Why don’t Americans migrate anymore?

Inter- and intratstate migration has collapsed within the United States over the last 60 years.

From “Understanding migration aversion using elicited counterfactual choice probabilities” Kosar, Ransom, and van der Klauw, Journal of Econometrics (2022).

This observation has been lurking in the not-completely-the-background of labor economics for 20 years. The best summary of the literature, by Jia et al, came out in the JEL last year. It’s a very useful and relatively complete treatment. I think a lot about migration these days, mostly asking about the determinants of our reservation wage of migration i.e. how much of a wage increase would someone have to offer you to pick up and move to an entirely new community.

If we take the above figure at face value, it would appear the reservation wage of migraton has increased for Americans. Quite a bit, actually. Of course, it is also possible that American’s no longer have to migrate to find a better job or wage, but that seems a hardly universal phenomenon over that last 50 years. Work from home has only had traction for a decade now at best. Labor markets aren’t as concentrated as they perhaps once were, loosening the monopsonistic lid a bit in a lot of markets, but at the same time the labor share of revenues hasn’t increased, in fact it’s decreased on average. So why aren’t people moving? I have some narrow, testable, answers that I am pursuing as research projects, but I also have a broad hypothesis that seems supremely untestable for the moment, sitting as it were in that thinkpiece uncanny valley between narrow research and podcast cheaptalk.

The concept of diminishing returns is an easy intuition to adopt. We all know the first bite of dessert is the best, the last the one most encumbered with regret. Economic growth remains a miracle, but it’s still true that nothing gained at the margin of the modern developed world will ever compete with those first steps out of subsistence. Very nearly every form of household capital and consumption in the modern work is characterized by some amount of diminishing returns, but that doesn’t mean they are diminishing at the same rate.

There are some goods for which there are few, if any substitutes. Demand for these special goods can be quite inelastic – we’re willing to sacrifice a lot to maintain a certain level of consumption. There are also goods that are quite complementary with one another, their value to us increasing as they are bundled together. Complements are powerful, putting together the right mix of consumption is quite literally the recipe for a better life. Complements, however, are often part and parcel to a cautionary tale. If something is a powerful complement to everything else in your life, we might find ourselves saying things like “I can’t live without it.” No amount of wealth in the world can survive being multiplied by zero.

There are few, if any, substitutes for friends, family, and our broader social network. Some goods cannot be consumed alone. If the sociological literature is to be believed, Americans are lonelier than ever. Both our deepest and most casual friendships have diminished in number. Relationships with neighbors are nonexistent, our ties to communities at a premium. That might, at first blush, make it sound like moving should be less costly– why stick around to maintain relationships that you don’t have. But on the other hand, if new relationships are harder to form than previously, then the relationships you already have are worth more than ever, to be protected jealously. Your only friend is, by definition, your best friend. No one wants to move away from their best friend.

Putting it all together, if personal relationships are an inelastic demand good that is complementary with a large chunk of our consumption bundle, then the price, the shadow price, we are willing to pay for it is going to go through the roof in the face of a negative supply shock. In a world where relationships are sudenly at a premium, you will be willing to forego a lot of additional income in order to preserve a small network in which you have a lot of social capital.

In two weeks half the country is going to be watching the Superbowl with a 3 or 4 friends, maybe 10 or 20. Thanks to innovation and economic growth, most people will be watching it on a 55 inch high definititon television with decent food and beverages. What about game would change if the host got a 20% raise? The TV might get a a little bigger, the snacks less fried, the beer more imported. What if the host moved two years ago? Would they have friends close enough to invite over? $15,000 worth of catering is a poor substitute for having someone to high-five.

The more I think about our lives and how little economic pressure, survival pressure, there is to find a 10% higher wage in the modern developed world, I’m surprised anyone migrates at all.

Avoid subfield tunnel vision

Folks are dunking on a tweet and, indirectly, the underlying research connecting mosquito nets to the degredation of seagrass meadows.

