Charles Hugh Smith: Six Reasons the Global Economy Is Toast

If you are feeling OK about the world after a nice Labor Day weekend, I can fix that. How about six reasons why global economic growth will slow to a crawl, courtesy of perma-bear Charles Hugh Smith?

Smith is recognized as an earnest, good-willed alternative economic thinker. His OfTwoMinds blog and other publications bring out many valid facts and factors. He has been extrapolating from those factors to global financial collapse for well over fifteen years now, growing out of the imminent peak oil movement of circa 2007 vintage and the scary 2008-2009 financial crisis. Obviously, he has continually underestimated the resilience of the national and global systems, especially the ability of our finance and banking folks at keeping the debt plates spinning, and our ability to harness practical technology (e.g. fracking for oil production). Smith recommends preparing to become more self-reliant: we should learn more practical skills, and prepare to barter with local folks if the money system freezes up.

For now, I will let him speak for himself, and leave it to the readers here to ponder countervailing factors. From August 11, 2024, we have his article titled, These Six Drivers Are Gone, and That’s Why the Global Economy Is Toast:

The six one-offs that drove growth and pulled the global economy out of bubble-bust recessions for the past 30 years have all reversed or dissipated. Absent these one-off drivers, the global economy is stumbling off the cliff into a deep recession without any replacement drivers. Colloquially speaking, the global economy is toast.

Here are the six one-offs that won’t be coming back:

1) China’s industrialization.

2) Growth-positive demographics.

3) Low interest rates.

4) Low debt levels.

5) Low inflation.

6) Tech productivity boom.

( 1 ) Cutting to the chase, China bailed the world out of the last three recessions triggered by credit-asset bubbles popping: the Asian Contagion of 1997-98, the dot-com bubble and pop of 2000-02, and the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09. In each case, China’s high growth and massive issuance of stimulus and credit (a.k.a. China’s Credit Impulse) acted as catalysts to restart global expansion.

The boost phase of picking low-hanging fruit via rapid industrialization boosting mercantilist exports and building tens of millions of housing units is over. Even in 2000 when I first visited China, there were signs of overproduction / demand saturation: TV production in China in 2000 had overwhelmed global and domestic demand: everyone in China already had a TV, so what to do with the millions of TVs still being churned out?

China’s model of economic development that worked so brilliantly in the boost phase, when all the low-hanging fruit could be so easily picked, no longer works at the top of the S-Curve. Having reached the saturation-decline phase of the S-Curve, these policies have led to an extreme concentration of household wealth in real estate. Those who favored investing in China’s stock market have suffered major losses.

( 2 ) Demographics

Where China’s workforce was growing during the boost phase, now the demographic picture has darkened: China’s workforce is shrinking, the population of elderly retirees is soaring, and so the cost burdens of supporting a burgeoning cohort of retirees will have to be funded by a shrinking workforce who will have less to spend / invest as a result.

This is a global phenomenon, and there are no quick and easy solutions. Skilled labor will become increasingly scarce and able to demand higher wages regardless of any other factors, and that will be a long-term source of inflation. Governments will have to borrow more–and probably raise taxes as well–to fund soaring pension and healthcare costs for retirees. This will bleed off other social spending and investment.

( 3 ) The era of zero-interest rates and unlimited government borrowing has ended. As Japan has shown, even at ludicrously low rates of 1%, interest payments on skyrocketing government debt eventually consume virtually all tax revenues. Higher rates will accelerate this dynamic, pushing government finances to the wall as interest on sovereign debt crowds out all other spending. As taxes rise, households are left with less disposable income to spend on consumption, leading to stagnation.

( 4 ) At the start of the cycle, global debt levels (government and private-sector) were low. Now they are high. The boost phase of debt expansion and debt-funded spending is over, and we’re in the stagnation-decline phase where adding debt generates diminishing returns.

( 5 ) The era of low inflation has also ended for multiple reasons. Exporting nations’ wages have risen sharply, pushing their costs higher, and as noted, skilled labor in developed economies can demand higher wages as this labor cannot be automated or offshored. Offshoring is reversing to onshoring, raising production costs and diverting investment from asset bubbles to the real world.

Higher costs of resource extraction, transport and refining will push inflation higher. So will rampant money-printing to “boost consumption.”

