Author: Jeremy Horpedahl

Where Are The 7 Million Missing Men?

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You may have heard that there are roughly 7 million men of working age that are not currently in the labor force — that is, not currently working or looking for work. The statistic has been produced in various ways using slightly different definitions by different researchers, but the most well-known is from Nicholas Eberstadt who uses the age cohort of 25-55 years old and gets about 7 million (in 2015). More recently and perhaps more prominently is from Senator JD Vance, and as with almost all issues he has tied this to illegal immigration.

The 7-million-men statistic is true enough, and if we limit it to native-born American men with native-born parents (I assume this is the group Vance is concerned about), we can get right at 7 million non-working men in 2024 by expanding the age cohort slightly to 20-55 year olds.

Why are these men not working? According to what they report in the CPS ASEC, here are the reasons broken down by 5-year age cohort (I drop 55-year-olds here to keep the group sizes equal, which shrinks the total to 6.7 million men):

By far the largest reason given for not working is illness or disability, which is 42% of the total for all of these men, the largest reason for every age group except 20-24 (who are mostly in school if they aren’t working), and it’s the majority for workers ages 30-54 (about 56% of them report illness or disability). Slightly less than 10% report “could not find work” as the reason they weren’t working, which is about 650,000 men in this age group (and are native-born with native-born parents). And over half of those reporting that they couldn’t find work are under age 30 — for those ages 30-54, it’s only about 7% of the total.

More men report that they are taking care of the home/family (800,000) than report not being able to find work (650,000). And a lot more report that they are currently in school — almost 1.5 million, and even though they are mostly concentrated among 20–24-year-olds, about one-third of them are 25 or older.

It’s certainly true that the number of working age men in the labor force has fallen over time. In 1968, 97% of men ages 20-54 had worked at some point in the past 12 months (that’s for all men regardless of nativity, which isn’t available back that far in the CPS ASEC). In 2024, that was down to about 87%. But even if we could wave a magical wand and cure all of the men that are ill or disabled, this would add less than 3 million people to the labor force, not nearly enough to make up for all of the immigrants that Vance and others are suggesting have taken the jobs of native-born Americans.

What Are the Effects of TCJA? It’s A Little Hard to Say

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The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act was passed in late 2017 and went into effect in 2018. For academic research to analyze the effects, that’s still a very recent change, which can make analyzing the effects challenging. In this case the challenge is especially important because major portions of the Act will expire at the end of next year, and there will be a major political debate about renewing portions of it in 2025.

Despite these challenges, a recent Journal of Economic Perspectives article does an excellent job of summarizing what we know about the effects so far. In “Sweeping Changes and an Uncertain Legacy: The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017,” the authors Gale, Hoopes, and Pomerleau first point out some of the obvious effects:

  1. TCJA increased budget deficits (i.e., it did not “pay for itself”)
  2. Most Americans got a tax cut (around 80%), which explains #1 — and only about 5% of Americans saw a tax increase (~15% weren’t affected either way)
  3. Following from #2, every quintile of income saw their after-tax income increase, though the benefits were heavily skewed towards the top of the distribution ($1,600 average increase, but $7,600 for the top quintile, and almost $200,000 for the top 0.1%)

Beyond these headline effects, it seems that most of the other effects were modest or difficult to estimate — especially given the economic disruptions of 2020 related to the pandemic.

For example, what about business investment? Through both lowering tax rates for corporations and changing some rules about deductions of expenses, we might have expected a boom in business investment (it was also stated goal of some proponents of the law). Many studies have tried to examine the potential impact, and the authors group these studies into three buckets: macro-simulations, comparisons of aggregate data, and using micro-data across industries (to better get at causation).

In general, the authors of this paper don’t find much convincing evidence that there was a boom in business investment. The investment share of GDP didn’t grow much compared to before the law, and other countries saw more growth in investment as a share of GDP. Could that be because GDP is larger, even though the share of investment hasn’t grown? Probably not, as GDP in the US is perhaps 1 percent larger than without the law — that’s not nothing, but it’s not a huge boom (and that’s not 1 percent per year higher growth, it’s just 1 percent).

