What’s Killing Girls Ages 10-14?

I’m in the process of writing a review of Jon Haidt’s book The Anxious Generation. I wrote some preliminary thoughts a few weeks ago, but I’m diving a lot deeper now, so watch for that review soon. But one of the main startling pieces of data in the book is the dramatic rise in suicides among young girls. Haidt isn’t the first to point this out, but in large part his book is an attempt to explain this rise (as well as the rise among boys and slightly older girls).

This got me thinking a bit more broadly about not just suicides, but all causes of mortality among young Americans. So in the style of my 2022 post about the leading causes of death among men ages 18-39, let’s look at the historical trends for deaths among girls 10-14 in the US.

Data comes from CDC WONDER. The top dark line shows total deaths, and the scale for total deaths is the right-axis. Notice that for total deaths, there is a U-shaped pattern. From 1999 to about 2012, deaths for girls aged 10-14 are falling. Then, the bottom out and start to rise again. While the end point in 2022 is lower than 1999 (by about 9 percent), there is a 22 percent increase from 2010 to 2022.

What’s driving those trends? A fall in motor vehicle accidents (blue line, the leading cause of death in both 1999 and 2022) is driving the decline. This category fell 41 percent over the entire time period: a big drop for the leading cause of death!

But the rise in suicides (thick red line) starting in 2013 is the clear driver of the reversal of the overall trend. Suicides for this demographic in 2022 were 268 percent higher than 1999, and 116 percent higher than 2010. Haidt and others are right to investigate the causes of this trend (I’m not convinced they have the complete answer, but more on that in my forthcoming book review).

There has been no clear trend in cancer deaths over this time period, and the combination of all the three of these trends means that roughly equal number of girls ages 10-14 die from car accidents, suicide, and cancer.

What can we learn from this data? First, we should acknowledge just how rare death is for girls ages 10-14. At 14.8 deaths per 100,000 population, it is the lowest 5-year age-gender cohort, other than the ages just below it (ages 5-9, for both boys and girls). But just because it is small doesn’t mean we should ignore it. The big increase, especially in suicides, in the past decade is worrying and could be indicative of broader worrying social trends (and suicides have risen for almost every age group too, see my linked post above).

If a concern, though, is that we are over-protecting our kids and this is leading them to retreat into a world of social media, we might want to see if there are any benefits of this overprotection in addition to the costs. The decline in motor vehicle accidents is one candidate. Is this decline just a result of the overall increase in car safety? Or is there something specific going on that is leading to fewer deaths among young teens and pre-teens?

As we know from other data, a lot fewer young people are getting driver’s licenses these days, especially compared to 1999 (and engaging in fewer risky behaviors across the board). Of course, 10-14 year-olds themselves usually weren’t the ones getting licenses — they are too young in most states — but their 15 and 16 year-old siblings might be the ones driving them around. Is fewer teens driving around their pre-teen siblings a cause of the decline in motor vehicle deaths? We can’t tell from this data, but it is worth investigating further (note: best I can tell, only about 23 percent of the decline is from fewer pedestrian deaths, though in the long-run this is a bigger factor).

Social tradeoffs are hard. If there really is a tradeoff between fewer car accident deaths and more suicides, how should we think about that tradeoff? Or is the tradeoff illusory, and we could actually have fewer deaths of both kinds? I don’t think I know the answer, but I do think that many others are being way too confident that they have the answer based on what data we have so far.

One final note on suicides. For all suicides in the US, the most common method is suicide by firearm: about 55% of suicides in the US were committed with guns in 2022, with suffocations a distant second at about 25%. For girls ages 10-14, this is not the case, with suffocation being by far the leading method: 62% versus just 17% with firearms. I only mention this because some might think the increasing availability of firearms is the reason for the rise in suicides. It could be true overall, but it’s not the case for young girls.

Proposal: Mandating Hard Prison Time for CEO’s of Companies Whose Consumer Data Gets Hacked Would Cut Down on Data Breaches

Twice in the past year, I have received robo notices from doctors’ offices, blandly informing me that their systems have been penetrated, and that the bad guys have absconded with my name, phone number, address, social security number, medical records, and anything else needed to stalk me or steal my ID.  As compensation for their failure to keep my information safe, they offer me – – – a year of ID theft monitoring. Thanks, guys.

