Taylor Rule

Don’t Cut Rates

James Bailey2 Comments

The Federal Reserve will probably cut rates next week:

I can’t advise them on the complex politics of this, but based on the economics I think cutting would be a mistake. I see one good reason they want to cut: hiring is slow and apparently has been for a year. But that could be driven by falling labor supply rather than falling demand, and most other indicators suggest holding rates steady or even raising them.

Most importantly, inflation is currently well above their 2% target, 2.9% over the past year and a higher pace than that in August. Inflation expectations remain somewhat elevated. Real GDP growth was strong in Q2 and looks set to be strong in Q3 too, and NGDP growth is still well above trend.. The Conference Board’s measure of consumer confidence looks bad, but Michigan’s looks fine.

Financial conditions are loose, with stocks at all time highs and credit spreads low. Its only September and we’ve already seen more Initial Public Offerings than in any year since 2021 (when the last big bout of inflation kicked off):

Source: https://stockanalysis.com/ipos/statistics/

Crypto prices are back near all time highs and crypto is becoming more integrated into public stocks through bitcoin treasury companies and IPOs from Gemini and Figure.

The Taylor Rule provides a way of putting all this together into a concrete suggestion for interest rates. Some versions of the rule say rates are about on target, while others including my preferred Bernanke version suggest they should be closer to 6%. To me this is what the debate should be- do we keep rates steady or raise them? I see good arguments each way, but the case for a cut seems very weak.

I look forward to finding out in a year or two whether I or the FOMC is the crazy one here.

* The Usual Disclaimer, hopefully extra obvious in this case: These views are mine and I’m not speaking for any part of the Federal Reserve System.

The Economics of Taylor Swift

James Bailey8 Comments

Cowen’s 2nd Law states that there is a literature on everything. I would certainly expect there to be a literature on the best-selling musician in the world. And of course there is; Google Scholar returns 23,500 results for “Taylor Swift”, and we’ve done 5 posts here at EWED. But surprisingly, searching EconLit returns nothing, suggesting there are currently no published economics papers on Taylor Swift, though searching “Taylor” and “Swift” separately reveals hundreds of articles about the Taylor Rule and the SWIFT payment system. Google Scholar does report some economics working papers about her, but the opportunity to be the first to publish on Taylor Swift in an economics journal (and likely get many media interview requests as a result) is still out there.

Swift presents a variety of angles that could be worthy of a paper; re-recording her masters forcopyright reasons, her efforts to channel concert tickets to loyal fans over re-sellers, or her sheer macroeconomic impact. I’ve added a note about this to my ideas page (where I share many other paper ideas).

In the mean time, I’ll be giving a short talk on the Economics of Taylor Swift at 7pm Eastern on Monday, September 16th, as part of a larger online panel. The event is aimed at Providence College alumni, but I believe anyone can register here.

Update 10/25/24: A recording of the event is here, and a recording of a followup interview I did with local TV is here.

A Continually Updated Bernanke-Taylor Rule

James Bailey4 Comments

Despite its many flaws*, I always like to check in on what the Taylor Rule suggests for the Fed. Its virtues are that it gives a definite precise answer, and that it has been agreed upon ahead of time by a variety of economists as giving a decent answer for what the Fed should do. Without something like the Taylor Rule, everyone tends to grasp for reasons that This Time Is Different. Academics seek novelty, so would rather come up with some new complex new theory of what to do instead of something undergrads have been taught for years. Finance types tend to push whatever would benefit them in the short term, which is typically rate cuts. Political types push whatever benefits their party; typically rate cuts if they are in power and hikes if not, though often those in power simply want to emphasize good economic news while those out of power emphasize the bad news.

The Taylor Rule can cut through all this by considering the same factors every time, regardless of whether it makes you look clever, helps your party, or helps your returns this quarter. So what is it saying now? It recommends a 6.05% Fed funds rate:

Fed Funds Rate Suggested by the Bernanke Version of the Taylor Rule
Source: My calculation using FRED data, continually updated here

I continue to use the Bernanke version of the Taylor Rule, which says that the Fed Funds rate should be equal to:

Core PCE + Output Gap + 0.5*(Core PCE – 2) +2

*What are the flaws of the Taylor Rule? It sees interest rates as the main instrument of monetary policy; it relies on the Output Gap, which can only really be guessed at; and it incorporates no measures of expectations. If I were coming up with my own rule I would probably replace the Output Gap with a labor market measure like unemployment, and add measures of money supply shifts and inflation expectations. Perhaps someday I will, but like everyone else I would naturally be tempted to overfit it to the concerns of the moment; I like that the Taylor Rule was developed at a time when Taylor had no idea what it might mean for, say, the 2024 election or the Q3 2024 returns of any particular hedge fund.

