Recessions

What I’m telling my Intro Macro students on the last day of class, since we weren’t able to get through every chapter in the textbook:

A few of you might end up working in economic policy, or in highly macro-sensitive businesses like finance. For you, I recommend taking followup classes like Intermediate Macroeconomics or Money and Banking so you can understand the details. For everyone else, here are the very basics:

In the long run, economic growth is what matters most. The difference between 2% and 3% real GDP growth per capita sounds small in a given year, but over your lifetime it is the difference between your country becoming 5 times better off vs 10 times better off.
How to increase long-run economic growth? This is complicated and mostly not driven by traditional macroeconomic policy, but rather by having good culture, institutions, microeconomic policy, and luck.
In the shorter run, you want to avoid recessions and bursts of inflation.
High inflation means too many dollars chasing too few goods. To fix it, the federal government and the central bank need to stop printing so much money (the details can get very complicated here, but if we’re talking moderately high inflation like 5% the solution is probably the central bank raising interest rates, and if we’re talking very high inflation like 50% the solution is probably a big cut to government spending).
If there is a recession (which will look to you like a big sudden increase in layoffs and bankruptcies), the solution is probably to reverse everything in the previous point. The government should make money ‘easier’ via the central bank lowering interest rates while the federal government spends more and taxes less.
If you don’t take more economics classes, you will likely hear about macro issues mainly through the news media and social media. You should be aware of their two main biases: negativity bias and political bias.
- Negativity Bias: If It Bleeds, It Leads on the news. Partly this is because bad news tends to happen suddenly while good news happens slowly, so it doesn’t seem like news; partly it just seems to be what people want from the news and from social media.
- Political Bias: People tend to seek out news and social media sources that match their current preferences. These sources can be misleading in consistent ways for ideological reasons, or in varying ways based on whether the political party they like is currently in power.
There are different ways to measure each key macroeconomic variable. Think through them now and make a principled decision about which ones you think are the best measures, and track those. Otherwise, your media ecosystem will cherry-pick for you whichever measures currently make the economy look either the best or the worst, depending on what their biases or incentives dictate.
There are good ways to keep learning about economics outside of formal courses and textbooks, I list a few here.

Austrian economists rightfully have some gripes about mainstream macroeconomics – specifically about aggregation. The conventional wisdom says that a fall in output can be prevented or remedied in the short-run by an expansion of total spending (via increasing the money supply). Total output is stabilized and the crisis is averted. Even if rising spending preceded the output decline, the standard prescription is the same.

The Austrian Business Cycle theory says that, actually, the prior expansion in spending resulted in yet-to-be-realized poor investments due to easy credit. The decline in output is self-inflicted by unsustainable endeavors, and the money supply expansion response prevents the correction. The consequence is more malinvestment. The Austrians say that the focus on gross investment is a misleading aggregation and commits the fallacy of composition that all investment is the same or the same on relevant margins.

Both schools of thought are on firm ground. I don’t see them as conflicting. They both make valid points and are correct about the world. The conventional wisdom is able to paper-over short-run hiccups, and the Austrians recognize that resources are suboptimally allocated. The two sides are talking past each other to some extent.

The market process of seeking profits and satisfying consumer demands is a messy process. Prices and profits (and losses) incentivize firms with information that they use to adjust their behavior. They innovate and reallocate resources from bad projects and toward money-making projects. When firms earn negative profits (a loss) they learn that their understanding of the world was wrong and that they malinvested their scarce resources. Therefore, malinvestment is a standard and *necessary* part of the market process of identifying and serving the changing and unknown demands of individuals. Without malinvestment we lack the necessary information to distinguish success from failure.

Mal-investment is harmful insofar as it represents resources that were invested such that future output did not rise as it could have otherwise. So, while malinvestment is necessary to the market process, a preponderance of it makes us poorer in the future. Luckily, firms have incentives and finite resources such that mal-investment remains somewhat tamed. Indeed, malinvestment is the cost that we bear for innovation and identifying what works.

The issue is that the above discussion is oriented to the long-run. The conventional wisdom is oriented toward resolving the short-run threats. The two meet one another when malinvestment realizations occur in a correlated manner. It’s not that policy causes malinvestment. Rather, depressed interest rates and easy credit prevent firms from identifying which of their projects turned out to be more or less productive. Firms persist in bad investments because they can’t discriminate between the failed and successful projects ex ante.

So, when interest rates suddenly rise, low or negative productivity projects are identified and resources are reallocated. The discovery and reallocation process takes time. And if many projects are found to be failures at once, then the result is a drop in economic activity that is detectable at the aggregate level. The problem is not that malinvestment exists. The problem is that malinvestment was permitted to persist and grow such that the eventual realization of losses is correlated and has macroeconomic effects. We observe spending, output, and employment declines. That’s the ‘business cycle’ part of the Austrian Business Cycle. Interest rates rising helps to identify the bad projects. That’s good. But policy that increases the popularity of bad projects is bad. It makes us poorer in the long-run and more vulnerable to declines in the short-run.