Stock Options Tutorial 3. Selling Options to Generate Extra Income

In the first installment of this series on stock options, I focused on buying options, as a means to economically participate in the movement of a stock price up or down. If you guess correctly that say Apple stock will go up by 10% in the next two months, you can make much more money with less capital at risk by buying a call option than by buying Apple stock itself. Or if you guess correctly that Apple stock will go down by 10% in the next two months, you can make more money, with less risk, by buying a put option on Apple, then by selling the stock short.

In part two of the series, I discussed how options are priced, noting the difference between intrinsic value, and the time-dependent extrinsic value.

Here in part three, I will discuss the merits of selling, rather than buying options. This is the way I usually employ them, and this is what I would suggest to others who want to dip their toes in this pond.

Just to revisit a point made in the first article, I see two distinct approaches to trading options. Professional option traders typically make hundreds of smallish trades a year, with the expectation that most of them will lose some money, but that some will make big money. A key to success here is limiting the size of the losses on your losing trades. It helps to have nerves of steel. Some people have the temperament to enjoy this process, but I do not.

Selling Out of the Money Calls

Instead if spending my days hunched over a screen managing lots of trades, I would rather set up a few trades which may run over the course of 6 to 12 months, where I am fairly OK with any possible outcome from the trades. A typical example is if I bought a stock at say $100 a share, and it has gone up to $110 a share, and I will be OK with getting $120 a share for it; in this case I might sell a six-month call option on it for five dollars, at a strike price of $115. The strike price here is $5 “out of the money”, i.e., $5 above the current market price.

There are basically two possible outcomes here. If the price of the stock goes above $115, the person who bought the call option will likely exercise it and force me to sell him or her the stock for a price of $115. Between that, and the five dollars I got for selling the option period, I will have my total take of $120.

On the other hand, if the stock price languishes below $115, I will get to keep the stock, plus the five dollars I got for selling the option. That is not a ton of money, but it is 4.3% of $115. If at the end of the first six-month period I turned around and sold another, similar six-month call option which had the same outcome, now I have squeezed an 8.6% income out of holding the stock. If the stock itself pays say a 4% dividend, now I am making 12.6% a year. Considering the broader stock market only goes up an average of around 10% a year, this is pretty good money.

At this point, you should be asking yourself, if making money selling options is so easy, I have I heard of this before? What’s the catch?

The big catch is that by selling this call, I have forfeited the chance to participate in any further upside of the stock price, beyond my $120 ($155 + $5). If at the end of six months, the stock has soared to $140 a share, but I must sell it for a net take of $120, I am relatively worse off by selling the call. I have still made some money ($20) versus my original purchase price. However, if I had simply held the stock without selling a call option, I would have been ahead by $40 instead of $20. And now if I want to stay in the game with this stock, I have to turn around and buy it back for $140. This decision can involve irksome soul-searching and regrets.

There are two techniques are used to reduce these potential regrets. One is to only sell calls on say half of my holdings of a particular stock. That way, if the stock rockets up, I have the consolation of making the full profit on half my shares.


The other technique is to try to identify stocks that trade in a range. For instance, the price of oil tends to load up and down between about seven day and $90 a barrel, barring some geopolitical upset. and the price of major oil companies, like Chevron or ExxonMobil, likewise trade up and down within a certain range. If you sell calls on these companies when they are near the top of their range, it is less likely that the share price will exceed the strike price of your option. Or, if it does, and you have to sell your shares, there is a good chance that if you just wait a few months, you will be able to buy them back cheaper. On the other hand, a stock like Microsoft tends to just go up and up and up, so it would not be a good target for selling calls.

Some Personal Examples

From memory, I will recount two cases from my own trading, with the two different outcomes noted above. ExxonMobil stock has been largely priced between $95 and $115 per share, depending mainly on the price of oil. In early 2024, with the price of XOM around 117, I sold a call contract with a strike price of 120 and an expiration date in January, 2024. I think I got around $9 per share for selling this option. The next twelve months went by, and the price of XOM never got above 120, so nobody exercised this call contract against me, and so I simply kept the $9, and kept my XOM shares. Since each contract covers 100 shares, I pocketed $9 x 100= $900 from this exercise, covering 100 shares (approx. $12,000 worth) of XOM stock.

That was the good, here is a not so good: I bought some ARES (Ares Management Corporation) around February 2023 for (I think) around $80/share. For the next few months, the price wobbled between $75 and $90, while the broader S&P 500 stock index (lead by the big tech stocks) was rising smartly. I lost faith in ARES as a growth stock, but decided to at least squeeze some income out of it by selling a call option for about $10 at a strike price of $110 and a distant expiration of Dec 2024.

