Humanity’s Last Exam in Nature

Last July I wrote here about “Humanity’s Last Exam”:

When every frontier AI model can pass your tests, how do you figure out which model is best? You write a harder test.

That was the idea behind Humanity’s Last Exam, an effort by Scale AI and the Center for AI Safety to develop a large database of PhD-level questions that the best AI models still get wrong.

The group initially released an arXiV working paper explaining how we created the dataset. I was surprised to see a version of that paper published in Nature this year, with the title changed to the more generic “A benchmark of expert-level academic questions to assess AI capabilities.”

One the one hand, it makes sense that the core author groups at the Center for AI Safety and Scale AI didn’t keep every coauthor in the loop, given that there were hundreds of us. On the other hand, I’m part of a different academic mega-project that currently is keeping hundreds of coauthors in the loop as it works its way through Nature. On the third, invisible hand, I’m never going to complain if any of my coauthors gets something of ours published in Nature when I’d assumed it would remain a permanent working paper.

AI is now getting close to passing the test:

What do we do when it can answer all the questions we already know the answer to? We start asking it questions we don’t know the answer to. How do you cure cancer? What is the answer to life, the universe, and everything? When will Jesus return, and how long until a million people are convinced he’s returned as an AI? Where is Ayatollah Khamenei right now?

Learning the Bitter Lesson at EconLog

I’m in EconLog with:

Learning the Bitter Lesson in 2026

At the link, I speculate on doom, hardware, human jobs, the jagged edge (via a Joshua Gans working paper), and the Manhattan Project. The fun thing about being 6 years late to a seminal paper is that you can consider how its predictions are doing.

Sutton draws from decades of AI history to argue that researchers have learned a “bitter” truth. Researchers repeatedly assume that computers will make the next advance in intelligence by relying on specialized human expertise. Recent history shows that methods that scale with computation outperform those reliant on human expertise. For example, in computer chess, brute-force search on specialized hardware triumphed over knowledge-based approaches. Sutton warns that researchers resist learning this lesson because building in knowledge feels satisfying, but true breakthroughs come from computation’s relentless scaling. 

The article has been up for a week and some intelligent comments have already come in. Folks are pointing out that I might be underrating the models’ ability to improve themselves going forward.

Second, with the frontier AI labs driving toward automating AI research the direct human involvement in developing such algorithms/architectures may be much less than it seems that you’re positing.

If that commenter is correct, there will be less need for humans than I said.

Also, Jim Caton over on LinkedIn (James, are we all there now?) pointed out that more efficient models might not need more hardware. If the AIs figure out ways to make themselves more efficient, then is “scaling” even going to be the right word anymore for improvement? The fun thing about writing about AI is that you will probably be wrong within weeks.

Between the time I proposed this to Econlog and publication, Ilya Sutskever suggested on Dwarkesh that “We’re moving from the age of scaling to the age of research“.

Broad Slump in Tech and Other Stocks: Fear Over AI Disruption Replaces AI Euphoria

Tech stocks (e.g. QQQ) roared up and up and up for most of 2023-2025, more than doubling in those three years. A big driving narrative was how AI was going to make everything amazing – productivity (and presumably profits) would soar, and robust investments in computing capacity (chips and buildings), and electric power infrastructure buildout, would goose the whole economy.

Will the Enormous AI Capex Spending Really Pay Off?

But in the past few months, a different narrative seems to have taken hold. Now the buzz is “the dark side of AI”. First, there is growing angst among investors over how much money the Big Tech hyperscalers (Google, Meta, Amazon, Microsoft, plus Oracle) are pouring into AI-related capital investments. These five firms alone are projected to spend over $0.6 trillion (!) in 2026. When some of this companies announced greater than expected spends in recent earning calls, analysts threw up all over their balance sheets. These are just eye-watering amounts, and investors have gotten a little wobbly in their support. These spends have an immediate effect on cash flow, driving it in some cases to around zero. And the depreciation on all that capex will come back to bite GAAP earnings in the coming years, driving nominal price/earnings even higher.