And we hear about other data thefts, often on gigantic scales. For instance, this headline from a couple of months ago: “Substantial proportion” of Americans may have had health and personal data stolen in Change Healthcare breach”. By “substantial proportion” they mean about a third of the entire U.S. population (Change Healthcare, a subsidiary of UnitedHealth, processes nearly half of all medical claims in the nation). The House Energy and Commerce  Committee last week called UnitedHealth CEO Sir Andrew Witty to testify on how this happened. As it turned out:

The attack occurred because UnitedHealth wasn’t using multifactor authentication [MFA], which is an industry standard practice, to secure one of their most critical systems.

UnitedHealth acquired Change Healthcare in 2022, and for the next two years did not bother to verify whether their new little cash cow was following standard protection practices on the sensitive information of around a hundred million customers. Sir Andrew could not give a coherent explanation for this lapse, merely repeating, “For some reason, which we continue to investigate, this particular server did not have MFA on it.”

But I can tell you exactly why this particular server did not have MFA on it: It was because Sir Andrew did not have enough personal liability for such a failure. If he knew that such an easily preventable failure would result in men in blue hauling him off to the slammer, I guarantee you that he would have made it his business within the first month of purchasing Change Healthcare to be all over the data security processes.

Humans do respond to carrots and sticks. The behaviorist school of psychology has quantified this tendency: establish a consistent system to reward behavior X and punish behavior not-X, and behaviors will change. As one example, Iin one corporate lab I worked in, a team of auditors from headquarters came one year for a routine, scheduled audit of the division’s operations. If the audit got less than the highest result, the career of the manager of the lab would be deeply crimped. Our young, ambitious lab manager made it crystal clear to the whole staff that for the next six months, the ONLY thing that really mattered was a spotless presentation on the audit. It didn’t matter (to this manager) how much productivity suffered on all the substantive projects in progress, as long as he was made to look good on the audit.

Let me move to another observation from my career in industry, working for a Certain Unnamed Large Firm, let’s called it BigCo. BigCo had very deep pockets. Lawyers loved to sue BigCo, and regulators loved to fine BigCo, big-time. And it would be a feather in the cap of said regulators, or other government prosecutors, to throw an executive of BigCo in the slammer.

Collusion among private companies to fix prices does do harm to consumers, by stifling competition and thereby raising prices. So, back in the day when regulators fiercely regulated, statutes were enacted making it a criminal act for company agents to engage in collusion, and authorizing severe financial penalties. American authorities were fairly aggressive about following up potential evidence, and over in Europe, police forces would engage in psychological warfare using their “dawn raid” tactic: just as everyone had sat down at their desks in the morning in would burst a SWAT team armed with submachine guns and lock the place down so no one could leave. I don’t know if the guns were actually loaded, but it was most unpleasant for the employees.  BigCo’s main concern was avoiding multimillion dollar fines and restrictions on business that might result from a collusion conviction, so they devoted significant resources to training and motivating staff to avoid collusion.

Every year or two we researchers had to troop into a lecture hall (attendance was taken) and listen to the same talk by the same company lawyer, reminding us that corporations don’t go to jail, people (i.e. employees) go to jail, by way of motivating us to at all costs avoid even the appearance of colluding with other companies to fix prices or production or divide up markets or whatever. This was a live issue for us researchers, since some of us did participate in legitimate technical trade associations where matters were discussed like standardizing analytical tests. If memory serves, the lawyer advised us that if anyone in a trade association meeting, even in jest, made a remark bordering on a suggestion for collusion, we were to stand up, make a tasteful scene to make it memorable, and insist that the record show that the BigCo representative objected to that remark and left the meeting, and then stride out of the room. And maybe report that remark to a government regulator. That maybe sounds over the top, but I was told that just such a forceful response in a meeting actually saved BigCo from being subjected to a massive fine imposed on some other firms who did engage in collusion

My point is that if the penalties (on the corporate or managerial level) for carelessness are severe enough, the company WILL devote more substantial resources to preventing fails. It seems to me that the harm to we the people is far greater from having our personal data sucked out of health care and other company databases, than the harm from corporate collusion which might raise the price of copier paper or candle wax. Thus, I submit that if someone in the C-suite, like the chief information officer or the CEO, were liable to say 90 days in jail, management would indeed apply sufficient resources to data integrity to thwart the current routine data theft.

