With Inflation Staying High, Consider I-Bonds

The latest CPI-U data suggests inflation was around 4 percent in the past year (I say “around” because due to the late 2025 government shutdown, we have no October 2025 baseline data to calculate the rate). The persistently high inflation — even using the core CPI, it is still close to 3 percent — and currently high interest has made some investors consider the safer, more guaranteed returns of good old bonds.

One type of bond you may want to consider: Series I Bonds. These bonds issued by the federal government pay a rate that is set for 6 months, and the rate is based on the most recent 6 months of inflation as measured by the CPI-U (plus a fixed rate, more on that in a moment). These bonds are currently paying 5.51 percent, since the most 6 months of CPI-U inflation was 2 percent, which you essentially double to get an annual rate, and then a fixed rate (currently 1.4 percent) is added to that inflation rate. When you buy the bond, the fixed portion of the rate is fixed for the life of the bond (30 years). That 5.51 percent is currently higher than the 10-year Treasury bond, and even slightly better than the 30-year bond! But the rate is only guaranteed for 6 months, after which it will change.

The biggest reason to buy these now is not the headline rate but the fixed rate of 1.4 percent. That’s the best fixed rate they have offered since 2006-2007! I purchased some of these bonds back in 2022, and I still think it was a good choice: they were paying over 7 percent at the time, which increased to 9.62 percent the following 6 months. Not a bad return in a year when the stock market was unstable and actually fell almost 20 percent that full year. But when I purchased the I-Bonds in 2022, there was no fixed rate attached. That means the 2022 bonds I am still holding are currently just 4 percent, rather than the headline 5.51 percent.

Even if you believe that CPI-U inflation will eventually get back down to 2 percent, and stay there into the future, I-Bonds purchased now will pay almost 3.5 percent for the life of the bond — not a stellar return, but not bad for a guaranteed return. Of course, you could always lock in almost 5 percent for 10 years or over 5 percent for 30 years with ordinary Treasury Bonds. Those aren’t bad ideas other. But if you think inflation will remain elevated, or especially if you think it will ramp up again, putting some of your cash in I-Bonds might make sense.

As a historical point of reference, the best time to buy these bonds would have been in the late 1990s, when they were first issued. At the time they paid a fixed rate of over 3 percent! That means today those bonds are paying 7.5 percent and had been paying as high as 13 percent in 2022 at the peak of CPI-U inflation. Not bad for a guaranteed return! The cumulative return on a $10,000 investment in 1998 would be about 5x, today worth over $50,000. That’s only about half the return of the S&P 500 — but with much less volatility. Those high fixed rates are unlikely to return soon, but the 1.4 percent fixed rate is not too shabby.

Important final thoughts: don’t take this as professional investment advice, just as an idea to research more on your own and with your financial advisor. You can only put $10,000 per year into Series I Bonds, so no need to think about whether you should move all of your money into I Bonds — just think about the margin dollar you are investing. And if you sell these bonds within 5 years, you will lose a small amount of interest (3 months’ worth).

The Blue Wave Was Not That Surprising If You Followed Prediction Markets

The election last night was clearly a victory for Democrats. But was it a surprise? For the most part, no, especially if you follow prediction markets. Here’s what the Senate map looked like on ElectionBettingOdds.com the night before the election:

Of course, there are still a few surprises on that map, such as Iowa, South Carolina, and maybe Mississippi. But only Mississippi was a huge surprise. Betting markets had Iowa as a toss-up, and South Carolina as 2/1. And even in Mississippi, the Democrat had 1-in-7 chances based on the average across three betting markets. 1-in-7 chances do happen sometimes! None of the states that were solid blue or red on the map (indicating >90% chances) went the other way. But even without those three races, it was clear that Democrats were the favorite (even if the extent of their domination wasn’t completely clear the day before).

And these are not just a few cherry-picked results from one election. A recent paper published in PNAS shows that across a wide variety of outcomes, prediction markets are “well calibrated” — that is, events with X% probability on prediction markets tend to happen… about X% of the time!

UPDATE: Here’s a calibration Kalshi just provided for the 2026 midterms:

What Will the GDP Report Say Tomorrow?

Based on all of the good predictors that I track, GDP growth for the 3rd quarter of 2026 will likely be right around 3.2%:

Table 1

Kalshi, the Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow model, and the WSJ survey of economists are typically the best predictors, and they are all right around 3.2%. I’ve also added a new column to the table, a Nowcast from the St. Louis Fed. This one tends to be a pretty poor predictor, so you might wonder why I’m adding it to my list. Read on below to see why, but for now it’s interesting to note that it is very close to the three other good predictors (the NY Fed model is generally not very good).