What then happened is ARES has taken off like a rocket, sitting today at $132/share. If it keeps up like this, it may be well over $150 by December, 2024. I will likely have to sell my 100 shares for $110 (the strike price), so I will get a total of $110 + $10 = $120 for my shares. That is far less than the current market value of these shares. I am not crying, though, since I have some more ARES shares that I did not sell calls on. Also, getting $120 for the shares I bought for $80 is OK with me. There is a saying on Wall Street about being too greedy, “Bulls make money, bears make money, pigs get slaughtered.”

Selling Puts

Briefly, selling out-of-the money puts is like selling calls, on the buy-side instead of the sell-side. It is a way to generate a little income, while garnering an advantageous purchase price, if things go as hoped. In my ARES example above, suppose my 100 shares get called away from me, when the market price is $150. I have various choices at that point. I could simply by a fresh 100 shares at $150, or I could get onto other investments. Or, if I were not happy about paying $150, I might sell a $140 put for say $6 per share. I would have to be OK with either of two outcomes: (1) either the price drops below $140 and the buyer of my put option forces me to buy it at $140 (in which case I need to have $140 x 100= $14,000 in cash available) , though net the stock will only cost me $140 – $6 = $134 ; or (2) the price stays above $140 and I simply pocket the $6 option premium.  And I have to be willing to live with the regret if ARES goes on to $180, in which case it would have been better to have simply bought shares at $150 instead of dinking around with options.

So, there is no one-size-fits-all approach. Again, I prefer to sell puts on companies that more trade in a range. For instance, gold tends to meander up and down – I have thought about it, but never got around to selling puts on gold companies at lows, and calls when they are high.

In Summary

I find judicious selling of calls and puts is a fairly tame way to make a little extra income on stocks. Also, it forces me to set some price targets for buying and selling. I have horrible selling discipline otherwise – I have a hard time making up my mind to buy a stock, but once I do, and once it goes up, I fall in love with it and don’t want to sell it (partly because lazy me doesn’t want to do the work to find a substitute). Selling calls is one way to force myself to set “OK” price targets for letting a stock go.

All that said, selling calls does forfeit participation in the full upside of a stock, and is probably not a good approach in general for growth-oriented tech stocks. Likewise, selling puts, instead of outright buying a stock, may lead to regrets if the stock price goes way up and gets away from you.

As usual, this discussion does not constitute advice to buy or sell any security.

The Unified Theory of Excel

There are two ways to increase profits or available funds: grow revenues or reduce costs. We typically laud the creative teams that identify paths to greater revenues while, at best, tolerating those in charge of tightening belts. Given the tones in which we speak of austerity, there’s the thought that perhaps those at it’s vanguard are underrated (and they probably are, at least relatively). On the other hand, we often find ourselves operating within an economy of credit and blame. Credit for revenue gains tends to spread to the whole team, while credit for profits attributable to spending cuts specifically accrue to the management imposing those cuts. In such a model, spending cuts would be overemphasized as a profit-maximizing strategy. Growth can also be overemphasized of course – venture capital has come to exist as an institution that seems to only be interested in “home run” investment outcomes, likely at the expense of simply supernormal returns. We could keep pursuing this line of thinking, but I’m not really interested in adjudicating where austerity or growth is overrated. I think there is a broader concern to be considered in the growth/austerity strategy dichotomy. Within such a model of optimal decision-making there is an unstated, but critical, assumption that the relevent set of revenues and costs is perfectly fungible, and in turn comparable, across all contexts.

I think of this phenomena as the Unified Theory of Excel (UTE), an operating principle that can take over decision-making within a company or institution. The UTE carries the false promise that all contexts across an operating entity can be reduced to columns in a spreadsheet and, in turn, a decision made by netting out the effect of changes to those columns. Now, If you think that I, your friendly neighborhood economist, am about to make woo-woo claims deriding the information held within costs and revenues, get used to disappointment. My concern lies in the arrogance, sometimes negligence, in the assumption that numerically identical changes in costs and revenues across different contexts are comparable. It’s not that the information within the columns is bogus or irrelevant, but rather that the lack for context characterizing the relationships between the columns undermines any hope for knowledge to be produced. Data are just meaningless numbers absent a model to characterize the relationships between the numbers. And that’s all a model is – an attempt to place the data in the appropriate context.

