Canadians are blocking a bridge. For Americans who like to engage in stereotypes about Canadians, this is inexplicable (even though the practice of blocking things in Canada is not new by any means). However, for me as an economist, it is entirely explicable.

Consider what vaccine mandates/passports (which is what initiated the current mayhem) do in pure economics terms: they raise costs for the unvaccinated. They do not alter the benefit of being vaccinated. All they do is raise costs. People could be more or less inelastic to this cost, but the fact that many are willing to spend time and resources (fuel, wear and tear of trucks etc.) to prevent such policies from continuing suggest that their behavior is not perfectly inelastic.

How elastic is it then? Well, we can see that by looking at what happens when we alter the benefit of being vaccinated. This is the case with vaccine lotteries. The “extra” benefits associated with a lottery is that the unvaccinated obtains the value of the vaccine plus the expected value (i.e. the probability) of winning a particular prize. One recent paper in Economics Letters finds that for $55, you can convince an extra person to be vaccinated. That is basically the cost of administering a lottery plus the prizes themselves. That is a relatively cheap way to increase the benefit for the unvaccinated in order to have them change their mind. Another paper, in the American Journal of Health Economics, finds a similar results by concentrating on the Ohio vaccine lottery. The difference is that the amount is $75 instead of $55. Still, pretty cheap for an extra vaccinated person and the generally high social benefit of a vaccine in terms of avoided costs of infections/hospitalizations/deaths.

Thus, we can say that behavior is quite elastic. But this is where the rub comes. When you raise the benefits in this case, the story is over. There is nothing else that happens after that. When you raise the costs, people might resist and adopt other measures to avoid the costs. This includes blocking bridges on the US-Canada border. And what is the social cost of that attempt at avoiding the cost of the coercive private-cost-increasing policy? Pretty high. Probably higher than the cost of a lottery system or other voluntary programs that play with the marginal private benefit of being vaccinated.

The point I am trying to get across to you is quite simple: persuasion works because it essentially increases the perception of benefits from doing X or Y activity. Coercion is impose a private cost of not doing X or Y with the potential downside that people respond in ways that create socially detrimental outcomes. Yup, coercion isn’t cheap.

This tweet first reads as snarky, then insightful, but give it a few seconds and you’ll realize it’s pointing out a real problem.

There are many reasons why an industry can become concentrated within a narrow geographic region. Externally generated increasing returns to scale i.e. a firm becomes more productive simply by being near other firms producing the same thing, is an observation that goes all the way back to Alfred Marshall. That’s the story of Hollywood and Silicon Valley, not to mention a million other micro-industries. The story of journalism, however, is different, because it is not the capital or labor market opportunities, but specifically the labor itself that is concentrated in a narrow location. The “Writer living in Brooklyn” Twitter/LinkedIn/Muckrack bio is a cliche at this point for a reason. But why are they all in Brooklyn? And why do I get the sense that I can summarize at least half of them as White children of the upper-middle class who paid full-freight for an English-adjacent degree from an expensive liberal arts college?

Wages in journalism have gone to hell while, at the same time, there has emerged an extreme upper tail whose public standing achieved escape velocity, allowing them to go independent via Substack and earn vastly higher incomes. These diverging trends have their origin in the same phenomenon: the skyrocketing potential of any one journalist to reach the masses. The power law scale of social networks means every article, post, or tweet has a chance of going viral, and with it the chance to reach tens of millions of eyeballs. Put another way, its gotten easier to reach people, but harder to get paid to reach people.

There is a status that comes with strangers knowing who you are, what you wrote, what your core ideas are. It is also a status that disproportionately recognizes itself. When prominent writers hang out with each other, recognizing the ideas that each carries and communicates to large numbers of people, they reinforce the status that comes with that reach. I’m getting out over my psychological skis a bit here, but I’m willing to wager it feels good, in a way not dissimilar to my research being recognized by my academic peers. With less risk to going beyond my own expertise, I’m willing to argue that the reach, imprint, pageviews, and followers; the eyeballs that your work generates, is the prinicipal source of status within the modern journalist community.