When I have tracked these predictors in the past, I have been comparing them to the advanced GDP estimate, the first one the BEA puts out. Being able to predict this release is a good and hard enough task, but ultimately we don’t actually care about the number that will come out tomorrow. This number will be revised many times with more data, not only the 2 months after it, but through subsequent benchmarking and revisions in later years. Ultimately, we care whether these predictors are getting the true number, not BEA’s initial release (even though they are calibrated to predict that initial release, for the most part as I understand them).

What does it look like if we compare those predictions to the current best data on GDP growth going back to 2023? On this measure, the St. Louis Fed Nowcast looks pretty good recently:

Table 2

While the St. Louis Fed Nowcast looks pretty bad over the entire time period — the worst of these 5 predictors — it has done very well in the past 3 quarters, including nailing the 1st quarter of 2026 exactly (though in one quarter, they got the sign wrong). So I’m now tracking it in my table to see if it will continue to perform well — maybe they improved the model? The 3rd quarter data won’t actually tell us much about the St. Louis Fed model relative to the others, since they all are saying the same thing, but it will be worth watching in the future.

If we tally up the best predictors using the final or most recent GDP growth estimate, the best predictor is Kalshi’s betting markets. Kalshi has the lowest average error, which is just slightly better than the WSJ survey of economists. But Kalshi was also the best predictor in 6 of the 14 quarters in Table 2. The WSJ survey was only the best in 3 quarters — and in two of those it had the same prediction as Kalshi. It was only best as a standalone in one quarter (the oldest one in these 14 quarters). The St. Louis Fed was the best predictor in 5 quarters, all of these by itself, but its average error (as well as standard deviation and variance) is the highest of these 5 predictors.

Based on different combinations of the predictors, the best pair of predictors is Kalshi and WSJ. Averaging those together gets you an average error of 0.68, better than any single predictor. That means my prediction based on all this information is 3.15% growth in the third quarter for the final figure, once we eventually have it. The average of the Atlanta Fed and Kalshi is the best pair for the advanced figure, which gives a slightly different prediction of 3.24%.

Has Mexico’s “Canasta Básica” Policy Made Food More Affordable?

A recent article in The Guardian profiles economist Isabella Weber. She doesn’t seem to like other economists very much, supposedly because we “obsess over ideological purity and are inflexible when searching for solutions.” Weber wants economists to come up with solutions that work even if… I guess, even if they don’t work well in theory? Maybe they will work well in practice?

Anyway, so far as I can tell, the article only gets into details on two concrete solutions to affordability. I’m sure she has more in her book, but let’s see what these are. The first for governments to create “publicly owned entities that can buy and sell grain into its market,” presumably to smooth out fluctuations in grain prices. The second is “the Mexican government’s canasta básica policy, through which retailers voluntarily cap the total price of a basket of two-dozen essential goods.”

Let’s look at the second one, since I think for developed countries like the US, fluctuating grain prices aren’t the primary source of affordability concerns. But perhaps American consumers would like a basket of grocery essentials to be cheaper.

Has this policy in Mexico worked? It was first implemented in 2022, and food inflation has certainly fallen in Mexico since then. But it has also fallen everywhere else in the world — 2022 was peak inflation not just in the US, but in most countries — so we can’t judge the success of the program based on that alone.

Instead, we can look at internationally comparable data on food spending, which comes from the USDA’s Economic Research Service. Our World in Data has a nice chart based on this data, and even though it is now two years out of date (I will provide 2025 data below), the 2023 data makes a case against the success of the “price controls” in Mexico (I put “price controls” in quotes because it is not a true price control, but an attempt to control prices via incentives):

Figure 1

It will probably not surprise you that the US spends much less on food as a percent of total spending than Mexico, given that we are a high-income country. But it is still worth pointing out just how low food spending is in the US. However, this chart still paints Mexico in a very poor light: for countries with about the same income level in the Americas (as measured by consumer expenditures), Mexicans spend much more on food than Argentina, Chile, or Panama.

If we use the 2025 USDA data, and focus on the 10 countries with consumption expenditure closest to Mexico (between about $8,000 and $12,000 of consumption), we see that Mexico is very much on the high end: only Argentina was clearly higher:

Table 1

Finally, we can compare Mexico against itself in this data, looking at food spending going back to 2017:

Figure 2

Food spending actually peaked in 2020, though be cautious of any data from 2020 as the pandemic made data collection difficult. After declining in 2021 and then into 2022 (the policy seems to have been put in place in mid-2022), there haven’t been any further declines. And food spending is still well above pre-pandemic levels (unlike the US, where the 2025 figure of 6.4% is the same as 2017-18).

Ultimately, we would want a more sophisticated analysis than my simple tables and charts here. But it doesn’t appear that Mexico’s 2022 policy really made food much more affordable, either relative to peer countries with similar income levels, or relative to Mexico’s own recent history. And that’s even before we get into any unintended consequences of the “price controls.” Of course, the policy may have made that basic basket of two-dozen items more affordable than it otherwise might be — for that we would need to compare individual item prices to peer countries — but it hasn’t obviously made food overall more affordable in Mexico.