Ultimately though, it is hard to say what the correct counterfactual would be for business investment, even with synthetic control analyses (the authors discuss a few synthetic control studies on pages 21-22, but they aren’t convinced).

What’s important about some of the main effects is that these were largely predictable, at least by economists. The authors point to a 2017 Clark Center poll of leading economists. Almost no economists thought GDP would be “substantially higher” from the tax changes, and economists were extremely certain that it would increase the level of federal debt (no one disagreed and only a few were uncertain).

Consumer Expenditures in 2023

Jeremy Horpedahl2 Comments

Today BLS released the annual update to the Consumer Expenditure Survey, which is exactly what it sounds like: a survey of US consumers about what their spending. The sample size is “20,000 independent interview surveys and 11,000 independent diary surveys” so it’s a pretty big sample. And this is a really great data source, because versions of it go back over 100 years (though the current, annual survey with a lot of detail starts in 1984).

What does this new data tell us? One area that has received a lot of attention lately is food spending (including a lot of attention on this blog), especially the cost of groceries. According to the CPI food at home index, grocery prices are up almost 26 percent since the beginning over 2020. That’s a lot! But incomes are up too, so how does this affect spending patterns?

Here’s what food and grocery spending for middle-quintile households looks like:

Compared to the pre-pandemic 2019 levels, consumers are spending slightly less of their income on food (12.7% vs. 13.2%), though a slightly larger share of their income is being spent on groceries (8.1% vs. 7.8%). Those changes are noticeable, though this isn’t the radical realignment of spending patterns you might expect from such a big change in food prices. The reason is clear: while grocery prices are up about 26%, middle-quintile incomes are up a similar 25% since 2019. That’s falling behind a little bit, but incomes have roughly kept pace with rising food prices. And from 2022 to 2023, both of these percentages decreased slightly, by about 0.3 percentage points.

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The Top 1 Percent Paid a Lot of Taxes in 2021

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In 2021 the top 1 percent of taxpayers in the United States paid 36 percent of all federal taxes (they have 21.1 percent of income). This figure had been below 20 percent until the mid-1990s, and as recently as 2019 it was just 24.7 percent (they had 15.9 percent of the income that year).

The data comes from the latest CBO report on “The Distribution of Household Income in 2021.”

The increase is primarily due to a large number of high-income households realizing capital gains in 2021. With all the talk lately of potentially taxing unrealized capital gains, it’s important to note that we do tax realized gains, and these change a lot from year to year. Another contributing factor is that the share of the bottom 60 percent of households only paid 1 percent of federal taxes in 2021, a big drop from 2019 due to a big increase in temporary refundable tax credits.

Better Off Than 4 Years Ago? Median Family Income Edition

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Are you better off than you were four years ago? That question was asked at the Presidential debate last night. But more importantly, we also got a massive amount of new data on income and poverty from Census yesterday. That data allows us to make that just that comparison, although somewhat imperfectly.

The Census data is excellent and detailed, but it’s annual data, meaning that the release yesterday only goes through 2023. We won’t have 2024 data for another year. Such is the nature of good data. (Note: I’ve tried to address this same question with more real-time data, such as average wages). Still, it’s a useful comparison to make. It’s especially useful right now because the new 2023 data on income are (for most categories) the highest ever with one exception: 4 years ago, in 2019.

A reasonable read of the data on income (whether we use households, families, or persons) is that in 2023 the median American was no better off than in 2019, after adjusting for inflation. In fact, they were probably slightly worse off. I fully expect this will no longer be true when we have 2024 data: it will certainly be above 4 years prior (2020) and likely above 2019 too (more on this below). But we can’t say that for sure right now.

So let’s do a comparison of “are you better off than 4 years ago” for recent Presidents that were up for reelection (treating 2024 as a reelection year for Biden-Harris too), using the 4-year comparison that would have been available at the time using real median family income. Notice that this data would be off by one year, but it’s what would have been known at the time of the election.