The critical question here is whether all that capex will pay out with mushrooming earnings three or four years down the road, or is the life blood of these companies just being flushed down the drain?  This is viewed as an existential arms race: benefits are not guaranteed for this big spend, but if you don’t do this spending, you will definitely get left behind. Firms like Amazon have a long history of investing for years at little profit, in order to achieve some ultimately profitable, wide-moat quasi-monopoly status.  If one AI program can manage to edge out everyone else, it could become the default application, like Amazon for online shopping or Google/YouTube for search and videos. The One AI could in fact rule us all.

Many Companies May Get Disrupted By AI

We wrote last week on the crash in enterprise software stocks like Salesforce and ServiceNow (“SaaSpocalypse”). The fear is that cheaper AI programs can do what these expensive services do for managing corporate data. The fear is now spreading more broadly (“AI Scare Trade”);  investors are rotating out of many firms with high-fee, labor-driven service models seen as susceptible to AI disruption. Here are two representative examples:

  • Wealth management companies Charles Schwab and Raymond James dropped 10% and 8% last week after a tech startup announced an AI-driven tax planning tool that could customize strategies for clients
  • Freight logistics firms C.H. Robinson and Universal Logistics fell 11% and 9% after some little AI outfit announced freight handling automation software

These AI disruption scenarios have been known for a long time as possibilities, but in the present mood, each new actual, specific case is feeding the melancholy narrative.

All is not doom and gloom here, as investors flee software companies they are embracing old-fashioned makers of consumer goods and other “stuff”:

The narrative last week was very clearly that “physical” was a better bet than “digital.” Physical goods and resources can’t be replaced by AI like digital goods and services can be at an alarming rate

As I write this (Monday), U.S. markets are closed for the holiday. We will see in the coming week whether fear or greed will have the upper hand.

Truth: The Strength and Weakness of AI Coding

There was a seismic shift in the AI world recently. In case you didn’t know, a Claude Code update was released just before the Christmas break. It could code awesomely and had a bigger context window, which is sort of like memory and attention span. Scott Cunningham wrote a series of posts demonstrating the power of Claude Code in ways that made economists take notice. Then, ChatGPT Codex was updated and released in January as if to say ‘we are still on the frontier’. The battle between Claude Code and Codex is active as we speak.

The differentiation is becoming clearer, depending on who you talk to. Claude Code feels architectural. It designs a project or system and thrives when you hand it the blueprint and say “Design this properly.” It’s your amazingly productive partner. Codex feels like it’s for the specialist. You tell it exactly what you want. No fluff. No ornamental abstraction unless you request it.

Codex flourishes with prompts like “Refactor this function to eliminate recursion”, or “ Take this response data and apply the Bayesian Dawid-Skene method. It does exactly that. It assumes competence on your part and does not attempt to decorate the output. It assumes that you know what you’re doing. It’s like your RA that can do amazing things if you tell it what task you want completed. Having said all of this, I’ve heard the inverse evaluations too. It probably matters a lot what the programmer brings to the table.

Both Claude Code and Codex are remarkably adept at catching code and syntax errors. That is not mysterious. Code is valid or invalid. The AI writes something, and the environment immediately reveals whether it conforms to the rules. Truth is embedded in the logical structure. When a single error appears, correction is often trivial.

When multiple errors appear, the problem becomes combinatorial. Fix A? Fix B? Change the type? Modify the loop? There are potentially infinite branching possibilities. Even then, the space is constrained. The code must run, or time out. That constraint disciplines the search. The reason these models code so well is that the code itself is the truth. So long as the logic isn’t violated, the axioms lead to the result. The AI anchors on the code to be internally consistent. The model can triangulate because the target is stable and verifiable.

AI struggles when the anchor disappears

Continue reading

SaaSmageddon: Will AI Eat the Software Business?

A big narrative for the past fifteen years has been that “software is eating the world.” This described a transformative shift where digital software companies disrupted traditional industries, such as retail, transportation, entertainment and finance, by leveraging cloud computing, mobile technology, and scalable platforms. This prophecy has largely come true, with companies like Amazon, Netflix, Uber, and Airbnb redefining entire sectors. Who takes a taxi anymore?

However, the narrative is now evolving. As generative AI advances, a new phase is emerging: “AI is eating software.”  Analysts predict that AI will replace traditional software applications by enabling natural language interfaces and autonomous agents that perform complex tasks without needing specialized tools. This shift threatens the $200 billion SaaS (Software-as-a-Service) industry, as AI reduces the need for dedicated software platforms and automates workflows previously reliant on human input. 

