## AS-AD: From Levels to Percent

The aggregate supply & aggregate demand model (AS-AD) is nice because it’s flexible and clear. Often professors will teach it in levels. That is, they teach it with the level of output on one axis, and the price level on the other axis. This presentation is convenient for the equation of exchange, which can be arranged to reflect that aggregate demand (AD) is a hyperbola in (Y, P) space. Graphed below is the AD curve in 2019Q4 and in 2020Q2 using real GDP, NGDP, and the GDP price deflator.

The textbook that I use for Principles of Macroeconomics, instead places inflation (π) on the vertical axis while keeping the level of output on the horizontal axis. The authors motivate the downward slope by asserting that there is a policy reaction function for the Federal Reserve. When people observe high rates of inflation, state the authors, they know that the Fed will increase interest rates and reduce output. Personally, I find this reasoning to be inadequate because it makes a fundamental feature of the AS-AD model – downward sloping demand – contingent on policy context.

At the same time, I do think that it can be useful to put inflation on the vertical axis. Afterall, individuals are forward looking. We expect positive inflation because that’s what has happened previously, and we tend to be correct. So, I tell my students that “for our purposes”, placing inflation on the vertical axis is fine. I tell them that, when they take intermediate macro, they’ll want to express both axes as rates of change. I usually say this, and then go about my business of teaching principles.

But, what does it look like when we do graph in percent-change space?

## In Praise of the FRED Excel Add-in

Sometimes, large entities have enough money to throw at a problem that by sheer magnitude they produce something great (albeit at too high a cost). The iPhone app from the FRED is not that thing. But the Excel add-in is something that every macroeconomics professor should consider adding to their toolkit.

Personally, I include links to FRED content in the lecture notes that I provide to students. But FRED makes it easy to do so much more. They now have an add-in that makes accessing data *much* faster. With it, professors can demonstrate in excel their transformations that students can easily replicate. The advantage is that students can learn to access and transform their own data rather than relying on links that I provide them.

The tool is easy enough to find – FRED wants you to use it. After that, the installation is largely automatic.

Installed in excel you will see the below new ribbon option. It’s very user friendly.

## Housing & The Fed’s Reputation

I am not worried about inflation and I’m not worried about the total spending in the economy. As I’ve said previously, total spending is on track with the pre-pandemic trend and, I think, that helped us experience the briefest recession in US history. When output growth declines below trend, we face higher prices or lower incomes. The former causes inflation, the latter causes large-scale defaults. Looking at the historical record, I’m for more concerned about the latter.

I do, however, want to call special attention to the composition of the Fed’s balance sheets. Specifically, its Mortgage Backed Security (MBS) assets. Having learned from the 2008 recession, the Fed was very intent on maintaining a stable and liquid housing market. Purchasing MBS is one way that it maintained that stability. Its total MBS holdings almost doubled from March of 2020 to December of 2021 to \$2.6 trillion. Should we be concerned?

At first, a doubling sounds scary. And, anything with the word ‘trillion’ is also scary. Even the graph below looks a little scary. MBS holdings by the Fed jumped and have continued to increase at about a constant rate. Is the housing market just being supported by government financing? What happens when the Fed decides to exit the market?

Luckily for us, there is precedent for Fed MBS tapering. The graph below is in log units and reflects that a similar acceleration in MBS purchases occurred in 2013. Fed net purchases were practically zero by 2015 and total MBS assets owned by the Fed were even falling by 2018. Do you remember the recession that we had in 2013 when the Fed stopped buying more MBS’s? Wasn’t 2018-2019 a rough time for the economy when the Fed started reducing its MBS holdings? No. We experienced a recession in neither 2013 nor 2018. Financial stress was low and RGDP growth was unexceptional.

Although there was no macroeconomic disruption, what about the residential sector performance during those times? Here is a worrisome proposed chain of causation:

1. Relative to a heavier MBS balance sheet, the Fed reducing its holdings increases supply on the MBS market.
2. This means that the return on creating new MBS’s falls (the price rises).
3. A lower return on MBS’s means that there is less demand from the financial sector for new loans from loan originators.
4. A tighter secondary market for mortgages decreases the eagerness with which banks lend to individuals.
5. Fewer loans to individuals puts downward pressure on the demand for houses and on the price of the associated construction materials.

The data fits this story, but without major disruption.