Wealth of Generations in 2025

Two weeks ago I provided an update on estimates of wealth for recent generations in the US. But just this week, the Federal Reserve gave us the once-every-three-years complete update to this data, which allows us to calculate medians rather than average, and to more precisely separate age groups.

I will have a lot more to say about this data, both on this blog and a book I am working on, but for now here is the chart you have all been waiting for:

“The Grim Old Days” in Charts

I’ve just started reading Chelsea Follett’s new book The Grim Old Days, which shows just how bad things were in the past. It’s a great book, and I encourage everyone to buy it. If you want a sample of what’s in the book, check out her series of blog posts on “contemporary accounts of daily life in the past” or read her blog post summarizing some of the topics in the book.

As an economist when I think about the past, in my head I see charts. Lots of charts, full of data! Follett’s book is mostly narrative history, and it is not filled with charts and data. That’s OK, I still am very much enjoying the book. But what charts would I select to show how grim the old days were, if I wanted to take that approach to the topic?

Here are four good ones from Our World in Data.

Child mortality in the past was horrible, with only about half of children surviving to adulthood (goes along with Chapters 2 and 3 of her book):

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Wealth of Generations: Update Through the First Half of 2026

It’s been a while since I updated my generational wealth chart, and we now have estimates through the 2nd quarter of 2026, so here’s the latest chart:

Figure 1

Wealth for younger Americans continues to grow substantially, but let me make two caveats:

  1. Yes, I know median data is better. I’m writing a book that uses median wealth data! But the latest median wealth data from the Fed’s SCF is currently only available through 2022, so it’s not super relevant to current conversations. We should have the 2025 data soon.
  2. Because of the way the data in my chart is produced in the Fed’s DFA, it groups everyone under age 45 together. That’s a mighty big group, and it because it encompasses both Millennials and a lot of Gen Z, it makes it hard to directly compare to earlier generations.

So, until we have 2025 median wealth data, and until the Fed’s DFA starts breaking out Millennials and Gen Z, here is my current best compromise chart:

Figure 2

In Figure 2, I have used the Fed DFA data for age groups, which are still pretty large groups, but you can consistently compare them over time. The average wealth level of both the 18-39 group and the 40-54 group have seen substantial gains. In fact, the gains for younger cohorts have been even better than middle-aged Americans, though both saw substantial gains.

And this chart shouldn’t be affected by the lack of household formation among some younger Americans: I am using the full population as the denominator, so if anything, this will understate growth rates. Even so, the growth rate from the depths of Financial Crisis in 2010 have been substantial: 228 percent growth from 2010 to 2026 for ages 18-39. The growth rate for ages 40-54 was less dramatic, though they also didn’t experience as large of a slump from 2007-2010.

While we can always hope and work towards growth rates being better, average wealth for Americans of working age is currently at record highs, having fully recovered from both the Financial Crisis and the inflation slump of 2022.

Are You Better Off Than You Were 22 Months Ago? Midterm Elections and Real Wage Growth

The phrase “are you better off than you were 4 years ago?” seemed to have been a winning campaign slogan for Ronald Reagan in 1980. But when I looked at the data, it didn’t really hold up, if we are looking at real income growth to determine “better off.” Real family income growth was actually positive under Carter, but he lost reelection. Then four years later, Reagan won reelection, despite having negative real income growth. This is a pattern we see often in recent presidential reelection years. Interestingly, it does not appear to be 4-year income growth that matters, but 1-year income growth might.

Is there any similar data we can look at for midterm elections? It is well known that Presidents almost always lose seats in a midterm election. But might they lose fewer seats if the economy is performing well? The following scatter plot shows all midterm elections since 1970. On the horizontal axis is the percent change in real wages (AHETPI series, deflated by the PCEPI) from the January a President takes office until November of the midterm election year. The vertical axis shows the net change in Congressional seats for the party of the President, including both the Senate and House (I weight Senate seats at 4.35x House seats, which is somewhat arbitrary).

Figure 1

What can we learn from this scatter plot? I would say there is a weak correlation between the variables: better real wage growth means losing few seats. The sample size is small, so I am reluctant to plot a trendline, but it would be positive. The only two midterm elections since 1970 where the President’s party actually gained Congressional seats had very high wage growth: Bush in 2002 (3.3%) and Clinton in 1996 (a very robust 5.3%). Very negative wage growth shows up just once, for the Nixon/Ford midterm in 1974, and here the Congressional losses were pretty massive.

Now you might object that other factors matter. And surely they do. The Republicans probably would have lost a lot of seats in 1974 anyway, due to Nixon’s resignation. But I’m sure the higher rates of inflation and resulting negative real wage growth didn’t help. And Bush probably got a significant post-9/11 hero bounce in 2002, though the real wage growth might have helped too.

