power with various foreigners, the Sauds have done so with the religious establishment:

Though the monarch has absolute power, his authority is at least in part derived from Saudi Arabia’s Islamic religious establishment. The ulema (a group of the highest-ranking clerics) is officially integrated into the government, and plays an important role in legal matters. However, the religious establishment has slowly been marginalized by the monarchy over the last few decades, and has possibly been subjugated entirely since the reform era began five years ago.

Winning freedom of action has been a long road with many setbacks:

[King] Abdulaziz constantly had to reassure enraged Wahhabi clerics that he wasn’t selling out the Arab homeland to treacherous infidels. IIRC, it was some time in the 1920s that Abdulaziz had to publicly smash a telegraph to prove to the clerics that he wasn’t bewitched by infidel technology.

In late 1979, 400-500 extremist Sunni Saudis seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca (the holiest Islamic site on earth) and demanded the overthrow of the Saud dynasty in favor of a theocratic state meant to await an imminent apocalypse. They held on for two weeks while managing to fight off waves of Saudi police and military squads. Eventually, three French commandos flew to Mecca, converted to Islam in a hotel room, and led a successful assault to retake the Mosque. Over 100 men died on each side, with hundreds more wounded.

The Grand Mosque seizure was the final wake-up call for the Saud dynasty. Something drastic had to be done or their regime would likely be ground down under mounting internal and external pressure…. King Khalid led a social/religious/political reactionary revolution within Saudi Arabia to align with the Sunni extremists. Up until about four years ago, Saudi society was still gender segregated and enforced a largely literalist interpretation of Sharia, hence the array of bizarre and antiquated laws – gender segregation in public, requiring women to cover their faces, outlawing of non-Muslim religious buildings (there are a few Shia mosques), restrictions on foreign media, etc. Saudi Arabia was always conservative, but most of these draconian laws were only put into place in the 1980s. The Saud dynasty purposefully induced a reactionary legal regime and pulled Saudi Arabia further away from liberalism.

The charitable take on making an already oppressive regime even more oppressive is that the Sauds were trying to bend Saudi Arabia to the extremists so the country would not break. And by all accounts, it worked; the conservative Wahhabi clerics backed by the Saud dynasty placated a sizeable portion of the Sunni extremists inside and outside of Saudi Arabia, and they became a pool of support against the Shia and Baathists. Saudi Arabia was certainly made a worse country for its citizens, but that was the price to pay for averting civil war.

More recently, Crown Prince Salman has consolidated power to the point where he can make modernizing reforms that Wahhabis might have opposed, like allowing women to drive, allowing non-Muslim foreigners to to get tourist visas, allowing music concerts, et c. Lakeman obviously likes these reforms, but at the same time worries that the concentrated power that so far Salman has largely used to enact positive reforms could be abused going forward, and on a larger scale than murdering the occasional dissident.

Wood argues that a worst case scenario parallel to MBS is Syrian Dictator Bashar al-Assad. Like MBS, there were high hopes that Assad would be a liberal reformer when he took over Syria. After all, Assad had been living and working in the UK as an ophthalmologist with no political aspirations, and was known to be a fan of Phil Collins. He was called to the throne after the unexpected death of his older brother, and so the West hoped that this nerdy British doctor would bring upper-middle class liberal values to Syria. Instead, Assad became one of the worst dictators of the modern Middle East, probably second only to Saddam Hussein.

I recommend reading the whole thing, here I’m quoting relatively small parts of an article full of interesting detail on the history, economics, and politics of Saudi Arabia. There’s also a section on visiting:

The silver lining to Saudi Arabia’s lack of tourism is that there aren’t many tourist restrictions. I went to two ancient settlements and I found no guards, no gates, no notices at all. I walked in, around, and on top of 2,000 year old houses, and I honestly have no idea if I was allowed to.

Message To My Students: Don’t Use AI to Cheat (at least not yet)

If you have spent any time on social media in the past week, you’ve probably noticed a lot of people using the new AI program called ChatGPT. Joy blogged about it recently too. It’s a fun thing to play with and often gives you very good (or at least interesting) responses to questions you ask. And it’s blown up on social media, probably because it’s free, responds instantly, and is easy to screenshot.