If I were king, this would be the policy in my realm. I recognize that in the current U.S. legal framework, the corporate structure shields management from much in the way of personal liability, and there are good reasons for that. I suppose another way to get at this is to have automatic fines structured to strip away nearly all shareholder value or management compensation, whilst still allowing the company to operate its business. This would be another route to put pressure on management to prioritize protection for their customers. Sir Andrew’s total compensation package has been running about $20 million/year. To my knowledge, the impact of the recent gigantic data breach on him has been fairly minimal in the big picture. Sure, it was aggravating for him to have to tell the U.S. Congress that he had no idea why his corporate division screwed up so badly, and to have to devote a good deal of effort to damage control, but I am guessing that his golf game (if he is a golfer) was not unduly impacted. He is still CEO, and collecting a princely compensation. But what if the laws were such that a major data hack would automatically result in a claw-back of say 95% of his past two years of compensation, and dismissal from any further management role in that company?  I submit that such a policy would have motivated the good Sir Andrew to have devoted proper diligence and company resources to data integrity, such that this data breach would not have happened.

I don’t mean to pick on Andrew Witty as being uniquely negligent. By all accounts he is a nice guy, but his behavior is paradigmatic of ubiquitous benign management neglect, which has consequences for us little people.

These are just some personal musings; I’m sure readers can improve on these proposals.

Brief thoughts from attending SOLE 2024

I just back from the Society of Labor Economics Meetings in Portland. A couple thoughts in no particular order

  1. Conferences are about both luxuriating and reinvesting in our geographically dispersed social networks. Everything else is a secondary. Its not just that I like seeing these people who speak our language and share our jokes, I genuinely miss them when it’s been too long.
  2. Post sessions are fantastic for applied work. I enjoyed multiple 2 to 4 person discussions with an actively engaged author who had a perfect prop to lean on. Great stuff.
  3. If you’re going to give a keynote, don’t try to impress people, try to educate them on something you specialize it. We all miss being students. Give us a crash course to distract us from the hotel catering.
  4. Portland, and the Pacific Northwest in general, is just beautiful. Go to the Japanese Gardens next time you are there.

Social Cost Irregularities

If you want an economist to support a government intervention, then there are two major sets of logic that they generally find attractive.

The first concerns rate of return and attracts narrower support. If the government can invest in a project in a way that the private sector couldn’t/wouldn’t and the payoff is bigger than the investment by enough, then the project should be built. 

The second set of logic is more accepted more broadly. If there is an externality, and the administration costs are small relative to the change in the externality, then the project should be pursued in order to increase total welfare.

I’m going to criticize and refine the second argument.  I was inspired by a student who wrote about education creating positive externalities for “all”. They kept using the word “all”. And I notated each time “not *all*”. While we might refer to something called ‘social’ cost and value, the existence of externalities does not imply that everyone is affected by the them identically. That’s a representative agent fallacy. The externalized costs and benefits are often irregularly distributed among 3rd parties. This is important because government intervention can impose its own externalities depending on how the administrative costs funded.

I’ll elaborate with two examples that illustrate when an irregular distribution of externalities is a problem and when it isn’t a problem.

Electric Plant Pollution

The first example illustrates how resolving an irregular distribution of externalities can be resolved without issue. Consider a coal-powered electric plant that serves a metropolitan area and creates pollution. That pollution drifts east and passively harms residents in the form of asthma exacerbation and long-term ill health. The residents to the west are unaffected by the pollution, thanks to favorable weather patterns. Obviously, one would rather live on the west side, all else constant (importantly, all else it not always constant and there is a case to be made that there is no externality here).

To resolve the externality, the government imposes a tax per particle on the power plant at a low administrative cost. That’s nice and efficient – we won’t waste our time with means-oriented regulations. In turn, the cost of electricity increases for all metropolitan residents, both those in the east and in the west. Why is this appropriate? Prior to the intervention, the electricity users in the west were enjoying electricity at a low price, failing to pay for the harm done by their consumption. For that matter, the residents to the east are also paying the higher rates, but now they enjoy better health.

In the end, the externality is resolved by imposing a cost on all consumers of the good – which happens to be everyone. This circumstance is not pareto efficient, but it is Kaldor-Hicks efficient. Everyone now considers the costs that they were previously able to impose on others and ignore.