Less eager lenders went hand-in-hand with higher mortgage rates and less residential construction spending. The substitution effect pushed more real-estate lending and spending to the commercial side. Whereas residential spending was almost the same in late 2019 as it was in early 2018, commercial real-estate spending rose 13% over the same time period.

But, importantly in the story, the income effect of a Fed disruption should have been negative, resulting in less total spending and lower construction material prices. And that’s not what happened. Total Construction spending rose and so did construction material prices. Both of these are the opposite of what we would expect if the Fed had caused disruption in the housing construction sector due to its MBS holding changes.   Spending on residential construction fell understandably. But spending on commercial construction and the price of construction materials rose.

My point is that you should not listen to the hysteria.

The Fed has a variety of assets on its balance sheet and it pays special attention to the residential construction sector. Do you think that there is a residential asset bubble? Ok. Now you have to address whether the high prices are due to demand or supply. Do you suspect that the Fed unloading its MBS’s will result a popped bubble and maybe even contagion? It’s ok – you’re allowed to think that. But the most recent example of the Fed doing that didn’t result in either a macroeconomic crisis or substantial disruption in the construction markets.

The Fed has a track record and it has a reputation that serves as valuable information concerning its current and prospective activities. The next time that someone gets hysterical about Fed involvement in the housing sector, ask them what happened last time? Odds are that they don’t know. Maybe that information doesn’t matter for their opinion. You should value their opinion accordingly.

## Covid-19 & The Federal Reserve

I remember people talking about Covid-19 in January of 2020. There had been several epidemic scare-claims from major news outlets in the decade prior and those all turned out to be nothing. So, I was not excited about this one. By the end of the month, I saw people making substantiated claims and I started to suspect that my low-information heuristic might not perform well.

People are different. We have different degrees of excitability, different risk tolerances, and different biases. At the start of the pandemic, these differences were on full display between political figures and their parties, and among the state and municipal governments. There were a lot of divergent beliefs about the world. Depending on your news outlet of choice, you probably think that some politicians and bureaucrats acted with either malice or incompetence.

I think that the Federal Reserve did a fine job, however. What follows is an abridged timeline, graph by graph, of how and when the Fed managed monetary policy during the Covid-19 pandemic.

February, 2020: Financial Markets recognize a big problem

The S&P begins its rapid decent on February 20th and would ultimately lose a third of its value by March 23rd.  Financial markets are often easily scared, however. The primary tool that the Fed has is adjusting the number of reserves and the available money supply by purchasing various assets. The Fed didn’t begin buying extra assets of any kind until mid-March. There is a clear response by the 18th, though they may have started making a change by the 11th.  One might argue that they cut the federal funds rate as early as the 4th, but given that there was no change in their balance sheet, this was probably demand driven.

March, 2020: The Fed Accommodates quickly and substantially.

In the month following March 9th, the Fed increased M2 by 8.3%. By the week of March 21st, consumer sentiment and mobility was down and economic policy uncertainty began to rise substantially – people freaked out. Although the consumer sentiment weekly indicator was back within the range of normal by the end of April, EPU remained elevated through May of 2020. Additionally, although lending was only slightly down, bank reserves increased 71% from February to April. Much of that was due to Fed asset purchases. But there was also a healthy chunk that was due to consumer spending tanking by 20% over the same period.

In the 18 months prior to 2020, M2 had grown at rate of about 0.5% per month. For the almost 18 months following the sudden 8.3% increase, the new growth rate of M2 almost doubled to about 1% per month. The Fed accommodated quite quickly in March.

April, 2020: People are awash with money

Falling consumption caused bank deposit balances to rise by 5.6% between March 11th and April 8th. The first round of stimulus checks were deposited during the weekend of April 11th. That contributed to bank deposits rising by another 6.7% by May 13th.

By the end of March, three weeks after it began increasing M2, the Fed remembered that it really didn’t want another housing crisis. It didn’t want another round of fire sales, bank failures, disintermediation, collapsed lending, and debt deflation. It went from owning \$0 in mortgage-backed securities (MBS) on March 25th to owning nearly \$1.5 billion worth by the week of April 1st. Nobody’s talking about it, but the Fed kept buying MBS at a constant growth rate through 2021.

May, 2020 – December, 2021: The Fed Prevents Last-Time’s Crisis

Jerome Powell presided over the shortest US recession ever on record. The Fed helped to successfully avoid a housing collapse, disintermediation, and debt deflation – by 2008 standards. The monthly supply of housing collapsed, but it had bottomed out by the end of the summer. By August of 2021, the supply of housing had entirely recovered. The average price of new house sales never fell. Prices in April of 2020 were typical of the year prior, then rose thereafter. A broader measure of success was that total loans did not fall sharply and are nearly back to their pre-pandemic volumes. After 2008, it took six years to again reach the prior peak. A broader measure still, total spending in the US economy is back to the level predicted by the pre-pandemic trend.