But as with all things AI, there are numerous concerns that come up, both theoretical and immediately real. One immediately real concern among academics is the possibility of cheating by students on homework, short writing assignments, or take-home exams. I don’t want to diminish these concerns, but I think for now they are overblown. Let me demonstrate by example.

This semester I am teaching an undergraduate course in Economic History. Two of the big topics we cover are the Industrial Revolution and the Great Depression. Specifically, we spend a lot of time discussing the various theories of the causes of these two events. On the exams, students are asked to, more or less, summarize these potential causes and discuss them.

How does ChatGPT do?

On the Industrial Revolution:

And on the Great Depression:

Now, it’s not that these answers are flat out wrong. The answers certainly list theories that have been discussed by at various times, including in the academic literature. But these answers just wouldn’t be very good for my class, primarily because they miss almost all of the theories that we have discussed in class as being likely causes. Moreover, the answers also list theories that we have discussed in class as probably not being correct.

These kinds of errors are especially true of the answer about the Great Depression, which reads like it was taken straight from a high school history textbook, ignoring almost everything economists have said about the topic. The answer for the Industrial Revolution doesn’t make this mistake as much as it misses most of the theories discussed by Koyama and Rubin, which was the main book we used to work through the literature. If a student gave an answer like the AI, it suggests to me that they didn’t even look at the chapter titles in K&R, which provide a roadmap of the main theories.

So, my message to students: don’t try to use this to answer questions in class, at least not right now. The program will certainly improve in the future, and perhaps it will eventually get very good at answering these kinds of academic questions.

But I also have a message to fellow academics: make sure that you are writing questions that aren’t easily answered by an AI. This can be hard to do, especially if you haven’t thought about it deeply, but ultimately thinking in this way should help you to write better exam and homework questions. This approach seems far superior to the one that the AI suggests.

Gambler Ruined: Sam Bankman-Fried’s Bizarre Notions of Risk and the Blow-Up of FTX

The drama continues for Sam Bankman-Fried (SBF), the former head of now-bankrupt crypto exchange FTX. This past week has been giving a series of interviews, in which he (the brilliant master, the White Knight, of the crypto world a mere month ago) is trying to convince us (potential jurors?) that he is too dim-witted to have masterminded a shell game of international wire transfers, and that he had no idea what was happening in the closely-held company of which he was Chief Executive Officer. (For an entertaining take on what We The People think of SBF’s disclaimers, see responses in this thread ttps://, especially the video posted by “Not Jim Cramer”). 

The word on the street is that his former partner Caroline Ellison (who he has been implicitly throwing under the bus with his disclaimers of responsibility for the multi-billion dollar transfers from his FTX to her Alameda company) may well be cutting a deal with prosecutors to testify against SBF.  It remains to be seen whether SBF’s monumental political donations will suffice to keep him from doing hard time.

But all that legal drama aside, the SBF saga brings up some interesting issues on risk management. Earlier here on EWED James Bailey  highlighted a revealing exchange between SBF and Tyler Cowen, in which SBF displayed a heedless neglect of the risk of catastrophic outcomes, as long as there is a reasonable chance of great gain:

TC: Ok, but let’s say there’s a game: 51% you double the Earth out somewhere else, 49% it all disappears. And would you keep on playing that game, double or nothing?

SBF: Yeah…take the pure hypothetical… yeah.

TC: So then you keep on playing the game. What’s the chance we’re left with anything? Don’t I just St. Petersburg Paradox you into non-existence?

SBF: No, not necessarily – maybe [we’re] St. Petersburg-paradoxed into an enormously valuable existence. That’s the other option.

Boiled down, the St Petersburg Paradox involves a scenario where you have a 50% chance of winning $2.00, a 25% (1/4) chance of winning $4.00, a 1/8 chance of winning $8.00, and so on without limit. If you add up all the probabilities multiplied by the amount won for each probability, the Expected Value for this scenario is infinite. Therefore it seems like it would be rational, if you were offered a chance to play this game, to stake 100% of your net worth in one shot. However, almost nobody would actually do that; most folks might spend something like $20 or maybe 0.1% of their net worth for a shot at this, since the likely prospect of losing a large amount does not psychologically compensate for the smaller chance of gaining a much, much larger amount. But SBF is not “most folks”.