The problem isn’t that writing generates status, but rather that this status is grossly out of proportion to the wages they are earning in the market. Amongst other problems, this selects for people who value status over wages (often because they are independently financially secure). In this light it’s not surprising the community has become so geographically concentrated – there are enormous rewards to living with the people that most recognize and grant this status. This is not unto itself a problem until that concentration is part of greater demand for what is already some of the most expensive real estate in the world. I’d wager there are more than a few writers with non-trivial followings out there whose Brooklyn lifestyle is a net monetary loss every month. Thats bad, but honestly I think its even worse than it sounds.

1. Status skews even less equally than income

I’m tempted to say that status is a zero-sum game, but that’s not really true. A field or industry can grow in status as a whole, making all its members better off. The distribution of status, however, will tend to be even more skewed than the famously unequal distribution of income, an attribute likely to be all the more acutely observed in a field where attention begets attention – see Exhibit A, the power law distribution of retweets. If you think wage inequality puts people in a frothy rage of perceived unfairness, wait until a group of Brooklynites three drinks deep find out the friend they always hated got retweeted by Drake.

2. Status can’t pay the rent

Unlike wages, status is extremely difficult to directly exchange for goods and services. You need an intermediary, such as a person desperate to market their latest brand of protein powder or neo-fascist authoritarianism, who will pay you for access to your status.

3. Twenty-two year-olds will often accept status in lieu of wages

Makowsky’s law of career planning: never bet your entire future on doing something other people will happily do for free. If you’re curious why unionization has taken the journalism world by storm the last few years, you don’t have to look to politics or in-group signaling for an explanation, basic economics will get you all the way there. If you have an industry where amateurs can provide you the inputs you need at 60% of the quality level as professionals, but for 10% of the costs, the incumbent professionals in your labor force are going to have it rough. If those incumbents can close the shop via unionization and raise the mininmum wages within the profession, the balance will tip back to skilled professionals. You reduce quantity of labor supplied and end up with higher equilibrium wages for those who manage to get their foot in the door. Of course, this will only heighten the favoring of those who can get their foot in the $3200/mo Brooklyn rent door while dressing fashionably and using “semiotics” correctly in a sentence, but that’s neither here nor there.

4. Status rewards lead to homogeneity

Status rewards incentivize geographic concentration, which will in turn intensify herding behavior. If the bulk of your compensation is in-group status, you’re going to want to spend as much time with that group as possible. Your social life will become more important than ever. That also means, however, that anything that might risk disdain or ostracism within the group is to be avoided whenever possible. Opinions, particularly on subjects that don’t directly impact your life, will tend to become more and more homogeneous over time. It also means hypotheses born of motivated reasoning i.e. the next mayor will be super progressive or want to “defund the police” can acquire a life of their own and quickly evolve from idea spoken aloud in a Brooklyn cocktail bar to universally accepted truth within an insular community. This classic herding phenomenon is relevant to the broader world because this particular community spends its working hours delivering the news to us.

5. Homogeneity creates rewards to heresy

Even if you can survive off status and a monthly check from your parents at twenty-two, the same can rarely be said at forty-two. The mortgage needs to be paid, the kid needs braces, and you need to start putting away some money every month so you can die somewhere warm. The only thing you know how to do at a professional level is write, but you can’t find a way to get people to pay you well for what you’ve been writing.

Solution: write something that people will pay you for.

You need to find something that is undersupplied relative to demand. The answer lies in the very same homogeneity being created in your old neighborhood. You want to get paid: move to cheap suburb of a medium sized city and start writing heresy, the more inflammatory the better. Accusations of politicians and celebrities. Cheap pablum for frothing basement trolls and listicles of reasons never to let your kids leave the house. Election conspiracy theories and a new expose on why red wine and chocolate will cure Covid. Corporate public relations expressing the deepest committment of the NFL to protect everyone and only good from here on out. Anything that someone is willing to pay you to write because nobody else will write it for free.

So yeah, a bunch of writers live in Brooklyn and they are currently a hilariously homogeneous monolith of progressive cosplay, often producing little in the way of insight or information, surviving emotionally off the status returns of living in a bubble of mutual-affirmation and shared anxiety. It’d all be pretty innocuous if I didn’t worry that today’s progressive writer’s commune is also a breeding ground for tomorrows purveyors of reactionary fearmongering and misinformation.

I was listening to an episode of Planet Money and, as one does, thought of a completely brand new and in no way derivative idea that would make many billions of dollars for myself and my future investors. It was a very exciting drive home. Of course, the prospects and originality of idea did not survive first contact with Google.