A recent jolt here has been the January 30 release by Anthropic of plug-in modules for Claude, which allow a relatively untrained user to enter plain English commands (“vibe coding”) that direct Claude to perform role-specific tasks like contract review, financial modeling, CRM integration, and campaign drafting.  (CRM integration is the process of connecting a Customer Relationship Management system with other business applications, such as marketing automation, ERP, e-commerce, accounting, and customer service platforms.)

That means Claude is doing some serious heavy lifting here. Currently, companies pay big bucks yearly to “enterprise software” firms like SAP and ServiceNow (NOW) and Salesforce to come in and integrate all their corporate data storage and flows. This must-have service is viewed as really hard to do, requiring highly trained specialists and proprietary software tools. Hence, high profit margins for these enterprise software firms.

 Until recently, these firms been darlings of the stock market. For instance, as of June, 2025, NOW was up nearly 2000% over the past ten years. Imagine putting $20,000 into NOW in 2015, and seeing it mushroom to nearly $400,000.  (AI tells me that $400,000 would currently buy you a “used yacht in the 40 to 50-foot range.”)

With the threat of AI, and probably with some general profit-taking in the overheated tech sector, the share price of these firms has plummeted. Here is a six-month chart for NOW:

Source: Seeking Alpha

NOW is down around 40% in the past six months. Most analysts seem positive, however, that this is a market overreaction. A key value-add of an enterprise software firm is the custody of the data itself, in various secure and tailored databases, and that seems to be something that an external AI program cannot replace, at least for now. The capability to pull data out and crunch it (which AI is offering) it is kind of icing on the cake.

Firms like NOW are adjusting to the new narrative, by offering pay-per-usage, as an alternative to pay-per-user (“seats”). But this does not seem to be hurting their revenues. These firms claim that they can harness the power of AI (either generic AI or their own software) to do pretty much everything that AI claims for itself. Earnings of these firms do not seem to be slowing down.

With the recent stock price crash, the P/E for NOW is around 24, with a projected earnings growth rate of around 25% per year. Compared to, say, Walmart with a P/E of 45 and a projected growth rate of around 10%, NOW looks pretty cheap to me at the moment.

(Disclosure: I just bought some NOW. Time will tell if that was wise.)

Usual disclaimer: Nothing here should be considered advice to buy or sell any security.

Google’s TPU Chips Threaten Nvidia’s Dominance in AI Computing

Here is a three-year chart of stock prices for Nvidia (NVDA), Alphabet/Google (GOOG), and the generic QQQ tech stock composite:

NVDA has been spectacular. If you had $20k in NVDA three years ago, it would have turned into nearly $200k. Sweet. Meanwhile, GOOG poked along at the general pace of QQQ.  Until…around Sept 1 (yellow line), GOOG started to pull away from QQQ, and has not looked back.

And in the past two months, GOOG stock has stomped all over NVDA, as shown in the six-month chart below. The two stocks were neck and neck in early October, then GOOG has surged way ahead. In the past month, GOOG is up sharply (red arrow), while NVDA is down significantly:

What is going on? It seems that the market is buying the narrative that Google’s Tensor Processing Unit (TPU) chips are a competitive threat to Nvidia’s GPUs. Last week, we published a tutorial on the technical details here. Briefly, Google’s TPUs are hardwired to perform key AI calculations, whereas Nvidia’s GPUs are more general-purpose. For a range of AI processing, the TPUs are faster and much more energy-efficient than the GPUs.

The greater flexibility of the Nvidia GPUs, and the programming community’s familiarity with Nvidia’s CUDA programming language, still gives Nvidia a bit of an edge in the AI training phase. But much of that edge fades for the inference (application) usages for AI. For the past few years, the big AI wannabes have focused madly on model training. But there must be a shift to inference (practical implementation) soon, for AI models to actually make money.

All this is a big potential headache for Nvidia. Because of their quasi-monopoly on AI compute, they have been able to charge a huge 75% gross profit margin on their chips. Their customers are naturally not thrilled with this, and have been making some efforts to devise alternatives. But it seems like Google, thanks to a big head start in this area, and very deep pockets, has actually equaled or even beaten Nvidia at its own game.

