Do Tariffs Decrease Prices?

Much of what economics has to say about tariffs comes from microeconomic theory. But it’s mostly sectoral in nature. Trade theory has some insights. But the effects on the whole of an economy are either small, specific to undiversified economies, or make representative agent assumptions that avoid much detail. Given that the economics profession has repeatedly said that the Trump tariffs would contribute to inflation, it seems like we should look at the historical evidence.

Lay of the Land

Economists say things like ‘competition drives prices closer to marginal cost’. Whether the competitor lives abroad is irrelevant. More foreign competition means lower prices at home. But that’s a partial equilibrium story. It’s true for a particular type of good or sector. What happens to prices in the larger economy in seemingly unrelated industries? The vanilla thinking that it depends on various elasticities.

I think that the typical economist has a fuzzy idea that the general price level will be higher relative to personal incomes in some sort of real-wages and economic growth mental model. I don’t think that they’re wrong. But that model is a long-run model. As we’ve discovered, people want to know about inflation this month and this year, not the impact on real wages over a five-year period.

Part of the answer is technical. If domestic import prices go up, then we’ll sensibly see lower quantities purchased. The magnitude depends on the availability of substitutes. But what should happen to total import spending? Rarely do we talk about the expenditure elasticity of prices. Rarely do we get a simple ‘price shock’ in a subsector. It’s unclear that total spending on imports, such as on coffee, would rise or fall – not to mention the explicit tax increase. It’s possible that consumers spend more on imports due to higher prices, or less due to newly attractive substitutes. The reason that spending matters is that it drives prices in other parts of the economy.

For example, I argued previously that tariffs reduce dollars sent abroad (regardless of domestic consumer spending inclusive of tariffs) and that fewer dollars will return as asset purchases. I further argued that uncertainty makes our assets less attractive. That puts downward pressure on our asset prices. However, assets don’t show up in the CPI.

According to the above discussion, it’s unclear whether tariffs have a supply or demand impact on the economy. The microeconomics says that it’s a supply-side shock. But the domestic spending implications are a big question mark.

What is a Tariff Shock?

That’s the title of a recent working paper from the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. It’s a fun paper and I won’t review the entirety. They start by summarizing historical documents and interpreting the motivation of tariffs going back to 1870. They argue that tariffs are generally not endogenous to good or bad moments in a business cycle and they’re usually perceived as permanent. The authors create an index  to measure tariff rates.

Here’s the fun part. They run an annual VAR of unemployment, inflation, and their measure of tariffs. Unemployment in negatively correlated with output and reflects the real side of the economy. Along with inflation, we have the axes of the Aggregate Supply & Aggregate Demand model. Tariffs provide the shock – but to supply or demand?.  Below are the IRF results:

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“The Pope and the Price of Fish”

Christians across the world are observing the season of Lent right now, concluding this week. This important period of religious observance involves personal sacrifice of some sort, and for Western Christians a common form of sacrifice is abstaining from consuming meat on Fridays during Lent. But there is one exception: most Christians allow consumption of fish on Fridays, in lieu of other kinds of meat.

But abstaining from meat on Fridays was not always a practice reserved for Lent. Catholics used to abstain from meat for the entire year prior to a 1966 decree by Pope Paul VI. This decree relaxed the rules on fasting and decentralized them. In the US, Catholic Bishops chose to eliminate meatless Fridays, except during Lent.

No doubt this was an important religious change, but it was also an important economic change. And the first question an economist would ask is: how did this impact the price of fish? In our simple supply and demand framework, this should result in a decrease in demand, which would lower the price of fish. Did that happen?

In 1968, economist Frederick Bell asked just that question in an article published in the American Economic Review titled “The Pope and the Price of Fish.” The short answer is that yes, the price of fish did indeed decline!

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Primary Driver for This Inflation Is Surging Demand (Fueled by COVID Payments), Not Supply Chain Constraints

Inflation is colloquially defined as, “Too much money chasing too few goods (and services)”. Supply chain constraints get talked about, and these are widely blamed for the inflation we are seeing.  Of course, supply limitations play into inflation, but to focus on them is to miss the elephant in room. The primary driver of this inflation is not “too few goods”, but “too much money.”

Such is the thesis of a widely circulated article by Ray Dalio’s investing firm Bridgewater Associates, “It’s Mostly a Demand Shock, Not a Supply Shock, and It’s Everywhere.” The point is summarized:

While the headlines tend to focus on the micro elements of the supply shock (the LA port, coal in China, natural gas in Europe, semiconductors globally, truckers in the UK, etc.), this perspective largely misses the macro cause that is likely to persist and for which there is no idiosyncratic solution. This is not, by and large, a pandemic-related supply problem: as we’ll show, supply of almost everything is at all-time highs. Rather, this is mostly an MP3-driven upward demand shock. [emphases in the original]

In Bridgewater’s terminology, “MP3” is “Monetary Policy #3”, and refers to massive deficit spending combined with central bank quantitative easing. We saw this implemented in 2020-2021 when the federal government pumped out trillions of dollars of stimulus payments and enhanced unemployment benefits, and the Fed instantly soaked up the bonds that were issued to pay for these trillions. This fed/Fed combo amounts to simply printing money on an enormous scale.

Those trillions of dollars funded a huge surge in durable goods purchases. By late 2021 the supply of these goods was well above 2019 (pre-COVID) levels, and even above normal growth trendlines. However, the supply and transport systems simply could not grow fast enough to accommodate this insatiable demand. Charts below substantiate this. To focus on supply chain bottlenecks of themselves is misleading. The primary driver for this inflation has been the trillions of dollars of federal largesse. The Fed knows all this, obviously, but Jay Powell (the Chief Enabler of this deficit spending) would likely not have been reappointed if he spoke too directly about the cause of this inflation. Hence the endless prattle about supply chains.

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