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The Cumulative Effect of Small Changes in Economic Growth

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A recent post from the blogger (Substacker?) Cremieux called Rich Country, Poor Country showed how small differences in economic growth add up over time. Because he used nominal GDP growth rates, I don’t think that post is exactly the right way to analyze the question, but I still think it’s a very important one. So in this post I will offer, not necessarily a critique of that post, but perhaps a better way of looking at the data.

For the data, I will use the Maddison Project Database, which attempts to create comparable GDP per capita estimates for countries going back as far as possible… for some, back thousands of years, but for most countries at least the last 100 years. And the estimates are stated in modern, purchasing power adjusted dollars, so they should be roughly comparable over time (if you think these estimates are a bit ambitious, please note that they are scaled back significantly from Angus Maddison’s original data, which had an estimate for every country going back to the year 1 AD). The most recent year in the data is currently 2022, so if I slip up in this post and say “today,” I mean 2022, or roughly today in the long sweep of history.

Like Cremieux’s post, I am interested in how much slightly lower economic growth rates can add up over time. Or even not so slightly lower growth rates, like 1 percentage point less per year — this is a huge number, because the compound annual average growth rate for the US from 1800 to 2022 is 1.42%. So let’s look at the data way back to 1800 (the first year the MPD gives us continuous annual estimates for the US) to see how changes in growth rates affect long-term growth.

It probably won’t surprise you that if our 1.42% growth rate had been 1 percentage point lower, the US would be much poorer today, but to put a precise number on it, we would be about where Bolivia is today (that is, ranked 116th out of the 169 countries in the MP Database). Note: I’m using a logarithmic scale, both so it’s easier to see the differences and because this is standard for showing long-run growth rates.

What is very interesting, I think, is that if our growth rate had been just 0.25 percentage points lower per year since 1800, we would be about where Spain is. Now, Spain is certainly a fine, modern developed country (they rank 34th of the 169 MPD countries). But Spain’s growth has not been spectacular lately. Average income in Spain is almost half of the US today (purchasing power adjusted!), which is another way to say that just 0.25 percentage points lower over 222 years reduces your growth rate by half.

That’s the power of economic growth.

And if our growth rate had been 0.5 percentage points lower, we’d be about where the big former Communist countries are today (both China and the former countries of the USSR are about equal today — about 1/3 of the income of the US).

What if we perform the same analysis for a shorter time horizon? If we go back 50 years to 1972, the effects are not quite as dramatic, but still visible.

Our cumulative annual growth rate since 1972 has been a bit higher than the long-run average, around 1.68%. Under these four alternative growth scenarios since 1972, the comparable countries don’t sound so bad. It probably wouldn’t be a huge deal if we were only at Australia’s level, losing just about a decade of economic growth. But it would be a huge failure if we were only at Italy’s current level of development. Under that 1 percentage point lower growth scenario, we would have had no net growth since about year 2000, which has roughly been the case for Italy.

All of these alternative scenarios show the power of economic growth to add up over time, but they do so in pessimistic way: what if growth had been slower. What if we look at the opposite: what if growth had been faster over some time horizon. Sticking with the 1972 medium-run example, if real growth rates had been 1 percentage point higher, our income today would be almost double what it actually is, about $95,000 compared with the current $58,000 (the MPD data is stated in 2011 dollars, so that sounds lower than it actually is now: over $80,000).

What if we went back even further? If our economic growth rate since 1800 had been 1 percentage point higher every year, our average income in 2022 would be an astonishing $517,000 — almost 10 times what it actually was in 2022. That’s a dizzying number to think about, and maybe that’s not a realistic alternative scenario.

But what if it had only been 0.25 percentage points higher since 1800 — that probably is a world that was possible. In that case, GDP per capita would be about double what it actually was in 2022, at over $100,000 (again, stated in 2011 dollars).