Victor Haghani recently authored an article on risk management and on SBF’s approach:

Most people derive less and less incremental satisfaction from progressive increases in wealth – or, as economists like to say: most people exhibit diminishing marginal utility of wealth. This naturally leads to risk aversion because a loss hurts more than the equivalent gain feels good. The classic Theory of Choice Under Uncertainty recommends making decisions that maximize Expected Utility, which is the probability-weighted average of all possible utility outcomes.

SBF explained on multiple occasions that his level of risk-aversion was so low that he didn’t need to think about maximizing Expected Utility, but could instead just make his decisions based on maximizing the Expected Value of his wealth directly. So what does this mean in practice? Let’s say you find an investment which has a 1% chance of a 10,000x payoff, but a 99% chance of winding up worth zero. It has a very high expected return, but it’s also very risky. How much of your total wealth would you want to invest in it?

There’s no right or wrong answer; it’s down to your own personal preferences. However, we think most affluent people would invest somewhere between 0.1% and 1% of their wealth in this investment, based on observing other risky choices such people make and surveys we’ve conducted…

SBF on the other hand, making his decision strictly according to his stated preferences, would choose to invest 100% of his wealth in this investment, because it maximizes the Expected Value of his wealth.

Even in a game with a fair 50/50 outcome, a player with finite resources will eventually go broke. This is the “Gambler’s Ruin” concept in statistics. SBF’s outsized penchant for risk took his net worth to something like $30 billion earlier this year, something we more-timid souls will never achieve, but it eventually proved to be his undoing.

Most people have a more or less logarithmic sense of the utility of money – if you only have $1000, the gain or loss of $100 is significant, whereas $100 is lost in the noise for someone whose net worth is over a million dollars. SBF apparently felt that he was playing with such big numbers, that he did not need to worry about big losses, as long as there was a chance at a big, big win. Here is a Twitter Thread  by SBF, from  Dec 10, 2020:

SBF: …What about a wackier bet? How about you only win 10% of the time, but if you do you get paid out 10,000x your bet size?

[So, if you have $100k,] Kelly* suggests you only bet $10k: you’ll almost certainly lose. And if you kept doing this much more than $10k at a time, you’d probably blow out.

…this bet is great Expected Value; you win [more precisely, your Expected Value is] 1,000x your bet size.

…In many cases I think $10k is a reasonable bet. But I, personally, would do more. I’d probably do more like $50k.

Why? Because ultimately my utility function isn’t really logarithmic. It’s closer to linear.

…Kelly tells you that when the backdrop is trillions of dollars, there’s essentially no risk aversion on the scale of thousands or millions.

Put another way: if you’re maximizing EV(log(W+$1,000,000,000,000)) and W is much less than a trillion, this is very similar to just maximizing EV(W).

Does this mean you should be willing to accept a significant chance of failing to do much good sometimes?

Yes, it does. And that’s ok. If it was the right play in EV, sometimes you win and sometimes you lose.

(*The Kelly criterion is a formula that determines the optimal theoretical size for a bet.)

Haghani concludes, “It seems like SBF was essentially telling anyone who was listening that he’d either wind up with all the money in the world, which he’d then redistribute according to his Effective Altruist principles – or, much more likely, he’d die trying.”

( Full disclosure: I have lost an irritating amount of money thanks to SBF’s shenanigans. My BlockFi crypto account is frozen due to fallout from the FTX collapse, with no word on if/when I might see my funds again. )

The Imperfection of Subgame Perfection

I’ve written previously about Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria (PSNE). They are the set of strategies that players can adopt in equilibrium – with no incentive to change their strategy. Students have an intuition that PSNE aren’t great because some outcomes that they identify depend on players making silly decisions in the past. In jargon, we can say that some PSNE depend on players choosing irrationally in a subgame while still reaching a PSNE.

See the extensive form game (below right). There are two players, each with two strategies per information set, and player two has two information sets. All PSNE will include a strategy for each information set. We can present the same game in normal form in order to make it easier to identify the PSNE (below left).

