Tradeoffs: Bluesky edition

The reply culture on Bluesky is starting to get nasty. I know this is either ironic or churlish coming from someone who wanted more tension on Bluesky (I swear I just wanted people arguing about research and papers in a fruitful manner). Maybe I am in fact just getting what I asked for (oops). So what exactly can we do about said reaping of cursed sowing?

I don’t have any genious suggestions in the face of a very difficult exercise in tradeoffs. On the one hand we have the status quo of an open forum where we incur the cost of jerks and interlopers poisoning the conversation. On the other hand we could set up barriers to entry around the conversation, turning Bluesky into a very large #EconSky slack channel with hundreds (thousands?) of economists, policy professionals, and journalists engaging in a conversation. This sounds great at first blush, but the idea of finding new and innovative ways to make economics an even more insular club of insiders does not appeal to me. The costs go beyond that, though, because once you decide to wall something off, mechanisms have to be put in place to admit new members (and kick out misbehavers). Those mechanisms come with their own set of problems, including the costs borne by those who must see to the administering and oversight of those mechanisms.

So what’s the answer? I don’t have a silver bullet, but I am a big fan of trivial costs of entry that will only affect those attempting to enter “at scale” i.e. troll farms. Some sort of third party registration using .edu, .gov, and other profession email addresses. Maybe a google scholar or RePec connection. Basically, anything that will take 5 minutes for professionals to accomplish. Just enough that registering 100 accounts becomes costly for troll farms and repeatedly registering banned accounts becomes too much of a hassle for independent anonymous jerks. Such a thing could work for a professionally accredited jerks as well. If getting blocked by 3 people removes you from the register, then you have to go back and do the 5 minute registration over again. A tiny cost, sure, but I suspect a lot of jerks, after being removed 3 times, will simply take the hint or decide they can’t be bothered.

Yes, I know this means that the laws of ironic comeuppance will strike me down on Bluesky at some point, but if it protects the network from turning into Twitter I’ll take the hit.

New evidence on the effects of legal financial obligations

Newly published research from Finlay et al takes the deepest dive yet on how the costs of the criminal justice system impact people’s lives going forward. Leveraging the new (and phenonomenal) integrated data from CJARS, the authors look at 9 (!) separate discontinuous increases in the fines and fees associated with misdemeanor and felony convictions. The paper is exceptionally well executed, connecting criminal and earnings records to estimate a pooled seemingly unrelated regression of those 9 separate treatments. They observe null effects on future convictions, earnings, and living conditions. So does this mean we can soak those convicted for every penny in their pockets without consequence? No, I don’t think so (and I strongly doubt the authors do either). Does it mean that people, such as myself, need to soften their calls to stem the growing tide of law enforcement as local regressive taxation scheme? Maybe in some cases, but I do think additional context matters here. A couple quick comments, in no particular order:

  1. Of the 9 increased fine and fee treatments, 4 are small (≤$65), 5 are large (≥$200). Four of the large increases are explicitly raising the fines and fees of traffic offenses (DUIs). It’s not unfair to summarize the legislated treatments here as mild for those more likely to be in a state of poverty since you have to have access to a car to receive the larger treatments.
  2. There’s always a little bit of a Rorschach test with RD designs, even when the differences are or are not statistically significant. In this case we observe null effects, but it sure seems like something happens with convictions in the first 100 days after reform and then it returns to trend (see below in Panel A). That feels like a system updated the de facto rules to accomodate the new de jure. As for earnings, it’s always tough when slopes change sign (Panels B and C), but the differences aren’t significant.
  3. In the subgroup analysis there are two significant increases in recidivism, most notably a 4.7% increase in recidivism for those in the lowest predicted income quartile. This isn’t an enormous effect, but when it comes to what I consider to be a regressive tax, then focusing on the lowest income quartile isn’t an exercise in p-hacking, it’s to some degree the point of the endeavor. Combine that with the fact that the overweighting of the high magnitude treatments on driving offense can be expected to attenuate the potential effect on treated individuals with low incomes, a 4.7% increase in recidivism doesn’t seem that small anymore.