This explains much of the recent disparity in stock movements. It should be noted, however, that for a quirky business reason, Google is unlikely in the near term to displace Nvidia as the main go-to for AI compute power. The reason is this: most AI compute power is implemented in huge data/cloud centers. And Google is one of the three main cloud vendors, along with Microsoft and Amazon, with IBM and Oracle trailing behind. So, for Google to supply Microsoft and Amazon with its chips and accompanying know-how would be to enable its competitors to compete more strongly.

Also, AI users like say OpenAI would be reluctant to commit to usage in a Google-owned facility using Google chips, since then the user would be somewhat locked in and held hostage, since it would be expensive to switch to a different data center if Google tried to raise prices. On contrast, a user can readily move to a different data center for a better deal, if all the centers are using Nvidia chips.

For the present, then, Google is using its TPU technology primarily in-house. The company has a huge suite of AI-adjacent business lines, so its TPU capability does give it genuine advantages there. Reportedly, soul-searching continues in the Google C-suite about how to more broadly monetize its TPUs. It seems likely that they will find a way. 

As usual, nothing here constitutes advice to buy or sell any security.

AI Computing Tutorial: Training vs. Inference Compute Needs, and GPU vs. TPU Processors

A tsunami of sentiment shift is washing over Wall Street, away from Nvidia and towards Google/Alphabet. In the past month, GOOG stock is up a sizzling 12%, while NVDA plunged 13%, despite producing its usual earnings beat.  Today I will discuss some of the technical backdrop to this sentiment shift, which involves the differences between training AI models versus actually applying them to specific problems (“inference”), and significantly different processing chips. Next week I will cover the company-specific implications.

As most readers here probably know, the popular Large Language Models (LLM) that underpin the popular new AI products work by sucking in nearly all the text (and now other data) that humans have ever produced, reducing each word or form of a word to a numerical token, and grinding and grinding to discover consistent patterns among those tokens. Layers of (virtual) neural nets are used. The training process involves an insane amount of trying to predict, say, the next word in a sentence scraped from the web, evaluating why the model missed it, and feeding that information back to adjust the matrix of weights on the neural layers, until the model can predict that next word correctly. Then on to the next sentence found on the internet, to work and work until it can be predicted properly. At the end of the day, a well-trained AI chatbot can respond to Bob’s complaint about his boss with an appropriately sympathetic pseudo-human reply like, “It sounds like your boss is not treating you fairly, Bob. Tell me more about…” It bears repeating that LLMs do not actually “know” anything. All they can do is produce a statistically probably word salad in response to prompts. But they can now do that so well that they are very useful.*

This is an oversimplification, but gives the flavor of the endless forward and backward propagation and iteration that is required for model training. This training typically requires running vast banks of very high-end processors, typically housed in large, power-hungry data centers, for months at a time.

Once a model is trained (e.g., the neural net weights have been determined), to then run it (i.e., to generate responses based on human prompts) takes considerably less compute power. This is the “inference” phase of generative AI. It still takes a lot of compute to run a big program quickly, but a simpler LLM like DeepSeek can be run, with only modest time lags, on a high end PC.

GPUs Versus ASIC TPUs

Nvidia has made its fortune by taking graphical processing units (GPU) that were developed for massively parallel calculations needed for driving video displays, and adapting them to more general problem solving that could make use of rapid matrix calculations. Nvidia chips and its CUDA language have been employed for physical simulations such as seismology and molecular dynamics, and then for Bitcoin calculations. When generative AI came along, Nvidia chips and programming tools were the obvious choice for LLM computing needs. The world’s lust for AI compute is so insatiable, and Nvidia has had such a stranglehold, that the company has been able to charge an eye-watering gross profit margin of around 75% on its chips.

AI users of course are trying desperately to get compute capability without have to pay such high fees to Nvidia. It has been hard to mount a serious competitive challenge, though. Nvidia has a commanding lead in hardware and supporting software, and (unlike the Intel of years gone by) keeps forging ahead, not resting on its laurels. 

So far, no one seems to be able to compete strongly with Nvidia in GPUs. However, there is a different chip architecture, which by some measures can beat GPUs at their own game.