That said, people have now created enough different versions of the Taylor Rule that they can produce quite a range of answers, undermining one of its main virtues. The Atlanta Fed maintains a site that calculates 3 alternative versions of the rule, and makes it easy for you to create even more alternatives:

Two of their rules suggest that Fed Funds should currently be about 4%, implying a major cut at a time that the Bernanke version of the rule suggests a rate hike. On the other other hand, perhaps this variety is a virtue in that it accurately indicates that the current best path is not obvious; and the true signal comes in times like late 2021 when essentially every version of the rule is screaming that the Fed is way off target.

Monetary and Fiscal Policy Is Still Easy

James Bailey4 Comments

The last post where I attempted a macro prescription was in April 2022, when I said the Fed was still under-reacting to inflation. That turned out right; since then the Fed has raised rates a full 500 basis points (5 percentage points) to fight inflation. So I’ll try my luck again here.

Headline annual CPI inflation has fallen from its high of 9% at the peak last year to 3.7% today. Core PCE, the measure more closely watched by the Fed, is at a similar 3.9%. Way better than last year, but still well above the Fed’s target of 2%. Are these set to fall to 2% on the current policy path, or does the Fed still need to do more?

The Fed’s own projections suggest one more rate hike this year, followed by cuts next year. They expect inflation to remain a bit elevated next year (2.5%), and that it will take until 2026 to get all the way back to 2.0%. They expect steady GDP growth with no recession.

What do market-based indicators say? The yield curve is still inverted (usually a signal of recession), though long rates are rising rapidly. The TIPS spread suggests an average inflation rate of 2.18% of the next 5 years, indicating a belief the Fed will get inflation under control fairly quickly. Markets suggest the Fed might not raise rates any more this year, and that if they do it will only be once. All this suggests that the Fed is doing fine, and that a potential recession is a bigger worry than inflation.

Some of my other favorite indicators muddy this picture. The NGDP gap suggests things are running way too hot:

M2 shrank in the last month of data, but has mostly leveled off since May, whereas a year ago it seemed like it could be in for a major drop. I wonder if the Fed’s intervention to stop a banking crisis in the Spring caused this. Judging by the Fed’s balance sheet, their buying in March undid 6 months of tightening, and I think that underestimates its impact (banks will behave more aggressively knowing they could bring their long term Treasuries to the Fed at par, but for the most part they won’t have to actually take the Fed up on the offer).

The level of M2 is still well above its pre-Covid trend:

Before I started looking at all this data, I was getting worried about a recession. Financial markets are down, high rates might start causing more things to break, the UAW strike drags on, student loan repayments are starting, one government shutdown was averted but another one in November seems likely. After looking at the data though, I think inflation is still the bigger worry. People think that monetary policy is tight because interest rates have risen rapidly, but interest rates alone don’t tell you the stance of policy.

I’ll repeat the exercise with the Bernanke version of the Taylor Rule I did in April 2022. Back then, the Fed Funds rate was under 0.5% when the Taylor Rule suggested it should be at 9%- so policy was way too loose. Today, the Taylor Rule (using core PCE and the Fed’s estimate of the output gap) suggests:

3.9% + 0.5*(2.1%-1.8%) + 0.5%*(3.9%-2%) + 2% = 7%

This suggests the Fed is still over 1.5% below where they need to be. Much better than being 9% below like last April, but not good. The Taylor rule isn’t perfect- among other issues it is backward-looking- but it tends to be at least directionally right and I think that’s the case here. Monetary policy is still too easy. Fiscal policy is still way too easy. If current policy continues and we don’t get huge supply shocks, I think a mild “inflationary boom” is more likely than either stagflation or a deflationary recession.