Complaints from those on ground about clueless management and soulless beancounters are, essentially, complaints that they are operating without a model. Cutting $100k from a marketing budget is not the same thing as cutting $100k on jet engine inspections and quality control. The world of possible outcomes from marketing cuts might include between $25k to $50k less in sales revenue, a large drop the worst attributable failure possible. In contrast, $100k quality control cuts will result in $100k in increased profits in 99% of possible outcomes, but of course there’s also a 1% chance that 10,000 people die in a fiery blaze, billions are lost in lawsuits, and the company ceases to exist. To be clear, I am fully aware of the resources that companies invest in projecting risk from decisions. Rather, the point is to illustrate the importance of context and the dangers of treating all numbers on a ledger as comparable and complete.

The Unified Theory of Excel is the belief that everything is fungible and can be abstracted to a spreadsheet absent any context or model. This belief in universal business fungibility is especially alluring given that the most recent wave of “people who got rich off of low-hanging fruit” were finance folks who observed the fungibility of risk across debt instruments. This false fungibility ignored the dangers of stripping numbers of context, which in the case of mortgage debt instruments included the relationship of ledgers across markets and higher statistical moments i.e. tail risk. Economic theory is built on abstraction, but abstraction has the fun property of being useful until it is disastrous. It’s the last step that kills you. Or creates a financial crisis. Or produces a jet where those 1% events keep happening.

What I am observing, in the news and broader conversation, is a frustration with management that I think is often being misinterpreted as “frustration with business” but I think is more correctly viewed as “frustration with business done poorly” or, perhaps more precisely, “business done with the wrong model”. Writers, actors, and film crews are frustrated with management operating with models that have been outdated for at least a decade. Journalists are losing their minds dealing with publishers who can’t keep outlets afloat and make payroll on time because an underlying model appears to be absent entirely. If this was purely about competing interests then the answer would, in theory, be available in competitive markets or at the collective bargaining table. But something seems off. It I didn’t know better, I’d be looking for a broad inefficiency, some sort of negative technology shock. An investment or commitment to operating in a contextual vacuum.


The thing about MBAs is they are generalists by training who often, by dint of their advanced credentialing, sometimes think of themselves as specialists. Their speciality being “business” carries with it an implied concept that business can be reduced to the universal application of their training and expertise, both of which have increasingly come to be…well…Excel. Excel is many things, but it is not a model (or at least not a very good one). Neither is “business”, for that matter. A spreadsheet supporting a pivot table embedded in a power point slide deck is something that you can carry from job to job, contract to contract. A 73kb hammer you carry in a world of nails waiting to be enumerated on your LinkedIn. It can accomplish tasks, present outcomes, but it offers no more context than a three-ring binder. It’s a model that says that everything is the same, everything is fungible. That the world can be reduced to mathematics no more complicated than 4th grade arithmetic. The sort of simple answer to a complex problem that HL Mencken warned us of.

One of my grad school classmates had a turn of phrase that I’ve grown to appreciate: “Hippy Hayekians”. These were folks who favored free markets not because business people were geniuses or heros, or because goverment was inherently evil, but because good decision-making comes down to the tacit knowledge that only comes from being in and of something, on the ground, embedded in it day to day. I’m by no means an Austrian economist, and my friend would never have put it this way, but I’m increasingly of the view that good management often does in fact come down to “vibes”. If, of course, by “good management” you mean a holistic understanding of the entire enterprise, including not just ledgers, but also risks, ambitions, culture, customers, and constraints. And by “vibes” you mean the tacit knowledge held and communicated by every single human being within a firm. Perhaps the occasional dog or cat.

I’m a data-driven guy down to my bones. Whether its criminal justice policy or how to produce a successful new brand of toothpaste, the best possible answer is in the data. But interpreting data is impossible without context, without a model. So maybe this whole post is a warning to be careful of anyone, be they managers, consultants, or management consultants, offering advice without a model.

Programmer Pain in Memes

Memes communicate a lot of information, yet they are rarely preserved and explained.

It is February 2024. A friend of mine who works in tech just posted a fleet of funny memes about his job.

I have written a research paper and a policy paper about job selection into tech.

Research paper: “Willingness to be Paid: Who Trains for Tech Jobs?

I found that enjoyment or subjective preferences are underrated in the policy literature on the skills gap and promoting STEM in America. In a presentation in the Spring of ’23, I speculated that ChatGPT or other AI-assisted coding tools would make coding less tedious and therefore more fun.

I observe in this set of memes (posted in February 2024) that ChatGPT is already embedded in coding life, and yet it does not feel like anything fundamental has changed. Workers still Google their own way to solutions (although surely that has diminished somewhat due to LLMs). The work still feels hard and the workers still feel undervalued.