The episode in question, “Of Boxes and Boats” was characteristically delightful and informative. TL;DR: the supply chain is a disaster, ports are backed up, and the US is experiencing an especially acute shortage of warehouse space. A moment that especially caught my attention was warehouse manager expressing that there was, in fact, empty space in his warehouse, but that the firm currently leasing that space wasn’t using it, and the warehouse had no means of offering that space to another client.

That’s interesting. That’s a resource that, in the moment, is suboptimally allocated, even if only for the hour, day, or week. That’s an arbitrage opportunity. In fact, this is exactly what AirBnB did: found real estate that was more valuable to potential short-term renters than current lease holders that could be temporarily exchanged between parties, and as a facilitator for that exchange AirBnB could take a cut. Someone needs to make Warehouse AirBnB! I’m a genius.

No, I’m not.

Meet “The Airbnb of Warehouse Space”

Sigh. I wasn’t even first to the incredibly obvious one-line sales pitch. But my fanciful dreams of buying an English (or at least Belgian) soccer team asside, I honestly can’t decide if I should feel better or worse knowing this idea is already out there. On the one hand, it’s good to be reminded how dynamic and responsive entrpreneurs are in identifying problems and offering solutions.

On the other hand, the supply chain is still very much a mess, warehouses are still out of useable space, and I see no evidence that there is in fact a rich secondary market in warehouse space allocations. Clearly something is getting in the way of the market responding. Is the market over-regulated? The Department of Homeland Security apparently makes entry into the shipping and warehouse business pretty costly. Maybe it’s under-regulated? Perhaps firms are squatting on warehouse space rather than sell it to potential long-term competitors. Maybe the intermediaries, real and hypothesized, are so inefficient that their additional costs as a middlemen are prohibitive. Maybe it’s <Insert Politician You Don’t Like Here>‘s fault. That idiot screwed up everything they touched.

The fact remains though that the idea itself was not the limiting factor, and I suspect it rarely is. I thought of it in ten seconds after listening to a podcast. For the people working in such a field, they probably come up with similar ideas daily. No, the limiting factor isn’t inspiration, or likely even perspiration. It’s being able to identify a path from idea to execution. A path that includes sufficient time, energy, capital, and personnel to make it happen. It’s about resources and risk. All of which is obvious. I’m pretty sure the “It’s About Resources and Risk” banner and bunting gets used more than “Happy Birthday” at your modal MBA program.

But it’s good to be reminded of the obvious every now and then. There are great ideas everywhere. When we’re thinking about any prospective policy regarding an issue we care about, it never hurts to think about whether it will be an aid or hindrance to others when they’re trying to solve the problems upstream and downstream from yours. Sometimes the best idea is to just stay out of the way.

My home province of Quebec in Canada has been under lockdown since the Holidays (again). At 393 days of lockdown since March 11th 2020, Quebec has been in lockdown longer than Italy, Australia and California (areas that come as examples of strong lockdown measures). Public health scientists admit that the Omicron variant is less dangerous. But the issue is not the health danger, but rather the concern that rising hospitalizations will cause an overwhelming of an exhausted health sector.

And to be sure, when one looks at the data on hospital bed capacity and use-rates, you find that the intensity of lockdowns is well-related to hospital capacity. Indeed, Quebec is a strong illustration of this as its public health care system has one of the lowest levels of hospital capacity in the group of countries with similar income-levels. The question then that pops to my mind is “how elastic is the supply of hospital/medical services?”.

In places like my native Quebec, where health care services are largely operated and financed by the government, the answer is “not much”. This is not surprising given that the capacity is determined bureaucratically by the provincial government according to its constraints. And with bureaucratic control comes well-known rigidities and difficulties in responding to changes in demand. But that does not go very far in answering the question. Indeed, the private sector supply could also be quite inelastic.

A few months ago, I came across this working paper by Ghosh, Choudhury and Plemmons on the topic of certificate-of-needs (CON) laws. CON-laws essentially restrict entry into the market for hospital beds by allowing incumbent firms to have a say in determining who has a right to enter a given geographical segment of the market. The object of interest of Ghosh et al. was to determine the effect of CON-laws on early COVID outbreak outcomes. They found that states without such laws performed better than states with such laws (on both non-COVID and COVID mortalities). That is interesting because it tells us the effect of a small variation in the legal ability of private firms to respond to changes in market conditions. Eliminating legal inability to respond to changes leaves us with normal difficulties firms face (e.g. scarce skilled workers such as nurses, time-to-build delays etc.).