I’ll be honest, the implication that free mosquito nets are net negative for poverty and health sent me into that special kind of rage that can only be fomented by someone on the internet being both condescending and egregiously wrong at the same time. Do I even need to go over why this is bad? Why malaria prevention at a continental level outweighs hypothesized marginal seagress loss? I didn’t think so.

What I want to talk about is is subfield tunnel vision. A common piece of advice passed on to each generation of PhD students is to become a genuine expert in something. If you write a dissertation on the effect of malaria nets on elementary school attenance in Uganda, then you should become an expert, on the bleeding edge of all related-research, on mosquitos, nets, and primary education in Africa. As you career takes shape, the both the questions that strike you as important and the opportunities presented to you by institutions and administrators will shape your research. Bit my bit you will be shaped (and occasionally sanded down) into an ever-narrower expert. And that’s fine, that’s the story of incentives to specialize that comes for us all (NB: if your mind went to one of the public intellectual generalists you admire, do note that being a generalist in the modern world is very much its own niche specialty).

Specialization is good, but do take care that while your expertise becomes narrower that your view of world remains wide. We all know the relevant cliche about all the world becoming a nail whilst holding a hammer, but this is about about the rationalizing of tools and techniques. This is about how your specialization fits within the world and, more specifically, how the consquences of choices you might advise stand in the grand utilitarian calculus.

The authors of the paper in question are the Chief Scientific Officer and Chief Conservation Officer of Project Seagrass. These are people who have dedicated their lives to the preservation of seagrass meadows and, in turn, ocean health and the global stock of fish. Should we be surprised that their paper’s abstract closes with “We conclude that the use of mosquito nets for fishing may contribute to food insecurity, greater poverty and the loss of ecosystem functioning”? No, we should not. First, you could argue that they are just putting, in words, the implied signs of their analysis, and not the relative magnitudes. Maybe they aren’t implying mosquito nets are a net negative. You could be generous and argue that all they are trying to say is “Mosquito nets are great, but as soon as the malaria vaccine is universally distributed we should ditch all these nets because the costs will outweigh the benefits.

I don’t think they are, though. They lean heavily on Short et al (2018) and their claim that fishing nets are the primary use of freely provided mosquito netting. That Short et a result appears to be based almost entirely on an online survey with 113 respondents. The implication is that the massive reduction in malaria specifically attributed to the distribution of free mosquito nets is in fact a mirage, that these nets are instead finding their way into the ocean as improvised capital for small scale fishing operations (“artisanal fishing”, in the parlance of the paper), with the resulting consequence of catching additional juvenile fish at the margin, harming the future stock of fish.

The second part of that equation seems entirely feasible! Unintended costs happen. What I want to emphasize is that the authors are narrowly focused on establishing the cost of future fish in seagrass meadows while also being overly credulous of what is, I’m sorry, a ridiculously crappy survey that dismisses the enormous benefits of those nets to save human lives, especially children under the age of 5.

I don’t think the authors are being selfish, have ill-motivations, or have been bought off by a global conspiracy of wealthy fishery magnates. I just think they have succumbed to a bias that afflicts every scholar at one time or another, myself included. Gatekeepers won’t publish your paper in top journals, fund your research with needed grants, or invite you to prestigious conferences unless you hype your work to the absolute maximum of feasible importance. Spend a couple years as the conductor on your subfield’s hypetrain and maybe you start to believe it just a wee bit too much. Your subject of concern remains concrete, the questions imperative, while everything else increasingly fades into the realm of the abstract, the consequences negotiable.

As for the twitter commenter being dunked on, I just think it’s classic overeagerness to denigrate everything touched by someone you find odious. SBF is a bad person, did bad things, has bad hair. Sure, but maybe don’t? Maybe leave the most successful malaria prevention endeavor in the history of the world out of your public disgust for a <checks notes> young cryptocurrency embezzler? Don’t let your deserved anger for a genuinely bad person make you dumber at the margin. Bad people already impose costs on us all. Letting them skew your view of everything they touch just makes their societal footprint bigger.

