Did you really think I was going to write a post this week? Sorry, this week is for far flung family and nutritionally disastrous cookies.

If you simply must have an economic observation, here you go: if you don’t gain weight during the holidays you’re probably too debt averse. Consume now, pay later. It’s worth the vig.

The reply culture on Bluesky is starting to get nasty. I know this is either ironic or churlish coming from someone who wanted more tension on Bluesky (I swear I just wanted people arguing about research and papers in a fruitful manner). Maybe I am in fact just getting what I asked for (oops). So what exactly can we do about said reaping of cursed sowing?

I don’t have any genious suggestions in the face of a very difficult exercise in tradeoffs. On the one hand we have the status quo of an open forum where we incur the cost of jerks and interlopers poisoning the conversation. On the other hand we could set up barriers to entry around the conversation, turning Bluesky into a very large #EconSky slack channel with hundreds (thousands?) of economists, policy professionals, and journalists engaging in a conversation. This sounds great at first blush, but the idea of finding new and innovative ways to make economics an even more insular club of insiders does not appeal to me. The costs go beyond that, though, because once you decide to wall something off, mechanisms have to be put in place to admit new members (and kick out misbehavers). Those mechanisms come with their own set of problems, including the costs borne by those who must see to the administering and oversight of those mechanisms.

So what’s the answer? I don’t have a silver bullet, but I am a big fan of trivial costs of entry that will only affect those attempting to enter “at scale” i.e. troll farms. Some sort of third party registration using .edu, .gov, and other profession email addresses. Maybe a google scholar or RePec connection. Basically, anything that will take 5 minutes for professionals to accomplish. Just enough that registering 100 accounts becomes costly for troll farms and repeatedly registering banned accounts becomes too much of a hassle for independent anonymous jerks. Such a thing could work for a professionally accredited jerks as well. If getting blocked by 3 people removes you from the register, then you have to go back and do the 5 minute registration over again. A tiny cost, sure, but I suspect a lot of jerks, after being removed 3 times, will simply take the hint or decide they can’t be bothered.

Yes, I know this means that the laws of ironic comeuppance will strike me down on Bluesky at some point, but if it protects the network from turning into Twitter I’ll take the hit.

Newly published research from Finlay et al takes the deepest dive yet on how the costs of the criminal justice system impact people’s lives going forward. Leveraging the new (and phenonomenal) integrated data from CJARS, the authors look at 9 (!) separate discontinuous increases in the fines and fees associated with misdemeanor and felony convictions. The paper is exceptionally well executed, connecting criminal and earnings records to estimate a pooled seemingly unrelated regression of those 9 separate treatments. They observe null effects on future convictions, earnings, and living conditions. So does this mean we can soak those convicted for every penny in their pockets without consequence? No, I don’t think so (and I strongly doubt the authors do either). Does it mean that people, such as myself, need to soften their calls to stem the growing tide of law enforcement as local regressive taxation scheme? Maybe in some cases, but I do think additional context matters here. A couple quick comments, in no particular order:

1. Of the 9 increased fine and fee treatments, 4 are small (≤$65), 5 are large (≥$200). Four of the large increases are explicitly raising the fines and fees of traffic offenses (DUIs). It’s not unfair to summarize the legislated treatments here as mild for those more likely to be in a state of poverty since you have to have access to a car to receive the larger treatments.
2. There’s always a little bit of a Rorschach test with RD designs, even when the differences are or are not statistically significant. In this case we observe null effects, but it sure seems like something happens with convictions in the first 100 days after reform and then it returns to trend (see below in Panel A). That feels like a system updated the de facto rules to accomodate the new de jure. As for earnings, it’s always tough when slopes change sign (Panels B and C), but the differences aren’t significant.
3. In the subgroup analysis there are two significant increases in recidivism, most notably a 4.7% increase in recidivism for those in the lowest predicted income quartile. This isn’t an enormous effect, but when it comes to what I consider to be a regressive tax, then focusing on the lowest income quartile isn’t an exercise in p-hacking, it’s to some degree the point of the endeavor. Combine that with the fact that the overweighting of the high magnitude treatments on driving offense can be expected to attenuate the potential effect on treated individuals with low incomes, a 4.7% increase in recidivism doesn’t seem that small anymore.