Senior programmers today would have grown up working very closely with search engines, largely to harvest the vast knowledge contained in tech message boards. I myself use that tool often when I have to program. Part of learning to code is just learning how to get help. This requires a certain mindset that is different from what is traditionally taught in school.
Many such cases.
Many people who end up as programmers want to do better. They are driven to write clean sensible code. A common theme is frustration that the product does not match the vision. This sentiment comes up more frequently than I have seen in other professions. The work they do is truly hard, and they are rarely afforded enough time to do it “right.”
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Is “Rich Dad  Poor Dad” a Fraud?

With my interest in personal finance, the headline

Robert Kiyosaki, ‘Rich Dad Poor Dad’ Author, Says, ‘I Am a Billionaire in Debt’ — And Calls Dave Ramsey An Idiot For Encouraging People To Live Debt-Free

got my attention. I happen to know many people who have been helped by Dave Ramsey‘s sensible courses and books on managing personal finances. But I don’t know a single person who has gotten rich by following Kiyosaki’s advice. So, I decided to do a little fact checking here.

Richard Kiyosaki published his financial self-help book Rich Dad Poor Dad in 1997. The book purports to be non-fiction, and dispenses financial advice through a supposed autobiographical narrative which contrasts his well-educated, hard-working but not-rich father (“poor dad”) with the father of his next-door neighbor Mike. Mike’s father (“rich dad”) was an eight-grade dropout who owned “convenient stores, restaurants, and a construction company. “

According to the narrative, Kiyosaki learned financial business secrets from this rich dad, which Kiyosaki applied to quickly build a vast real estate empire, using the magic of borrowed money.
Rich Dad Poor Dad became a runaway success, selling over 32 million copies, and remaining on the New York Times best seller list for over six years. Kiyosaki has parlayed its success into a series of further books and related products. Kiyosaki’s narrative has fired the imaginations of millions, and made him rich through the sales of his books and other products.

I read his book back around 2000, and came away with mixed impressions. On the one hand, there was sensible advice to put your resources into money-generating assets rather than frittering it away on consumer goods. The narrative of how easy it is to make big money in rental real estate was alluring, and motivated me to delve further into the subject. On the other hand, the book was pretty short on specifics of how to actually do this, beyond recommending expensive courses offered by Mr. Kiyosaki. It seemed too good to be true, but hey, how could I argue with such apparent success?

It turns out that that skeptical intuition of mine was justified: the promises offered in Rich Dad Poor Dad are too good to be true, and in fact the whole narrative of the book appears to have been made up in order to appeal to gullible readers.

Various people have probed into the Kiyosaki story. The most extensive treatment I know of is “John T. Reed’s analysis of Robert T. Kiyosaki’s book Rich Dad, Poor Dad”, but see also “ Shocking Revelation: Kiyosaki’s “Rich Dad” Is Not Real, but a Myth Like Harry Potter “, by KSCHANG at Tough Nickel, and others.

As best anybody can tell, there never was this “rich dad” character as described by Kiyosaki. Also, there’s no evidence that Kiyosaki actually made significant money by real estate dealings, prior to making millions of dollars with his book sales (and presumably putting some of that into real estate.)

As a person who values personal integrity, I tend to be peeved when authors or screenwriters present a book or a movie as fact, when key parts of it are actually fictional.  The usual “Based on a true story“ disclaimer doesn’t cut it, since readers/viewers can’t help coming away with the impression that this is what happened, when really it didn’t (Think: Roots, A Beautiful Mind, etc., etc.).

So the dishonesty at the core of Rich Dad Poor Dad annoys me. What is more significant is that much of the advice is actually counterproductive, harmful, or even illegal. For instance, Kiyosaki recommends trading stocks based on private tips from friends in corporations; this is called “insider trading”, and people like Martha Stewart have gone to jail in connection with it. He also tells of how he can back out of contracts by inserting a clause “subject to the approval of my partner”, where said partner was actually his cat. That is called “fraud”.

Richard Emert at The Motley Fool opines, “Kiyosaki’s material is almost completely devoid of specific financial advice. Further, his material on making money in real estate appears to be little more than repackaged hype from the “no money down” real estate hucksters of the late ’80s.”
In deference to his exhaustive investigation, I’ll give John Reed the last words here (tell us how you really feel, John):

Rich Dad, Poor Dad is one of the dumbest financial advice books I have ever read. It contains many factual errors and numerous extremely unlikely accounts of events that supposedly occurred.

