What Will the GDP Report Say Tomorrow?

Based on all of the good predictors that I track, GDP growth for the 3rd quarter of 2026 will likely be right around 3.2%:

Table 1

Kalshi, the Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow model, and the WSJ survey of economists are typically the best predictors, and they are all right around 3.2%. I’ve also added a new column to the table, a Nowcast from the St. Louis Fed. This one tends to be a pretty poor predictor, so you might wonder why I’m adding it to my list. Read on below to see why, but for now it’s interesting to note that it is very close to the three other good predictors (the NY Fed model is generally not very good).

When I have tracked these predictors in the past, I have been comparing them to the advanced GDP estimate, the first one the BEA puts out. Being able to predict this release is a good and hard enough task, but ultimately we don’t actually care about the number that will come out tomorrow. This number will be revised many times with more data, not only the 2 months after it, but through subsequent benchmarking and revisions in later years. Ultimately, we care whether these predictors are getting the true number, not BEA’s initial release (even though they are calibrated to predict that initial release, for the most part as I understand them).

What does it look like if we compare those predictions to the current best data on GDP growth going back to 2023? On this measure, the St. Louis Fed Nowcast looks pretty good recently:

Table 2

While the St. Louis Fed Nowcast looks pretty bad over the entire time period — the worst of these 5 predictors — it has done very well in the past 3 quarters, including nailing the 1st quarter of 2026 exactly (though in one quarter, they got the sign wrong). So I’m now tracking it in my table to see if it will continue to perform well — maybe they improved the model? The 3rd quarter data won’t actually tell us much about the St. Louis Fed model relative to the others, since they all are saying the same thing, but it will be worth watching in the future.

If we tally up the best predictors using the final or most recent GDP growth estimate, the best predictor is Kalshi’s betting markets. Kalshi has the lowest average error, which is just slightly better than the WSJ survey of economists. But Kalshi was also the best predictor in 6 of the 14 quarters in Table 2. The WSJ survey was only the best in 3 quarters — and in two of those it had the same prediction as Kalshi. It was only best as a standalone in one quarter (the oldest one in these 14 quarters). The St. Louis Fed was the best predictor in 5 quarters, all of these by itself, but its average error (as well as standard deviation and variance) is the highest of these 5 predictors.

Based on different combinations of the predictors, the best pair of predictors is Kalshi and WSJ. Averaging those together gets you an average error of 0.68, better than any single predictor. That means my prediction based on all this information is 3.15% growth in the third quarter for the final figure, once we eventually have it. The average of the Atlanta Fed and Kalshi is the best pair for the advanced figure, which gives a slightly different prediction of 3.24%.

Macroeconomic Policy In a Nutshell

What I’m telling my Intro Macro students on the last day of class, since we weren’t able to get through every chapter in the textbook:

A few of you might end up working in economic policy, or in highly macro-sensitive businesses like finance. For you, I recommend taking followup classes like Intermediate Macroeconomics or Money and Banking so you can understand the details. For everyone else, here are the very basics:

  1. In the long run, economic growth is what matters most. The difference between 2% and 3% real GDP growth per capita sounds small in a given year, but over your lifetime it is the difference between your country becoming 5 times better off vs 10 times better off.
  2. How to increase long-run economic growth? This is complicated and mostly not driven by traditional macroeconomic policy, but rather by having good culture, institutions, microeconomic policy, and luck.
  3. In the shorter run, you want to avoid recessions and bursts of inflation.
  4. High inflation means too many dollars chasing too few goods. To fix it, the federal government and the central bank need to stop printing so much money (the details can get very complicated here, but if we’re talking moderately high inflation like 5% the solution is probably the central bank raising interest rates, and if we’re talking very high inflation like 50% the solution is probably a big cut to government spending).
  5. If there is a recession (which will look to you like a big sudden increase in layoffs and bankruptcies), the solution is probably to reverse everything in the previous point. The government should make money ‘easier’ via the central bank lowering interest rates while the federal government spends more and taxes less.
  6. If you don’t take more economics classes, you will likely hear about macro issues mainly through the news media and social media. You should be aware of their two main biases: negativity bias and political bias.
    • Negativity Bias: If It Bleeds, It Leads on the news. Partly this is because bad news tends to happen suddenly while good news happens slowly, so it doesn’t seem like news; partly it just seems to be what people want from the news and from social media.
    • Political Bias: People tend to seek out news and social media sources that match their current preferences. These sources can be misleading in consistent ways for ideological reasons, or in varying ways based on whether the political party they like is currently in power.
  7. There are different ways to measure each key macroeconomic variable. Think through them now and make a principled decision about which ones you think are the best measures, and track those. Otherwise, your media ecosystem will cherry-pick for you whichever measures currently make the economy look either the best or the worst, depending on what their biases or incentives dictate.
  8. There are good ways to keep learning about economics outside of formal courses and textbooks, I list a few here.

Bad Claims About Food Stamps (SNAP)

One of the likely effects of the federal government shutdown is that recipients of SNAP benefits (what used to be officially called “food stamps,” a term still used by the general public, especially those that dislike the program) may lose their benefits next month. This would obviously be a hardship for those that depend on this program, but it has also led to bad claims being made about the program, from both supporters and opponents of the program.

Let’s start from the political right: Matt Walsh makes the claim that by subsidizing food consumption “obviously drives up the cost” of groceries.

As with all bad claims, there is a nugget of truth baked into them. If the government subsidizes anything, we would expect demand to increase, and thus unless supply is perfectly elastic, there will be some effect on prices. However, we need to think more carefully about the nature of the subsidy.

The way SNAP works is that beneficiaries receive an electronic voucher to spend at the grocery store, which is about $300 per month on average for a household. That $300 must be spent on groceries. However, if that household had already planned to spend $300 or more on groceries, it is unlikely they will spend all of the additional $300 on food. In the limit, it’s entirely possible they will spend no additional money on groceries, merely reducing their out-of-pocket spending on groceries by $300. They will then effectively have $300 more to spend on other goods. More likely is that they will spend some of the additional $300 on groceries, and some of it on other goods.

Many studies have tried to look at the extent to which SNAP benefits affect household spending, but these were mostly observational studies. There was no treatment and control group. But a 2009 paper titled “Consumption Responses to In-Kind Transfers: Evidence from the Introduction of the Food Stamp Program” has a better approach to studying the question. Since the original Food Stamp program was slowly rolled out across the country over more than a decade, you can compare counties that entered the program first to counties that entered it later. By doing so, Hilary Hoynes and Diane Schanzenbach find out some first interesting things about the causal effects of SNAP benefits.

For the claim by Walsh in his Tweet, the most relevant result from the paper is that food stamps impact household spending similarly to a cash transfer. Yes, the program increases household spending on groceries, but it also increases spending on other goods and services. And it does so almost identically to how cash transfers impact household spending. In other words, while pitching the program as assistance for buying groceries may make it more politically palatable, SNAP benefits are no different from a similarly-sized cash transfer for the average recipient. If they do cause any inflation, they do so in the same way as a cash transfer would, and thus there is no specific impact on food inflation.

A second bad claim about SNAP comes from the political left, in this case Minnesota Governor Tim Walz:

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