You don’t know what you will like

There is no shortage of advice that falls along the lines of “If you aren’t eating at least one disappointing meal a weak/month/etc, then you aren’t trying enough new recipes or restaurants.” It all falls along the lines of increasing your risk of experiences that are subpar relative to what you already know you like so that you can increase your probability of adding something new to your portfolio of “likes” while also getting that one-time dopamine hit that comes from personal discovery.

It’s a good framing and broad set of advice. I endorse it.

What’s interesting though is that there’s a greater breadth to the foundational concept. Our lives are sufficiently short that we really don’t have that great of an idea of what we like and don’t like, especially for forking decisions that don’t allow for easy exploration of the counterfactual. At the same time, dedicating your life to the repeated pure act of discovery carries a certain…shallowness. To perpetually be on the lookout for the new and better is to never invest in the experiences that fill us with satisfication and joy. To get really good at doing what makes us happy. To get really good at being happy.

So where’s the balance? I don’t know and I am reasonably certain that’s at the core of the human condition, so I don’t think I going to come up with the answer in a blog post. But it strikes me that cultivating a certain taste for disappointment, not unlike a particularly peaty Scotch, is an incredible adaptation towards a better overall lived experience.

Which is to say that, after 30 years of telling anyone who would listen that I would never want a cat, that I refuse to get a cat, that a cat would offer no value to me, I absolutely love having a cat. My cat rules and it’s left me wondering what other things am I absolutely convinced I have no interest in that would fill my life with greater joy. What are things that I think I can’t stand, that other people love, that I might actually find incredibly-well suited to my tastes. A random list of things that, at the moment, I have no interest in:

  1. Motorcycles
  2. Cricket (the sport)
  3. Lasik
  4. Traveling to (actually) dangerous countries
  5. Committing crimes
  6. Running for office
  7. Eating any dish that includes raw chicken

That’s in no particular order, but I can’t help but wonder if there is something on that list I should give a go. City council? Visiting the Middle East? Larceny? To be clear, I’m not going to do any of those things, but that doesn’t me I shouldn’t. But there is a balance to having experiences you might not like, you probably won’t like, and, every few years, you think you definitely won’t like. Just in case.

San Francisco Fed Says Pandemic Surplus Is Gone; Boston Fed Demurs

Is it the best of times or the worst of times? This question I asked myself as I saw the following three headlines juxtaposed last week:

“US consumers are in the best shape ever” is sandwiched between two downers. The American consumer’s ongoing spending has staved off the long-predicted recession, quarter after quarter after quarter. Can we keep those plates spinning?

We noted earlier that the huge windfall of pandemic benefits (direct stimulus plus enhanced unemployment benefits) put trillions of dollars into our bank accounts, and the spending down of that surplus seems to have powered the overall economy and hence employment (and inflation). How the economy does going forward is still largely determined by that ongoing spend-down. Thus, the size of the remaining hoard is critically important.

Unfortunately, it seems to be difficult to come up with an agreed-on answer here. The San Francisco Fed maintains a web page dedicated to tracking “Pandemic-Era Excess Savings.” Here is a key chart, tracking the ups and downs of “Aggregate Personal Savings”:

This is compared to a linear projection of pre-pandemic savings, which is the dotted line. (Which dotted line you choose is crucial, see below) . The next chart plots the cumulative savings relative to that line, showing a steady spend-down, and that this excess savings is just about exhausted:

If this represents reality, then we might expect an imminent slowdown in consumer spending and in GDP growth, and presumably a lessening in inflationary pressures, which may in turn justify more rate cuts by the Fed.

