Looking Ahead: Post-Powell Interest Rates

Jerome Powell’s term as Fed Chair ends in late May 2026. President Trump has said that he will nominate a new chair and the US senate will confirm them. It may take multiple nominations, but that’s the process. The new chair doesn’t govern monetary and interest rate policy all by their lonesome, however. They have to get most of the FOMC on board in order to make interest rate decisions. We all know that the president wants lower interest rates and there is uncertainty about the political independence of the next chair. What will actually happen once Jerome is out and his replacement is in?

The treasury markets can give us a hint. The yields on government debt tend to follow the federal funds rate closely (see below). So, we can use some simple logic to forecast the currently expected rates during the new Fed Chair’s first several months.

Here’s the logic. As of October 16, the yield on the 6-month treasury was 3.79% and the yield on the 1-year treasury was 3.54%. If the market expectations are accurate, then holding the 1-year treasury to maturity should yield the same as the 6-month treasury purchased today and then another one purchased six months from now. The below diagram and equation provide the intuition and math.

Since the federal funds rate and US treasury yields closely track one another, we can deduce that the interest rates are expected to fall after 6 months. Specifically, rates will fall by the difference in the 6-month rates, or about 49.9 basis points (0.499%).  This cut is an expected value of course. Given that the cut is between a half and a zero percent, we can back out the market expectation of for a 0.5% vs 0.0% cut where α is the probability of the half-point cut.* Formally:

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Is the Fed’s Inflation Target Really 2%?

The Fed has had an official inflation target of 2% since 2012, a commitment they reaffirmed just last month after their policy review:

The Committee reaffirms its judgment that inflation at the rate of 2 percent, as measured by the annual change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures, is most consistent over the longer run with the Federal Reserve’s statutory maximum employment and price stability mandates.

But since 2020, they haven’t been acting like it. Lets look at their preferred measure of inflation, the annual change in the PCE price index:

The last time annual inflation was at or below 2.0% was February 2021. The Fed just cut rates despite inflation being at 2.6%. If you didn’t know about their 2% target and were trying to infer their target based solely on their actions, what would you guess their target is?

Considering the post-Covid period, I see their actions as being more consistent with a 3% target than a 2% target. They stopped raising rates once inflation got below 3.4%, and started cutting them again once inflation got below 2.4%. The Fed’s own projections show more rate cuts coming despite the fact that they don’t expect inflation to get back to 2.0% until 2028! Bloomberg’s Anna Wong does the math and infers their target is 2.8%:

Perhaps the Fed’s target should be higher than 2%, but if they have a higher target, they should make it explicit so as not to undermine their credibility. Or at least make explicit that their target is loose and they’d rather miss high than low, if that is in fact the case. This is what Greg Mankiw would prefer:

I feel strongly that a target of 2 percent is superior to a target of 2.0 percent….. It would be better if central bankers admitted to the public how imprecise their ability to control inflation is. They should not be concerned if the inflation rate falls to 1.6. That comfortably rounds up to 2. And they should be ready to declare victory in fighting inflation when the inflation rate gets back to 2.5. As the adage goes, that is good enough for government work. Maybe the Fed should even ditch a specific numerical target for inflation and instead offer a range, as some other central banks do. The Fed could say, for example, that it wants to keep the inflation rate between 1 and 3. Doing so would admit that the Fed governors are notquite as godlike as they sometimes feign.

The Fed seems to have taken Mankiw’s approach to heart, except with a preferred range of 2.0-3.5%. I take Mankiw’s point about not being able to fine-tune everything, but given the bigger picture I think the Fed should if anything err on the low side of 2.0%. The Federal deficit is in the trillions and rising, inflation has been above target since 2021, and consumers never got over the Covid-era increase in the price level:

Source: Michigan Consumer Survey

The Fed let inflation stay mostly below 2% during the 2010s, to the detriment of the labor market. They updated their policy framework in 2020 to allow for “Flexible Average Inflation Targeting”, where they would let inflation stay above 2% for a while to make up for the years of below 2% inflation. This is part of why they let inflation get so out of hand in 2022. This made up for the 2010s and then some- our price level is now 3-4% higher than it would be if we’d had 2.0% inflation each year since 2007. But the sudden big burst of inflation in 2022 led the Fed to abandon this flexible targeting idea in the 2025 framework. The lack of “make up” policy latest framework means that they don’t see themselves as needing to do anything to repair their 2022 mistake- “just don’t do it again”.

We’re certainly being stuck with permanently higher prices as a result, and I worry we will be stuck with higher inflation too.

