Seven Reasons Why Americans Pay So Much for Health Care

Ken Alltucker at USA Today recently published a piece titled Seven reasons why Americans pay more for health care than any other nation. It starts off:

Americans spend far more on health care than anywhere else in the world but we have the lowest life expectancy among large, wealthy countries.

A lot of that can be explained by the unique aspects of our health care system. Among other things, we reward doctors more for medical procedures than for keeping people healthy, keep costs hidden from customers and spend money on tasks that have nothing to do making patients feel better.

“We spend more on administrative costs than we do on caring for heart disease and caring for cancer,” said Harvard University economist David Cutler. “It’s just an absurd amount.”

The article notes that the whole system is skewed towards high costs. It is not just profiteering insurance companies. Seven factors are listed. I will excerpt them in italics below, and close with a few of my comments.

Reason 1: Lack of price limits

U.S. hospitals have more specialists than do medical facilities in other nations. Having access to 24/7 specialty care, particularly for hospitals in major metro areas, drives up costs… Patients have more elbow room and privacy here. U.S. hospitals typically have either one or two patients per room, unlike facilities abroad that tend to have open wards with rows of beds, Chernew said. He said differences in labor markets and regulatory requirements also can pack on costs.

Of the $4.5 trillion spent on U.S. health care in 2022, hospitals collected 30% of that total health spending, according to data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. Doctors rank second at 20%. Prescription drugs accounted for 9% and health insurance − both private health insurance and government programs such as Medicare and Medicaid − collect 7% in administrative costs.

Reason 2: Hospitals and doctors get paid for services, not outcomes

Doctors, hospitals and other providers are paid based on the number of tests and procedures they order, not necessarily whether patients get better.  The insurer pays the doctor, hospital or lab based on negotiated, in-network rates between the two parties.

Critics of this fee-for-service payment method says it rewards quantity over quality. Health providers who order more tests or procedures get more lucrative payments whether the patients improve or not.

Reason 3: Specialists get paid much more ‒ and want to keep it that way

Doctors who provide specialty care such as cardiologists or cancer doctors get much higher payments from Medicare and private insurers than primary care doctors.

Some see that as a system that rewards doctors who specialize in caring for patients with complex medical conditions while skimping on pay for primary care doctors who try to prevent or limit disease.

[My comment: There is a saying in management science that your system is perfectly designed for the results you are getting. In other nations with a fixed pot of money, doled out by the government, to mainly non-profit health providers, there is (in theory, at least) an incentive system that would work towards minimizing overall health expenses. In the U.S., though, we have a mainly for-profit system, that collects more moolah the more health problems we have, and the more expensive are the treatments. Most healthcare providers try to be noble-minded and work for the good of their patients, but still the overall financial incentives are what they are.  The health insurance companies are one of the few forces working against endless upward spiraling of healthcare costs. ]

Under the current system, doctors are chosen or approved by the American Medical Association to a 32-member committee which recommends values for medical services that Medicare then considers when deciding how much to pay doctors. Some have compared the idea of doctors setting their own payscale to the proverbial fox guarding the henhouse.

Reason 4: Administrative costs inflate health spending

One of the biggest sources of wasted medical spending is on administrative costsseveral experts told USA TODAY….Harvard’s Cutler estimates that up to 25% of medical spending is due to administrative costs.

Health insurers often require doctors and hospitals to get authorization before performing procedures or operations. Or they mandate “step therapy,” which makes patients try comparable lower-cost prescription drugs before coverage for a doctor-recommended drug kicks in.  These mandates trigger a flurry of communication and tasks for both health insurers and doctors.

Reason 5: Health care pricing is a mystery

Patients often have no idea how much a test or a procedure will cost before they go to a clinic or a hospital. Health care prices are hidden from the public. …An MRI can cost $300 or $3,000, depending on where you get it. A colonoscopy can run you $1,000 to $10,000.

Economists cited these examples of wide-ranging health care prices in a request that Congress pass the Health Care Price Transparency Act 2.0, which would require hospitals and health providers to disclose their prices.