The Fed can’t control long-run output. As I’ve written previously, insofar as aggregate demand management is concerned, we are perfectly on track. The problem in the US economy now is real output. The Fed avoided debt deflation, but it can’t control the real responses in production, supply chains, and labor markets that were disrupted by Covid-19 and the associated policy responses.

What was the cost of the Fed’s apparent success? Some have argued that the Fed has lost some of its political insulation and that it unnecessarily and imprudently over-reached into non-monetary areas. Maybe future Fed responses will depend on who is in office or will depend on which group of favored interests need help. Personally, I’m not so worried about political exposure. But I am quite worried about the Fed’s interventions in particular markets, such as MBS, and how/whether they will divest responsibly.

Of course, another cost of the Fed’s policies has been higher inflation. During the 17 months prior to the pandemic, inflation was 0.125% per month. During the pandemic recession, consumer prices dipped and inflation was moderate through November.  But, in the 16 months since April of 2020, consumer prices have grown at a rate of 0.393% per month – more than three times the previous rate. Some of that is catch-up after the brief fall in prices.

Although people are genuinely worried about inflation, they were also worried about if after the 2008 recession and it never came. This time, inflation is actually elevated. But people were complaining about inflation before it was ever perceptible. The compound annual rate of inflation rose to 7% in March of 2021. But it had been almost zero as recent as November, 2020. That March 2021 number is misleading. The actual change in prices from February to March was 0.567%. Something that was priced at \$10 in February was then priced at \$10.06 in March. Hardly noticeable, were it not for headlines and news feeds.

## QE, Stock Prices, and TINA

The U.S. economy as quantified by GDP has been sputtering along in slow growth mode for a number of years. It took a huge hit in 2020 due to covid shutdowns and has not nearly recovered. But stock prices have been rocketing upwards, and this past year is no exception. Markets took a cliff-dive in March, but have since way overshot to the upside.

Here is a plot of the past five decades of U.S. GDP and of the Wilshire 5000 index, which approximates the total stock market capitalization in the U.S.:

Chart Source: St. Louis Fed, as plotted by Lyn Alden Schwartzer

These two curves have crisscrossed each other over the past five decades, but in recent years the stock market has roared to the upside. One of Warren Buffet’s favorite metrics as to whether stock are overvalued is to consider the ratio of these two quantities, i.e. the market-capitalization-to-GDP (Cap/GDP) ratio:

Source: Lyn Alden Schwartzer

The ratio is much higher than it has even been. The last time it got this high was in 2000, and that did not end well.

## Peering Inside the Balance Sheet of the Fed

A balance sheet gives a snapshot of a corporation’s assets and liabilities. The difference between total assets and total liabilities is (by definition) the value of the equity owned by the owners or shareholders of the company.

With, say, a manufacturing firm, the assets would include tangible items such as buildings and equipment and inventory, and intangibles such as cash, bank accounts, and accounts receivable. Liabilities may include mortgages and other loans, and accounts payable such as taxes, wages, pensions, and bills for purchased goods.

The balance sheet for a bank is different. The “Assets” are mainly loans that the bank has made, plus some securities (such as US Treasury bonds) that the bank has purchased. These assets pay interest to the bank. The money the bank used to make these loans and purchase these securities came mainly from customer deposits or other borrowings by the bank (which are considered “Liabilities” of the bank), and also from paid-in capital from the bank owners/shareholders. [1]  As usual, the current equity of the bank is assets minus liabilities. Thus:

Source:  BBVA

The Federal Reserve System is a complex beast. We will not delve into all the components and moving parts, but just take a look at the overall balance sheet.

Unlike other banks, the Fed has the magical power of being able to create money out of thin air. Technically, what the Fed can do with that money is mainly make loans, i.e. buy interest-bearing securities such as government bonds. The Fed makes its transactions through affiliated banks, so it credits a bank’s reserve account with a million dollars, if it buys from that bank a million dollars’ worth of bonds. Those bonds then become part of the Fed’s “assets”, while the reserve account of the bank at the Fed (which is a liability of the Fed) becomes larger by a million dollars. Since the Fed is not a for-profit bank, the “Equity” entry on its balance sheet is nearly zero. Thus, total assets are essentially equal to total liabilities.