Don’t Cut Rates

The Federal Reserve will probably cut rates next week:

I can’t advise them on the complex politics of this, but based on the economics I think cutting would be a mistake. I see one good reason they want to cut: hiring is slow and apparently has been for a year. But that could be driven by falling labor supply rather than falling demand, and most other indicators suggest holding rates steady or even raising them.

Most importantly, inflation is currently well above their 2% target, 2.9% over the past year and a higher pace than that in August. Inflation expectations remain somewhat elevated. Real GDP growth was strong in Q2 and looks set to be strong in Q3 too, and NGDP growth is still well above trend.. The Conference Board’s measure of consumer confidence looks bad, but Michigan’s looks fine.

Financial conditions are loose, with stocks at all time highs and credit spreads low. Its only September and we’ve already seen more Initial Public Offerings than in any year since 2021 (when the last big bout of inflation kicked off):

Source: https://stockanalysis.com/ipos/statistics/

Crypto prices are back near all time highs and crypto is becoming more integrated into public stocks through bitcoin treasury companies and IPOs from Gemini and Figure.

The Taylor Rule provides a way of putting all this together into a concrete suggestion for interest rates. Some versions of the rule say rates are about on target, while others including my preferred Bernanke version suggest they should be closer to 6%. To me this is what the debate should be- do we keep rates steady or raise them? I see good arguments each way, but the case for a cut seems very weak.

I look forward to finding out in a year or two whether I or the FOMC is the crazy one here.

* The Usual Disclaimer, hopefully extra obvious in this case: These views are mine and I’m not speaking for any part of the Federal Reserve System.

Can the President Fire a Member of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors?

That’s exactly what he tried to do this past Monday. Trump announced on social media that Lisa Cook, appointed by Biden in 2022, is now fired. Things are about to get awkward.

First, Trump can’t simply fire Fed governors willy-nilly. Remember when DOGE was involved in all of those federal workforce lay-offs earlier in the year? I know, it seems like forever ago. The US Supreme Court ruled on the legality of those firings, including some at government corporations and ‘independent agencies’. The idea behind such entities is that they are supposed to be politically insulated and less bound by the typical red tape of the government. But Trump’s administration argued that the separation from the rest of the executive branch is a fiction and that there is no one else in charge of them if not the president. The Supreme Court agreed with the administration, with one exception.

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Forecasting the Fed: Description Vs Prescription

After raising rates in 2022 to belatedly combat inflation, the FOMC was feeling successful in 2024. They were holding the line and remaining steadfast while many people were getting all in a tizzy about pushing us into a recession. People had been predicting a recession since 2022, and the Fed kept the federal funds rate steady at 5.33% for an entire year. Repeatedly, in the first half of 2024, betting markets were upset that the Fed wasn’t budging. I had friends saying that the time to cut was in 2023 once they saw that Silicon Valley Bank failed. I remained sanguine that rates should not be cut.

I thought that rates should have been higher still given that the labor market was strong. But, I also didn’t think that was going to happen. My forecasts were that the Fed would continue to keep rates unchanged. At 5.33%, inflation would slowly fall and there was plenty of wiggle room for unemployment.

Then, we had a few months of lower inflation. It even went slightly negative in June 2024. Some people were starting to talk about overshooting and the impending recession. I documented my position in August of 2024. Two weeks later, Jerome Powell gave a victory lap of a speech. He said that “The time has come for policy to adjust”.  Instead of discerning whether the FOMC would cut rates, the betting markets switched to specifying whether the cut would be 0.25% or 0.5%. The Fed chose the latter, followed by two more cuts by the end of the year.

I was wrong about the Fed’s policy response function. But why? Was the FOMC worried about the downward employment revisions? That was big news. Did they think that they had inflation whipped? I’m not sure. There was a lot of buzz about having stuck the soft landing. In late 2024, I leaned toward the theory that the Fed was concerned about employment. Like, they thought that we had been doing better until then.

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Abnormal Times Call for Abnormal Policies

The Fed made two mistakes during the Great Recession of 2007-2009: being too slow and weak in their initial reaction to the financial crisis, and being too hurried in their attempts to return to a ‘normal’ policy stance. The first mistake turned what could have been a minor road bump into the worst recession in decades, and the second mistake meant it took a full decade from the start of the crisis in 2007 for unemployment to return to pre-crisis levels.

The rapid recovery from the Covid recession shows that the Fed learned from its first mistake in 2007. In 2020, the Fed acted quickly and decisively, so that despite the worst pandemic in a century the US experienced a recession that lasted only months, and it took unemployment barely 2 years to return to pre-Covid levels. But the Fed’s talk about cutting rates this year makes me worry they did not learn the second lesson. Despite all their talk of being “data driven”, I don’t see how a dispassionate look at current inflation, labor market, or financial data could lead them to be considering rate cuts; if anything it currently suggests rate hikes.