Reason 6: Americans pay far more for prescription drugs than people in other wealthy nations

There are no price limits on prescription drugs, and Americans pay more for these life-saving medications than residents of other wealthy nations.

U.S prescription drug prices run more than 2.5 times those in 32 comparable countries, according to a 2023 HHS report…. Novo Nordisk charged $969 a month for Ozempic in the U.S. ‒ while the same drug costs $155 in Canada, $122 in Denmark, and $59 in Germany, according to a document submitted by Sanders.

[My comment: Yes, this disparity irks me greatly].

Reason 7: Private Equity

Wall Street investors who control private equity firms have taken over hospitals and large doctors practices, with the primary goal of making a profit. The role of these private equity investors has drawn increased scrutiny from government regulators and elected officials.

One example is the high-profile bankruptcy of Steward Health Care, which formed in 2010 when a private equity firm, acquired a financially struggling nonprofit hospital chain from the Archdiocese of Boston.

Private equity investors also have targeted specialty practices in certain states and metro regions.

Last year, the Federal Trade Commission sued U.S. Anesthesia Partners over its serial acquisition of practices in Texas, alleging these deals violated antitrust laws and inflated prices for patients. …FTC Chair Lina Khan has argued such rapid acquisitions allowed the doctors and private equity investors to raise prices for anesthesia services and collect “tens of millions of extra dollars for these executives at the expense of Texas patients and businesses.”

[ This also concerns me. That anesthesia monopoly should never have been allowed, in my opinion. The reason the PE firm paid to acquire all those individual practices was so that they could raise prices while minimizing services. Duh. That is the PE gamebook. When they do a corporate takeover, they nearly always fire employees and raise prices on products, to goose profits. This would not be a problem if the business were, say, selling pet rocks, but healthcare is different.

In many metro areas now, nearly all healthcare providers (even if they seem to retain their private practices) have become part of one or two mega conglomerates that cover the area. I feel fortunate because at least on of the mega conglomerates in my area is a high-quality non-profit, but I pity those whose only choice is between two for-profits.]

Final comments: I think another factor here is in our private enterprise system, it is so costly to become a doctor that they have to charge relatively high fees to compensate. This leads to a system where there are layers and layers of admins and nurses to shield you from actually seeing the doctor. As an example, I sliced my finger a couple of years ago, and went to an urgent care facility. There was an admin at the desk who took down my insurance info and relayed my condition to the back. Some time later, an aide took me back and weighed me and took my blood pressure. I think a nurse swung by as well. Finally, The Doctor Himself sailed in, to actually patch me up. And of course there were layers of administrative paperwork between me, the care facility, and my insurance company, to settle all the charges.

In contrast, a friend told me that when he broke his arm in the UK, he went to the local clinic, which was staffed by a doctor, and no one else. The doc set his arm, charged him some nominal fee, and sent him on his way.

There are other factors, I’m sure, such as the unhealthy lifestyle choices of many Americans. Think: obesity and opioids, among others.  I suspect that is to blame for the poorer health outcomes in this country, more than the healthcare system.

In favor of the current U.S. system, although we pay much more, I think we do get something in return. It seems that with a good health plan, the availability of procedures is better in the U.S. than in many other countries, though I am open to correction on that.

Proposal: Mandating Hard Prison Time for CEO’s of Companies Whose Consumer Data Gets Hacked Would Cut Down on Data Breaches

Twice in the past year, I have received robo notices from doctors’ offices, blandly informing me that their systems have been penetrated, and that the bad guys have absconded with my name, phone number, address, social security number, medical records, and anything else needed to stalk me or steal my ID.  As compensation for their failure to keep my information safe, they offer me – – – a year of ID theft monitoring. Thanks, guys.

And we hear about other data thefts, often on gigantic scales. For instance, this headline from a couple of months ago: “Substantial proportion” of Americans may have had health and personal data stolen in Change Healthcare breach”. By “substantial proportion” they mean about a third of the entire U.S. population (Change Healthcare, a subsidiary of UnitedHealth, processes nearly half of all medical claims in the nation). The House Energy and Commerce  Committee last week called UnitedHealth CEO Sir Andrew Witty to testify on how this happened. As it turned out:

The attack occurred because UnitedHealth wasn’t using multifactor authentication [MFA], which is an industry standard practice, to secure one of their most critical systems.

