Hayek on The Volatility Pie

In the Road to Serfdom, Friedrich Hayek uses some basic quantitative logic to make an important point about employment and political economy.

Hayek starts by assuming that government jobs are stable relative to those in the private sector. This might seem obvious, but let’s just start by checking the premises. Below are the percent change in total compensation and total employment for government employees and for the private sector. From year to year, private employment and total compensation is more volatile. So, Hayek’s initial premise is correct.

From there, he proceeds to say that if any part of income or employment is guaranteed or stabilized by the government, then the result must be that the risk and volatility is borne elsewhere in the economy. He reasons that if there is a decline in total spending, then stable government pay and employment implies that the private sector must have a deeper recession than the overall economy. Looking at the above graphs, both government employment and the total compensation are much less volatile.

But can’t governments intervene in macroeconomic stabilization policies effectively? Yes! They can and do stabilize the economy, especially with monetary policy. But Hayek is referring to individual stabilizations. For any individual to be guaranteed an income, all others must necessarily experience greater income volatility. How’s that?

Consider two individuals. Person #1 has an average income of $100. In any given year, his income might be $10 – or 10% – higher or lower than average. For the moment, person #2 is not employed and has income volatility of zero. If the government provides a job with a constant pay rate to person #2, then they still have zero income volatility. But instead of earning a consistent $0, person #2 earns a consistent $50. Nice.

Of course, person #2 gets his pay from somewhere. By one means or another, it comes from person #1. Let’s be generous and assume the tax on person #1 has no resulting behavioral effect. His new average income is $50, being $10 higher or lower in any given year. But now, that $10 deviation is over a base of $50 rather than $100. Person #1’s income varies by 20% relative to his new average!

Reasoning through this, we can consider that a person has a stable portion of their income and a volatile portion. If someone takes a part of your stable portion and leaves you with all of your volatile portion, then your remaining income is now more volatile on average. I think that this point is interesting enough all by itself.

IRL, many of our taxes are not lump sum. Rather, progressive taxation causes a negative incentive for production & earnings. The downside is that we produce less. The upside is that the government takes a higher proportion of our volatile income than of our stable income (because income changes are always on the margin and those marginal dollars are taxed at a higher rate). So, the government shares the income volatility of the private sector. By continuing to pay government employees a stable salary, the government is effectively absorbing some of that year-to-year income volatility on behalf of its employees.* The government is, in a sense, providing income insurance to a subgroup.

What does this have to do with The Road to Serfdom? Hayek argues that, as the government employs an increasing proportion of the population, the remaining private sector experiences increasing income and employment volatility. Such volatility increases private risk exposure so much that people begin to fawn over and increasingly compete for the stability found in government work. He gets anthropological and argues that the economic attraction to government jobs will introduce greater competition for those jobs and subsequently greater esteem and respect for those who are able to get them. This process makes the government jobs even more attractive.

My own two cents is that there is nothing internally unstable about this process. Total real income would fall compared to the alternative. However, such a state of affairs might be externally unstable as other governments/economies compete with the increasingly socialist one.


*An important analogue is that firms behave in a similar way. An individual may receive a relatively constant salary so long as they are employed. But the result must be that the firm bears more of the net-profit volatility. So, as more people want stable private sector jobs, the profit volatility of firms would increase and result in greater [seemingly windfall] profits and losses.

The Simple Utility Function Vs. Socialism

I’m a big fan of Friedrich Hayek. I first read his work in an academic setting. But many people first encounter him via The Road to Serfdom, his book that outlines the political and social consequences of state economic controls. I always meant to go back and read it, but it usually took a back seat to other works. Now, I’m slowly making my way through.

A lovely snippet includes Hayek explaining the popular sentiment that “it’s only money” or that money-related concerns are base or superficial. Such an attitude is especially common when people recount their childhood or family life during times of financial difficulty. The story often goes “times were hard, but we had each other”. Similarly, a popularly derisive trope is that economists ‘only care about money’ [, rather than the more important things].

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Mises’s Interventionism, A Recap

I suspect that Mises may have felt somewhat restless after writing Socialism. He had taken a very good stab at describing the socialist economy and its inadequacy for the promotion of human flourishing. By 1940 fascism had arisen in both Italy and in Germany, who Mises considered the clear antagonists of World War II. Further, the communist Soviets were allied with Germany at the time of writing Interventionism.

A communist-fascist alliance may seem strange to idealogues, but it appeared quite natural to Mises that the two distasteful versions of socialism should find cooperation convenient to achieve their own ends. In America, the revelations of German atrocities had yet to arrive and there were many sympathizers with both Russia and Germany. In Britain, union leaders were promoting the idea of socialism as a reward to the public who would be bearing the costs of the war.

Mises thought that the disfunction of socialism was adequate to describe its ultimate failure as an economic system. However, socialist tendencies were pervasive in the liberal market economies among both idealogues and demagogues enough to make the transition to socialism a very real threat. After all, while socialism may not be a stable regime in a dynamic world, certain features within specific market economies may nonetheless tend toward it. What is the cause of such tendencies?

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The Transition to a Market Economy: Did Former Soviet Republics Fail?

This semester I am participating in a reading group with undergraduate students that focuses on the history and prospects for capitalism and socialism. Lately we have been reading Joseph Stiglitz, who has long argued that China’s transition to a market economy has gone much better than the former Soviet Union. Gradual transition is superior to “shock therapy,” according to Stiglitz.

There’s an extent to which this is true. If we just look at economic growth rates since, say, 1995, China has clearly outpaced Russia.

Source: Our World in Data

It’s hard to know exactly what year to start, since GDP figures for former planned economies immediately after transition aren’t reliable, but the start date is mostly irrelevant for everything I’ll say here (please play around with the start year in the charts to see if I’m cherry-picking years). 1995 seems a reasonable enough year to start for reliable post-transition starting point.

As we see above, while Russia has had a rough doubling of GDP per capita since 1995 (respectable, and yes, it’s all adjusted for inflation!), China has soared almost 600%. Wow! But this is something of a cheat. Despite all that growth, average income in China is still lower than Russia: only about 60% of Russia in 2020. China started from a much lower level, meaning that faster growth, while not guaranteed, is at least easier to achieve. In fact, if we go back to 1978, when China’s first reforms began, GDP per capita in the Former USSR was about 6 times as high as China (that’s according to the latest Maddison Project estimates, which will always be speculative for non-market economies, but are the best we have).

Furthermore, Russia hasn’t really transitioned to a democracy either. China clearly hasn’t, but no one doubts that. But despite having the outward symbols of democracy (elections, a legislature, etc.), Russia still scores low on most indexes of democracy and civil liberties. For example, Freedom House scores them at 19/100, a little better than China (9/100), but nothing like Western Europe.

So, did the quick transition to market economies fail? Not so fast. While it did fail in Russia, in most of Eastern Europe and the eastern part of the former USSR seems to have been a major success. Take a look at this chart, which shows the former Soviet Republics in and near Europe (I exclude Central Asian FSRs).

Source: Our World in Data
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