Why then is the Fed talking rate cuts? Of course you can dig and find a few data points to support cuts, but I think the driving factor is simply a feeling that interest rates are currently above “normal”. They are digging to find data points to support cuts because they want to return rates to “normal”, just as in the early to mid 2010’s they were digging for reasons to raise rates to “normal”. Rather than being consistently too hawkish or too dovish, they are consistently too eager to return rates to “normal” when circumstances are still abnormal.

This is not simply out of a social and political desire to avoid appearing “weird”, though that is definitely a factor. There is also a long academic tradition of measuring the stance of monetary policy by comparing current interest rates to a neutral, “natural” rate of interest, r*. But this tradition has problems. The “natural” rate of interest is always changing, and at any given time we can’t really know for sure what it is. The current Fed Funds rate may be higher than it has been in recent years, but that doesn’t necessarily mean it is above the current natural rate of interest; the natural rate itself could have risen too. This is why interest rates aren’t a great way to measure the stance of monetary policy. At times Chair Powell himself has made the same point, saying that trying to set policy by comparing to the “natural” rate of interest r* is like “navigating by the stars under cloudy skies”.

Lacking such celestial guidance, I can only hope the Fed will make good on their promise to be data-driven and navigate by the guideposts they can see around them: measures like current inflation and unemployment, or market-based forecasts of such measures.

When Will the Fed Raise Rates?

Everyone else keeps asking when the Fed will cut rates, and yesterday Chair Powell said they will likely cut this year. Either they are all crazy or I am, because almost every indicator I see indicates we are still above the Fed’s inflation target of 2% and are likely to remain there without some change in policy. Ideally that change would be a tightening of fiscal policy, but since there’s no way Congress substantially cuts the deficit this year, responsibility falls to the Federal Reserve.

Source: https://fiscaldata.treasury.gov/americas-finance-guide/national-deficit/

Lets start with the direct measures of inflation: CPI is up 3.1% from a year ago. The Fed’s preferred measure, PCE, is up 2.4% from a year ago. Core PCE, which is more predictive of where inflation will be going forward, is up 2.8% over the past year. The TIPS spread indicates 2.4% annualized inflation over the next 5 years. The Fed’s own projections say that PCE and Core PCE won’t be back to 2.0% until 2026.

The labor market remains quite tight: the unemployment rate is 3.7%, payroll growth is strong (353,000 in January), and there are still substantially more job openings than there are unemployed workers. The chattering classes underrate this because they are in some of the few sectors, like software and journalism, where layoffs are actually rising. Real GDP growth is strong (3.2% last quarter), and nominal GDP growth is still well above its long-run trend, which is inflationary.

I do see a few contrary indicators: M2 is still down from a year ago (though only 1.4%, and it is up over the past 6 months). The Fed’s balance sheet continues to shrink, though it is still trillions above the pre-Covid level. Productivity rose 3.2% last quarter.

But overall I am still more worried about inflation than about a recession, as I was 6 months ago. Financial conditions have changed dramatically from a year ago, when the discussion was about bank runs and a near-certain recession. Today the financial headlines are about all time highs for Bitcoin, Gold, Japan, and US stocks, with an AI-fueled boom (bubble?) in tech pushing the valuation of a single company, Nvidia, above the combined valuation of the entire Chinese stock market. All of this screams inflation, though it could also indicate a recession in a year or so if the bubble pops.

At least over the past year I think fiscal policy is more responsible than monetary policy for persistent inflation. But I can’t see Congress doing a deficit-reducing grand bargain in an election year; the CBO projects the deficit will continue to run over 5% of GDP. That means our best chance for inflation to hit the target this year is for the Fed to tighten, or at least to not cut rates. If policy continues on its current inflationary path, our main hope is for a deus-ex-machina like a true tech-fueled productivity boom, or deflationary events abroad (recession in China?) lowering prices here.

“The Biggest Blunder in The History of The Treasury”: Yellen’s Failure to Issue Longer-Term Treasury Debt When Rates Were Low

That extra $4 trillion or so that the feds dumped into our collective checking accounts in 2020-2021 – -where did it come from? Certainly not from taxes. It was created out of thin air, via a multi-step alchemy. The government does not have the authority to simply run the printing presses and crank out benjamins. The  U.S. Treasury sells bonds to Somebody(ies), and that Somebody in turn gives the Treasury cash, which the Treasury then uses to fund government operations and giveaways. In 2020-2021, the Somebody who bought all those bonds was mainly the Federal Reserve, which does have the power to create unlimited amounts of cash, in exchange for government bonds or certain other investment-grade fixed income securities.