UnitedHealth acquired Change Healthcare in 2022, and for the next two years did not bother to verify whether their new little cash cow was following standard protection practices on the sensitive information of around a hundred million customers. Sir Andrew could not give a coherent explanation for this lapse, merely repeating, “For some reason, which we continue to investigate, this particular server did not have MFA on it.”

But I can tell you exactly why this particular server did not have MFA on it: It was because Sir Andrew did not have enough personal liability for such a failure. If he knew that such an easily preventable failure would result in men in blue hauling him off to the slammer, I guarantee you that he would have made it his business within the first month of purchasing Change Healthcare to be all over the data security processes.

Humans do respond to carrots and sticks. The behaviorist school of psychology has quantified this tendency: establish a consistent system to reward behavior X and punish behavior not-X, and behaviors will change. As one example, Iin one corporate lab I worked in, a team of auditors from headquarters came one year for a routine, scheduled audit of the division’s operations. If the audit got less than the highest result, the career of the manager of the lab would be deeply crimped. Our young, ambitious lab manager made it crystal clear to the whole staff that for the next six months, the ONLY thing that really mattered was a spotless presentation on the audit. It didn’t matter (to this manager) how much productivity suffered on all the substantive projects in progress, as long as he was made to look good on the audit.

Let me move to another observation from my career in industry, working for a Certain Unnamed Large Firm, let’s called it BigCo. BigCo had very deep pockets. Lawyers loved to sue BigCo, and regulators loved to fine BigCo, big-time. And it would be a feather in the cap of said regulators, or other government prosecutors, to throw an executive of BigCo in the slammer.

Collusion among private companies to fix prices does do harm to consumers, by stifling competition and thereby raising prices. So, back in the day when regulators fiercely regulated, statutes were enacted making it a criminal act for company agents to engage in collusion, and authorizing severe financial penalties. American authorities were fairly aggressive about following up potential evidence, and over in Europe, police forces would engage in psychological warfare using their “dawn raid” tactic: just as everyone had sat down at their desks in the morning in would burst a SWAT team armed with submachine guns and lock the place down so no one could leave. I don’t know if the guns were actually loaded, but it was most unpleasant for the employees.  BigCo’s main concern was avoiding multimillion dollar fines and restrictions on business that might result from a collusion conviction, so they devoted significant resources to training and motivating staff to avoid collusion.

Every year or two we researchers had to troop into a lecture hall (attendance was taken) and listen to the same talk by the same company lawyer, reminding us that corporations don’t go to jail, people (i.e. employees) go to jail, by way of motivating us to at all costs avoid even the appearance of colluding with other companies to fix prices or production or divide up markets or whatever. This was a live issue for us researchers, since some of us did participate in legitimate technical trade associations where matters were discussed like standardizing analytical tests. If memory serves, the lawyer advised us that if anyone in a trade association meeting, even in jest, made a remark bordering on a suggestion for collusion, we were to stand up, make a tasteful scene to make it memorable, and insist that the record show that the BigCo representative objected to that remark and left the meeting, and then stride out of the room. And maybe report that remark to a government regulator. That maybe sounds over the top, but I was told that just such a forceful response in a meeting actually saved BigCo from being subjected to a massive fine imposed on some other firms who did engage in collusion

My point is that if the penalties (on the corporate or managerial level) for carelessness are severe enough, the company WILL devote more substantial resources to preventing fails. It seems to me that the harm to we the people is far greater from having our personal data sucked out of health care and other company databases, than the harm from corporate collusion which might raise the price of copier paper or candle wax. Thus, I submit that if someone in the C-suite, like the chief information officer or the CEO, were liable to say 90 days in jail, management would indeed apply sufficient resources to data integrity to thwart the current routine data theft.