That’s the best case scenario.

Continue reading

The effect of the minimum wage on everything

David Neumark has an excellent article reviewing the extensive literature examining the effects of the minimum wage on, well, a little bit of everything. Sometimes we see improved outcomes, sometimes worse outcomes, often not much of anything. I’m not demeaning this literature to which I’ve myself helped make a modest contribution, but there does arise the concern that perhaps the fruit has begun to hang a bit too low. Which is to say that in a world of modern computing, where regressions can be run at approaching zero cost and policy changes are characterized by an at least a minimally sufficient level of exogeneity, there’s nothing stopping anyone from regressing any measurable outcome on the minimum wage. We’re still arguing about the minimum wage, but what exactly is it that we are learning?

I’m going to head this post off at the pass befores it veers into “back in my day economics used to be about the theory” territory. Yes, the ascendance of empirically-driven applied economics has led to theory to taking something of a backseat, at least in terms of the sheer volume of published research, but I don’t think that is what is going on with the minimum wage literature. Rather, I think its a story of supply and demand.

The minimum wage is an almost perfect issue for people to argue over. It’s not life or death, which keeps the temperature below “brick throwing” levels. The status quo always bears the possibility of change, making arguments policy salient. The absence of action is a meaningful option, particularly in a world with non-trivial inflation. It’s a quantifiable policy that affects incomes and employment directly, which means it’s sufficiently concrete for anyone to have an opinion on. Last, but certainly not least, it lends itself to binary opinion-affiliation in that you either think the minimum wage should be higher or you don’t.

From the point of view of researchers, this adds up to a policy for which there will be near endless research demand. To satisfy that demand your research should, preferably, give consumers a new reason to belief the minimum wage should or should not be higher. To do that a researcher need either i) give new and useful evidence as to how and how much the minimum wage affects earnings and employment, or ii) new and useful evidence that the minimum wage makes some other measurable outcome better or worse. When you consider that the cost of consuming new research is both low and constant, it’s fair to consider the demand to be perfectly elastic. Coupled with the increase in the supply of empirical research generated by reduced cost of computing noted earlier, we shouldn’t be surprised by an equilibrium where an ever-growing number of outcomes have been regressed on the minimum wage.

I don’t think this is anything to get worked up over, don’t see any first-order negative externalities. Most complaints about low-cost empirical research usually sound like academics pining for a time with higher barriers to entry, when you had to be “really good” to produce economic research. The assumption that the complainer is themselves, of course, “really good” always seems to remain unstated. Back to my earlier question, though: what are we learning?

If you’re genuinely curious about the minmum wage, read Neumark’s review. It’s characteristically excellent. Rather than recap, let me come out and say what I think I’ve learned from the reading a lot, but certainly not all, of the minimum wage literature. The minimum wage matters, it’s salient to people earnings, but not nearly as much as the volume of research or argument would suggest. The effects observed tend to be moderate, but labor markets are sufficiently local, heterogenous, and complex that the there remains the possibility of observing different results with different (but largely honest) analyses. This goes doubly so for observing any second-order effects beyond wages and employment, such as health, education, or crime. You are more likely to observed improved outcomes when changes are small, deleterious effects when changes are large.

Those are easy, largely riskless conclusions to share, so let me go a bit farther. The fact that we observe anything but trivial outcomes, positive or negative, is a stark reminder of the margins on which so many people are making decisions. Whether it’s earning a dollar more an hour or losing half a shift a week, it is telling that we see more criminal recidivism, more smoking, less teen-pregnancy, more maternal time with children, and a dozen other effects. It just doesn’t take that much to move the needle.

There is a constant cultural bombardment to value income and material goods less. Perhaps the lesson of a thousand and one minimum wage regressions is that many people aren’t experiencing the diminishing returns to income that popular advice would have you believe. For the young, less-educated, recently immigrated, or those burdened with the stigma of a criminal record, the income elasticity of human behavior remains very much intact. Labor policies matter, even if the minimum wage shouldn’t be quite so close to the top of the list.