( 6 ) The tech productivity boom was also a one-off. Economists were puzzled in the early 1990s by the stagnation of productivity despite the tremendous investments made in personal and corporate computers, a boom launched in the mid-1980s with Apple’s Macintosh and desktop publishing, and Microsoft’s Mac-clone Windows operating system.

By the mid-1990s, productivity was finally rising and the emergence of the Internet as “the vital 4%” triggered the adoption of the 20% which then led to 80% getting online combined with distributed computing to generate a true revolution in sharing, connectivity and economic potential.

The buzz around AI holds that an equivalent boom is now starting that will generate a glorious “Roaring 20s” of trillions booked in new profits and skyrocketing productivity as white-collar work and jobs are automated into oblivion.

There are two problems with this story:

1) The projections are based more on wishful thinking than real-world dynamics.

2) If the projections come true and tens of millions of white-collar jobs disappear forever, there is no replacement sector to employ the tens of millions of unemployed workers.

In the previous cycles of industrialization and post-industrialization, agricultural workers shifted to factory work, and then factory workers shifted to services and office work. There is no equivalent place to shift tens of millions of unemployed office workers,as AI is a dragon that eats its own tail: AI can perform many programming tasks so it won’t need millions of human coders.

As for profits, as I explained in There’s Just One Problem: AI Isn’t Intelligent, and That’s a Systemic Risk, everyone will have the same AI tools and so whatever those tools generate will be overproduced and therefore of little value: there is no pricing power when the world is awash in AI-generated content, bots, etc., other than the pricing power offered by monopoly, addiction and fraud–all extreme negatives for humanity and the global economy.

Either way it goes–AI is a money-pit of grandiose expectations that will generate marginal returns, or it wipes out much of the middle class while generating little profit–AI will not be the miraculous source of millions of new high-paying jobs and astounding profits.

(End of Smith excerpt; emphases mainly his)

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Have a nice day…

Aging Populations = Inevitable Slow GDP Growth?

Last month Eric Basmajian published “Why Demographics Matter More Than Anything (For The Long Term)” on the financial site Seeking Alpha. He predicts that that the developed world plus China face a future of low economic growth (regardless of policy machinations) due simply to demographics. His key points:

Demographics are the most important factor for long-term analysis.

The young and old age cohorts negatively impact economic growth.

The prime-age population (25-64) drives the bulk of economic activity.

The world’s major economies are suffering from lower population growth and an older population.

Over the long run, the world’s major economies will have worse economic growth, which will negatively impact pro-cyclical asset prices (like stocks).

I will paste in some of his supporting charts. First, the labor force is more or less proportional to the 25-64 age cohort (U.S. data shown) :

…and GDP growth trends with labor force growth:

Also, on the consumption side, that is highest with the 25-54 age group:

And so,

Younger people are a drag on economic growth and older people are a drag on economic growth… The prime-age population is the segment that drives economic activity, so if the share of population that is 25-54 is shrinking, which it is, then you’re going to have more people that are a negative force than a positive force:

Once the working-age population growth flips negative, an economy is doomed…. Working age population growth in Japan flipped negative in the 1990s, and they moved to negative interest rates, QE, and they have never been able to stop. The economy is too weak.

After 2009, the working-age population in Europe flipped negative, and they moved to negative rates and QE, and they haven’t been able to stop. Even now, as the US is raising rates, Europe is struggling to catch up and has already abandoned most of its tightening plans.

In 2015, China’s working-age population flipped negative, and they’ve had problems ever since. They devalued their currency in 2015 and tried one more time to inflate a property bubble, but it didn’t work, and now they’re having to manage the deflation of an asset bubble that the population cannot support.

The US is in better shape than everyone else, but we’re not looking at robust growth levels in this prime-age population.

In conclusion, “ The real growth rate in most developed nations is collapsing because of those two factors, worsening demographics, and increased debt burdens.    In the US, as a result of the demographic trends I just outlined plus a rising debt burden, real GDP per capita can barely sustain 1% increases over the long run compared to 2.5% in the 60s, 70s, and 80s.”

That is pretty much where Basmajian leaves it. No actionable advice (besides subscribing to his financial newsletter). What isn’t addressed is whether productivity (production per worker) can somehow be accelerated. Also, one of his charts (which I did not copy here) showed a big trend down in 25-64 age fraction in the US population in the 1950’s-1960’s (as hangover from the Depression?), and yet these were decades of strong GDP growth. So these demographic trends are not the whole story, but his analysis is sobering.