This is good research, but like most contributions it isn’t the last word. The growing use of fines and fees as revenue sources is a complex and, in many ways, adaptive system that exists to generate revenue for local governments whose revenue apparatuses hamstrung in countless ways, frequently struggling to keep the lights on (whether those lights should necessarily be on is a whole separate question). When they’re looking for that revenue, many (but not all) will arrive at the conclusion that they can only get so much much from poor people. Sometimes, such as with traffic offenses, the poorest individuals that do get caught in this system aren’t necessarily the intended targets, but rather the collateral damage. When we’re looking for that collateral damage, it’s important to know both where that damage is occuring and where it is being mitigated by local adaptation, particularly that which exists outside of the laws as written.

The customer is often wrong

There’s probably nothing more dangerous to an already successful business than giving customers what they say they want. This is not to say you can give customers something they don’t want, quite the opposite in fact. Rather, it’s to never deny the preeminence of revealed preferences.

People want things. They don’t always, however, enjoy how those preferences might be perceived by others (or by themselves). Customizing your consumption to fit the preferences that you would prefer to signal is not a luxury that we can often indulge, however. Basic instrumental needs have to come first. Once a good is already in a household’s portfolio of consumption, however, it is relatively low cost to signal alternative preferencs to peers, surveyers, or focus group organizers. If a producer were to take these signals as earnest, however, they could end up undermining the good already previously purchased and consumed, leading to a business catastrophe. “Trust people’s actions over words” is at least a cliche, if not an outright proverb. I’ll leave it to you to find its most archaic analogue.

I’ve been thinking about this a lot, and no, not in the context of political polling and the recent election, though I will grant the relevance. I’ve been thinking about it more when watching sports and consuming the news.

Soccer in the top leagues, particularly the English Premiere League (currently the best in the world) is in year 5 of a growing injury crisis. Most seasons the winner can be predicted based on total salary outlays. Not because of superior top line talent, however, but because they can afford 11 second string players of top quality to play when the starters are inevitably injured. This is largely because of a tragedy of the commons in international soccer, but it’s been massively exacerbated because the EPL responded to the perceived request from consumers that the sport become “more physical”. This amorphous physicality has been granted in the form of more lenient refereeing. The result of this has not been to increase the “fight in the game”, but to grant less talented players greater license in kicking and sliding through the legs of more talented players. I don’t know the full economics of modern sports, but I’m pretty sure fans don’t pay large ticket prices to see the best players in the world on the sidelines in high-end athleisure wear draped discreetly over a walking boot.

As for the news, I see a related, but not identical phenomena. Being a GenX-er, I spent a lot of time in heavy conversation during college bemoaning the impact of advertisers on media content. The “news as propaganda” bit is not a new concept, I assure you. What very, very few us would have guessed, however, is that Craigslist destroying the ad revenue of newspapers and the internet walking off with the customer base most interested in news as information source would lead television program producers untethered to the desires of their advertising sponsors, leaving them to create bespoke content for their new overlords: the consumer. As it turns out, what the remaining subset of customers most wants isn’t information or insight, it’s reaffirmation. We wanted advertisers out of content, but it turns out you got better news when the true customers were corporate overlords hawking sugar water and baggy clothes. People signaled that they wanted deep reporting, uncompromised integrity, and uncomfortable truths. And hey, more people than ever subscribe to The Economist. But it turns out most people just wanted confirmation bias.

Sure, by clicking on the link to this post you’ve signaled to me that you want a depth of insight you just can’t get anywhere on the internet. But I, enwisened scribe, know that what you really want is cliched aphorisms.

Be careful what you wish for.

Working through work from home

A recent conversation with Sadhika Bagga and her research on labor reallocation got me thinking about remote work, about which there is no shortage of forecasts and opinions. Working from home has taken off. Working from home is failing. Working from home is here to stay. Working from home is already over.