Player 1 (P1) can choose the row (B or C) and Player 2 (P2) can choose the column. Importantly, whether P1 might want to change his mind depends on P2’s strategy at the decision node in the alternative information set. Therefore, P2 must have two strategies, one per information set.

The four PSNE strategies and payoffs are underlined in the above table and they are noted in red on the below extensive form games. Again, the logic of PSNE states that no player can improve their payoff by changing only their own strategy, given the opposing player’s strategy. After all, a player can control their own strategy, but not that of their opponent. For example, note PSNE II. In the left subgame, P2 chooses M. His payoff would be unchanged if he changed his strategy, given the strategy of P1.

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Ban, Subsidize, Mandate: Ethics and US Healthcare Policy

Tomorrow (Friday 12/2) I’ll be speaking at the Fall Ethics Forum at Sacramento State. The Center for Practical and Professional Ethics there does a forum every year on a different field of practical ethics, and this year they chose healthcare (some previous iterations look quite interesting, like Bryan Caplan on education and Lyman Stone on population). The event is open to the public if you happen to live near Sacramento, and I hope to be able to post a recording later. But for now, here’s a short preview of what I plan to say:

In many key respects, US health policy is about restricting the choices available to patients and health care providers: banning things the government doesn’t want, while mandating or subsidizing things they want. These restrictions on autonomy are typically justified by the idea that they lead to superior health or economic outcomes. In some cases this tradeoff between freedom and efficient utilitarian outcomes is real, but I highlight some policies such as Certificate of Need laws that appear to harm both freedom and efficiency. I argue that the overarching US approach to health policy is to subsidize demand while restricting supply, which together lead to exceptionally high prices but mediocre health outcomes.

I’ll also take on some classic questions like: when are free lunches truly free? And when is moral hazard really immoral?

Fight for $15? $25? $40?

Remember the “Fight for $15”? It’s a 10-year-old movement to raise the federal minimum wage to $15 per hour. While there hasn’t been any increase in the federal minimum wage since the movement began in 2012, plenty of states and localities have done so.

I won’t rehash the entire debate on the minimum wage here, but I will point you to this post from Joy on large minimum wage changes, and here are several other posts on this blog on the same topic. But lately I have seen an increasing call for even larger minimum wage increases, well beyond $15.

A prominent recent call for a higher wage comes from the SEIU, the second largest labor union in the nation. They are calling for a $25 minimum wage in Chicago, where the legal minimum wage just recently crossed $15 last year. Again, without getting into the detailed debates about the economics of the minimum wage, we can recognize that this would be a massively high minimum wage, given that median hourly wage for the Chicago MSA was $22.74 in May 2021. It’s certainly a bit higher in 2022, and the city of Chicago is probably a bit higher than the entire MSA. Still, we are talking about a minimum wage that would cover roughly half the workforce. Well, at least half the current workforce. The negative employment effects would potentially be large.

Here I will dabble a little bit in the minimum wage literature. One of the most famous recent papers that suggests increasing the minimum wage doesn’t have large negative employment effects is a 2019 paper by Cengiz, et al. This paper only looks at legal minimum wages that go up to 59% of the median market wage, which is the highest wages have been pushed up so far. By contrast, that $25 minimum wage in Chicago would be somewhere around 100% (!) of the local median market wage. That’s huge, and goes far beyond what even the most sympathetic-to-the-minimum-wage research has looked at.

But here’s the most recent minimum wage call that really takes the cake: over $40 per hour in Hawaii. That comes from, in a way, a Tweet from Hal Singer:

Now in fairness, he doesn’t exactly call for a $40 minimum wage in Hawaii, but he does say we should use the minimum wage as a tool to address homelessness, and then points to a study showing that you would need to earn $40/hour in Hawaii to afford a two-bedroom apartment. That’s pretty close. The median wage in Hawaii? About $23 in May 2021. In fact, the 75th percentile wage in Hawaii was $36.50 in 2021! So, depending on exactly how much wage growth there has been in Hawaii since May 2021, we are likely talking about a $40 minimum wage covering 75% of the workforce! That would likely have some “bite,” as economists say.