This is good research, but like most contributions it isn’t the last word. The growing use of fines and fees as revenue sources is a complex and, in many ways, adaptive system that exists to generate revenue for local governments whose revenue apparatuses hamstrung in countless ways, frequently struggling to keep the lights on (whether those lights should necessarily be on is a whole separate question). When they’re looking for that revenue, many (but not all) will arrive at the conclusion that they can only get so much much from poor people. Sometimes, such as with traffic offenses, the poorest individuals that do get caught in this system aren’t necessarily the intended targets, but rather the collateral damage. When we’re looking for that collateral damage, it’s important to know both where that damage is occuring and where it is being mitigated by local adaptation, particularly that which exists outside of the laws as written.

There’s probably nothing more dangerous to an already successful business than giving customers what they say they want. This is not to say you can give customers something they don’t want, quite the opposite in fact. Rather, it’s to never deny the preeminence of revealed preferences.

People want things. They don’t always, however, enjoy how those preferences might be perceived by others (or by themselves). Customizing your consumption to fit the preferences that you would prefer to signal is not a luxury that we can often indulge, however. Basic instrumental needs have to come first. Once a good is already in a household’s portfolio of consumption, however, it is relatively low cost to signal alternative preferencs to peers, surveyers, or focus group organizers. If a producer were to take these signals as earnest, however, they could end up undermining the good already previously purchased and consumed, leading to a business catastrophe. “Trust people’s actions over words” is at least a cliche, if not an outright proverb. I’ll leave it to you to find its most archaic analogue.

I’ve been thinking about this a lot, and no, not in the context of political polling and the recent election, though I will grant the relevance. I’ve been thinking about it more when watching sports and consuming the news.

Soccer in the top leagues, particularly the English Premiere League (currently the best in the world) is in year 5 of a growing injury crisis. Most seasons the winner can be predicted based on total salary outlays. Not because of superior top line talent, however, but because they can afford 11 second string players of top quality to play when the starters are inevitably injured. This is largely because of a tragedy of the commons in international soccer, but it’s been massively exacerbated because the EPL responded to the perceived request from consumers that the sport become “more physical”. This amorphous physicality has been granted in the form of more lenient refereeing. The result of this has not been to increase the “fight in the game”, but to grant less talented players greater license in kicking and sliding through the legs of more talented players. I don’t know the full economics of modern sports, but I’m pretty sure fans don’t pay large ticket prices to see the best players in the world on the sidelines in high-end athleisure wear draped discreetly over a walking boot.

As for the news, I see a related, but not identical phenomena. Being a GenX-er, I spent a lot of time in heavy conversation during college bemoaning the impact of advertisers on media content. The “news as propaganda” bit is not a new concept, I assure you. What very, very few us would have guessed, however, is that Craigslist destroying the ad revenue of newspapers and the internet walking off with the customer base most interested in news as information source would lead television program producers untethered to the desires of their advertising sponsors, leaving them to create bespoke content for their new overlords: the consumer. As it turns out, what the remaining subset of customers most wants isn’t information or insight, it’s reaffirmation. We wanted advertisers out of content, but it turns out you got better news when the true customers were corporate overlords hawking sugar water and baggy clothes. People signaled that they wanted deep reporting, uncompromised integrity, and uncomfortable truths. And hey, more people than ever subscribe to The Economist. But it turns out most people just wanted confirmation bias.

Sure, by clicking on the link to this post you’ve signaled to me that you want a depth of insight you just can’t get anywhere on the internet. But I, enwisened scribe, know that what you really want is cliched aphorisms.

Be careful what you wish for.

Farm Bureau has released their annual data on the cost of a Thanksgiving meal. The headline is that this meal has declined, in nominal terms, for 2 years in a row — back-to-back years of roughly a 5 percent decline. That’s good news for consumers. But they note it’s not all good news, because the meal is still 19 percent higher than 2019, “which highlights the impact inflation has had on food prices – and farmers’ costs – since the pandemic.”

However, the news is even better than they say. If we compare the price of this meal to median earnings, it is actually cheaper than it was in 2019. It’s now the second most affordable Thanksgiving on record, and the only lower year was 2020 — an anomalous year for many reasons (prices fell, due to decreased demand, while median wages were artificially lifted by lower-wage workers losing their jobs).