The Fed also has the power of literally printing money, in the form of Federal Reserve Notes (printed dollar bills). These, too, are classified as liabilities. Thus, you are probably carrying in your wallet right now some of the liabilities of the central bank of the United States.

Before 2008, the balance sheet of the Fed was under a trillion dollars. Nearly all the “Liabilities” were the Federal Reserve Notes and nearly all the “Assets” were US Treasury securities. The reserve accounts of the affiliated Depository Institutions was minuscule. All that changed with the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009. To help stabilize the financial system, the Fed started buying lots of various types of securities, including mortgage-backed securities (MBS) [2]. The Fed thus propped up the value of these securities, and injected cash (liquidity) into the system.

Here is a plot of how the assets of the Fed ballooned in the wake of the GFC, from about \$ 0.9 trillion to over \$ 4 trillion:

Source: Investopedia

The initial purchases in 2008 were US Treasuries, which the Fed had prior authorization to do. To buy other securities, especially the mortgage products, required congressional authorization. The increased liabilities of the Fed which offset these purchases were mainly in the form of larger reserve accounts of the affiliated banks. The Fed started paying interest on these reserve accounts, to keep short term interest rates above zero at all times (otherwise the whole money market in the U.S. might implode).

With the Fed relentlessly buying the mortgage and bond products, the interest rates on long-term mortgages and bonds was kept low. This was deemed good for economic growth. The Fed tried to sell off some securities to taper down its balance sheet in 2018, but that effort blew up in its face – – the stock market started crashing in response in late 2018, and so the Fed backtracked . You can look at weekly tables of the Fed balance sheet here.

Anyway, the GFC and its aftermath provided the precedent for massive purchases of “stuff” by the Fed. When the Covid shutdown of the economy hit in March of this year, the Fed very quickly went into high gear. Its balance sheet shot up from \$4 trillion to \$7 trillion in just a few months. It bought not only Treasuries and MBS, but corporate bonds. This was way outside the Fed’s original charter, but the crisis was so intense that nobody seemed to care whether these actions were legal or not. And now, to finance the huge deficit spending of the federal government in the wake of the shutdowns, the Fed has been buying up nearly the entire issuance of Treasury bonds and notes.

These actions may have long term consequences we will explore in later posts [3]. For now, the Fed has made it clear that it will keep interests rates near zero for at least the next couple of years. Invest accordingly.

ENDNOTES

[1] Huge caveat: This statement gives the impression that a bank must first receive say a thousand dollar deposit before it can make a thousand dollar loan. That is not the case. The reality is just the opposite: the act of making a thousand dollar loan actually CREATES a corresponding thousand dollar deposit. This is very counterintuitive, and I won’t try to explain or justify this point here.

[2] Technically, the Fed is not “buying” the mortgage-backed security (MBS). Rather, it is making a “loan” to the bank, and holding the MBS as collateral against that loan.

[3] It is now harder to take the federal deficit seriously as a constraint on spending:  the government can issue unlimited bonds to fund deficits, which the Fed will purchase to keep interest rates low. Yes, the government has to pay interest on those bonds, but the Fed has to return most of that interest to the Treasury, so the real cost to the government of that extra debt is low.

## Aggregate Demand Regimes

### Is inflation correlated with output growth?

Consider the AD-AS model which is often expressed in growth rates. Economists will often say that the short-run supply curve is flatter in the short-run and vertical in the long-run. In other words, aggregate demand policy can have SR output effects, and only has LR price effects.  Sounds good.

But there is a lot of baggage hiding behind “can have effects”. Often we’ll say that lackadaisical businesses cause a flatter SRS and that businesses with rational expectations have a vertical one. Also sounds good.

What causes the steepness of the SR supply curve? I’m sure that there are multiple determinants in regard to expectations. Here’s what got me on this topic. David Andolfatto shared the below graph and asked “Does lowflation necessarily mean low growth?.

Good question. My answer includes expectations concerning the monetary policy regime. Specifically, my answer was “It does in a regime of volatile and uncertain nominal income. Surprise AD growth pushes us up the SRAS.” Andolfatto called me out and in the right way, asking “What’s the evidences for this?