But the Boston Fed says, “Maybe not.”  A study by Omar Barbiero and Dhiren Patki published in November titled Have US Households Depleted All the Excess Savings They Accumulated during the Pandemic? showed that it makes a huge difference which savings rate trend you choose for a baseline.

The following chart shows two versions of the first plot shown above, with (on the left) a linear, increasing projection of 2018-2019 savings trends, versus a flat savings rate baseline:

Two significant differences between these plots and the San Francisco Fed plot shown above are that these plots only run through the end of 2022, and that they display per cent savings rate rather than dollar amounts. However, they demonstrate the difference that the baseline makes. Using an increasing savings rate baseline (2018-2019 trend projection), the surplus was nearly exhausted at the end of 2022. Using a flat rate average of 2016-2019 for the baseline, the surplus was barely dented.

We will see how this plays out. My guess is that at the first whiff of actual recession and job losses, the administration will gush out the maximum amount of largesse; while we may have ongoing inflation and high interest rates due to the deficit spending, we will not have a hard landing. I think.

The Power Game

The anecdotes in Hedrick Smith’s “The Power Game” may be 40 years out of date, but the core insight into the US system of governance remains the same: power is fluid, fleeting, and indeterminant. A shocking variety of people can, for a given moment, find themselves to be the most powerful person in the US. Sometimes it is in fact the president, but it can just as easily be a block of senators, or a particularly flush and motivated donor. It can be losing candidate in a three-way race who, simply by considering dropping out, finds a moment of irresistible political leverage. Power in our republic is a constantly changing and uncertain mantle, almost as much projection as reality. I would also argue that it is the central selling point of our system: people think twice about how to go about swinging a sword if they’re not sure who’ll be swinging it tomorrow and what end they’re actually holding on to today.

Which brings me to plagiarism.

Bill Ackman wants use AI to investigate academics for plagiarism at scale. The scale here is key, the implication that AI will allow a wide net to be cast. Plagiarism never struck me as a particularly widespread problem in high level research, but I could at least feasibly be wrong and I’m in no position to tell him how to spend his time. What is fairly clear to me, however, is that there is amongst some the perception that academics have too much power. The ambition behind, or at least the gleeful anticipation for, these hypothesized plagiarism purges is to reduce that power and influence.

But where does this perception come from and why plagiarism? Power is fluid, based as much on perception as reality. In an age when the quantity of information is never in question and the price is approaching zero, the short-side of the market will always be quality, credibility, and context. Maybe we’re entering into a golden age of power and influence for academic scribblers, and that’s a reality some would like to head off at the pass. An accusation of plagiarism could stunt a career. A mass accusation of “rampant” plagiarism could diminish the broad credibility of scholars, reducing the perceived quality of the information relayed and the context they provide for policy and social discussions.

The US has three branches of federal government, four military branches, and 50 states, all sitting on top of thousands of municipal governments. As far as spreading power goes, that’s a pretty good start. If the 3,982 degree-granting institutions in the US have to be added to the registry of power, that’s fine, but I’ll have to admit that my students don’t seem all that awed by any power I’m currently wielding. Going by the focus of the media and Ackman, maybe we only need to add institutions in Cambridge, MA to the registry of power, but that doesn’t make power any less fluid and fleeting. It’s just political whack-a-mole, which I would remind everyone is a game where you can smack one source of power down, but you can’t control where power pops up next. Maybe power shifts to Silicon Valley. Maybe a cluster of TikTok influencers whose politics makes the median MIT professor look like Barry Goldwater. Be careful what you wish for…

Obviously wrong ideas are a sign of a healthy discipline

Some of us are relishing what by all accounts appears to be a successful recession-resistant soft landing that was enabled, at least in part, by the management of interest rates by the Federal Reserve bank. But some of us also might be a little bummed. Pandemic stimulus led to non-trivial inflation for the first time in 30 years that had real consequences for the economy. Those issues were confronted by policy makers at the Federal Reserve bank who did their part to raise interest rates that ease us out of this inflationary window without triggering a recession. Those consecutive events, stylized facts even, appear to have left “Modern Monetary Theory” in shambles. I only interject the “appear to” qualification because MMT is a theoretic vacuum that better serves as a quasi-economic Rorschach test than falsifiable model. What are we to do without our favorite economic punching bag? What could ever unite us all, Keynesians, New Keynesians, Neoliberals/New Liberals, Monetarists, Austrians, like defending the shared empirical reality that money is real, printing money isn’t a policy free lunch, and hyperinflation is an economic tragedy to be taken deadly serious?