NVIDIA GPUs are general-purpose parallel processors with high flexibility, capable of handling a wide range of tasks from gaming to AI training, supported by a mature software ecosystem like CUDA. GPUs beat out the original computer central processing units (CPUs) for these tasks by sacrificing flexibility for the power to do parallel processing of many simple, repetitive operations. The newer “application-specific integrated circuits” (ASICs) take this specialization a step further. They can be custom hard-wired to do specific calculations, such as those required for bitcoin and now for AI. By cutting out steps used by GPUs, especially fetching data in and out of memory, ASICs can do many AI computing tasks faster and cheaper than Nvidia GPUs, and using much less electric power. That is a big plus, since AI data centers are driving up electricity prices in many parts of the country. The particular type of ASIC that is used by Google for AI is called a Tensor Processing Unit (TPU).

I found this explanation by UncoverAlpha to be enlightening:

A GPU is a “general-purpose” parallel processor, while a TPU is a “domain-specific” architecture.

The GPUs were designed for graphics. They excel at parallel processing (doing many things at once), which is great for AI. However, because they are designed to handle everything from video game textures to scientific simulations, they carry “architectural baggage.” They spend significant energy and chip area on complex tasks like caching, branch prediction, and managing independent threads.

A TPU, on the other hand, strips away all that baggage. It has no hardware for rasterization or texture mapping. Instead, it uses a unique architecture called a Systolic Array.

The “Systolic Array” is the key differentiator. In a standard CPU or GPU, the chip moves data back and forth between the memory and the computing units for every calculation. This constant shuffling creates a bottleneck (the Von Neumann bottleneck).

In a TPU’s systolic array, data flows through the chip like blood through a heart (hence “systolic”).

  1. It loads data (weights) once.
  2. It passes inputs through a massive grid of multipliers.
  3. The data is passed directly to the next unit in the array without writing back to memory.

What this means, in essence, is that a TPU, because of its systolic array, drastically reduces the number of memory reads and writes required from HBM. As a result, the TPU can spend its cycles computing rather than waiting for data.

Google has developed the most advanced ASICs for doing AI, which are now on some levels a competitive threat to Nvidia.   Some implications of this will be explored in a post next week.

*Next generation AI seeks to step beyond the LLM world of statistical word salads, and try to model cause and effect at the level of objects and agents in the real world – – see Meta AI Chief Yann LeCun Notes Limits of Large Language Models and Path Towards Artificial General Intelligence .

Standard disclaimer: Nothing here should be considered advice to buy or sell any security.

Michael Burry’s New Venture Is Substack “Cassandra Unchained”: Set Free to Prophesy All-Out Doom on AI Investing

This is a quick follow-up to last week’s post on “Big Short” Michael Burry closing down his Scion Asset Management hedge fund. Burry had teased on X that he would announce his next big thing on Nov 25. It seems he is now a day or two early: Sunday night he launched a paid-subscription “Cassandra Unchained” Substack. There he claims that:

Cassandra Unchained is now Dr. Michael Burry’s sole focus as he gives you a front row seat to his analytical efforts and projections for stocks, markets, and bubbles, often with an eye to history and its remarkably timeless patterns.

Reportedly the subscription cost is $39 a month, or $379 annually, and there are 26,000 subscribers already. Click the abacus and…that comes to a cool $ 9.9 million a year in subscription fees. Not bad compensation for sharing your musings on line.

Michael Burry was dubbed “Cassandra” by Warren Buffett in recognition of his prescient warnings about the 2008 housing market collapse, a prophecy that was initially ignored, much like the mythological Cassandra who was fated to deliver true prophecies that were never believed. Burry embraced this nickname, adopting “Cassandra” as his online moniker on social media platforms, symbolizing his role as a lone voice warning of impending financial disaster. On the About page of his new Substack, he wrote that managing clients’ money in a hedge fund like Scion came with restrictions that “muzzled” him, such that he could only share “cryptic fragments” publicly, whereas now he is “unchained.”

Of his first two posts on the new Substack, one was a retrospective on his days as a practicing doctor (resident in neurology at Stanford Hospital) in 1999-2000. He had done a lot of on-line posting on investing topics, focusing on valuations, and finally left medicine to start a hedge fund. As he tells it, he called the dot.com bubble before it popped.

The Business Insider summarizes Burry’s second post, which attacks the central premise of those who claim the current AI boom is fundamentally different from the 1990s dot.com boom:

The second post aims straight at the heart of the AI boom, which he calls a “glorious folly” that will require investigation over several posts to break down.