[…crickets…]

I had no evidence. I had the AS-AD model in hand and some logic – but no evidence. My logic is as follows. In a monetary regime that includes a constant rate of AD growth, output and price growth are inversely correlated. If NGDP grows at 5% always, then inflation falls when output growth rises. In other words, AD is exactly what people expect – illustrated as a vertical SRAS curve.

However, expectations are different in a regime of erratic AD. Let’s say that the rate of AD growth is unknown, but that the variance is known. If this is the world that you live in, then you make hay when the sun shines. Businesses sell more in periods of higher income. And, because they’re marching up the marginal cost curve, prices also rise. Alternatively, it may be that output growth is inflexible and prices rise as a goods are rationed.

Regardless of the truth, the above explanation is just story-telling. I had no evidence. What would the evidence even be? Here’s what I settled on. First, let’s express the AS-AD model in quarterly growth rates. In order to get a handle on monetary regime AD variance, I calculated the standard deviation of the NGDP growth rate by Fed Chair. Presumably, the Fed chair has a decent amount to do with monetary policy and the rear that occupies that chair is an indicator of when a regime begins and ends. I calculated the correlation between the GDP deflator and RGDP growth rates by regime. Below is the scatter plot.

What does it tell us? It tells us that regimes of stable AD growth experience a negative correlation between inflation and output growth. It also tells us that a AD growth volatility is associated with a positive correlation between inflation and output growth. So,  Does lowflation necessarily mean low growth? It does in a regime of volatile and uncertain nominal income.

(Of course this is all casual. It makes sense to me at first blush though. Having said that, the line of best fit also looks like it’s driven by the 2 extremely variable times: McCabe & Powell.)

## Timeline of the Global Financial Crisis, Part 1: January-September, 2008

The sudden shutdown of much of the economy of the U.S. and of the world starting in February and March of 2020 led to deep concern, if not panic, in world financial markets. Millions of people were suddenly unemployed or furloughed, millions of small businesses faced bankruptcy, and stocks plunged some 30% in the fastest fall of global markets in history. Demand collapsed, and prices for nearly all financial assets fell. Trillions of dollars of financial transactions were in danger of unravelling.

The Federal Reserve immediately rode to the rescue, slashing interest rates and buying up all kinds of financial assets. These purchases of bonds and similar products injected cash into the markets to provide much-needed liquidity, and kept the system on track. In late March, the U.S. federal government authorized trillions of dollars of payments to individuals and businesses to stave off bankruptcy, and forbade foreclosures on mortgages, to keep people from losing their homes (at least in the near term). Banks and governments in other nations took similar measures. By May, it was clear that the worst scenarios had been averted, even though there will be significant lingering consequences of the Covid shutdowns.

The speed and scale of the Fed and government responses in March, 2020, may be attributed in part to learnings from the 2008-2009 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). In that crisis, the severity of the problem was not understood at first. There was naturally reluctance to take unprecedented actions to do what was perceived as bailing out of irresponsible banks and other companies. Over a period of many months, various measures were implemented to address some immediate needs, but then more and more problems kept cropping up. It was a macroeconomic game of whack-a-mole.

As a bit of a history lesson, here is a timeline of the main financial events of January-September, 2008. These descriptions are taken, with only minor editing, from an article by Kimberly Amadeo in The Balance.

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

January 2008: Fed Tries to Stop Housing Bust

Easy credit and expectations of always-increasing home prices led to a speculative run-up in housing in 2002-2006. Mortgages were given to people who really could not afford them, and billions of dollars of those unsound sub-prime mortgages were repackaged and sold into the broad financial system. That all began to unravel in 2006-2007. In response to a struggling housing market, the Federal Market Open Committee began lowering the fed funds rate. It dropped the rate to 3.5% on January 22, 2008, then to 3.0% a week later. Economic analysts thought lower rates would be enough to restore demand for homes.

February 2008: Bush Signs Tax Rebate as Home Sales Continue to Plummet

President Bush signed a tax rebate bill to help the struggling housing market. The bill increased limits for Federal Housing Administration loans and allowed Freddie Mac to repurchase jumbo loans.

February’s homes sales fell 24% year-over-year. It reached 5.03 million according to the National Association of Realtors. The median resale home price was \$195,900, down 8.2% year-over-year.  Foreclosures were up.

March 2008: Fed Begins Bailouts

The Fed Chair realized the Fed needed to take aggressive action. It had to prevent a more serious recession. Falling oil prices meant the Fed was not concerned about inflation. When inflation isn’t a concern, the Fed can use expansionary monetary policy. The Fed’s goal was to lower the LIBOR benchmark interest rate, and keep adjustable-rate mortgages affordable. In its role of “bank of last resort,” it became the only bank willing to lend.

