Bailout – Economist Writing Every Day

Myron Scholes was on top of the world in 1997, having won the Nobel Prize in economics that year for his work in financial economics, work that he had applied in the real world in a wildly successful hedge fund, Long Term Capital Management. But just one year later, LTCM was saved from collapse only by a last-minute bailout that wiped out his equity (along with that of the other partners of the fund) and cast doubt on the value of his academic work.

Roger Lowenstein told the story of LTCM in his 2001 book “When Genius Failed“. I finally got around to reading this classic of the genre this year, and I’d say it is still well worth picking up. The story is well-told, and the lessons are timeless-

Beware hubris
Beware leverage
Bigger positions are harder to get out of (especially once everyone knows you are in trouble)
In a crisis, all correlations go to one
Past results don’t necessarily predict future performance
Sometimes things happen that are very different from anything that happened in your backtest window.

The book came out in 2001 but it presages the 07 financial crisis well- not about mortgage derivatives specifically, but the dangers of derivatives, leverage, using derivatives to avoid regulations restricting leverage, and over-relying on mathematical models of risk based on past behavior. If Fed had let LTCM fail, could we have avoided the next crisis? Perhaps so, as their counterparties (most major Wall Street banks) who got burned would have been more careful about the leverage and derivatives used by themselves and their counterparties, and regulators may have taken stronger stances on the same issues.

Perhaps some more recent well-contained blowups foreshadow the next big crisis in the same way, like FTX or SVB?

Some more specific highlights about LTCM:

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The Fed was founded after a spat of banking crises.

We know that the Federal Reserve also has the goals of full employment and steady, moderate inflation. Since the 1990s, that’s meant 2%. But it’s a relatively recent addition to the Fed’s policy goals. The primary purpose was initially and always has been financial system stability.

In 2008, the Fed demonstrated that it’s willing to attain financial stability at the cost of employment. After and during the financial crisis, the Fed purchased mortgage backed securities (MBS) from private banks at a time when their value was highly uncertain (and discounted). The purpose was to replace these assets of uncertain value with less risky assets. At the time, there was resentment that these security holders were insulated from losses while the homeowners whose loans composed the MBS did not get comparable relief. I remember arguing that the Fed, with the cooperation of congress, could have just paid part of the mortgages on behalf of the homeowners such that there were fewer foreclosures and fewer personal bankruptcies. That way, both the borrowers wouldn’t default and the debt holders would enjoy stable returns.

But, the primary goal of the Fed is financial system stability. Pre-financial crisis, banks had loaded-up on securities of uncertain value with the help of regulatory arbitrage and some lending shenanigans. The Fed needed to avoid the ensuing catastrophe that was a consequence of the greater-than-anticipated realized risk. Importantly, catastrophe to the Fed is financial-sector specific. Markets losing liquidity, bank-runs, and financial sector business failures all qualify as the stuff of concern (all of which occurred). While making mortgage payments for specific mortgages would have been popular amongst many debtors, it also would have taken much more time to implement. The Fed wanted to avoid more financial instability than had already occurred. And frankly, the Fed’s first priority isn’t to take care of the public. Given the alternative between a slow popular option and a quick adequate option, the Fed has demonstrated an inclination toward the latter.

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