We noted earlier (see “The Biggest Blunder in The History of The Treasury”: Yellen’s Failure to Issue Longer-Term Treasury Debt When Rates Were Low ), along with many other observers, that it seemed like a mistake for the Treasure to have issued lots of short-term (e.g. 1-2 year) bonds to finance the sudden multi-trillion dollar budget deficit from the pandemic-related spending surge in 2020-2021. Rates were near-zero (thanks to the almighty Fed) back then.
Now, driven by that spending surge, inflation has also surged, and thus the Fed has been obliged to raise interest rates. And so now, in addition to the enormous current deficit spending, that tsunami of short-term debt from 2020-2021 is coming due, to be refinanced at much higher rates. This high interest expense will contribute further to the growing government debt.
Hedge fund manager Stanley Druckenmiller commented in an interview:
When rates were practically zero, every Tom, Dick and Harry in the U.S. refinanced their mortgage… corporations extended [their debt],” he said. “Unfortunately, we had one entity that did not: the U.S. Treasury….
Janet Yellen, I guess because political myopia or whatever, was issuing 2-years at 15 basis points[0.15%] when she could have issued 10-years at 70 basis points [0.70 %] or 30-years at 180 basis points [1.80%],” he said. “I literally think if you go back to Alexander Hamilton, it is the biggest blunder in the history of the Treasury. I have no idea why she has not been called out on this. She has no right to still be in that job.
Unsurprisingly, Yellen pushed back on this charge (unconvincingly). More recently, former Treasury official Amar Reganti has issued a more detailed defense. Here are some excerpts of his points:
( 1 ) …The Treasury’s functions are intimately tied to the dollar’s role as a reserve currency. It is simply not possible to have a reserve currency without a massive supply of short-duration fixed income securities that carry no credit risk.
( 2 ) …For the Treasury to transition the bulk of its issuance primarily to the long end of the yield curve would be self-defeating since it would most likely destabilise fixed income markets. Why? The demand for long end duration simply does not amount to trillions of dollars each year. This is a key reason why the Treasury decided not to issue ultralong bonds at the 50-year or 100-year maturities. Simply put, it did not expect deep continued investor demand at these points on the curve.
( 3 ) …The Treasury has well over $23tn of marketable debt. Typically, in a given year, anywhere from 28% to 40% of that debt comes due…so as not to disturb broader market functioning, it would take the Treasury years to noticeably shift its weighted average maturity even longer.
( 4 ) …The Treasury does not face rollover risk like private sector issuers.
Here is my reaction:
What Reganti says would be generally valid if the trillions of excess T-bond issuance in 2020-2021 were sold into the general public credit market. In that case, yes, it would have been bad to overwhelm the market with more long-term bonds than were desired. But that is simply not what happened. It was the Fed that vacuumed up nearly all those Treasuries, not the markets. The markets were desperate for cash, and hence the Fed was madly buying any and every kind of fixed income security, public and corporate and mortgage (even junk bonds that probably violated the Fed’s bylaws), and exchanging them mainly for cash. Sure, the markets wanted some short-term Treasuries as liquid, safe collateral, but again, most of what the Treasury issued ended up housed in the Fed’s digital vaults.
So, I remain unconvinced that the issuance of mainly long-term (say 10-year and some 30-year; no need to muddy the waters like Reganti did with harping on 50–100-year bonds) debt would have been a problem. So much fixed-income debt was vomited forth from the Treasury that even making a minor portion of it short-term would, I believe, have satisfied market needs. The Fed could have concentrated on buying and holding the longer-term bonds, and rolling them over eventually as needed, without disturbing the markets. That would have bought the country a decade or so of respite before the real interest rate effects of the pandemic debt issuance began to bite.
But nobody asked my opinion at the time.