Kiyosaki is a salesman and a motivational speaker. He has no financial expertise and won’t disclose his supposed real estate or other investment success.

Rich Dad, Poor Dad contains much wrong advice, much bad advice, some dangerous advice, and virtually no good advice.

[emphases in the original]

…the book goes on to deliver a pack of lies that make getting rich seem much easier than it really is and make education sound much less valuable than it really is. Basically, people want to get rich quick without effort or risk. Kiyosaki is just the latest in a long line of con men who pander to that fantasy.

[But] to members of Kiyosaki’s cult, it matters not how many false or probably-false statements I find in Kiyosaki’s writings. They just like the guy. Personality is an appropriate criterion for selecting someone to hang around with. But it is a highly inappropriate criterion for evaluating Kiyosaki’s advice, because he’s not going to let you hang around with him and your family’s finances are serious business.

What happens when NCAA athletes unionize?

Darthmouth men’s basketball took the next step in forming the first union of NCAA athletes. What does that mean? First, some background. The NCAA is divided into Division 1, 2, and 3 schools. Division 1 schools earns roughly $16 billion per year, the lion share of the revenue. The organizing institution, the NCAA earns about a $1 billion per year, and while their website reports that they return 75% of that to member schools, $250 million dollars per year is nothing to sneeze at for doing little more than managing and enforcing a cartel. Until 2 years ago, the NCAA prohibited any compensation for athletes beyond scholarships, room, and board. Now they can earn incomes from their image rights. In the Ivy League, athletes aren’t even allowed to receive scholarships (though I’ve been told by many personal friends that financial aid packages are unusually large for athletic recruits).

Cards on the table, I’ve long felt this was the most egregious abuse of labor currently active in our country. We scream at each other over whether the minimum wage should be higher while ignoring a group of workers upon whom a cartel is enforcing a maximum pecuniary wage of zero? Is there a side of the political spectrum currently arguing for ceilings on wages for anyone? How bans on athlete compensation survived this long is beyond me, though when left to speculate upon it my mind inevitably wanders to our worst cultural sins.

Let’s assume that the union eventually comes to be. Let’s further assume that the unions of teams and sports federate, eventually forming an umbrella union of all NCAA athletes across all divisions and sports. What will happen? When economists talk about unions, they typically focus on two channels through which they can have positive effects for their members. The first is they can close shop, restricting the supply of labor, driving up wages. This is Econ 101, not a lot of controversy. The second is that they can solve a collective action problem, enabling cooperation amoung members when bargaining for wages against employers. The size of this benefit depends largely on how organized employers are. The more cartelized employers, the more effectively they can collude, the larger the expected gain from collective action on behalf of labor. As such, we can expect the largest positive effect for labor when the union is negotiating against a monopsonistic employer (i.e. the employer constitutes the entire labor market) or a perfectly organized cartel of employers.

As such, when economists argue about (private sector) unions, any disagreement typically comes down to an empirical question: how concentrated is the labor market? How much power does the employer have in the labor market? With long-standing unions, political economy and bigger picture policy cost come into play, but we let’s put that aside for now (NB: we won’t even touch public sector unions. Those are a completely different bag).

What makes the NCAA context interesting is that there is no debate as to whether the NCAA is a cartel or sufficiently well-organized to impose significant costs on labor. It’s a >$16 billion dollar industry and the mission-critical employees haven’t been getting paid any pecuniary income at all. My suspicion is that even amongst the most union critical economists you could fine, most would agree that, conditional on the continuing existence of the NCAA, athletes would benefit from unionizing.

Ok, great, but what’s going to happen?