However, Clinton and Obama had the worst midterm losses in this era, in 1992 and 2010, much worse than Nixon/Ford in 1974, and despite positive but weak real wage growth. Does this mean the correlation is useless?

Here’s one way to save it: compare Presidents against themselves. While Clinton and Obama had poor showings in their first midterm elections, their second midterms were much better — and had much better wage growth! Ditto for Nixon, though in reverse: his first midterm was pretty good, and so was real wage growth. Reagan had similarly bland real wage growth rates in both midterms, and had similarly mediocre Congressional losses. Bush did worse in his second midterm — again, you could blame a reverse-9/11 effect, with voters now weary of the global War on Terror, but wage growth was also worse.

What does this all mean for Trump? While we don’t have the full wage growth picture yet, through 18 months it has been pretty mediocre: 0.3%, and falling in recent months due to inflation exceeding wage gains for most of 2026. On social media and among pundits, a lot of people are trying to make comparisons to Biden. “But gas prices were even higher under Biden!”

If Figure 1 is at all useful, it is probably most useful to compare Trump to himself, in his first midterm. Wage growth through November 2018 was about 2.1%: not bad, not great. And he suffered middling Congressional losses. Because wage growth will almost certainly be much worse this time around, we can expect Trump to perform much worse than in his first, 2018 midterm. If Democrats pick up 20 seats in the House and 5 seats in the Senate (current prediction markets suggest about this many), this will put Trump pretty close to the Reagan 1986 point in Figure 1. That feels about right, given recent history, though it wouldn’t be surprising if the Republicans lost even more seats, since that would be a Congressional shift not much different from Trump’s first midterm.

Family Income Continues to Grow in 2025 Data

Yesterday the Census Bureau released their annual treasure trove of data from the Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplement. Loads of new data are now available for 2025 on income, poverty, and health insurance coverage. This new data allows me to update one of my favorite charts, showing the distribution of family income in the U.S. since 1967. Census releases this data by grouping families into nine different income groups, which I have collapsed into three groups, each being as close to one-third of the total as I can get using the publicly available data.

Figure 1

See also a similar chart from Mark Perry which uses household income (rather than family income) over the same time period.

Figure 1 shows that, adjusted for inflation, the proportion of families with income over $150,000 has grown almost seven-fold since 1967. There has been a roughly constant one-third of the population between $75,000 and $150,000, and the ranks of those under $75,000 has been cut in half since 1967. Again, these dollar figures all adjusted for inflation, using the preferred deflator of the Census Bureau.

What’s even more astonishing is when we look at the number of families at various thresholds, rather than just the share, as seen in Figure 2.

Figure 2

In 1967 there were fewer than 3 million families with incomes over $150,000 (in 2025 inflation-adjusted dollars). By 2025, that had grown to over 31 million families. If we look at the highest income threshold in this Census data — over $200,000 — the number of families has grown from just 1 million in 1967 to over 20 million in 2025. And there are fewer lower-income families too: the number of families under $75,000 shrunk, not just as a proportion of the total as seen in Figure 1, but even in absolute terms by almost 3 million families from 1967 to 2025.

Of course, some of these families do have more earners than in 1967, though we shouldn’t overstate that too much. Using other data from Census, we can see that the share of families with multiple earners hasn’t increased much since 1967, and especially hasn’t since the mid-1990s.

Table 1

As seen in Table 1, as far back as 1967 the majority of families in the U.S. had multiple earners. Now it’s true these were not all married couples with both spouses working full-time, and hours of work in the household have risen over time — but not much since the 1990s. This data is somewhat skewed by the aging of the population, as evidenced by the rising number of families with no earners. But even if we drop those families with no earners, multiple-income families haven’t grown much: from 58% of the total in 1967 to 63% in 2025.

Women Have Always Worked, Often in the Formal Labor Force

In a February 2025 blog post, I created a chart showing male and female work patterns both inside and outside the home, going back to 1900. The data was for the United States, and the general trends were more female work in the paid labor force, more male work in the household (rather than paid labor force), but overall total hours of work being roughly constant from 1900 to 2023 (on average, of course).

Despite women always working, 1900 did look a lot different: adult working-age women in the US spent about 50 hours per week working in their own household, and a little under 10 hours per week in the formal paid labor force. Men were almost a mirror image of this (though working a few hours less per week in total).

So the gradual change over the 20th century was a huge shift in gender roles, and by 2023 women on average spent about the same number of hours in household and paid work. But the US is something of an anomaly here. Female labor force participation was higher — in some cases much higher — in other developed countries around 1900. Using data collected by Claudia Olivetti, here are female labor force participation rates for working age women (generally ages 15-64) around 1890-1900 (I average across years if there are multiple estimates):

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