Can they all be true? No, but also yes. At least, that’s where my thinking is at the moment. What all of the preceding pieces seem to do is acknowledge the benefits and costs of remote work while also emphasizing any one particular cost or benefit that generates their preferred lede.

Remote workforces bring lower labor efficiency (e.g. more distractions, less monitoring, more shirking) and greater labor flexibility (e.g. larger labor pools to select from, faster labor turnover) to a firm or industry. It gives firms the ability to pay employees in something other than money, such as schedule flexibility and locational choice, capturing some of the rents from those compensating wage differentials for themselves in the form of lower labor costs. It also means firing and hiring people with greater efficiency and lower costs when each subsequent wave of technological obsolescence hits, more effectively curating your labor force to fit the newest technological opportunities and needs.

How this story plays out will be bespoke to every firm, industry, and sector, but one broad trend I’m looking for is how industries separate by technological turnover. Industries differentiate by the historical rate of technological upheaval. Construction is different today than it was 25 years ago, but that amount of change is almost trivial compared to the televison entertainment industry. I expect that firms industries that reward “nimbleness” in the adoption of and adaption to new technologies will embrace work from home in far greater numbers. This will, in turn, shrink the “periodicity” of industry business cycles. Industires with high remote work labor forces will both more quickly collapse to a dominant set of firms when excludable technology gives them and advantage. They will also, however, more quickly reinflate to a more competitive landscape from new firm entry enter as remote work allows rivals to rapidly update their labor force to match the newest technological landscape. I expect applied micro work on remote work preferences and theoretic work on the consequences of search costs for competition to find each other atop the empire state building and yield the kind of policy recommendations that would make Nora Ephron proud.

This is just one of many broad trends to look for as remote work evolves. The complexity of interacting forces makes forecasting both a fool’s errand and palm reading. All of the forecasts will be internally logical, collectively incompatible, partially correct, and completely wrong.

Don’t overthink it

If you’re trying to understand the US election outcome, this is the only graph you need:

I’m not saying “anti-incumbency” is everything. There are a lot of forces wrapped up within this graph. My unnuanced take is that that the pandemic hens came home to roost for incumbent parties. Every single bundle of pandemic policies, from the heaviest handed to the most laissez-faire, were characterized by inevitable trade-offs. People don’t like tradeoffs regardless of whether the bill is paid with a year of doubled fatalities, two years of tripled unemployment, or three years of quadrupled inflation. And that’s why I think incumbent parties, be it US Democrats or UK Tories, lost significant ground. If you want to parse it farther, you could argue US Republicans should be disappointed they didn’t win more given how well opposition parties performed elsewhere.

None of that will change the Take Economy, of course. Thousands of pundits, published or barstool, are all describing in exquisite detail exactly the manner in which this election is a referendum on how the Democrats handled exactly the issue they personally happen to care the most about. It doesn’t mean any one of their opinions is narrowly wrong. I’m sure there was a more perfect campaign to be run, if only because there always is and was.

National politics is rarely a referendum and it’s never just the will of the people. It’s a chaotic system. It’s the weather. We forecast the weather. We makes plans. We accomodate, mitigate, and celebrate. And yes, sometimes we just try to survive it. But we can’t control it.

It’s chaos, be kind.

Democracy is hard to forecast

Voting costs time and attention, arguably the only resources everyone is short on. The compensation is implicit, ephemeral, and uncertain. Never make the mistake of thinking you can predict exactly how much other people will behave when the price is subjective and wrapped in uncertainty.

A democracy is an endless cascade of institutions designed to pick winners. Those winners are themselves a product of the rules as much, if not more, than the preferences of voters. Rules will inevitably be gamed, sometimes in manners that seem unfair at best, antithetical to the ambitions of democracy at their worst. A good rule of thumb, however, is that the more unfair an outcome seems, the more fragile it is. A minority party that has gerrymandered voting districts to the hilt might have disproportionate power one day, but they are exactly one exogenous shock away from a electoral cascade event. Any political party is never more than one election away from the dustbin of history.

Polling is increasingly challenging and it’s hard not to feel like they are always fighting the last war. How do you find out what people want in a world where, as previously mentioned, time and attention are scarce? How do you poll people who won’t answer the phone and, even worse, those who do answer phone are decidedly different from those who do? Same thing for people on Facebook. Same thing for people at the mall. Same thing for anyone who uses one tool or media instead of another. It’s never been easier to learn about an exact subset of people, while never harder to learn about everyone.

The electoral college is an extremely dumb peculiar institution. Tuesday could be a tie or a two point differential, but the most likely outcome is a roughly 80 point blowout. The catch being that the blowout could go either way.

I voted (early) for Harris/Walz. I hope they win, but not sure I can say much else for sure. Democracy is hard.

What if they’re listening?

It’s spooky season and I just received perhaps the spookiest of student emails. We all know that students never read the syllabus, only want to know what’s on the exam, and can’t be bothered to pay attention. But, and hear me out…what if they are listening?

I got this email yesterday. It might be my favorite student email ever, even if it is direct evidence that my stream of consciousness while lecturing, from the students’ perspectives, must border on surreal at times. I don’t know that much of it is actually funny, but it’s interesting to see what actually sticks in a student’s mind. Notes in curly brackets { } are edits and additions from me, with a few small redactions to ensure the anonymity of the student:


From: {NAME REDACTED}

Halloween is the time to celebrate the spooky things in life, and what is scarier than being perceived? I have taken it upon myself to write down some of the silly things you say in class throughout the month of October to celebrate the scariest time of the year. I have compiled them all here and I think you should be proud of your wit. I think they are funnier without context, so in the spirit of politics, I will be leaving it out. 

“I’m just a decomposing corpse here on stage.”

“The good thing about a recession is it’s not a vibes-based measure.”

“[Imagine] You’re wearing a suit, mens or pant….”

“We’re not making assumptions about shapes… yet.”

“Can you imagine the ad campaigns for the eight year old vote?!”

“[In reference to Jesse Ventura, one might even imagine little hearts scribbled in the margins] He’s perfect” {Note: This was not said in admiration of his politics, but rather his existence as Jesse Ventura}

“{Irrelevant 3rd party candidate} is the antichrist, that’s all I know. They kicked my dog and I want to throw them into the 4th layer of hell.” 

(with the most deadpan tone and expression) “Yippee, we’re fine, we’re free, we’re great.”

“There’s crooks, and then there’s crooks”

“What I’m saying is, we’re all becoming monsters.” (very on theme to be honest)

“I cannot tell the difference between parody and reality.” (uh oh)

“White gets 1, grey gets 0, and professor Makowsky goes into a quiet rage.” 

“Get an amish pretzel with amish butter on it, ya know. Love yourself.”

“Stay away from the swamps, there’s luggage there that wants to eat you.”

At the moment (updated 10/22/24)

I am part of the exodus from Twitter to Bluesky. I still maintain my Twitter account, but do not post there. I do, however, still scroll both of my feeds on occasion. I am more optimistic for the future of Bluesky for a variety of reasons, not least of which is simply that it is improving with each week. The mechanics are excellent, there is far less garbage/noise/bots, and I never feel like I am party to anything with nefarious ambitions in the long or short run. There is a problem though.

It’s still kind of… boring. The echo chamber feeling at Bluesky is stronger, born almost exclusively of the selection effects of first and second movers from Twitter. I am rarely surprised on Bluesky, I never feel terribly challenged in an exciting way, unless you count the more frequent posting of squishy academic policy affirmations. There’s plenty of (warranted) election anxiety, but there’s no oppositional forces. There’s no tension.