Burry goes on to address a common argument about the difference between the dot-com bubble and AI boom — that the tech companies leading the charge 25 years ago were largely unprofitable, while the current crop are money-printing machines.

At the turn of this century, Burry writes, the Nasdaq was driven by “highly profitable large caps, among which were the so-called ‘Four Horsemen’ of the era — Microsoft, Intel, Dell, and Cisco.”

He writes that a key issue with the dot-com bubble was “catastrophically overbuilt supply and nowhere near enough demand,” before adding that it’s “just not so different this time, try as so many might do to make it so.”

Burry calls out the “five public horsemen of today’s AI boom — Microsoft, Google, Meta, Amazon and Oracle” along with “several adolescent startups” including Sam Altman’s OpenAI.

Those companies have pledged to invest well over $1 trillion into microchips, data centers, and other infrastructure over the next few years to power an AI revolution. They’ve forecasted enormous growth, exciting investors and igniting their stock prices.

Shares of Nvidia, a key supplier of AI microchips, have surged 12-fold since the start of 2023, making it the world’s most valuable public company with a $4.4 trillion market capitalization.

“And once again there is a Cisco at the center of it all, with the picks and shovels for all and the expansive vision to go with it,” Burry writes, after noting the internet-networking giant’s stock plunged by over 75% during the dot-com crash. “Its name is Nvidia.”

Tell us how you really feel, Michael. Cassandra, indeed.

My amateur opinion here: I think there is a modest but significant chance that the hyperscalers will not all be able to make enough fresh money to cover their ginormous investments in AI capabilities 2024-2028. What happens then? For Google and Meta and Amazon, they may need to write down hundreds of millions of dollars on their balance sheets, which would show as ginormous hits to GAAP earnings for a number of quarters. But then life would go on just fine for these cash machines, and the market may soon forgive and forget this massive misallocation of old cash, as long as operating cash keeps rolling in as usual. Stocks are, after all, priced on forward earnings. If the AI boom busts, all tech stock prices would sag, but I think the biggest operating impact would be on suppliers of chips (like Nvidia) and of data centers (like Oracle). So, Burry’s comparison of 2025 Nvidia to 1999 Cisco seems apt.

META Stock Slides as Investors Question Payout for Huge AI Spend

How’s this for a “battleground” stock:

Meta stock has dropped about 13% when its latest quarterly earnings were released, then continued to slide until today’s market exuberance over a potential end to the government shutdown. What is the problem?

Meta has invested enormous sums in AI development already, and committed to invest even more in the future. It is currently plowing some 65% (!!) of its cash flow into AI, with no near-term prospects of making big profits there. CEO Mark Zuckerberg has a history of spending big on the Next Big Thing, which eventually fizzles. Meta’s earnings have historically been so high that he can throw away a few billion here and there and nobody cared. But now (up to $800 billion capex spend through 2028) we are talking real money.

Up till now Big Tech has been able to finance their investments entirely out of cash flow, but (like its peers), Meta started issuing debt to pay for some of the AI spend. Leverage is a two-edged sword – – if you can borrow a ton of money (up to $30 billion here) at say 5%, and invest it in something that returns 10%, that is glorious. Rah, capitalism! But if the payout is not there, you are hosed.

Another ugly issue lurking in the shadows is Meta’s dependence on scam ads for some 10% of its ad revenues. Reuters released a horrifying report last week detailing how Meta deliberately slow-walks or ignores legitimate complaints about false advertising and even more nefarious mis-uses of Facebook. Chilling specific anecdotes abound, but they seem to be part of a pattern of Meta choosing to not aggressively curtail known fraud, because doing so would cut into their revenue. They focus their enforcement efforts in regions where their hands are likely to be slapped hardest by regulators, while continuing to let advertisers defraud users wherever they can get away with it:

…Meta has internally acknowledged that regulatory fines for scam ads are certain, and anticipates penalties of up to $1 billion, according to one internal document.

But those fines would be much smaller than Meta’s revenue from scam ads, a separate document from November 2024 states. Every six months, Meta earns $3.5 billion from just the portion of scam ads that “present higher legal risk,” the document says, such as those falsely claiming to represent a consumer brand or public figure or demonstrating other signs of deceit. That figure almost certainly exceeds “the cost of any regulatory settlement involving scam ads.”