As a percent of median weekly earnings for full-time workers, the Farm Bureau Thanksgiving meal will cost just 5 percent of weekly earnings (note: I use 3rd quarter earnings for each year, since it is the latest available for 2024). In 2020 it was only 4.7 percent, but other than that 2024 is lower than all other years for which we have data, which goes back to the mid-1980s, when it took 6-8 percent of earnings to buy this meal.

Last year I also said that this meal was the second cheapest ever — if you ignore the weird years of the pandemic. But now if you ignore those years, it is the most affordable it has ever been.

That’s something to be thankful for next week, but also every time you go to the grocery store. Since October 2019, average wages have increased more than prices at the grocery store — not by much, but still better than you might suspect (and yes, I have checked my receipts). If we go back to the 1980s, wages beat inflation by a much larger margin.

A recent conversation with Sadhika Bagga and her research on labor reallocation got me thinking about remote work, about which there is no shortage of forecasts and opinions. Working from home has taken off. Working from home is failing. Working from home is here to stay. Working from home is already over.

Can they all be true? No, but also yes. At least, that’s where my thinking is at the moment. What all of the preceding pieces seem to do is acknowledge the benefits and costs of remote work while also emphasizing any one particular cost or benefit that generates their preferred lede.

Remote workforces bring lower labor efficiency (e.g. more distractions, less monitoring, more shirking) and greater labor flexibility (e.g. larger labor pools to select from, faster labor turnover) to a firm or industry. It gives firms the ability to pay employees in something other than money, such as schedule flexibility and locational choice, capturing some of the rents from those compensating wage differentials for themselves in the form of lower labor costs. It also means firing and hiring people with greater efficiency and lower costs when each subsequent wave of technological obsolescence hits, more effectively curating your labor force to fit the newest technological opportunities and needs.

How this story plays out will be bespoke to every firm, industry, and sector, but one broad trend I’m looking for is how industries separate by technological turnover. Industries differentiate by the historical rate of technological upheaval. Construction is different today than it was 25 years ago, but that amount of change is almost trivial compared to the televison entertainment industry. I expect that firms industries that reward “nimbleness” in the adoption of and adaption to new technologies will embrace work from home in far greater numbers. This will, in turn, shrink the “periodicity” of industry business cycles. Industires with high remote work labor forces will both more quickly collapse to a dominant set of firms when excludable technology gives them and advantage. They will also, however, more quickly reinflate to a more competitive landscape from new firm entry enter as remote work allows rivals to rapidly update their labor force to match the newest technological landscape. I expect applied micro work on remote work preferences and theoretic work on the consequences of search costs for competition to find each other atop the empire state building and yield the kind of policy recommendations that would make Nora Ephron proud.

This is just one of many broad trends to look for as remote work evolves. The complexity of interacting forces makes forecasting both a fool’s errand and palm reading. All of the forecasts will be internally logical, collectively incompatible, partially correct, and completely wrong.

If you’re trying to understand the US election outcome, this is the only graph you need:

I’m not saying “anti-incumbency” is everything. There are a lot of forces wrapped up within this graph. My unnuanced take is that that the pandemic hens came home to roost for incumbent parties. Every single bundle of pandemic policies, from the heaviest handed to the most laissez-faire, were characterized by inevitable trade-offs. People don’t like tradeoffs regardless of whether the bill is paid with a year of doubled fatalities, two years of tripled unemployment, or three years of quadrupled inflation. And that’s why I think incumbent parties, be it US Democrats or UK Tories, lost significant ground. If you want to parse it farther, you could argue US Republicans should be disappointed they didn’t win more given how well opposition parties performed elsewhere.

None of that will change the Take Economy, of course. Thousands of pundits, published or barstool, are all describing in exquisite detail exactly the manner in which this election is a referendum on how the Democrats handled exactly the issue they personally happen to care the most about. It doesn’t mean any one of their opinions is narrowly wrong. I’m sure there was a more perfect campaign to be run, if only because there always is and was.

National politics is rarely a referendum and it’s never just the will of the people. It’s a chaotic system. It’s the weather. We forecast the weather. We makes plans. We accomodate, mitigate, and celebrate. And yes, sometimes we just try to survive it. But we can’t control it.

It’s chaos, be kind.