It increased its Term Auction Facility program to \$50 billion.﻿ It also initiated a series of term repurchase transactions. These were 28-day term repurchase agreements with primary dealers. The Fed’s goal was to pump \$100 billion into the economy.

March 11: The Fed announced it would lend \$200 billion in Treasury notes to bail out bond dealers. They were stuck with mortgage-backed securities and other collateralized debt obligations. They couldn’t resell them on the secondary market. The subprime mortgage crisis dried up the secondary market for these debt products.

No one knew who had the bad debt or how much was out there. All buyers of debt instruments became afraid to buy and sell from each other. No one wanted to get caught with bad debt on their books. The Fed was trying to keep liquidity in the financial markets.

But the problem was not just one of liquidity, but also of solvency. Banks were playing a huge game of musical chairs, hoping that no one would get caught with more bad debt. The Fed tried to buy time by temporarily taking on the bad debt itself.﻿ It protected itself by only holding the debt for 28 days and only accepting AAA-rated debt.

March 14: The Federal Reserve held its first emergency weekend meeting in 30 years. On March 17, it announced it would guarantee Bear Stearns‘ bad loans. It wanted JP Morgan to purchase Bear and prevent bankruptcy. Bear Stearns’ had about \$10 trillion in securities on its books. If it had gone under, these securities would have become worthless. That would have jeopardized the global financial system.

March 18: The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) lowered the fed funds rate by 0.75% to 2.25%. It had halved the interest rate in six months. That put downward pressure on the dollar, which increased oil prices.

That same day, federal regulators agreed to let Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac take on another \$200 billion in subprime mortgage debt.﻿ The two government-sponsored enterprises would buy mortgages from banks. This process is known as buying on the secondary market. They then package these into mortgage-backed securities and resell them on Wall Street. All goes well if the mortgages are good, but if they turn south, then the two GSEs would be liable for the debt.

The Federal Housing Finance Board also took action. It authorized the regional Federal Home Loan Banks to take an extra \$100 billion in subprime mortgage debt. The loans had to be guaranteed by Fannie and Freddie Mac

Fed Chair Ben Bernanke and U.S. Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson thought this would take care of the problem. They underestimated how extensive the crisis had become. These bailouts only further destabilized the two mortgage giants.

April – June: Fed Lowers Rate and Buys More Toxic Bank Debt

April 30: The FOMC lowered the fed funds rate to 2%.

April 7 and April 21: The Fed added another \$50 billion each through its Term Auction Facility.

May 20: The Fed auctioned another \$150 billion through the Term Auction Facility.

By June 2, the Fed auctions totaled \$1.2 trillion. In June, the Federal Reserve lent \$225 billion through its Term Auction Facility. This temporary stop-gap measure of adding liquidity had become a permanent fixture.

July 11, 2008: IndyMac Bank Fails

July 11: The Office of Thrift Supervision closed IndyMac Bank.﻿ Los Angeles police warned angry IndyMac depositors to remain calm while they waited in line to withdraw funds from the failed bank. About 100 people worried they would lose their deposit. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) only insured amounts up to \$100,000. This was later raised to \$250,000.

July 23: Treasury Secretary Paulson made the Sunday talk show rounds. He explained the need for a bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The two agencies themselves held or guaranteed almost half of the \$12 trillion of the nation’s mortgages.

Wall Street’s fears that these loans would default caused Fannie’s and Freddie’s shares to tumble. This made it more difficult for private companies to raise capital themselves. Paulson reassured talk show listeners that the banking system was solid, even though other banks might fail like IndyMac.

July 30: Congress passed the Housing and Economic Recovery Act. It gave the Treasury Department authority to guarantee as much as \$25 billion in loans held by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

September 7: Treasury Nationalizes Fannie and Freddie

The FHFA placed Fannie and Freddie under conservatorship.﻿ It allowed the government to run the two until they were strong enough to return to independent management.

The FHFA allowed Treasury to purchase preferred stock of the two to keep them afloat. They could also borrow from the Treasury. Last but not least, Treasury was allowed to purchase their mortgage-backed securities.

The Fannie and Freddie bailout initially cost taxpayers \$187 billion. But over time, they two paid back all costs plus added \$58 billion in profit to the general fund.﻿

September 15, 2008: Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy Triggered Global Panic

Paulson urged Lehman Brothers to find a buyer. Only two banks were interested: Bank of America and British Barclays.