  1. Athletes will incrementally unionize.
  2. Compensation will increase, even beyond Name, Image, and Licensing (NIL) compensation.
  3. Scholarships will appear, in some form, at Ivy League schools.
  4. Sports will remain nearly everywhere, but I expect some schools will find that costs now exceed benefits, exiting Division 1 and 2.
  5. The model of compensating with “exposure” to professional scouts will continue to dissipate. You don’t need to be on national television anymore to have a scouting profile. Data and YouTube have changed the value-add of playing for a top 10 versus top 200 school, which means that compensation will become an even more critical deciding factor in recruitment.
  6. Athletes will frequently exit college with savings but also having already peaked in terms of lifetime yearly earnings. Which is fine – there is no shame in never making $200k/year again.
  7. The competive advantage of the the top schools in “big roster” sports i.e. football will grow. This will make already lopsided football matchups less tenable and, quite frankly, too dangerous. The formation of a collegiate football “super conference” is inevitable. It will make big money and so will the athletes. The NFL will have a true minor league, albeit one with a rabid fan base. It’s the rare win-win-win.
  8. Alumni donations will create “upstart schools” in sports overnight. A single $5 million dollar donation can make you the best gymnastics program in the country overnight. University hospitals have long been funded by saving the lives of very grateful, very rich people. Don’t be surprised when a walk-on who wrestled at 149 pounds and invented the next killer app writes a check that creates a dynasty.
  9. Coaches salaries will decline, often enormously. Head coach salaries will recover to some degree, assistant coach salaries will not. Coaches will become the labor class being most paid in “exposure” and “opportunity”.
  10. My guess is the only losers in this entire story will be a) Division 1 football and basketball coaches and b) officials at the NCAA. I will shed no tears for them.
  11. Enterprising athletes will start making money on Twitch playing the video game version of their sports, possibly themselves, against fans on their nights off. It will be awesome until 19 year olds start getting canceled for saying bad things in the heat of competitive video game competition.
  12. Athletes will negotiate more favorable practice and travel schedules. Graduation rates will go up.
  13. Schools won’t want to pay salaries for unused players. Red shirt rates will go down.
  14. Athlete influencers. There’s going to be so many college athlete influencers.

Please, no selfies and livestreams in my class. Please. I’m just trying to get through my day.

Taylor Swift to the Super Bowl with AdamSmithWorks

I had some fun with my favorite editor Christy Horpedahl.

WOULD ADAM SMITH TELL TAYLOR SWIFT TO ATTEND THE SUPER BOWL?

Have you been told that economists only care about money? If anyone would tell Taylor Swift to focus on her own career, you might think it would be the most famous economist of all, Adam Smith. But AdamSmithWorks fans already know that Adam Smith was concerned with the whole person. So, would Adam Smith advise Taylor Swift to rush back to America after an exhausting concert just to cheer on a man in a football game? 

Click the link and find out!

Bride Who Called Off Wedding Donates $15,000 Reception to Special Needs Families; and Other Good News.

My eye was caught my a recent random headline, “Bride Donates $15,000 Reception to Special Needs Families After Calling off Her Wedding”:

In the true definition of a worst-case scenario, an unnamed California bride-to-be is reported to have called off her entire non-refundable wedding reception worth $15,000, after learning something about her fiance.

But…she took the disaster and turned it on its head, donating the reception party complete with dinner, dessert, drinks, DJ, dancing, and photo booth to a non-profit called Parents Helping Parents which provides community support to parents with children who have special needs.

…Organizers at PHP sent out invitations for the “Ball for All” and had all the seats reserved 48 hours before the event. … “Nearly everyone [there] was a young adult with special needs, their parent or a member of the care team,” Daane said. “Their joy and delight really told the story about how special and unique this event was—the moment the ballroom was opened, and we all filed into a beautiful candlelit room with tables draped in white linen.”

Yay!

This cheering item is on the “Good News Network”, which I had never heard of before. Other headlines on this site include:

Irishman Whips Out Fiddle to Entertain Passengers in Flight–and People Dance a Jig in the Aisle (WATCH)

Singing or Playing Music Throughout Life is Linked with Better Brain Health While You Age

and

She’s a Pet Detective Who’s Tracked Down and Reunited 330 Lost Dogs with Owners for Free–Using Thermal Imaging.

 I think it is great to publicize such civic acts. Let’s make this the new normal.

Why don’t Americans migrate anymore?

Inter- and intratstate migration has collapsed within the United States over the last 60 years.

From “Understanding migration aversion using elicited counterfactual choice probabilities” Kosar, Ransom, and van der Klauw, Journal of Econometrics (2022).

This observation has been lurking in the not-completely-the-background of labor economics for 20 years. The best summary of the literature, by Jia et al, came out in the JEL last year. It’s a very useful and relatively complete treatment. I think a lot about migration these days, mostly asking about the determinants of our reservation wage of migration i.e. how much of a wage increase would someone have to offer you to pick up and move to an entirely new community.

If we take the above figure at face value, it would appear the reservation wage of migraton has increased for Americans. Quite a bit, actually. Of course, it is also possible that American’s no longer have to migrate to find a better job or wage, but that seems a hardly universal phenomenon over that last 50 years. Work from home has only had traction for a decade now at best. Labor markets aren’t as concentrated as they perhaps once were, loosening the monopsonistic lid a bit in a lot of markets, but at the same time the labor share of revenues hasn’t increased, in fact it’s decreased on average. So why aren’t people moving? I have some narrow, testable, answers that I am pursuing as research projects, but I also have a broad hypothesis that seems supremely untestable for the moment, sitting as it were in that thinkpiece uncanny valley between narrow research and podcast cheaptalk.