But what is more telling in the paper is that Ghosh et al. studied the effect of states with CON-laws that eased those laws because of COVID. This is particularly interesting because it unveils how fast previously regulated firms can start acting like deregulated firms. They find similar results (i.e. fewer deaths from COVID and non-COVID sources).

Are there other works? I found a few extra ones such as this one in the Journal of Risk and Financial Management that find that hospitals were less overcrowded in states without CON-laws. Another one, in the Journal of General Internal Medicine finds that states with CON-laws tended to have more overcrowded installations — notably nursing homes — which meant higher rates of COVID transmission in-hospital.

All of these, taken together, suggest to me that hospital capacity is not as fixed as we think of. Hospitals are capable of adjusting on a great number of margins to increase capacity in the face of adverse exogenous shocks. That is if there are profit-motives tied behind it — which is not the case in my home country of Quebec.

As we noted in September, natural gas prices are sky-high in Europe. Coal-burning power plants have been shut down and the windmills have not spun as fast as expected, which led to a drawdown of European natural gas stocks for electric power generation. The Russians are not sending as much gas as hoped through their pipelines, so Europe is scratching around for (very, very expensive) liquified natural gas to be shipped by ship from the U.S. and the Middle East.

As noted, this hurts European economies in various ways. Fertilizer plants and aluminum smelters have shut down because of too-costly natural gas feedstock, consumers are paying much more in utility bills, and some governments are going deeper into deficit by paying subsidies to partially cushion consumers. This energy shortage also makes Europe very vulnerable to Russia, at a time when Putin is menacing Ukraine with invasion.

France derives about 70% of its electricity from nuclear energy. Due to its low cost of generation, France is the world’s largest net exporter of electricity, earning over €3 billion per year from this. China and other countries are ramping up nuclear. (The U.S. is sadly dysfunctional when it comes to building nukes; we can’t seem to do anything without years of delay and billions in cost overruns).

Like nearly everything in Germany, the German nuclear power plants are well-run. They have never had a serious incident. Nuclear power plants pump out gobs of electric power with essentially no CO2 emission.  If you think that green advocates in Germany would therefore desire to keep these plants running, you would think wrong. Such is the loathing for nuclear power that Germany is shutting them down. Every single one. Katja Hoyer writes:

Just before midnight on Dec. 31, Germany switched off three more of its nuclear power plants [including one in Grohnde]. Once it had 17; now only three are left, and they too will be shut down at the end of the year. Soon Germany will produce no nuclear energy at all. But the activists were wrong to celebrate. Germany’s hasty nuclear retreat is neither safe nor green. It’s a disastrous mistake that will have ramifications well beyond the country’s own borders.

The Grohnde plant is a perfect example of what Germany is giving up. It was one of the most productive nuclear power plants in the world. It provided enough electricity to cover 15 percent of Lower Saxony’s annual energy needs single-handedly, saving 10 million tons of carbon dioxide emissions a year in the process. The site even made headlines in February 2021 for producing more electricity than any other nuclear power plant in the world. Now it will have to be dismantled at a cost of around 1 billion euros.

The loss of these nukes puts further strain on the European-wide grid. The irony of shutting these plants down and therefore buying more power from other countries generated by nuclear power and by burning more gas and coal seems to be lost on the Germans. Their plan to mitigate the effects of calm winds is to build even more windmills, even if that requires deforesting vast tracts of woodland.

Let Them Eat Porridge

The U.K. utility Ovo, which prides itself on providing all-renewable power, sent customers a link with advice for keeping warm whilst turning down their thermostats this winter. These suggestions included cuddling your pets, eating hot porridge, cleaning the house, having a hula hoop contest, doing star jumps (jumping jacks), and leaving the oven open after you are done baking. I leave to your imagination how this advice was received by the British public. In lieu of affordable electricity, the utility company E.ON which shut down one those German nuclear power plants sent out 30,000 pairs of socks to encourage people to get by with less power and heat.

You couldn’t make this stuff up.