Well, don’t fret. There’s one more gift not everyone has opened yet. The gift that is “degrowth”. Not unlike MMT, degrowth is a little tricky to pin down. The central tenet, if there is one, is that economic growth needs to be both reversed and re-defined. That we all need to learn to live with less. As best I can tell. I guess I could link to Jason Hinkel’s book…but I don’t want to. If wikipedia is to be trusted: “The main argument of degrowth theory is that an infinite expansion of the economy is fundamentally contradictory to the finiteness of material resources on Earth”. I’m not going to spend an entire blog post dismantling this school of thought that is somehow both amusingly silly and darkly bleak in what it speaks of it’s advocates. Though spare me this one shot at an obviously wrong idea: the entire point of economic growth is that the economy can, in fact, expand forever, because new ideas (i.e. technology) and exchange both add value to the world without requiring any additional material resources (i.e. they are “non-rival”). There will never be an end to new ideas and, given those new ideas, there will never be an end to the prospective gains from exchange. Are we done here?

Of course not, don’t be silly. There are careers to be had. Keynotes to be given. Books to sell. Conferences to host. I took a shot at this on twitter, but I’m actually far more sanguine on the subject than I come across in my grim little tweet.

I’m emotionally unburdened by the attention paid to degrowth for the same reason I slept fine knowing MMT advocates were out their peddling their terrible policies. I take it as a sign of good health within the broader discipline of economics that for all of our squabbles, most of us are speaking the same language and engaging with an objective reality. Which is not to say that there aren’t knock-down, drag-out arguments about what we are observing empirically and what it means, but everyone knows what it is we are arguing about. There’s no Sokal hoax on the horizon for economics. The data is real. The policies are real. The consequences of bad decisions are very, very real.

What that means is that when a tribe forms around bad ideas and pushes them into the broader public, they have to defend those ideas. And their defense can’t elude criticism with nothing but rhetorical sleight of hand or pandering to fortified political identities for shelter from the scholarly storm. At least not for long. Whether they like it or not, their ideas will have to come into contact with reality, with formal rigor, with the data. There’s no postmodern escape hatch - to be exposed as unfasifiable is to fail at first contact. *

Yes, bad ideas can get you tenure somehwere. Or a letter published in Nature. Or a nice circuit of hosts willing to prop you up as the academic scribbler to provide the intellectual scaffolding their political movement is desperate for. But you’re not going to matter to the discipline. Your terrible, vacuous ideas will be confronted, considered, and then dismissed. No harm, no foul.

That these ideas can enter the arena at all is a sign of excellent health within the discipline. You can posit some truly wild ideas and still get them in front of the global jury of economists. You don’t have to be a Harvard economist. You don’t even have to be an economist. No position of power, no union card. The doors are open. That doesn’t mean, however, that you’re going to get a show. There’s no minimum stage time owed. Your ideas are terrible, get off the stage, next. You expected to come home from the battle either with your shield or on it, a grand warrior exposing the soft underbelly of the dismal dragon, but turned out to be just another 5 seconds of empty calories. You didn’t get what you wanted from this belch of a conflict, but the economists sitting together in the jury box did get something: a reminder that we’re all doing the best we can. We’re hissing and fighting, but only because we care. We’re trying to do it right, which is hard, and but that’s what matters the most at the end of the day. The trying.