Rather than voluntarily agreeing to do more to vet advertisers, the same document states, the company’s leadership decided to act only in response to impending regulatory action.

Thus, the seamy underside of capitalism. And this:

…The company only bans advertisers if its automated systems predict the marketers are at least 95% certain to be committing fraud, the documents show. If the company is less certain – but still believes the advertiser is a likely scammer – Meta charges higher ad rates as a penalty, according to the documents. 

So…if Meta is 94% (but not 95%) sure that an ad is a fraud, they will still let it run, but just charge more for it.  Sweet. Guess that sort of thinking is why Zuck is worth $250 million, and I’m not.

But never fear, Meta’s P/E is the lowest of the Mag 7 group, so maybe it is a buy after all:

Source

As usual, nothing here should be considered advice to buy or sell any security.

Circular AI Deals Reminiscent of Disastrous Dot.Com Vendor Financing of the 1990s

Hey look, I just found a way to get infinite free electric power:

This sort of extension-cord-plugged-into-itself meme has shown up recently on the web to characterize a spate of circular financing deals in the AI space, largely involving OpenAI (parent of ChatGPT). Here is a graphic from Bloomberg which summarizes some of these activities:

Nvidia, which makes LOTS of money selling near-monopoly, in-demand GPU chips, has made investing commitments in customers or customers of their customers. Notably, Nvidia will invest up to $100 billion in Open AI, in order to help OpenAI increase their compute power. OpenAI in turn inked a $300 billion deal with Oracle, for building more data centers filled with Nvidia chips.  Such deals will certainly boost the sales of their chips (and make Nvidia even more money), but they also raise a number of concerns.

First, they make it seem like there is more demand for AI than there actually is. Short seller Jim Chanos recently asked, “[Don’t] you think it’s a bit odd that when the narrative is ‘demand for compute is infinite’, the sellers keep subsidizing the buyers?” To some extent, all this churn is just Nvidia recycling its own money, as opposed to new value being created.

Second, analysts point to the destabilizing effect of these sorts of “vendor financing” arrangements. Towards the end of the great dot.com boom in the late 1990’s, hardware vendors like Cisco were making gobs of money selling server capacity to internet service providers (ISPs). In order to help the ISPs build out even faster (and purchase even more Cisco hardware), Cisco loaned money to the ISPs. But when that boom busted, and the huge overbuild in internet capacity became (to everyone’s horror) apparent, the ISPs could not pay back those loans. QQQ lost 70% of its value. Twenty-five years later, Cisco stock price has never recovered its 2000 high.

Beside taking in cash investments, OpenAI is borrowing heavily to buy its compute capacity. Since OpenAI makes no money now (and in fact loses billions a year), and (like other AI ventures) will likely not make any money for several more years, and it is locked in competition with other deep-pocketed AI ventures, there is the possibility that it could pull down the whole house of cards, as happened in 2000.  Bernstein analyst Stacy Rasgon recently wrote, “[OpenAI CEO Sam Altman] has the power to crash the global economy for a decade or take us all to the promised land, and right now we don’t know which is in the cards.”

For the moment, nothing seems set to stop the tidal wave of spending on AI capabilities. Big tech is flush with cash, and is plowing it into data centers and program development. Everyone is starry-eyed with the enormous potential of AI to change, well, EVERYTHING (shades of 1999).

The financial incentives are gigantic. Big tech got big by establishing quasi-monopolies on services that consumers and businesses consider must-haves. (It is the quasi-monopoly aspect that enables the high profit margins).  And it is essential to establish dominance early on. Anyone can develop a word processor or spreadsheet that does what Word or Excel do, or a search engine that does what Google does, but Microsoft and Google got there first, and preferences are sticky. So, the big guys are spending wildly, as they salivate at the prospect of having the One AI to Rule Them All.

Even apart from achieving some new monopoly, the trillions of dollars spent on data center buildout are hoped to pay out one way or the other: “The data-center boom would become the foundation of the next tech cycle, letting Amazon, Microsoft, Google, and others rent out intelligence the way they rent cloud storage now. AI agents and custom models could form the basis of steady, high-margin subscription products.”

However, if in 2-3 years it turns out that actual monetization of AI continues to be elusive, as seems quite possible, there could be a Wile E. Coyote moment in the markets: