Circular AI Deals Reminiscent of Disastrous Dot.Com Vendor Financing of the 1990s

Hey look, I just found a way to get infinite free electric power:

This sort of extension-cord-plugged-into-itself meme has shown up recently on the web to characterize a spate of circular financing deals in the AI space, largely involving OpenAI (parent of ChatGPT). Here is a graphic from Bloomberg which summarizes some of these activities:

Nvidia, which makes LOTS of money selling near-monopoly, in-demand GPU chips, has made investing commitments in customers or customers of their customers. Notably, Nvidia will invest up to $100 billion in Open AI, in order to help OpenAI increase their compute power. OpenAI in turn inked a $300 billion deal with Oracle, for building more data centers filled with Nvidia chips.  Such deals will certainly boost the sales of their chips (and make Nvidia even more money), but they also raise a number of concerns.

First, they make it seem like there is more demand for AI than there actually is. Short seller Jim Chanos recently asked, “[Don’t] you think it’s a bit odd that when the narrative is ‘demand for compute is infinite’, the sellers keep subsidizing the buyers?” To some extent, all this churn is just Nvidia recycling its own money, as opposed to new value being created.

Second, analysts point to the destabilizing effect of these sorts of “vendor financing” arrangements. Towards the end of the great dot.com boom in the late 1990’s, hardware vendors like Cisco were making gobs of money selling server capacity to internet service providers (ISPs). In order to help the ISPs build out even faster (and purchase even more Cisco hardware), Cisco loaned money to the ISPs. But when that boom busted, and the huge overbuild in internet capacity became (to everyone’s horror) apparent, the ISPs could not pay back those loans. QQQ lost 70% of its value. Twenty-five years later, Cisco stock price has never recovered its 2000 high.

Beside taking in cash investments, OpenAI is borrowing heavily to buy its compute capacity. Since OpenAI makes no money now (and in fact loses billions a year), and (like other AI ventures) will likely not make any money for several more years, and it is locked in competition with other deep-pocketed AI ventures, there is the possibility that it could pull down the whole house of cards, as happened in 2000.  Bernstein analyst Stacy Rasgon recently wrote, “[OpenAI CEO Sam Altman] has the power to crash the global economy for a decade or take us all to the promised land, and right now we don’t know which is in the cards.”

For the moment, nothing seems set to stop the tidal wave of spending on AI capabilities. Big tech is flush with cash, and is plowing it into data centers and program development. Everyone is starry-eyed with the enormous potential of AI to change, well, EVERYTHING (shades of 1999).

The financial incentives are gigantic. Big tech got big by establishing quasi-monopolies on services that consumers and businesses consider must-haves. (It is the quasi-monopoly aspect that enables the high profit margins).  And it is essential to establish dominance early on. Anyone can develop a word processor or spreadsheet that does what Word or Excel do, or a search engine that does what Google does, but Microsoft and Google got there first, and preferences are sticky. So, the big guys are spending wildly, as they salivate at the prospect of having the One AI to Rule Them All.

Even apart from achieving some new monopoly, the trillions of dollars spent on data center buildout are hoped to pay out one way or the other: “The data-center boom would become the foundation of the next tech cycle, letting Amazon, Microsoft, Google, and others rent out intelligence the way they rent cloud storage now. AI agents and custom models could form the basis of steady, high-margin subscription products.”

However, if in 2-3 years it turns out that actual monetization of AI continues to be elusive, as seems quite possible, there could be a Wile E. Coyote moment in the markets:

James Webb Telescope Still Orbiting the Sun

Last week I took kids to an excellent show at Samford’s Christenberry Planetarium. If you live in Alabama, follow them on Instagram for updates on events (often free).

I have heard people say that the liberal project is doomed because people just want to war.
Well, did you know that the James Webb Space Telescope orbits the sun? (I was busy on Christmas 2021 when the rest of the world was alerted to this fact.)

You can keep up with the mission here https://science.nasa.gov/mission/webb/

You can see what is Webb observing

Make discoveries through international collaboration, not war.

For a small number of readers who have time and interest in cutting edge physics and speculation, I know Julian Gough through Emergent Ventures and he’s at : “man-made black holes, the hidden catastrophe at the heart of materialist science

Shift in AI Usage from Productivity to Personal Therapy: Hazard Ahead

A couple of days ago I spoke with a friend who was troubled by the case of Adam Raine, the sixteen-year-old who was counseled by a ChatGPT AI therapy chatbot into killing himself.  That was of course extremely tragic, but I hoped it was kind of an outlier. Then I heard on a Bloomberg business podcast that the number one use for AI now is personal therapy. Being a researcher, I had to check this claim.

So here is an excerpt from a visual presentation of an analysis done by Marc Zao-Sanders for Harvard Business Review. He examined thousands of forum posts over the last year in a follow-up to his 2024 analysis to estimate uses of AI. To keep it tractable, I just snipped an image of the first six categories:

It’s true: Last year the most popular uses were spread across a variety of categories, but in 2025 the top use was “Therapy & Companionship”, followed by related uses of “Organize Life” and “Find Purpose”. Two of the top three uses in 2024, “Generate Ideas” and “Specific Search”, were aimed at task productivity (loosely defined), whereas in 2025 the top three uses were all for personal support.

Huh. People used to have humans in their lives known as friends or buddies or girlfriends/boyfriends or whatever.  Back in the day, say 200 or 2000 or 200,000 or 2,000,000 years ago, it seems a basic unit was the clan or village or extended kinship group. As I understand it, in a typical English village the men would drift into the pub most Friday and Saturday nights and banter and play darts over a pint of beer.  You were always in contact with peers or cousins or aunts/uncles or grandmother/grandfathers who would take an interest in you, and who might be a few years or more ahead of you in life. These were folks you could bounce around your thoughts with, who could help you sort out what is real. The act of relating to another human being seems to be essential in shaping our psyches. The alternative is appropriately termed “attachment disorder.”

The decades-long decline in face-to-face social interactions in the U.S. has been the subject of much commentary. A landmark study in this regard was Robert Putnam’s 1995 essay, “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital”, which he then expanded into a 2000 book. The causes and results of this trend are beyond the scope of this blog post.

The essence of the therapeutic enterprise is the forming of a relational human-to-human bond. The act of looking into another person’s eyes, and there sensing acceptance and understanding, is irreplaceable.

But imagine your human conversation partner faked sympathy but in fact was just using you.  He or she could string you along by murmuring the right reflective phrases (“Tell me more about …”,  “Oh, that must have been hard for you”, blah, blah, blah) but with the goal of getting money from you or turning you towards being an espionage partner. This stuff goes on all the time in real life.

The AI chatbot case is not too different than this. Most AI purveyors are ultimately in it for the money, so they are using you. And the chatbot does not, cannot care about you. It is just a complex software algorithm, embedded in silicon chips. To a first approximation, LLMs simply spit out a probabilistic word salad in response to prompts. That is it. They do not “know” anything, and they certainly do not feel anything.

Here is what my Brave browser embedded AI has to say about the risks of using AI for therapy:

Using AI chatbots for therapy poses significant dangers, including the potential to reinforce harmful thoughts, fail to recognize crises like suicidal ideation, and provide unsafe or inappropriate advice, according to recent research and expert warnings. A June 2025 Stanford study found that popular therapy chatbots exhibit stigmatizing biases against conditions like schizophrenia and alcohol dependence, and in critical scenarios, they have responded to indirect suicide inquiries with irrelevant information, such as bridge heights, potentially facilitating self-harm. These tools lack the empathy, clinical judgment, and ethical framework of human therapists, and cannot ensure user safety or privacy, as they are not bound by regulations like HIPAA.

  • AI chatbots cannot provide a medical diagnosis or replace human therapists for serious mental health disorders, as they lack the ability to assess reality, challenge distorted thinking, or ensure safety during a crisis.
  • Research shows that AI systems often fail to respond appropriately to mental health crises, with one study finding they responded correctly less than 60% of the time compared to 93% for licensed therapists.
  • Chatbots may inadvertently validate delusional or paranoid thoughts, creating harmful feedback loops, and have been observed to encourage dangerous behaviors, such as promoting restrictive diets or failing to intervene in suicidal ideation.
  • There is a significant risk of privacy breaches, as AI tools are not legally required to protect user data, leaving sensitive mental health information vulnerable to exposure or misuse.
  • The lack of human empathy and the potential for emotional dependence on AI can erode real human relationships and worsen feelings of isolation, especially for vulnerable individuals.
  • Experts warn that marketing AI as a therapist is deceptive and dangerous, as these tools are not licensed providers and can mislead users into believing they are receiving professional care.

I couldn’t have put it better myself.

What is in a QR Code?

Bar codes have been common in retail stores since the 1970s. These give a one-dimensional read of digital data. The hardware and software to decode a bar code are relatively simple.

The QR code encodes information in a two-dimensional matrix. The QR code, short for quick-response code, was invented in 1994 by Masahiro Hara of the Japanese company Denso Wave for labelling automobile parts. It can pack far more information in the same real estate than a bar code, but it requires sophisticated image processing to decode it. Fortunately, the chip power for image processing has kept up, so smart phones can decode even intricate QR codes, provided the image is clear enough.

Here is the QR code that encodes the URL for Wikipedia, i.e., the characters: “https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia”.

Like most QR codes, it has three distinctive square patterns on three corners, and a smaller one set in from the fourth corner, that give information to the image processing software on image orientation and sizing.

As time goes on, more versions of QR codes are defined, with ever finer patterns that convey more information. For instance, here is a medium-resolution QR Code (version 3), and a very high resolution QR code (Version 40):

Version 3 QR Code (29×29), encodes up to 50 characters

Version 40 QR Code  (177×177), encodes up to 1852 characters

My phone could not decode the Version 40 above; the limit may be how much detail the camera could capture.

QR codes use the  Reed–Solomon error correction methodology to correct for some errors in image capture or physical damage to the QR code. For instance, this QR code with the torn-off corner still decodes properly as the URL for Wikipedia (whole image shown above):

Torn QR Code still decodes properly.

Getting down a little deeper in the weeds, this image shows, for Version 3  (29×29) QR code, which pixels are devoted to orientation/alignment (reddish, pinkish), which define the format (blueish), and which encode the actual content (black and white):

Uses Of QR Codes

A common use of QR codes is to convey a web link (URL), so pointing your phone at the QR code is the equivalent of clicking on a link in an email. Here is an AI summary of uses:

They are used to access websites and digital content, such as restaurant menus, product information, and course details, enabling a contactless experience that reduces the need for printed materials. Smartphones can scan QR codes to connect to Wi-Fi networks by automatically entering the network name (SSID), password, and encryption type, simplifying the process for users. They facilitate digital payments by allowing users to send or receive money through payment apps by scanning a code, eliminating the need for physical cash or cards. QR codes are also used to share contact information, such as vCards, and to initiate calls, send text messages, or compose emails by pre-filling the recipient and message content. For app downloads, QR codes can directly link to the Apple App Store or Google Play, streamlining the installation process. In social media and networking, they allow users to quickly follow profiles on platforms like LinkedIn, Instagram, or Snapchat by scanning a code. They are also used for account authentication, such as logging into services like WhatsApp, Telegram, or WeChat on desktop by scanning a code with a mobile app. Additionally, QR codes are employed in marketing, event ticketing, and even on gravestones to provide digital access to obituaries or personal stories. Their versatility extends to sharing files like PDFs, enabling users to download documents by scanning a code. Overall, QR codes act as a bridge between the physical and digital worlds, enhancing efficiency and interactivity across numerous daily activities.

Note that your final statement in this world might be a QR code on your gravestone.

Security with QR Codes

On an iPhone, if “Scan QR Codes” (or something similar) has been enabled, pointing the phone at a QR code in Camera mode will display the first few characters of the URL or whatever, which gives you the opportunity to click on it right then. If you want to be a bit more cautious, you can take a photo, and then open Photos to look at the image of QR code. If you then press on the photo of the QR code, up will come a box with the entire character string encoded by the QR code. You can then decide if clicking on something ending in .ru is what you really want to do.

Accessing a rogue website can obviously hurt you. And even if you aren’t dinged by that kind of browser exploit, the reader’s permissions on your phone may allow use of your camera, read/write contact data, GPS location, read browser history, and even global system changes. The bad guys never sleep. Who would have thought that a QR code on a parking meter posing as a quick payment option could empty your bank account? Our ancestors needed to stay alert to physical dangers, for us it is now virtual threats.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: The bulk of the content, and all the images, in this blog post were drawn from the excellent Wikipedia article “QR code”.

Bears and Bulls Battle Over Nvidia Stock Price

Nvidia is a huge battleground stock – – some analysts predict its price will languish or crash, while others see it continuing its dramatic rise. It has become the world’s most valuable company by market capitalization.  Here I will summarize the arguments of one bear and one bull from the investing site Seeking Alpha.

In this corner…semi-bear Lawrence Fuller. I respect his opinions in general. While the macro prospects have turned him more cautious in the past few months, for the past three years or so he has been relentlessly and correctly bullish (again based on macro), when many other voices were muttering doom/gloom.  

Fuller’s article is titled Losing Speed On The AI Superhighway. This dramatic chart supports the case that NVDA is overvalued:

This chart shows that the stock value of Nvidia has soared past the value of the entire UK stock exchange or the entire value of US energy companies. Fuller reminds us of the parallel with Cisco in 2000. Back then, Cisco was a key supplier of gateway technology for all the companies scrambling to get into this hot new thing called the internet. Cisco valuation went to the moon, then crashed and burned when the mania around the internet subsided to a more sober set of applications. Cisco lost over 70% of its value in a year, and still has not regained the share price it had 25 years ago:

… [Nvidia] is riding a cycle in which investment becomes overinvestment, because that is what we do in every business cycle. It happened in the late 1990s and it will happen again this time.

…there are innumerable startups of all kinds, as well as existing companies, venturing into AI in a scramble to compete for any slice of market share. This is a huge source of Nvidia’s growth as the beating heart of the industry, similar to how Cisco Systems exploded during the internet infrastructure boom. Inevitably, there will be winners and losers. There will be far more losers than winners. When the losers go out of business or are acquired, Nvidia’s customer base will shrink and so will their revenue and earnings growth rates. That is what happened during the internet infrastructure booms of the late 1990s.

Fuller doesn’t quite say Nvidia is overvalued, just that it’s P/E is unlikely to expand further, hence any further stock price increases will have to be produced the old-fashioned way, by actual earnings growth. There are more bearish views than Fuller’s, I chose his because it was measured.

And on behalf of the bulls, here is noob Weebler Finance, telling us that Nvidia Will Never Be This Cheap Again: The AI Revolution Has Just Begun:

AI adoption isn’t happening in a single sequence; it’s actually unfolding across multiple industries and use cases simultaneously. Because of these parallel market build-outs, hyper-scalers, sovereign AI, enterprises, robotics, and physical AI are all independently contributing to the infrastructure surge.

…Overall, I believe there are clear signs that indicate current spending on AI infrastructure is similar to the early innings of prior technology buildouts like the internet or cloud computing. In both those cases, the first waves of investment were primarily about laying the foundation, while true value creation and exponential growth came years later as applications multiplied and usage scaled.

As a pure picks and shovels play, Nvidia stands to capture the lion’s share of this foundational build-out because its GPUs, networking systems, and software ecosystem have become the de facto standard for accelerated computing. Its GPUs lead in raw performance, energy efficiency, and scalability. We clearly see this with the GB300 delivering 50x per-token efficiency following its launch. Its networking stack has become indispensable, with the Spectrum-X Ethernet already hitting a $10b annualized run rate and NVLink enabling scaling beyond PCIe limits. Above all, Nvidia clearly shows a combined stack advantage, which positions it to become the dominant utility provider of AI compute.

… I believe that Nvidia at its current price of ~$182, is remarkably cheap given the value it offers. Add to this the strong secular tailwinds the company faces and its picks-and-shovels positioning, and the value proposition becomes all the more undeniable.

My view: Out of sheer FOMO, I hold a little NVDA stock directly, and much more by participating in various funds (e.g. QQQ, SPY), nearly all of which hold a bunch of NVDA.  I have hedged some by selling puts and covered calls that net me about 20% in twelve months, even if stock price does not go up.   Nvidia P/E (~ 40) is on the high side, but not really when considering the growth rate of the company. It seems to me that the bulk of the AI spend is by the four AI “hyperscalers” (Google, Meta, Amazon, Microsoft). They make bazillions of dollars on their regular (non-AI) businesses, and so they have plenty of money to burn in purchasing Nvidia chips. If they ever slow their spend, it’s time to reconsider Nvidia stock. But there should be plenty of warning of that, probably no near time crisis: last time I checked, Nvidia production was sold out for a full year ahead of time. I have no doubt that their sales revenue will continue to increase. But earnings will depend on how long they can continue to command their stupendous c. 50% net profit margin (if this were an oil company, imagine the howls of “price gouging”).

As usual, nothing here should be considered advice to buy or sell any security.

Government Makes Quasi-Nationalization Deal to Assure Supply of Critical Rare Earths for Defense 

If top government officials were regular readers of this blog, they would have been warned by a headline here more than two years ago, “China To Squeeze West by Restricting Export of Essential Rare Earths “.  For the last few years, the U.S. has been trying to limit Chinese access to the most powerful computing chips, which are largely made by American company Nvidia. But China has some high cards to play in this game. It produces some 90% of refined rare earths and rare earth products like magnets.  These super-powerful neodymium-containing magnets are utterly critical components in all kinds of high-tech products, including wind turbine generators and electric motors for electric vehicles and drones, and miscellaneous military hardware.

It has been painfully obvious at least since 2010, when China put the squeeze on Japan by unofficially slowing rare earth exports to Japan over a territorial dispute, that it was only a matter of time before China played that card again. But the West slumbered on. There is a reasonable amount of rare earth ores that are mined outside China, but nobody wanted to build and operate the expensive and environmentally messy processes to refine the rare earth minerals (carbonates, oxides, phosphates) into the pure metals. Unlike the esoteric and hard-to-imitate processing for cutting edge computing chips, anyone can gear up and start refining rare earth ores. It mainly just takes money, lots and lots of it, to build and operate all the processing equipment for the multiple steps involved*. There was little free market incentive for a Western company to invest in expensive processing, since China could readily bankrupt them by cutting prices as soon as they started up their shiny new process line. Reportedly, the Chinese used this tactic twice before (in 2002 and 2012) to kill nascent refining of the rare earth ores at Mountain Pass mine in California.

As of April of this year, in response to ongoing U.S. export restrictions on chips, China threw its latest rare earth card down on the table, requiring export licenses and imposing other restrictions that throttled rare earth exports. Western manufacturers were soon howling in pain. As of early June:

Global automakers are sounding the alarm on an impending shortage of rare earth magnets as China’s restrictions on the material vital for the automotive, defence and clean energy industries threaten production delays around the world.

German automakers became the latest to warn that China’s export restrictions threaten to shut down production and rattle their local economies, following a similar complaint from an Indian EV maker last week. U.S., Japanese and South Korean automakers warned President Donald Trump on May 9 car factories could close.

The Trump administration quickly caved on chips and in July permitted boatloads of high-end H20 Nvidia chips to ship to China, in return for resumption of rare earth exports from China. Score one for the CCP. As of mid-August, rare earth shipments had climbed back to around half of their pre-May levels, but China ominously warned Western companies against trying to stockpile any reserves of rare earths, or they would “face shortages” in the future.

After this ignominious face-slapping, the administration finally did something that should have been done years ago: they gave an American company a solid financial incentive to buckle down and do the dirty work of refining rare earth ores at large scale. The Defense Department inked a deal with MP Materials Corp, the current operator of the Mountain Pass mine and the modest refining operation there to quickly ramp up production:

The Department of Defense is investing capital in MP across several fronts. This includes a $400 million convertible preferred equity, struck at a fixed conversion price of $30.03. The government gets 10-year MP stock warrants also set for a $30.03 price. As planned, this would get the Department of Defense to about a 15% ownership position in MP Materials. In addition, the Department of Defense will lend MP Materials $150 million at a highly competitive interest rate to help the company expand its heavy rare earth element separation capabilities.

It’s not just a financing deal, however. This arrangement also provides a striking level of influence over pricing and profitability for MP Materials going forward.

For one thing, the Department of Defense will provide a price floor of $110 per kilogram for NdPr. NdPr is a product that is a combination of neodymium and praseodymium. This is a generous floor price…

The Department of Defense’s involvement now gives MP Materials the runway necessary to build what’s being dubbed the 10X magnet manufacturing expansion plant. The Department of Defense is committed to buying the output of this plant with a controlled cost-plus pricing structure. And there will be a profit split with the DoD getting a significant chunk of the upside above certain EBITDA thresholds.

This is being billed as a private-public partnership, but it is akin to nationalization. The government will be heavily involved in planning output and setting pricing here, as well as sharing in profits.  Fans of laissez-faire free markets may be understandably queasy over this arrangement, but national security considerations seem to make this necessary.

I predict that further “private-public” deals will be struck to subsidize Western production of vital materials. Let’s be clear: massive subsidies or similar incentives, in one form or another, will be needed. And this means that Americans will have to devote more resources to grinding out industrial materials, and less to consumer goods; hence, we will likely live in smaller houses, perhaps (gasp) lacking granite countertops and recessed lighting. Economics is all about trade-offs.

Due to its vast, lower-paid, hard-working and highly-capable workforce, the whole Chinese supply chain and production costs run far, far cheaper than anything in the West. We don’t have to produce 100% of what we use, even say 40% might be enough to keep from being helplessly squeezed by another nation. How to do this without descending into unproductive rent-seeking rip-offs will be a challenge.

Some other materials candidates:  China has as of December 2024 completely shut off exports to the U.S. of three key non-rare earth technical elements, gallium, germanium and antimony, so those might be a good place to start. China mines or refines between half and 90% of global supply of those minerals. Also, China has instituted export regulations of for more key metals (tungsten, tellurium, bismuth, indium and molybdenum-related products), so these may be further subjects for squeeze plays. Finally, “China is the world’s top graphite producer and exporter, and also refines more than 90% of the world’s graphite into a material that is used in virtually all EV batteries,” so that is yet another vital material where the West must decide how much it is worth to break its dependence on an unreliable trading partner.

Students still need to learn principles

Sometimes I get weeks in the summer that are more research focused. This past week is very much a teaching and service focused week at my university. I haven’t had any time to ponder topics related to research or current events. So, I will share what I’ve been telling my fellow college educators. This will sound backward to some and like common sense to others. Feel free to comment with your thoughts.

College professors who teach 200-level or “principles” classes should not change all that much in response to AI. Students still need to know something. There need to be a few concepts and vocabulary words in their heads. For example, a person cannot use a calculator effectively if they do not know what a square root is at all.

I see highly trained mid-career professionals bragging about how they get ChatGPT to do their work. Can a 20-year-old do that if they don’t know what words to use in a prompt? How does vibe coding go for people who never learned to write out a single line of code? (not a question I have an expert answer to right now)

We should largely be sticking to the “old ways” and at least to some extent still require memorization. Having an exam on paper is a good way to ensure that the students can form coherent thoughts of their own, when possible.

Indeed, students might become AI jockeys when they get to the workplace. A 400-level class would be a good place for them to start heavily integrating AI tools to accomplish tasks and do projects. For anyone unfamiliar with American college categories, that would mean that an undergraduate might heavily use AI tools in their 4th and final year of study.

AI makes a great tutor for learning and enforcing principles, but it should not serve as a replacement test-taker. A human who cannot read and write will not be able to take full advantage of an intelligent machine in the next decade. Voice recognition is getting very good and the models are getting more agentic, so this might all change if we can keep the data centers on long enough. In the future, you might argue that having students write an exam answer by hand is as superfluous as teaching them to play the violin.

As of 2025, what you might see is some teachers who feel pressured to claim they are integrating AI more than they actually want to. A relative I talked to his summer in a corporate job told me that she feels intense pressure at work to be able to claim that she’s using AI. Anyone doesn’t have the appearance of embracing AI looks behind or expendable!

We Don’t Have Mass Starvations Like We Used To

Two ideas coalesced to contribute to this post. First, for years in my Principles of Macroeconomics course I’ve taught that we no longer have mass starvation events due to A) Flexible prices & B) Access to international trade. Second, my thinking and taxonomy here has been refined by the work of Michael Munger on capitalism as a distinct concept from other pre-requisite social institutions.

Munger distinguishes between trade, markets, and capitalism. Trade could be barter or include other narrow sets of familiar trading partners, such as neighbors and bloodlines.  Markets additionally include impersonal trade. That is, a set of norms and even legal institutions emerge concerning commercial transactions that permit dependably buying and selling with strangers. Finally, capitalism includes both of these prerequisites in addition to the ability to raise funds by selling partial stakes in firms – or shares.

This last feature’s importance is due to the fact that debt or bond financing can’t fund very large and innovative endeavors because the upside to lenders is too small. That is, bonds are best for capital intensive projects that have a dependable rates of return that, hopefully, exceed the cost of borrowing. Selling shares of ownership in a company lets a diverse set of smaller stakeholders enjoy the upside of a speculative project. Importantly, speculative projects are innovative. They’re not always successful, but they are innovative in a way that bond and debt financing can’t satisfy. Selling equity shares open untapped capital markets.

With this refined taxonomy, I can better specify that it’s not access to international trade that is necessary to consistently prevent mass starvation. It’s access to international markets. For clarity, below is a 2×2 matrix that identifies which features characterize the presence of either flexible prices or access to international markets.

Continue reading

Meta AI Chief Yann LeCun Notes Limits of Large Language Models and Path Towards Artificial General Intelligence

We noted last week Meta’s successful efforts to hire away the best of the best AI scientists from other companies, by offering them insane (like $300 million) pay packages. Here we summarize and excerpt an excellent article in Newsweek by Gabriel Snyder who interviewed Meta’s chief AI scientist, Yann LeCun. LeCun discusses some inherent limitations of today’s Large Language Models (LLMs) like ChatGPT. Their limitations stem from the fact that they are based mainly on language; it turns out that human language itself is a very constrained dataset.  Language is readily manipulated by LLMs, but language alone captures only a small subset of important human thinking:

Returning to the topic of the limitations of LLMs, LeCun explains, “An LLM produces one token after another. It goes through a fixed amount of computation to produce a token, and that’s clearly System 1—it’s reactive, right? There’s no reasoning,” a reference to Daniel Kahneman’s influential framework that distinguishes between the human brain’s fast, intuitive method of thinking (System 1) and the method of slower, more deliberative reasoning (System 2).

The limitations of this approach become clear when you consider what is known as Moravec’s paradox—the observation by computer scientist and roboticist Hans Moravec in the late 1980s that it is comparatively easier to teach AI systems higher-order skills like playing chess or passing standardized tests than seemingly basic human capabilities like perception and movement. The reason, Moravec proposed, is that the skills derived from how a human body navigates the world are the product of billions of years of evolution and are so highly developed that they can be automated by humans, while neocortical-based reasoning skills came much later and require much more conscious cognitive effort to master. However, the reverse is true of machines. Simply put, we design machines to assist us in areas where we lack ability, such as physical strength or calculation.

The strange paradox of LLMs is that they have mastered the higher-order skills of language without learning any of the foundational human abilities. “We have these language systems that can pass the bar exam, can solve equations, compute integrals, but where is our domestic robot?” LeCun asks. “Where is a robot that’s as good as a cat in the physical world? We don’t think the tasks that a cat can accomplish are smart, but in fact, they are.”

This gap exists because language, for all its complexity, operates in a relatively constrained domain compared to the messy, continuous real world. “Language, it turns out, is relatively simple because it has strong statistical properties,” LeCun says. It is a low-dimensionality, discrete space that is “basically a serialized version of our thoughts.”  

[Bolded emphases added]

Broad human thinking involves hierarchical models of reality, which get constantly refined by experience:

And, most strikingly, LeCun points out that humans are capable of processing vastly more data than even our most data-hungry advanced AI systems. “A big LLM of today is trained on roughly 10 to the 14th power bytes of training data. It would take any of us 400,000 years to read our way through it.” That sounds like a lot, but then he points out that humans are able to take in vastly larger amounts of visual data.

Consider a 4-year-old who has been awake for 16,000 hours, LeCun suggests. “The bandwidth of the optic nerve is about one megabyte per second, give or take. Multiply that by 16,000 hours, and that’s about 10 to the 14th power in four years instead of 400,000.” This gives rise to a critical inference: “That clearly tells you we’re never going to get to human-level intelligence by just training on text. It’s never going to happen,” LeCun concludes…

This ability to apply existing knowledge to novel situations represents a profound gap between today’s AI systems and human cognition. “A 17-year-old can learn to drive a car in about 20 hours of practice, even less, largely without causing any accidents,” LeCun muses. “And we have millions of hours of training data of people driving cars, but we still don’t have self-driving cars. So that means we’re missing something really, really big.”

Like Brooks, who emphasizes the importance of embodiment and interaction with the physical world, LeCun sees intelligence as deeply connected to our ability to model and predict physical reality—something current language models simply cannot do. This perspective resonates with David Eagleman’s description of how the brain constantly runs simulations based on its “world model,” comparing predictions against sensory input. 

For LeCun, the difference lies in our mental models—internal representations of how the world works that allow us to predict consequences and plan actions accordingly. Humans develop these models through observation and interaction with the physical world from infancy. A baby learns that unsupported objects fall (gravity) after about nine months; they gradually come to understand that objects continue to exist even when out of sight (object permanence). He observes that these models are arranged hierarchically, ranging from very low-level predictions about immediate physical interactions to high-level conceptual understandings that enable long-term planning.

[Emphases added]

(Side comment: As an amateur reader of modern philosophy, I cannot help noting that these observations about the importance of recognizing there is a real external world and adjusting one’s models to match that reality call into question the epistemological claim that “we each create our own reality”.)

Given all this, developing the next generation of artificial intelligence must, like human intelligence, embed layers of working models of the world:

So, rather than continuing down the path of scaling up language models, LeCun is pioneering an alternative approach of Joint Embedding Predictive Architecture (JEPA) that aims to create representations of the physical world based on visual input. “The idea that you can train a system to understand how the world works by training it to predict what’s going to happen in a video is a very old one,” LeCun notes. “I’ve been working on this in some form for at least 20 years.”

The fundamental insight behind JEPA is that prediction shouldn’t happen in the space of raw sensory inputs but rather in an abstract representational space. When humans predict what will happen next, we don’t mentally generate pixel-perfect images of the future—we think in terms of objects, their properties and how they might interact

This approach differs fundamentally from how language models operate. Instead of probabilistically predicting the next token in a sequence, these systems learn to represent the world at multiple levels of abstraction and to predict how their representations will evolve under different conditions.

And so, LeCun is strikingly pessimistic on the outlook for breakthroughs in the current LLM’s like ChatGPT. He believes LLMs will be largely obsolete within five years, except for narrower purposes, and so he tells upcoming AI scientists to not even bother with them:

His belief is so strong that, at a conference last year, he advised young developers, “Don’t work on LLMs. [These models are] in the hands of large companies, there’s nothing you can bring to the table. You should work on next-gen AI systems that lift the limitations of LLMs.”

This approach seems to be at variance with other firms, who continue to pour tens of billions of dollars into LLMs. Meta, however, seems focused on next-generation AI, and CEO Mark Zuckerberg is putting his money where his mouth is.

Will LLMs get us the Missing Data for Solving Physics?

Tyler suggested that a “smarter” LLM could not master the unconquered intellectual territory of integrating general relatively and quantum mechanics.

Forget passing Ph.D. level qualifying exams. (j/k James) Are the AI’s going to significantly surpass human efforts in generating new knowledge?

What exactly is the barrier to solving the fundamental mysteries of physics? How do we experimentally confirm that all matter breaks down to vibrating strings?

In a podcast episode of Within Reason, Brian Greene says that we can imagine an experiment that would test the proposed unifying String Theory. The Large Hadron Collider is not big enough (17 miles in circumference is too small). We would need a particle accelerator as big as a galaxy.

ChatGPT isn’t going to get us there. However, Brian Greene did suggest that there is a possibility that an advance in mathematics could get us closer to being able to work with the data we have.

Beh Yeoh summarized what he heard from Tyler et al. at a live event on how fast the acceleration in our knowledge will get boosted from AI. They warned that some areas will hit bottlenecks and therefore not advance very fast. Anything that require clinical trials, for example, isn’t going to proceed at breakneck speed. Ben warns that “Protein folding was a rare success” so we shouldn’t get too too excited about acceleration in biotech. If advances in physics require bigger and better physical tools to do more advanced experimental observations, then new AI might not get us far.

However, one of the categories that made Yeoh’s list of where new AI might accelerate progress is “mathematics,” because developing new theories does not face the same kind of physical constraints.

So, we are unlikely to obtain new definitive tests of String Theory to the extent that it is a capital-intensive field. The scenario for AI advances to bring a solution to this empirical question in my lifetime is probably if the solution comes from advances in mathematics so that we can reduce our reliance on new observational data.

Related links:
my article for the Gospel Coalition – We are not “building God,” despite some claims.
my article for EconLog – AI will be constrained by the same problem that David Hume faced. AI can predict what is likely to occur in the future based on what it has observed in the past.

“The big upward trend in Generative AI/LLM tool use in 2025 continues but may be slowing.” Have we reached a plataue, at least temporarily? Have we experienced the big upswing already in productivity, and it’s going to level out now? At least programming will be less painful forever after?

LLM Hallucination of Citations in Economics Persists with Web-Enabled Models” I realize that, as of today, you can pay for yet-better models than what we tested. But if web-enabled 4o can’t cite Krugman properly, you do wonder if “6o” will be integrating general relatively and quantum mechanics. A slightly longer context window probably isn’t going to do it.