*Sometimes what looked, to some or most, to be bad ideas turn out to, in fact, be good ideas. Great ideas, even, the kind that move the discipline forward. That’s actually the most beautiful part, that small minority of ideas that look too far afield to be taken seriously only to survive these trials by fire and become internalized in the broader mainstream of economics. Ironically, this often proves a harder test for many members of the revolutionary factions. From my own interactions, I would note that the internalization of “public choice” into the broader mainstream of economics as “political economy” proved hard for some scholars to adapt to.

Saba Closed-End Funds ETF (CEFS): Have Finance Legend Boaz Weinstein Manage Your Closed End Fund Investments

Boaz Weinstein and the London Whale

Boaz Weinstein is a really smart guy. At age 16 the US Chess Federation conferred on him the second highest (“Life Master”) of the eight master ratings. As a junior in high school, he won a stock-picking contest sponsored by Newsday, beating out a field of about 5000 students. He started interning with Merrill Lynch at age 15, during summer breaks. He has the honor of being blacklisted at casinos for his ability to count cards. 

He entered into heavy duty financial trading right out of college, and quickly became a rock star. He joined international investment bank Deutsche Bank in 1998, and led their trading of then-esoteric credit default swaps (securities that payout when borrowers default). Within a few years his group was managing some $30 billion in positions, and typically netting hundreds of millions in profits per year. In 2001, Weinstein was named a managing director of the company, at the tender age of 27.

Weinstein left Deutsche Bank in 2009 and started his own credit-focused hedge fund, Saba Capital Management. One of its many coups was to identify some massive, seemingly irrational trades in 2012 that were skewing the credit default markets. Weinstein pounced early, and made bank by taking the opposite sides of these trades. He let other traders in on the secret, and they also took opposing positions.

(It turned out these huge trades were made by a trader in J. P. Morgan’s London trading office, Bruno Iksil, who was nick-named the London Whale. Morgan’s losses from Iksil’s trades mounted to some $6.2 billion.)

For what it’s worth, Weinstein is by all accounts a really nice guy. This is not necessarily typical for many high-powered Wall Street traders who have been as successful as he.

Weinstein and the Sprawling World of Closed End Funds

If you have a brokerage account, you can buy individual securities, like Microsoft common stock shares, or bonds issued by General Motors. Many investors would prefer not to have to do the work of screening and buying and holding hundreds of stocks or bonds. No problem, there exist many funds, which do all the work for you. For instance, the SPY fund holds shares of all 500 large-cap American companies that are in the S&P 500 index, so you can simply buy shares of the one fund, SPY. 

Without going too deeply into all this, there are three main types of funds held by retail investors. These are traditional open-end mutual funds, the more common exchange-traded funds (ETFs), and closed end funds (CEFs). CEFs come in many flavors, with some holding plain stocks, and others holding high-yield bonds or loans, or less-common assets like spicy CLO securities. A distinctive feature of CEFs is that the market price per share often differs from the net asset value (NAV) per share. A CEF may trade at a premium or a discount to NAV, and that premium or discount can vary widely with time and among otherwise-similar funds. This makes optimal investing in CEFs very complex, but potentially-rewarding: if you can keep rotating among CEF’s, buying ones that are heavily discounted, then selling them when the discount closes, you can in theory do much better than a simple buy and hold investor.

I played around in this area, but did not want to devote the time and attention to doing it well, considering I only wanted to devote 3-4% of my personal portfolio to CEFs. There are over 400 closed end funds out there. So, I looked into funds whose managers would (for a small fee) do that optimized buying and selling of CEFs for me.