What is causing a bit of a kerfuffle recently is public assessment of what sorts of bonds that Janet Yellen’s Treasury issued back then. Interest rates were driven down to historic lows in that period, thanks to the Fed’s monster “quantitative easing” (QE) operations. The Fed was buying up fixed income hand over fist: government bonds, mortgage securities, even corporate junk bonds (which was probably illegal under the Fed’s charter, but desperate times…). This buying frenzy drove bond prices up and rates down.

All corporate CFOs with functioning neurons and with BB+ credit ratings refinanced their company debt in that timeframe: they called in as much of their old bonds as they could, and re-issued long-term debt at near-zero interest rates. Or they just issued 5, 10, 20 year low-interest bonds for the heck of it, raising big war-chests of essentially free cash to tide them through any potential hard times ahead. And of course, millions of American homeowners likewise refinanced their mortgages to take advantage of low rates.

What about the federal government? Was the Treasury, under Secretary  Yellen, similarly clever? No, not really. Because there is little serious doubt that the U.S. government will be able to pay its debts (grandstanding government shutdowns aside), the government can always find takers for 20- and 30-year bonds, as well as shorter maturity securities. A mainstay of government financing is the 10-year bond. And in 2020-2021, the Fed would have consumed whatever kinds of bonds the Treasury wanted to sell, so the Treasury could have issued a boatload of long-term bonds.

It seems that the Treasury issued a lot of 2-year bonds, rather than longer-term bonds. If they had issued say ten-year bonds, the government would have had a decade of enjoying very low interest payments on that huge slug of pandemic-related debt. But now, all those 2-year bonds are being rolled over at much higher rates and thus much greater expense to the government. (Since the federal debt only grows, almost never shrinks, maturing earlier bonds are not simply paid down, but are paid by issuing yet more bonds).

Veteran hedge fund manager Stanley Druckenmiller (reported net worth: $6 billion) commented in an interview:

When rates were practically zero, every Tom, Dick and Harry in the U.S. refinanced their mortgage… corporations extended [their debt],” he said. “Unfortunately, we had one entity that did not: the U.S. Treasury….

Janet Yellen, I guess because political myopia or whatever, was issuing 2-years at 15 basis points[0.15%]   when she could have issued 10-years at 70 basis points [0.70 %] or 30-years at 180 basis points [1.80%],” he said. “I literally think if you go back to Alexander Hamilton, it is the biggest blunder in the history of the Treasury. I have no idea why she has not been called out on this. She has no right to still be in that job.

Ouch.

Druckenmiller went on:

When the debt rolls over by 2033, interest expense is going to be 4.5% of GDP if rates are where they are now,” he warned. “By 2043—it sounds like a long time, but it is really not—interest expense as a percentage of GDP will be 7%. That is 144% of all current discretionary spending.

Unsurprisingly, Yellen demurs:

 “Well, I disagree with that assessment,” Yellen said when asked to respond to the accusation during an interview on CNN Thursday night. She said the agency has been lengthening the average maturity of its bond portfolio and “in fact, at present, the duration of the portfolio is about the longest it has been in decades.”

According to Druckenmiller, this is not quite true. It does seem that of the federal bonds held by the public (including banks), the average maturity (recently as long as 74 months) has indeed been a bit longer than usual in the past several years. However, this ignores the huge amount of government bonds held at the Fed:

“The only debt that is relevant to the US taxpayer is consolidated US government debt,” Druckenmiller said. “I am surprised that the Treasury secretary has chosen to exclude $8 trillion on the Fed balance sheet that is paying overnight rates in the repo market. In determining policy, it makes no sense for Treasury to exclude it from their calculations.”

Druckenmiller makes an important point. However, how this plays out depends on how the Fed treats these bonds going forward. If the Fed keeps these bonds on its balance sheet, and buys the replacement bonds, there will be actually very little interest expense to the government going forward. The reason is that the Fed is required to remit 90% of its profits back to the Treasury, so the gazillions of interest payments on those bonds and their replacements will largely flow right back to Treasury. However, if the Fed continues with reducing its balance sheet, forcing the Treasury to go the open market to roll these bonds over, Druckenmiller’s dire warnings will prove correct.

Because of this enormous debt overhang and the ongoing need for the government to sell bonds, I do not expect interest rates to go down as low as 2021 or even 2019 levels, unless there is a financial catastrophe requiring the Fed to become a gigantic net buyer of bonds once again.

Christine Lagarde on Instability in 2023

Christine Lagarde, President of the European Central Bank, gave a speech called “Policymaking in an age of shifts and breaks” at Jackson Hole in August 2023.

She mentioned multiple factors that make the near future hard to predict, from the effect of A.I. on jobs to the war in Ukraine.

In the pre-pandemic world, we typically thought of the economy as advancing along a steadily expanding path of potential output, with fluctuations mainly being driven by swings in private demand. But this may no longer be an appropriate model.

For a start, we are likely to experience more shocks emanating from the supply side itself.

A line I found interesting, because of my paper on sticky wages:

Large-scale reallocations can also lead to rising prices in growing sectors that cannot be fully offset by falling prices in shrinking ones, owing to downwardly sticky nominal wages. So the task of central banks will be to keep inflation expectations firmly anchored at our target while these relative price changes play out.

And this challenge could become more complex in the future because of two changes in price- and wage-setting behaviour that we have been seeing since the pandemic.

First, faced with major demand-supply imbalances, firms have adjusted their pricing strategies. In the recent decades of low inflation, firms that faced relative price increases often feared to raise prices and lose market share. But this changed during the pandemic as firms faced large, common shocks, which acted as an implicit coordination mechanism vis-à-vis their competitors.

Under such conditions, we saw that firms are not only more likely to adjust prices, but also to do so substantially. That is an important reason why, in some sectors, the frequency of price changes has almost doubled in the euro area in the last two years compared with the period before 2022.

Once Covid changed our lives so much, then things kept changing. Firms are raising prices because consumers got used to change.

At this Jackson Hole meeting, both J. Powell, the chair of the Federal Reserve, and Lagarde indicated that they are trying to get inflation under control and back to the 2% target. If you want to get this information via podcast, listen to “Joe Gagnon on Inflation Progress and the Path Ahead: Breaking Down Jerome Powell’s Jackson Hole Speech

After reading her interesting speech, I had to know more about C. Lagarde. On Wikipedia, I discovered:

After her baccalauréat in 1973, she went on an American Field Service scholarship to the Holton-Arms School in Bethesda, Maryland.[18][19] During her year in the United States, Lagarde worked as an intern at the U.S. Capitol as Representative William Cohen’s congressional assistant, helping him correspond with French-speaking constituents from his northern Maine district during the Watergate hearings.

Since my post about “awards for young talent” was found and shared on Twitter, I have continued thinking about it. According to Wiki, C. Lagarde has received several prestigious awards. Her progression through the “Most Powerful Woman in the World” ranking is something.

Imagine being that close to the top back in 2015 and getting beat out by American Melinda Gates.  But today, Lagarde is winning over both Melinda French Gates and Kamala Harris. Will an economist climb to #1? Lagarde is currently sitting at #2 when I checked the Forbes website.

Fed Priority #1: Financial System Stability

The Fed was founded after a spat of banking crises.

We know that the Federal Reserve also has the goals of full employment and steady, moderate inflation. Since the 1990s, that’s meant 2%. But it’s a relatively recent addition to the Fed’s policy goals. The primary purpose was initially and always has been financial system stability.


In 2008, the Fed demonstrated that it’s willing to attain financial stability at the cost of employment. After and during the financial crisis, the Fed purchased mortgage backed securities (MBS) from private banks at a time when their value was highly uncertain (and discounted). The purpose was to replace these assets of uncertain value with less risky assets. At the time, there was resentment that these security holders were insulated from losses while the homeowners whose loans composed the MBS did not get comparable relief. I remember arguing that the Fed, with the cooperation of congress, could have just paid part of the mortgages on behalf of the homeowners such that there were fewer foreclosures and fewer personal bankruptcies. That way, both the borrowers wouldn’t default and the debt holders would enjoy stable returns.


But, the primary goal of the Fed is financial system stability. Pre-financial crisis, banks had loaded-up on securities of uncertain value with the help of regulatory arbitrage and some lending shenanigans. The Fed needed to avoid the ensuing catastrophe that was a consequence of the greater-than-anticipated realized risk. Importantly, catastrophe to the Fed is financial-sector specific. Markets losing liquidity, bank-runs, and financial sector business failures all qualify as the stuff of concern (all of which occurred). While making mortgage payments for specific mortgages would have been popular amongst many debtors, it also would have taken much more time to implement. The Fed wanted to avoid more financial instability than had already occurred. And frankly, the Fed’s first priority isn’t to take care of the public. Given the alternative between a slow popular option and a quick adequate option, the Fed has demonstrated an inclination toward the latter.

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