The concept of diminishing returns is an easy intuition to adopt. We all know the first bite of dessert is the best, the last the one most encumbered with regret. Economic growth remains a miracle, but it’s still true that nothing gained at the margin of the modern developed world will ever compete with those first steps out of subsistence. Very nearly every form of household capital and consumption in the modern work is characterized by some amount of diminishing returns, but that doesn’t mean they are diminishing at the same rate.

There are some goods for which there are few, if any substitutes. Demand for these special goods can be quite inelastic – we’re willing to sacrifice a lot to maintain a certain level of consumption. There are also goods that are quite complementary with one another, their value to us increasing as they are bundled together. Complements are powerful, putting together the right mix of consumption is quite literally the recipe for a better life. Complements, however, are often part and parcel to a cautionary tale. If something is a powerful complement to everything else in your life, we might find ourselves saying things like “I can’t live without it.” No amount of wealth in the world can survive being multiplied by zero.

There are few, if any, substitutes for friends, family, and our broader social network. Some goods cannot be consumed alone. If the sociological literature is to be believed, Americans are lonelier than ever. Both our deepest and most casual friendships have diminished in number. Relationships with neighbors are nonexistent, our ties to communities at a premium. That might, at first blush, make it sound like moving should be less costly– why stick around to maintain relationships that you don’t have. But on the other hand, if new relationships are harder to form than previously, then the relationships you already have are worth more than ever, to be protected jealously. Your only friend is, by definition, your best friend. No one wants to move away from their best friend.

Putting it all together, if personal relationships are an inelastic demand good that is complementary with a large chunk of our consumption bundle, then the price, the shadow price, we are willing to pay for it is going to go through the roof in the face of a negative supply shock. In a world where relationships are sudenly at a premium, you will be willing to forego a lot of additional income in order to preserve a small network in which you have a lot of social capital.

In two weeks half the country is going to be watching the Superbowl with a 3 or 4 friends, maybe 10 or 20. Thanks to innovation and economic growth, most people will be watching it on a 55 inch high definititon television with decent food and beverages. What about game would change if the host got a 20% raise? The TV might get a a little bigger, the snacks less fried, the beer more imported. What if the host moved two years ago? Would they have friends close enough to invite over? $15,000 worth of catering is a poor substitute for having someone to high-five.

The more I think about our lives and how little economic pressure, survival pressure, there is to find a 10% higher wage in the modern developed world, I’m surprised anyone migrates at all.

Avoid subfield tunnel vision

Folks are dunking on a tweet and, indirectly, the underlying research connecting mosquito nets to the degredation of seagrass meadows.

I’ll be honest, the implication that free mosquito nets are net negative for poverty and health sent me into that special kind of rage that can only be fomented by someone on the internet being both condescending and egregiously wrong at the same time. Do I even need to go over why this is bad? Why malaria prevention at a continental level outweighs hypothesized marginal seagress loss? I didn’t think so.

What I want to talk about is is subfield tunnel vision. A common piece of advice passed on to each generation of PhD students is to become a genuine expert in something. If you write a dissertation on the effect of malaria nets on elementary school attenance in Uganda, then you should become an expert, on the bleeding edge of all related-research, on mosquitos, nets, and primary education in Africa. As you career takes shape, the both the questions that strike you as important and the opportunities presented to you by institutions and administrators will shape your research. Bit my bit you will be shaped (and occasionally sanded down) into an ever-narrower expert. And that’s fine, that’s the story of incentives to specialize that comes for us all (NB: if your mind went to one of the public intellectual generalists you admire, do note that being a generalist in the modern world is very much its own niche specialty).

Specialization is good, but do take care that while your expertise becomes narrower that your view of world remains wide. We all know the relevant cliche about all the world becoming a nail whilst holding a hammer, but this is about about the rationalizing of tools and techniques. This is about how your specialization fits within the world and, more specifically, how the consquences of choices you might advise stand in the grand utilitarian calculus.