Civil War as radical literalism

I saw A24’s newest and most expensive film to date, Civil War. <<Spoilers incoming>>

A brief summary: the audience is dropped into the middle of a new US civil war as being documented by a group of journalists, our viewpoint centered around a veteran war photographer played by Kirsten Dunst and her (nearly) uninterrupted, first-ballot hall of fame 108 minute RBF. (Seriously, her face is perfection in this movie, I’ve never appreciated her more, absolutely no notes.) A traveling party is formed, a road trip through a war taken on, each stop bringing the gang into contact with increasingly grim and grotesteque humanity.

The subject matter and timing of the film naturally lend themselves to interpretation, subtextual analysis, and Straussian readings. Most films tend to be pretty ham-fisted in their less than subtle themes. With regard to Civil War, there are plenty of thoughts about the underlying meanings and metaphors. Here’s mine: there is no subtext, metaphor, or Straussian messages to be unearthed. The director has pushed this concept and it’s being received as milquetoast marketing. I disagree. There are no secret themes and I think that is the absolutely radical agenda that defines and motivates the artistic endeavor. To portray a war without imbuing it with narrative, only tragic, significance. Hear me out.

There’s a million war movies, most of which have arcs and metaphors strewn throughout. The problem with making a moving about a hypothetical civil war in the modern United States is that the audience will spend so much time looking for the heroes, villains, and associated opportunities to feel morally superior that it seems almost impossible to deliver an effective portrayal of what it might actually feel like to wake up to a US civil war, with a genuinely splintered federalist system of governments and military forces. How do you make a movie that doesn’t celebrate a Civil War as an opportunity for anyone, that doesn’t unintentionally, if inevitably, enoble the prospect of such an outcome? How do you tell a story where nothing good happens because you earnestly believe such a war would be empty and horrible, with nothing advanced or achieved save the destruction of institutions and the killing of millions? Well, it seems that Alex Garland thought the best strategy was to strip a war story down to its barest bones and leave you absolutely zero metaphorical scaffolding to graft your identities or theories on to.

I think it worked. A couple points.

There are no heroes in the film. The four journalists in questions are respectively hollowed out, adrenaline addicted, naive, or looking for one last ride. There is zero allusion to nobility or moral obligation. We never learn the name of a single soldier, whether they are accomplishing a mission, pointlessly dying, or perpetrating atrocities. There’s no arch-antagonist. There are bad people, to be sure, and the third-term President that the film opens with has green lit air strikes on American citizens while filling the airwaves with empty propaganda, but he turns out to be nothing more than a standard-issue cowardly politician wholly incapable of anything save false bravado and begging for his life.

There are no political identities in the film. No left or right wing schism. It might seem that the “Western Forces” alliance of California and Texas is either a transparent political cop-out (putting the largest “red” and “blue” states together) or a subtextual allusion to a schism over immigrants (those states having the largest Latin immigrant populations), but I think there is a far simpler explanation: those are the only two states whose coalition could actually oppose a President trying to usurp the executive branch and fully subvert the constitution. Beyond their populations and economies, the raw number of military bases in the two states (especially air bases), are sufficient that a couple 2 star generals could coalesce a rival military body. There’s also a reference to Florida being an i6 ndependent secessionary state. [EDIT 4/23/24] Guess which states have the most military personnel and air force bases? California (184k+ 8 AFB) and Texas (164k + 9 AFB). Florida has the 5th most active duty personnel, but also has 6 AFB. Everyone else is a either a battle ground or a (literal) flyover state.

The film captures, I think brilliantly, the idle chaos of such a scenario. A world simultaneously shutting down and carrying on with life. Of people mostly trying to survive and wait it out. Mostly. There are some who are not sitting it out, putting themselves in contexts where they can play out their dreams to be heroes or monsters, never accomplishing anything but spreading a little extra death around. I kept thinking about the pandemic on the drive home from the theater. Millions of people died but most of our memories at the peak of the lockdown are of feeling trapped and bored. A civil war in a country this big might not feel all that different for months or even years at a time for most of the population.

The thing about the “banality of evil” is that it’s both extremely real and nearly impossible to portray in a film without comedic deadpan or ghoulish overkill. Civil War portrays a United States ripped apart at it’s constitutional seams by midwit politicians incapable of forward inducting from usurping power and committing atrocities to eventually being executed by a nameless soldier who will report their success to a command chain with no understanding or possibly even interest in putting it all back to together. That’s how the story of the United States as we know it could end. Without heroes or villains, moral or philosophic judgements, without even primary or secondary causes. The thing about a country falling apart, there isn’t always a why, just a when and how.