It turns out that there are several such funds-of-CEF-funds. These include ETFs with the symbols YYY and PCEF, CEFS, and also the closed end funds FOF and RIV. YYY and PCEF tend to operate passively, using fairly mechanical rules. PCEF aims to simply replicate a broad-based index of the CEF universe, while YYY rebalances periodically to replicate an “intelligent” index which ranks CEFs by yield, discount to net asset value and liquidity. FOF holds and adjusts a basket of undervalued CEFs chosen by active managers, while RIV holds a diverse pot of high-yield securities, including CEFs. The consensus among most advisers I follow is that FOF is a decent buy when it is trading at a significant discount, but it makes no sense to buy it now, when it is at a relatively high premium; you would be better off just buying a basket of CEFs yourself.

I settled on using CEFS (Saba Closed-End Funds ETF)  for my closed end fund exposure. It is very actively co-managed by Saba Capital Management, which is headed by none other than Boaz Weinstein. I trust whatever team he puts together. Among other things, Saba will buy shares in a CEF that trades at a discount, then pressure that fund’s management to take actions to close the discount.

The results speak for themselves. Here is a plot of CEFS (orange line) versus SP500 index (blue), and two passively-managed ETFs that hold CEFs, PCEF (purple) and YYY (green) over the past three years:

The Y axis is total return (price action plus reinvestment of dividends). CEFS smoked the other two funds-of-funds, and even edged out the S&P in this time period.  It currently pays out a juicy 9% annualized distribution. Thank you, Mr. Weinstein, and Merry Christmas to all my fellow investors.

Boilerplate disclaimer: Nothing in this article should be regarded as advice to buy or sell any security.

Sorry, you caught me between critical masses

I’m on Bluesky. I’m on twitter/X. I’m not happy with either right now. I wasn’t particularly happy on twitter before, but that was before it became much worse, so now I wish it could back to the way it was, when I was also complaining, because it turns out the counterfactual universe where it was different is actually worse. So here we are.

The decline in my personal portfolio of social media largely comes down to critical mass. The decline in Twitter usage has reduced its value to me (and most of its users). Only a tiny fraction of this loss in Twitter value is offset by the value I receive from Bluesky for the simple reason it doesn’t have enough users. Even if 100% of Twitter exits had led to Bluesky entrants, it would still be a value loss because the marginal user currently offers more value at Twitter. Standard network goods, returns to scale, power law mechanics, yada yada yada.

Now, to be clear, Twitter is still well above the minimum critical mass threshold for significant value-add, but the good itself has also been damaged by Elon’s managerial buffoonery. Bluesky, depending on your point of view and consumer niche, hasn’t achieved a self-sustaining critical mass (e.g. econsky hasn’t quite cracked it, unfortunately). The result is a decent number of people half-committing to both, which only serves to undermine consumer value being generated in the entire “microblogging” social media space.

The problem, simply put, is that Twitter still has too much option value to leave entirely. If (when) Elon get’s the mother-of-all-margin-calls, he’ll likely have to sell Twitter or large amount of his Tesla holdings. If he’s smart and doesn’t cave in to the sunk cost fallacy (a non-trivial “if”), he’ll sell Twitter. If new ownership successfully returns Twitter to suitable fascimile of it’s previous form, people will come flooding back, Bluesky will turn-off or wholly adapt into a new consumer paradigm, and everyone will be thrilled to have squatted on their previous accounts.

If Twitter retains its current form, then it will probably die, though not at the direct hands of Bluesky. More likely it will be displaced by some new product most of us don’t yet see coming, as the next generation departs twitter the way millenials departed Facebook for Snapchat and, eventually, TikTok. Perhaps counterintuitively, this outcome is actually excellent for Bluesky, because the absence of twitter will send the 3% of “professional” twitter users (economists, journalists, thinktank wonks, policy makers, etc) to Bluesky, where they will achieve niche critical mass and live happily ever after (at least as happy as one can be whilst immersed in a sea of status-obsessed try-hards).

But for the moment, we’re all a little stuck trying to make do with finding fulfillment in the complex personal lives, loving families, transcendant art, and multidimensional experiences that remain confined to meatspace. We can only do our best and remain strong during such trying times.