If I were king, this would be the policy in my realm. I recognize that in the current U.S. legal framework, the corporate structure shields management from much in the way of personal liability, and there are good reasons for that. I suppose another way to get at this is to have automatic fines structured to strip away nearly all shareholder value or management compensation, whilst still allowing the company to operate its business. This would be another route to put pressure on management to prioritize protection for their customers. Sir Andrew’s total compensation package has been running about $20 million/year. To my knowledge, the impact of the recent gigantic data breach on him has been fairly minimal in the big picture. Sure, it was aggravating for him to have to tell the U.S. Congress that he had no idea why his corporate division screwed up so badly, and to have to devote a good deal of effort to damage control, but I am guessing that his golf game (if he is a golfer) was not unduly impacted. He is still CEO, and collecting a princely compensation. But what if the laws were such that a major data hack would automatically result in a claw-back of say 95% of his past two years of compensation, and dismissal from any further management role in that company?  I submit that such a policy would have motivated the good Sir Andrew to have devoted proper diligence and company resources to data integrity, such that this data breach would not have happened.

I don’t mean to pick on Andrew Witty as being uniquely negligent. By all accounts he is a nice guy, but his behavior is paradigmatic of ubiquitous benign management neglect, which has consequences for us little people.

These are just some personal musings; I’m sure readers can improve on these proposals.

South Carolina Repeals Certificate of Need

Last week South Carolina Governor McMaster signed a bill repealing almost all Certificate of Need (CON) laws in the state. If you want to open or expand a health care facility in South Carolina, you can now do so faster, cheaper, and with more certainty.

This is a bigger deal than West Virginia’s reform earlier this year because it applies to almost all types of facilities, and applies to both new facilities and expansions of existing facilities. Only two parts of the CON system remain: a 3-year sunset where hospitals still need special permission to add beds, and a permanent restriction on nursing homes (why? see my recent post on why states hate nursing homes).

As is often the case, this reform took years to enact. I wrote last year about a repeal bill passing the SC Senate; it didn’t make it through the House then, but did this time. As I said then:

This seems like good news; here at EWED we’ve previously written about some of the costs of CON. I’ve written several academic papers measuring the effects of CON, finding for instance that it leads to higher health care spending. I aimed to summarize the academic literature on CON in an accessible way in this article focused on CON in North Carolina.

CON makes for strange bedfellows. Generally the main supporter of CON is the state hospital association, while the laws are opposed by economistslibertariansFederal antitrust regulatorsdoctors trying to grow their practices, and most normal people who actually know they exist. CON has persisted in most states because the hospitals are especially powerful in state politics and because CON is a bigger issue for them than for most groups that oppose it. But whenever the issue becomes salient, the widespread desire for change has a real chance to overcome one special interest group fighting for the status quo. Covid may have provided that spark, as people saw full hospitals and wondered why state governments were making it harder to add hospital beds.

Why did reform succeed this time in South Carolina? From where I sit in Rhode Island I can only guess, but here are my guesses. First, the reform side really had their stuff together. See this nice page from SC think tank Palmetto Promise on why to repeal CON, and this paper from Matt Mitchell that does a comprehensive review of the literature on CON and explains what it means for South Carolina. Legislative supporters like Senator Wes Climer just kept pushing.

Second, the biggest opponent of CON reform is usually the state hospital association, but in this case they did not formally oppose repeal. Why not? Here I’m really speculating, but in general it has been faster-growing states that repeal CON. Population growth makes it obvious that new facilities are needed, and it means that existing facilities are thinking about how to grow to take advantage of new opportunities, rather than thinking about lobbying to maintain their share of a static or shrinking pie. You can see some hospital CEOs say they don’t mind repeal in this article (where I’m also quoted). South Carolina has been growing at a decent clip, as is Florida, which also almost-entirely repealed CON in 2019. On this theory, the next big CON reform would happen in a fast-growing CON state like Montana, Delaware, North Carolina, Georgia, or Tennessee. If I had to pick one, I’d say North Carolina.

Update: Apparently Montana already repealed all non-nursing home CON in 2021 and I missed it!