The lesson I took away from Civil War is that a world doesn’t have to end for a reason. It can just end. And when it does, mostly what we’ll do is watch and wait for it to start up again.

Trader Vic’s Mai Tai

The mai tai is a lesson in how a good thing can become a bad thing without the name changing. Followers of politics should take notice. Good rule of thumb: if a mait tai is red it is bad. The simple solution is to always order a Trader Vic’s Mai Tai. If the bartender doesn’t know what that is, just order a Dark and Stormy and live to fight another day.

Trader Vic’s Mai Tai

3/4 ounce fresh lime juice
1/2 ounce orange curaçao
1/4 ounce orgeat
1/4 ounce simple syrup
2 ounces aged rum

If you are looking to abstain from alcohol I suspect you could make a phenomenal limeade by mixing in orgeat and some pineapple juice and then garnishing it with dusted red chili or habanero pepper.

Recovering My Frozen Assets at BlockFi 2. Scams and More Scams

As I noted last month, the crypto lending firm BlockFi has started to send back to its customers some of their funds which had been frozen for over a year, since the demise of Sam Bankman-Fried’s FTX exchange led to BlockFi likewise vanishing into the mists of Chapter 11.  As BlockFi emerges from bankruptcy, they are reimbursing customers in two tiers. Those who had crypto sitting in their “wallet” on the platform (not lent out and not earning interest), got back 100%. In my case, nearly all my assets on BlockFi were on the lending platform, earning juicy interest. For that class of assets, only a partial recovery is expected. Also, BlockFi will only send to you the crypto (e.g. Bitcoin or USDC) you owned as the crypto coin itself, not as the liquidated dollar value.

Therefore, you must establish an outside crypto wallet, and give them the external wallet address, so they can transfer the coin over a blockchain. This prospect of a connection between BlockFi (or its bankruptcy agent, Kroll) and your crypto wallet has brought out the scammers in force: if they can trick you into connecting them to your wallet, they can suck it dry in a flash.

The first thing I noticed back in early March was the proliferation of web sites that looked legit, but weren’t. When I browsed for “BlockFi withdrawal” or “BlockFi recovery,” up came a number of sites that had “BlockFi” or “Kroll” somewhere in their names, as clickbait. I don’t see any of these sites now, a month later. I assume that either those sites have been taken down as the thieves move onto the next heist, or the search engines have blotted them out.

Bogus phishing emails have also been sent out. Most insidious was an expertly-crafted email that I and other BlockFi customers received. Here is a screen shot of the now-infamous message:

As folks have pointed out, this looks pretty good. It has got the official company logo, and no misspellings. The return address on the email was BlockFi Holdings at www.everbridge.com. Unless you were vigilant, this address did not immediately raise suspicions like a random Gmail address or .ru address might.

Plus, this email was targeted to BlockFi customers, and came right when we were expecting further emails to tell us what steps to take to recovery our funds. How did the thieves have our email addresses? One speculation centers around the “Mother of All Breaches” (MOAB) when the Mailer Lite database was hacked in January. But we know that Kroll’s database was breached last year, where the lost data includes BlockFi customers’ names, email addresses, and amounts held at BlockFi, so that seems a more direct source.

Anyway, lots of BlockFi customers clicked on the link in this email. The thieves were pretty clever. First, they had you scrawl your signature on the screen. So now they have that archived, in order to do further ID theft mischief. And then, they had you connect their app to your wallet, as a trusted dApp. Over on Reddit (here and here), you can read the howls of pain from folks who got their wallets cleaned out. They are not alone – -as of late March, this scam had netted something like $5 million in digital assets.

An eerie thing about crypto is that the holdings at any address on the blockchain are public knowledge, even though you don’t know who the owner of that address is. So crypto sleuth Plumferno was able to display at least one of the BlockFi scammer’s wallets in the process of accumulating stolen assets:

This wallet (0x6C0e83422cD73fFD3A5EC4506638F6A0A8e22b38) currently holds well over $1million in Eth + various tokens combined, and as you can see, this scam is still very active – new victims are showing up in the transaction list quite regularly. Current holdings on Debank:

I am embarrassed to admit that I got taken in by this email. I tried clicking on the links, but fortunately my wallet was empty and my anti-malware resisted having me connect to the phishing site, so I did not lose any coin.  Some takeaways are:

( 1 ) Always be suspicious of emails; especially scrutinize the return address, to make sure it really is from a source you trust. Watch for almost-legit email addresses.

