I’ve written previously about Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria (PSNE). They are the set of strategies that players can adopt in equilibrium – with no incentive to change their strategy. Students have an intuition that PSNE aren’t great because some outcomes that they identify depend on players making silly decisions in the past. In jargon, we can say that some PSNE depend on players choosing irrationally in a subgame while still reaching a PSNE.

See the extensive form game (below right). There are two players, each with two strategies per information set, and player two has two information sets. All PSNE will include a strategy for each information set. We can present the same game in normal form in order to make it easier to identify the PSNE (below left).

Player 1 (P1) can choose the row (B or C) and Player 2 (P2) can choose the column. Importantly, whether P1 might want to change his mind depends on P2’s strategy at the decision node in the alternative information set. Therefore, P2 must have two strategies, one per information set.

The four PSNE strategies and payoffs are underlined in the above table and they are noted in red on the below extensive form games. Again, the logic of PSNE states that no player can improve their payoff by changing only their own strategy, **given the opposing player’s strategy.** After all, a player can control their own strategy, but not that of their opponent. For example, note PSNE II. In the left subgame, P2 chooses M. His payoff would be unchanged if he changed his strategy, given the strategy of P1.