Which is not to say Twitter is providing any of that in spades. Quite to the contrary, it’s a shell of its former self. The heaviest posters with the biggest followings have found plenty of reasons to stay, but for every big follower account, there were hundreds of medium sized accounts that pushed and pulled the conversation in interesting directions, providing both traction and the occasional surprise. A large share of medium accounts have abandoned ship, some moving to Bluesky, but far more have just dropped out of the medium entirely (apologies for the homonyms). There are interesting people left on Twitter, but they are inundated with bots, trolls, and milquetoast careerists only hanging around because they fell ass backwards into a couple thousand followers and feel too capital committed to move elsewhere. A once rich and diverse intellectual stew has been watered down into a thin broth of increasingly questionable nutritional value. And like a lot of spicy foods, I know I used to complain about the heat while I was eating it, but damned if I don’t miss it all the same.

Bluesky has passed the proof of concept. It works. It has value. Now we just need that final cohort to make the leap and bring the heat.

UPDATE ADDENDUM (10/22/24)

So THAT happened. Most people who are going to read it have already read it, but I did want to add two notes for future reference, both of which I tacked onto bluesky threads.

  1. What I actually miss is the policy/econ/metrics nerds having esoteric discussion full of rivalry and verve. Yes, it was parallel to all kinds of trash, but it was sufficiently insulated. I have quite purposely come to Bluesky because Twitter is now full of nazis, bots, and nazi bots. I promise I don’t miss the nazis
  2. I’ll admit I didn’t expect the word “tension” to get parsed as “negative approbation” , trauma, horrific violence, or hate. I could blame this on the internet, but this is my fault. I’ve been around long enough I should have know better. There is a reason why I tend to write things that come off pre-emptively defensive or as if they are equivocating. I try to prevent misinterpretation, willful or earnest, of my words. I should have done a better job here.
  3. People are rightfully protective of Bluesky as a space separate from Twitter. That said, there are definitely a lot of trolls and bots already in place trying to turning any discourse into a hatefest.

Apropos of everything

Robert Nozick and John Rawls were intellectual rivals, friendly colleagues, and even members of the same reading group. Their conversations, at least the ones we were privy to through their iterations of published work, were dedicated to reconciling the role of the state in manifesting the best possible world. Nozick, it can be said in a gratuituous oversimplification, favored a minimal government while Rawls, similarly oversimplified, favored a larger, wider reaching set of government institutions. Both were well aware of the risks and rewards of concentrating power within government institutions, they simply arrived at different conclusions based on risks each wanted to minimize versus those they were willing to incur.

My mental model of the evolution of government (influenced heavily by Nozick and refined towards the end by Rawls) goes something like this:

  1. 100,000 years ago roving bands of humans grow to thrive in their environment by solving collective action problems, largely through familial relations. Larger groups have more success hunting, foraging, and protecting themselves from predators.
  2. Eventually some groups get so good at collective action that they begin to prey on other smaller groups. These “bandits” gain more through resources taken by force than they would strictly producing resources through hunting and foraging.
  3. This creates an arms race in group size, with bigger groups having the advantage while facing the diminishing marginal returns imposed by difficultings in maintaining the integrity of collective action in the face of individual incentives to free ride i.e. its hard to get people to pull their weight when their parents aren’t watching.
  4. Some groups mitigate these difficulties, growing larger still. At some threshold of group size, the rewards to mobilitity are overtaken by the rewards to maintaining institutions and resources (freshwater, shelter, opportunities for agriculture), leading to stationary groups.
  5. These stationary groups begin to act as “stationary bandits”, extracting resources from both outsiders for the benefit of their group and from their members for the benefit of their highest status members.
  6. Differing institutions evolve across groups, varying the actions prescribed and proscribed for leaders, members (citizens), and non-members. Some groups are highly restrictive, others less so. Some groups are more extractive, funneling resources to a select minority. Some groups redistribute more , others less.
  7. Democracy evolves specifically as an institution to replace hereditary lines, a deviation from the familial lines that sat the origin of the state all the way back at step 1. Its correlation with other institutions is less certain, though it does seem to move hand-in-hand with personal property rights and market-based economies. Democracies begin to differentiate themselves based on the internal, subsidiary institutions they favor and instantiate.