( 2 ) If at all possible, avoid clicking on links in emails; try to go to the actual company website and click links from there.

( 3 ) See ( 1 )

See here for the bittersweet ending to this saga (I did get some money back, but only 27% of my original funds at BlockFi).

Costly introspection

In terms of unexpected introspection, I was careened into by an emotionally wreckless Winnebago :

The answer is obviously job, right? I mean, I’ve dedicated huge swaths of my life to economics. I love economics. Sacrifices have been made, time and emotional toil committed. I would love to be a 20% better economist. That would mean my labor in the profession would be at least 20% more valuable, likely more. The opportunity cost of my time would skyrocket. I would be in more demand as a consultant, would receive more outside offers that would bring me to new heights of salary, likely other parts of the country, other parts of the world even. My work would receive greater attention and scrutiny. I would be fueled by the pressure to keep up with my past self and past contributions. There would be more speculation as to whether I’ve passed my peak, remain worthy of continuing investment. There would be disserations to be written, careers to be made identifying the errors I’ve committed, both subtly important and catastrophically innocent. I’d feel a greater sense of obligation to my, perhaps unearned, talent. To make good on it through service to the world. Sleep, travel, leisure would all feel that much more costly, that much more selfish. Strangers would feel that much more compelled, that much more rewarded, for publicly impugning my abilities and intentions. I would, ironically, probably receive 1000% more public censure as a result of 20% greater capacity. Would my 20% spike in competence come bundled with a thicker skin, independence of thought, and clarity of identity? Would I still be me? What exactly does come out the other side of the teleporter Mr. Scott?

Yeah, so I told the djinn I’d rather be 100% better at golf.

Rhesus Politik

Thailand has a legitimate problem with roving gangs of monkeys that recently achieved significant scale leading to territorial violence in Lopburi :

The sophistication of the monkeys in question is such that gangs have been known to take a train two hours to find rival territory that is sufficiently resource rich and for which they have adequate numbers to the challenge the local monkeys. They also seem to have a rudimentary familiarity with firearms that makes tranquilizing them at any scale challenging.

There appears to be some theory behind mitigation strategies, tranquilizing and apprehending group leaders being number 1. What else might a little basic theory suggestion? Any alternative strategies?

The first question that comes to mind is whether there is a means to tilt the resource calculus towards exurban territories. That seems challenging simply given the calorie density of urban groceries and refuse. It’s probably too difficult to raise the price of resources sufficiently on their own (locked garbage cans, closed door supermarkets), but maybe the offering of monkey feeding sanctuaries outside of city limits that are within sight/smell of train lines? That could be useful means of concentrating then populations in an area that would then enable second-level strategies. And yes, I am already imagining small monkey cities wherein we can study their emergent politics. I’ve already titled my 2029 paper “Rhesus Politik” and before you ask, 1) No you can’t have the title, and 2) yes, you can be a co-author.

What about the violence as it stands within Lopburi? Can we shift the payoffs away from Hawk and towards Dove strategies? Can we increase each monkey’s expected cost of violence or decrease their payoff to exerting dominance? Perhaps an evolutionary tax on weight i.e. taking the largest monkeys out of the gene pool, the equivalent of neutering and spaying? Melee violence has signficant returns to scale, so perhaps we could expect less violence if groups were smaller. Can we change the optimal scale of individual gangs through artificial pheremones simply dousing them with knockoff Drakkar Noir? If Big Science has an genetically modified banana high in the amino acids that lead to introversion, now is a great time to share it. Personal experience suggests that if we start blasting Elliot Smith songs through the streets will monkeys begin to break off under the crushing weight of their own ennui.

I’d suggest fomenting another agricultural revolution amongst monkeys, but the initial reduction in violence over rival turf would eventually evolve into feudal violence between stationary bandits, which I fear would lead to a net increase in violence, at least for the first few thousand years. Instead, I believe we would be better served giving groups of monkeys the necessary institutions for establishing and adjudicating property rights, changing the payoffs such that the exchange of resources were preferable to violent expropriation. We’ve lived this evolutionary history before, we know how it goes. Maybe this time we can skip to the democratic peace and pax economica.