Thanksgiving Dinner is Once Again More Expensive (But Not the Most Expensive Ever)

Last year inflation hadn’t quite hit the levels we would see in 2022, but they were already rising. When Thanksgiving rolled around, many media sources were reporting that it was the “most expensive Thanksgiving ever.” In nominal terms that was true, though in nominal terms it isn’t that surprising. In a post last year, I compared the prices of Thanksgiving dinners (using the same data from Farm Bureau) to median earnings going back to 1986. While 2021 was more expensive the 2020, it turned out it was still the second lowest it had been since 1986.

As you might expect, this year’s Thanksgiving dinner is even more expensive than last year in nominal terms. It’s up about 20% since last year or over $10 more, according to Farm Bureau. That’s certainly more than the overall rate of inflation (7.7% in the past 12 months) and more than inflation for groceries (12.4% in the past 12 months). But how does that compare with median wages? Comparing the 3rd quarter of this year with the same quarter in 2021, median wages are only up about 7%, certainly not enough to keep up with those rising turkey prices.

When we add 2022 to the historical chart, here’s what it looks like.

The spike in the last 2 years is clear in the chart but notice that at about 6% of median weekly earnings, we have essentially returned to the average level of the entire series. From 2017-2021, we could be thankful that the price of your Thanksgiving dinner had dropped below that 6% level. We’ll have to find something else to be thankful for this year.

The Unimportance of Inflation: Stocks & Flows

One of my specializations in graduate school at George Mason University was monetary theory. It included two classes taught by Larry White who specializes in free-banking, Austrian macroeconomics, and monetary regimes. Separately, my dad was a libertarian and I’ve attended multiple Students for Liberty events. Right now, I’m writing from my hotel room at a Catholic/Crypto conference, where I learned that the deepest trench in Dante’s Inferno includes money debasers.

Everything about my pedigree suggests that I should have a disdain for the Federal Reserve and cast a wistful gaze toward the perpetually falling value of the US dollar. But I don’t. I certainly do have opinions about what the Fed should be doing and how our monetary system could work. But I’m not excited by the long-run depreciation of the dollar.

Let me tell you why.

Learning a little bit of theory is a dangerous thing. Monetary theory is especially hard because we examine the non-good side of the transaction: the medium of exchange. In frantic excitement, enthusiasts often point out that the value of the dollar has lost very much of its value in the past 100 years. They describe that loss is by describing the lower quantity of something that a dollar can purchase now versus what it could have purchased historically. That information is incapsulated in the price of a good. The price of a good is the number of dollars that one must exchange in order to purchase the good. Similarly, the price of a dollar is the number of goods that one must give up in order to purchase the dollar.

We can consider a variety of goods. Below is a graph that describes the quantity price of the dollar where the quantities are CPI basket units, gold, and housing. In the 35 years following 1986, a single dollar purchases 60% less of the consumer basket, 74% fewer houses (not quality adjusted), and 76% less gold.

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New Data: State Regulatory Procedures

Released this April, but I just heard about it today. Researchers did the painstaking work of going through all 50 states to determine which steps must be taken in each state before new regulations can take effect. For instance, it turns out half of states require economic analysis for new regulations, and half don’t. The paper is here:

My BlockFi Crypto Account Is Frozen Due to Monster FTX Exchange Blowup

About a year ago, I posted some articles touting the use of BlockFi as an alternative checking account. It paid around 9% interest (this was back when interest rates were essentially zero on regular savings accounts), and allowed withdrawal or deposit of funds at any time. Nice. BlockFi is associated with respected firm Gemini, and (unlike many crypto operations) is U.S. based, with consistent formal auditing. They earned interest on my crypto by lending it out to “trusted counter-parties”, always backed by extra collateral. What could possibly go wrong?

In July I wrote about a big cryptocurrency meltdown, in which a number of medium-sized players went bust.  At that time, BlockFi assured its customers that its sound business practices put it above the fray, no problemo. They did make it through that juncture OK. But I withdrew a third of my funds, just to be on the safe side.