Bank of America didn’t want a loan. It wanted the government to cover \$65 billion to \$70 billion in anticipated losses. Paulson said no.﻿ The U.S. Treasury had no legal authority to invest capital in Lehman Brothers, as Congress hadn’t yet authorized the Troubled Asset Relief Program. Barclays announced its British regulators would not approve a Lehman Brothers deal.

Since Lehman Brothers was an investment bank, the government could not nationalize it like it did government enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. For that same reason, no federal regulator, like the FDIC, could take it over.  Moreover, the Fed couldn’t guarantee a loan as it did with Bear Stearns. Lehman Brothers didn’t have enough assets to secure one.

When Lehman’s declared bankruptcy, financial markets reeled. The Dow fell 504 points, its worst decline in seven years. U.S. Treasury bond prices rose as investors fled to their relative safety. Oil prices tanked.

Later that day, Bank of America announced it would purchase struggling Merrill Lynch for \$50 billion.

September 16, 2008: Fed Buys AIG for \$85 Billion

The American International Group Inc. turned to the Federal Reserve for emergency funding. The company had insured trillions of dollars of mortgages throughout the world. If it had fallen, so would the global banking system. Bernanke said that this bailout made him angrier than anything else. AIG took risks with cash from supposedly ultra-safe insurance policies. It used it to boost profits by offering unregulated credit default swaps.

October 8, 2008: The Federal lent another \$37.8 billion to AIG subsidiaries in exchange for fixed-income securities.

November 10, 2008: The Fed restructured its aid package.﻿ It reduced its \$85 billion loan to \$60 billion. The \$37.8 billion loan was repaid and terminated.The Treasury Department purchased \$40 billion in AIG preferred shares. The funds allowed AIG to retire its credit default swaps rationally, stave off bankruptcy, and protect the government’s original investment.

September 17, 2008: Economy Almost Collapsed

Due to losses from Lehman’s bankruptcy, investors fled money market mutual funds. That’s where companies obtain their short-term cash.

September 16: The Reserve Primary Fund “broke the buck.” It didn’t have enough cash on hand to pay out all the redemptions that were occurring.

September 17: The attack spread. Investors withdrew a record \$172 billion from their money market accounts.﻿ During a typical week, only about \$7 billion is withdrawn. If it had continued, companies couldn’t get money to fund their day-to-day operations. In just a few weeks, shippers wouldn’t have had the cash to deliver food to grocery stores. We were that close to a complete collapse.

September 19, 2008: Paulson and Bernanke Meet with Congress

U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson (L) speaks as Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke (R) listens during a hearing before the House Financial Services Committee on Capitol Hill September 24, 2008 in Washington, DC. Photo: Alex Wong/Getty Images

September 19: Paulson and Bernanke met with Congressional leaders to explain the crisis.﻿ Republicans and Democrats alike were stunned by the somber warnings. They realized that credit markets were only a few days away from a meltdown.

The leaders were prepared to work together in a bipartisan fashion to craft a solution. But many rank-and-file members of Congress were not on board.

Bernanke announced the Fed would lend the money needed by banks and businesses to operate so they wouldn’t have to pull out the cash in money market funds. This, along with the announcement of the bailout package, calmed the markets enough keep the economy functioning.

September 20, 2008: Treasury Submits Legislation to Congress

On September 20, Paulson submitted a three-page document that asked Congress to approve a \$700 billion bailout.﻿ Treasury would use the funds to buy up mortgage-backed securities that were in danger of defaulting. By doing so, Paulson wanted to take these debts off the books of banks, hedge funds, and pension funds that held them.

When asked what would happen if Congress didn’t approve the bailout, Paulson replied, “If it doesn’t pass, then heaven help us all.”

September 21, 2008: The End of the “Greed Is Good” Era

Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, two of the most successful investment banks on Wall Street, applied to become regular commercial banks. They wanted the Fed’s protection.

September 26, 2008: WaMu Goes Bankrupt

Washington Mutual Bank went bankrupt when its panicked depositors withdrew \$16.7 billion in 10 days. It had insufficient capital to run its business. The FDIC then took over. The bank was sold to J.P. Morgan for \$1.9 billion.