The authors of the paper in question are the Chief Scientific Officer and Chief Conservation Officer of Project Seagrass. These are people who have dedicated their lives to the preservation of seagrass meadows and, in turn, ocean health and the global stock of fish. Should we be surprised that their paper’s abstract closes with “We conclude that the use of mosquito nets for fishing may contribute to food insecurity, greater poverty and the loss of ecosystem functioning”? No, we should not. First, you could argue that they are just putting, in words, the implied signs of their analysis, and not the relative magnitudes. Maybe they aren’t implying mosquito nets are a net negative. You could be generous and argue that all they are trying to say is “Mosquito nets are great, but as soon as the malaria vaccine is universally distributed we should ditch all these nets because the costs will outweigh the benefits.

I don’t think they are, though. They lean heavily on Short et al (2018) and their claim that fishing nets are the primary use of freely provided mosquito netting. That Short et a result appears to be based almost entirely on an online survey with 113 respondents. The implication is that the massive reduction in malaria specifically attributed to the distribution of free mosquito nets is in fact a mirage, that these nets are instead finding their way into the ocean as improvised capital for small scale fishing operations (“artisanal fishing”, in the parlance of the paper), with the resulting consequence of catching additional juvenile fish at the margin, harming the future stock of fish.

The second part of that equation seems entirely feasible! Unintended costs happen. What I want to emphasize is that the authors are narrowly focused on establishing the cost of future fish in seagrass meadows while also being overly credulous of what is, I’m sorry, a ridiculously crappy survey that dismisses the enormous benefits of those nets to save human lives, especially children under the age of 5.

I don’t think the authors are being selfish, have ill-motivations, or have been bought off by a global conspiracy of wealthy fishery magnates. I just think they have succumbed to a bias that afflicts every scholar at one time or another, myself included. Gatekeepers won’t publish your paper in top journals, fund your research with needed grants, or invite you to prestigious conferences unless you hype your work to the absolute maximum of feasible importance. Spend a couple years as the conductor on your subfield’s hypetrain and maybe you start to believe it just a wee bit too much. Your subject of concern remains concrete, the questions imperative, while everything else increasingly fades into the realm of the abstract, the consequences negotiable.

As for the twitter commenter being dunked on, I just think it’s classic overeagerness to denigrate everything touched by someone you find odious. SBF is a bad person, did bad things, has bad hair. Sure, but maybe don’t? Maybe leave the most successful malaria prevention endeavor in the history of the world out of your public disgust for a <checks notes> young cryptocurrency embezzler? Don’t let your deserved anger for a genuinely bad person make you dumber at the margin. Bad people already impose costs on us all. Letting them skew your view of everything they touch just makes their societal footprint bigger.

You don’t know what you will like

There is no shortage of advice that falls along the lines of “If you aren’t eating at least one disappointing meal a weak/month/etc, then you aren’t trying enough new recipes or restaurants.” It all falls along the lines of increasing your risk of experiences that are subpar relative to what you already know you like so that you can increase your probability of adding something new to your portfolio of “likes” while also getting that one-time dopamine hit that comes from personal discovery.

It’s a good framing and broad set of advice. I endorse it.

What’s interesting though is that there’s a greater breadth to the foundational concept. Our lives are sufficiently short that we really don’t have that great of an idea of what we like and don’t like, especially for forking decisions that don’t allow for easy exploration of the counterfactual. At the same time, dedicating your life to the repeated pure act of discovery carries a certain…shallowness. To perpetually be on the lookout for the new and better is to never invest in the experiences that fill us with satisfication and joy. To get really good at doing what makes us happy. To get really good at being happy.

So where’s the balance? I don’t know and I am reasonably certain that’s at the core of the human condition, so I don’t think I going to come up with the answer in a blog post. But it strikes me that cultivating a certain taste for disappointment, not unlike a particularly peaty Scotch, is an incredible adaptation towards a better overall lived experience.

Which is to say that, after 30 years of telling anyone who would listen that I would never want a cat, that I refuse to get a cat, that a cat would offer no value to me, I absolutely love having a cat. My cat rules and it’s left me wondering what other things am I absolutely convinced I have no interest in that would fill my life with greater joy. What are things that I think I can’t stand, that other people love, that I might actually find incredibly-well suited to my tastes. A random list of things that, at the moment, I have no interest in:

  1. Motorcycles
  2. Cricket (the sport)
  3. Lasik
  4. Traveling to (actually) dangerous countries
  5. Committing crimes
  6. Running for office
  7. Eating any dish that includes raw chicken

That’s in no particular order, but I can’t help but wonder if there is something on that list I should give a go. City council? Visiting the Middle East? Larceny? To be clear, I’m not going to do any of those things, but that doesn’t me I shouldn’t. But there is a balance to having experiences you might not like, you probably won’t like, and, every few years, you think you definitely won’t like. Just in case.