Grocery Inflation Since 2019: BLS Data is Probably About Right

Jeremy Horpedahl10 Comments

Grocery prices are definitely up a lot in the past few years. I’ve wrote about this several times before. But lately there has been a trend on social media to “post your receipts” and show how much your grocery prices have gone up. Unfortunately, very few people actually post the full receipts, often just showing the total, which leads to wild claims like prices being up 250% in just the past 2 years! That’s a huge contrast to BLS “food at home” category of the CPI, which shows an increase of 4.7% from July 2022 to July 2024 (it’s also unclear in the video what the exact date of the receipt is, he just says “2 years”). Depending on the exact base month, you’re going to be in the 20-25% compared with pre-pandemic or early pandemic using BLS data.

What if we actually looked at receipts? I tried such an exercise in November 2023, when there was another round of social media videos claiming prices had doubled in just a single year. My own personal receipt matched the corresponding BLS data pretty closely, but that was just one receipt with only eight items from Sam’s Club (which might not match grocery stores, for various reasons). At the time, I couldn’t find any good receipts from 2019 or 2020 (Kroger and Walmart drop old receipts in your account after about 2 years), but after scouring an old email account, I discovered two more receipts to compare. These are both from Walmart, in 2019 and 2020, and they contain a larger number of items than my Sam’s Club receipt (each with about a dozen and half items that are fairly typical grocery purchases, and I was able to find matching products today).

I present… the receipts!

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Did 818,000 jobs vanish?

Jeremy Horpedahl8 Comments

This morning the Bureau of Labor Statistics released the latest quarterly data for their Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages for the first quarter of 2024. Along with this release is the announcement of their preliminary “benchmark estimate” for March 2024, which will eventually (next year) be used to revise employment data for the Current Employment Statistics program. To keep all of the alphabet soup of programs clear in year head, CES is the more familiar “nonfarm jobs” data that is released each month, usually with some media fanfare.

Benchmarking is an important part of the process for many data releases, because the monthly CES data is based on a survey of employers, a subset of the total. But the QCEW data is the universe of employees — at least the universe of the those covered by Unemployment Insurance law, which is something like 97-98% of workers in the US. So the numbers will never match exactly (CES is supposed to be measuring all workers, not just the 97-98% covered by UI), but they should be pretty close. The media reports the CES monthly data more prominently, because it is more timely and usually pretty close to correct — but benchmarking is the process to see just how correct those initial surveys were.

That brings us to the release today, which is the preliminary estimate of the benchmark adjustment for March 2024 (it will be finalized early in 2025). And that preliminary estimate was a big number, with a downward revision projected of 818,000 jobs. To put this in perspective, the current CES data shows 2.9 million jobs were added between March 2023 and March 2024, so this estimate suggest that the job growth was overstated by perhaps 40 percent. That’s a big revision, though large revisions are not unheard of: the same figure for March 2022 was an estimated 468,000 jobs higher, while March 2019 was 501,000 jobs lower. But this year is a big one (largest absolute number since 2009). Here’s a chart summarizing recent years revisions from Bloomberg:

I’ve covered this topic before, such as an April 2024 post where I noted that as of September 2023, there was an 880,000 gap in job growth between the CES and QCEW over the prior year. So this was not unexpected, and in the days leading up to the report, close followers of the data were forecasting that the revision could be up to 1 million jobs.

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On Average, American Wage Earners are Better Off Than They Were Four Years Ago

Jeremy Horpedahl5 Comments

As I wrote last November, the question “are you better off than you were four years ago?” is a common benchmark for evaluating Presidential reelection prospects. And even though Biden is no longer running for reelection, voters will no doubt be considering the economic performance of his first term when thinking about their vote in November.

The good news for American wage earners (and possibly Harris’ election prospects) is that average wages have now outpaced average price inflation since January 2021. Despite some of that time period containing the worst price inflation in a generation, wages have continued to grow even as price growth has moderated. Key chart:

For most of Biden’s term, it was true that prices had outpaced wages. But no longer.

The real growth in wages, admittedly, is not very robust, despite being slightly positive. How does this compare to past performance under recent Presidents? Surprisingly, pretty well! (Lots of caveats here, but this is what the raw data shows.)