September 29, 2008: Stock Market Crashes as Bailout Rejected

A trader gestures as he works on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange September 29, 2008 in New York City. U.S. stocks took a nosedive in reaction to the global credit crisis and as the U.S. House of Representatives rejected the \$700 billion rescue package, 228-205. Photo by Spencer Platt/Getty Images

The stock market collapsed when the U.S. House of Representatives rejected the bailout bill. Opponents were rightly concerned that their constituents saw the bill as bailing out Wall Street at the expense of taxpayers. But they didn’t realize that the future of the global economy was at stake.

Stock investors did, sending the ​Dow Jones Industrial Average down 770 points. It was the most in any single day in history. It didn’t stop there. Global markets panicked: The Morgan Stanley Capital International World Index dropped 6% in one day, the most since its creation in 1970.

To restore financial stability, the Federal Reserve doubled its currency swaps with foreign central banks in Europe, England, and Japan to \$620 billion. The governments of the world were forced to provide all the liquidity for frozen credit markets.

[Again, these descriptions are taken nearly verbatim from 2008 Financial Crisis Timeline, by Kimberly Amadeo. See her article for coverage of the rest of 2008, and the ending of the recession in 2009.]

## How Much Money Is There?

It is not straightforward to define what “money” is in a modern national economy. Simply tallying the amount of coins and paper currency is inadequate. Most buying and selling is now done by shifting numbers between abstract bank accounts, not by pushing a bundle of bills across a table.  Thus, these bank accounts serve the functions of money (medium of exchange and store of value). The question then arises as to which of these financial accounts to regard as money.

There are a number of measures of money in modern economies. In the U.S. some of these are:

M0: The total of all physical currency (coins and paper bills).

MB (“Monetary Base”): The total of all physical currency (coins and bill) plus Federal Reserve  Deposits (special deposits that only banks can have at the Fed). This is money essentially created by the government plus the Federal Reserve, which does not necessarily enter the private economy to be spent.

M1: Physical currency circulating outside of the Fed and private banking system, plus the amount of demand deposits, travelers’ checks and other checkable deposits. This is highly “liquid” money, i.e. accepted and used for transactions in the private economy.

M2: M1 + most savings accounts, money market accounts, retail money market mutual funds, and small denomination time deposits (certificates of deposit of under \$100,000). The funds in these additional savings and money market accounts can in general be easily transferred to checkable accounts, and thus could go towards making purchases if desired.

MZM: “Money Zero Maturity” is one of the most popular aggregates in use by the Fed because its velocity has historically been the most accurate predictor of inflation. It is M2 – time deposits + institutional money market funds.

Below is a chart showing the growth in the U.S. in the past fifteen years of M0 (total currency, labeled “currency in circulation), MB, M1, and M2. The grayed areas are recessions, i.e. 2008-2009 and the present.  [1]

The M1 money supply (green line) was about \$1.4 trillion ( \$1,400 billion on the chart) in 2005, was fairly steady for several years, then started a steady ramp up to \$4 trillion by January, 2020. Due to the extraordinary events associated with the Covid-19 shutdown (government stimulus package plus Fed purchases of securities), M1 jumped up to \$ 5.4 trillion by August of this year. M2 followed similar trends, though on a much larger scale, rising to\$18.3 trillion this year. This compares to a current U. S. total GDP of about \$21 trillion.

The lowest line on the chart is the physical currency (blue line), which has grown slowly but steadily. The “Total MB” (red) line, was essentially on top of the blue line up until the 2008-2009 recession. Since MB = physical currency plus reserves, this meant that the amount of money in the reserve balances at the Fed of the private banks was nearly zero before 2008. The reserves jumped up (difference between the red and blue lines) in 2009, with the onset of massive purchases of securities by the Fed (“quantitative easing”). The Fed buys these securities from the banks, and credits their reserve accounts. The Fed has tried to taper down its holdings in recent years (red line declining 2015-2019), but suddenly purchased trillions more this spring (red line jumping up in 2020).  Most pundits hold that all this Fed money injected into the financial system has been the major cause of the enormous rise in stock prices in the past decade, especially in the past six months.

[1] Chart produced on the St. Louis Fed “FRED” site, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/categories/24 . This site has a wealth of economic data. Unfortunately, it is not easy to change units, so I was stuck with “billions” instead of “trillions” for the axis labels. Also, the M0 and MB numbers were only available in “millions”, so I had to divide those numbers by 1000 to get them to fit on the plot with M1 and M2. The grayed out spots on the graph labels is where I blotted out the “ /1000 ” which the plotting software put in. It would have been cleaner, in retrospect, to have exported the data to Excel and replotted it there.