A lot of my political leanings can be found not in favoring Nozick or Rawls, but in the risk immediately preceding their point of divergence. When I look at well-functioning modern democracies, I see an exception to the historical rule. I see thousands of years of stationary bandits voraciously extracting resources while high status members taking desperate action to maintain power in a world where property rights are weak and collective action is tenuous. Rawls saw a growing state as a opportunity to create justice through fairer, more equitable outcomes. Nozick saw a growing state as a further concentration of power that, no matter how potentially benevolent today, would eventually attract the most selfish and venial, leading to corruption and return to the purest stationary bandit, only now with the newfound scale.

Both strike as me as perfectly reasonable concerns about very real risks. Which do I believe the greater risk? Depends on the news and what I had for breakfast that day. In the current political context, both in the US and several other democracies, I am of the growing opinion they would be in broad agreement that the biggest risk is not the perversion of democracy from suboptimal policies and subsidiary institutions (step 7), but rather a disastrous reversion to the pre-democratic institutions (step 6).

The most underrated aspect of democracy may very well be its fragility. While historical rarity may not be undeniable evidence of inherent fragility, but it would certainly suggest that once achieved it is worth the overwhelming dedication of resources, including the sacrifice of welfare optimality, to ensure its perserverance.

It cost a lot to get here. A lot. Sacrifices that are hard to even conceive of, let alone empathize with, while living within the profound luxury of modern life. I have no doubt that many of us will find ourselves underwhelmed with the policy platforms of the full menu of viable candidates made available to voters at every level of national and local office in a few weeks. So take this little scribbling for exactly what it is: an argument to vote against candidates that reduce the probability of our constitutional republic remaining intact. By comparison, all the other differences add up to a historical rounding error.

It won’t be liberals that kill the Cybertruck

The rise of large pickup trucks and SUVs in the US is generally tied to the implicit subsidy borne of their exemption from Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards. The seemingly ever-growing scale of these vehicles has produced a perfect example of negative externalities in the form of increased risk to other drivers, cyclists, and pedestrians (yes, a pedestrian is in danger from any vehicle, but the decreased maneuverability from greater carriage remains relevant).

This particular negative externality is not wholly uninternalized by large truck drivers, however. They pay higher premiums to the insurance companies that must cover the payouts to negligent and catastrophic loss of life when their customers are found at fault in collisions. Without the internalizing of these externalities through civil cases, trucks would likely be even larger and more dangerous.

Which brings me to the Cybertruck. I don’t care for it as a vehicle for a variety of reasons, but I similarly don’t care for Lamborghinis. My tastes are irrelevant. What is relevant is that it is made out of 30-times cold-rolled steel, a design choice I believe reflects its ambition to appeal as a sort of post-apocalyptic survivor’s vehicle that can literally physically dominate other vehicles.

This is likely to be a very, very expensive choice.

It will probably take a while for the insurance market to internalize the externality, but as the number of Cybertrucks on the street increase, so will the number of collisions and, in turn, fatalities. Fatal accidents are high variance, high cost events that loom large in the vision of insurers. The actuaries will crunch the numbers and premiums will increase. And not just because of short term increases in fatalities. Insurance companies are in the forecasting business as well. If they anticipate that courts may respond to a vehicle whose makeup makes it a disproportionate threat to others on the road by tilting the scales of fault towards their drivers, then its entirely possible that there remains no feasible premium that remains profitable. There’s a reason Jackie Chan can’t get life insurance.

What happens when a $90k, 6,800 pound steel battering ram requires that it’s drivers be self-insured? What happens in states that don’t allow drivers to self-insure? Even if there remains a small number of companies that offer “exotic” vehicle insurance, the premiums will turn push prospective ownership further up the demand curve, turning the Cybertruck into the kind of road oddity you see every few years. I have seen a Lotus Exos exactly once.

It won’t be liberals that kill the Cybertruck. Hell, if they manage to repeal the CAFE exemption it’ll be the single biggest boost a giant EV truck could hope for. No, it’s going to be the market that kills the Cybertruck.