Former Treasury Official Defends Decision to Issue Short Term Debt for Pandemic;  I’m Not Buying It

We noted earlier (see “The Biggest Blunder in The History of The Treasury”: Yellen’s Failure to Issue Longer-Term Treasury Debt When Rates Were Low ), along with many other observers, that it seemed like a mistake for the Treasure to have issued lots of short-term (e.g. 1-2 year) bonds to finance the sudden multi-trillion dollar budget deficit from the pandemic-related spending surge in 2020-2021. Rates were near-zero (thanks to the almighty Fed) back then.

Now, driven by that spending surge, inflation has also surged, and thus the Fed has been obliged to raise interest rates. And so now, in addition to the enormous current deficit spending,  that tsunami of short-term debt from 2020-2021 is coming due, to be refinanced at much higher rates. This high interest expense will contribute further to the growing government debt.

Hedge fund manager Stanley Druckenmiller  commented in an interview:

When rates were practically zero, every Tom, Dick and Harry in the U.S. refinanced their mortgage… corporations extended [their debt],” he said. “Unfortunately, we had one entity that did not: the U.S. Treasury….

Janet Yellen, I guess because political myopia or whatever, was issuing 2-years at 15 basis points[0.15%]   when she could have issued 10-years at 70 basis points [0.70 %] or 30-years at 180 basis points [1.80%],” he said. “I literally think if you go back to Alexander Hamilton, it is the biggest blunder in the history of the Treasury. I have no idea why she has not been called out on this. She has no right to still be in that job.

Unsurprisingly, Yellen pushed back on this charge (unconvincingly). More recently, former Treasury official Amar Reganti has issued a more detailed defense. Here are some excerpts of his points:

( 1 ) …The Treasury’s functions are intimately tied to the dollar’s role as a reserve currency. It is simply not possible to have a reserve currency without a massive supply of short-duration fixed income securities that carry no credit risk.

( 2 ) …For the Treasury to transition the bulk of its issuance primarily to the long end of the yield curve would be self-defeating since it would most likely destabilise fixed income markets. Why? The demand for long end duration simply does not amount to trillions of dollars each year. This is a key reason why the Treasury decided not to issue ultralong bonds at the 50-year or 100-year maturities. Simply put, it did not expect deep continued investor demand at these points on the curve.

( 3 ) …The Treasury has well over $23tn of marketable debt. Typically, in a given year, anywhere from 28% to 40% of that debt comes due…so as not to disturb broader market functioning, it would take the Treasury years to noticeably shift its weighted average maturity even longer.

( 4 ) …The Treasury does not face rollover risk like private sector issuers.

Here is my reaction:

What Reganti says would be generally valid if the trillions of excess T-bond issuance in 2020-2021 were sold into the general public credit market. In that case, yes, it would have been bad to overwhelm the market with more long-term bonds than were desired.  But that is simply not what happened. It was the Fed that vacuumed up nearly all those Treasuries, not the markets. The markets were desperate for cash, and hence the Fed was madly buying any and every kind of fixed income security, public and corporate and mortgage (even junk bonds that probably violated the Fed’s bylaws), and exchanging them mainly for cash.  Sure, the markets wanted some short-term Treasuries as liquid, safe collateral, but again, most of what the Treasury issued ended up housed in the Fed’s digital vaults.

So, I remain unconvinced that the issuance of mainly long-term (say 10-year and some 30-year; no need to muddy the waters like Reganti did with harping on 50–100-year bonds) debt would have been a problem. So much fixed-income debt was vomited forth from the Treasury that even making a minor portion of it short-term would, I believe, have satisfied market needs. The Fed could have concentrated on buying and holding the longer-term bonds, and rolling them over eventually as needed, without disturbing the markets. That would have bought the country a decade or so of respite before the real interest rate effects of the pandemic debt issuance began to bite.

But nobody asked my opinion at the time.