The huge news in crypto this past week has been the sudden, total implosion of major exchange FTX (more on that below). FTX is a major business partner with BlockFi. No worries, though, as of Tuesday of last week,  BlockFi COO Flori Marquez tweeted that “All BlockFi products are fully operational”.  Then the hammer dropped: On Thursday (11/10), BlockFi froze withdrawals, due to complications with FTX. My remaining crypto is stranded, most likely for years of legal proceedings, and I may never get it all back. I’m not going to starve, but the amount is enough to hurt.

In this case, I don’t really blame BlockFi – by all accounts, they have been trying to run an honest, responsible business. Before last week, nobody had much reason to think that FTX was totally rotten.  My bad for not connecting the FTX-BlockFi dots earlier, and pulling out more funds when I had the chance.

The Great FTX Debacle

The star of this show is Sam Bankman-Fried, the (former) head of FTX:

James Bailey posted here on EWED on the FTX crash last week. CoinDesk author David Morris summarized the downfall of Bankman-Fried’s crypto empire:

FTX and Bankman-Fried are unique in the stature they achieved before self-immolating. Over the past three years, FTX has come to be widely regarded as a reputable exchange, despite not submitting to U.S. regulation. Bankman-Fried has himself become globally influential, thanks to his thoughts on cryptocurrency regulation and his financial support for U.S. electoral candidates – not necessarily in that order.

Facts first uncovered by CoinDesk played a major role in the events of the past week. On Nov. 2, reporter Ian Allison published findings that roughly $5.8 billion out of $14.6 billion of assets on the balance sheet at Alameda Research, based on then-current valuations, were linked to FTX’s exchange token, FTT.

This finding, based on leaked internal documents, was explosive because of the very close relationship between Alameda and FTX. Both were founded by Bankman-Fried, and there has been significant anxiety about the extent and nature of their fraternal dealings. The FTT token was essentially created from thin air by FTX, inviting questions about the real-world, open-market value of FTT tokens held in reserve by affiliated entities.

Negative speculation about a financial institution can be a self-fulfilling prophecy, triggering withdrawals out of a sense of uncertainty and leading to the very liquidity problems that were feared.

Customers started a “run on the bank”, withdrawing billions of dollars of assets, leading to total insolvency of FTX:

The Financial Times reported that FTX held approximately $900 million in liquid crypto and $5.4 in illiquid venture capital investments against $9 billion in liabilities the day before it filed for bankruptcy.

If FTX had been run as an honest exchange, this withdrawal should not have been too much of a problem – – just give customers back the coins they had deposited with FTX. Apparently, though, FTX had taken customer assets and transferred them over to a sister company, Alameda, to trade with. The valuable customer crypto assets left the FTX balance sheet, and were largely replaced by the self-generated (and now nearly worthless) FTT token:

It remains worryingly unclear, though, exactly why even such a dramatic rush for the exits would have led FTX to seek its own bailout. The exchange promised users that it would not speculate with cryptocurrencies held in their accounts. But if that policy was followed, there should have been no pause to withdrawals, nor any balance sheet gap to fill. One possible explanation comes from Coinmetrics analyst Lucas Nuzzi, who has presented what he says is evidence that FTX transferred funds to Alameda in September, perhaps as a loan to backstop Alameda’s losses.

It doesn’t help that on Friday (11/11) some $477 million was outright stolen from FTX wallets. (The Kraken exchange said it has identified the thief and are working with law enforcement).

Where does the FTX saga go from here? There seems little in the way of assets left for the bankruptcy judge to distribute to former customers and creditors. In the case of BlockFi, they are dependent on a $400 million line of credit extended to them by FTX back in June, to keep operating. And who knows how much of BlockFi assets were stored with FTX – – since FTX was to be their white knight, BlockFi would not be in a position to withdraw deposits from FTX like other customers did.

I predict that nothing really bad will happen to Bankman-Fried and his buddies who ran this thing. Although its operation was apparently dishonest, it is not clear how much is subject to U.S. federal or state legal jurisdiction. Bankman-Fried and friends ran their empire from a big apartment suite in the Bahamas. Plus, he is pretty well-connected. Beside his massive campaign contributions, his business and sometimes romantic partner Caroline Ellison (she is CEO of Alameda) is the daughter of MIT professor Glenn Ellison, the former boss (as colleagues at MIT) of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission chair Gary Gensler. These relations were captured in an impish tweet by Elon Musk: