That’s exactly what he tried to do this past Monday. Trump announced on social media that Lisa Cook, appointed by Biden in 2022, is now fired. Things are about to get awkward.
First, Trump can’t simply fire Fed governors willy-nilly. Remember when DOGE was involved in all of those federal workforce lay-offs earlier in the year? I know, it seems like forever ago. The US Supreme Court ruled on the legality of those firings, including some at government corporations and ‘independent agencies’. The idea behind such entities is that they are supposed to be politically insulated and less bound by the typical red tape of the government. But Trump’s administration argued that the separation from the rest of the executive branch is a fiction and that there is no one else in charge of them if not the president. The Supreme Court agreed with the administration, with one exception.
Did president Trump’s first term tariffs, enacted in 2018, increase manufacturing employment or even just manufacturing output? Let’s set the stage.
Manufacturing employment was at its peak in 1979 at 19.6 million. That number declined to 18m by the 1980s, 17.3m in the 1990s. By 2010, the statistics bottom out at 11.4m. Since then, there has been a rise and plateau to about 12.8m if we omit the pandemic.
Historically, economists weren’t too worried about the transition to services for a while. After all, despite falling employment in manufacturing, output continued to rise through 2007. But, after the financial crisis, output has been flat since 2014, again, if we omit the pandemic. Since manufacturing employment has since risen by 5% through 2025, that reflects falling productivity per worker. That’s not comforting to either economists or to people who want more things “Made in the USA”.
Looking at the graphs, there’s no long term bump from the 2018 tariffs in either employment or output. If you squint, then maybe you can argue that there was a year-long bump in both – but that’s really charitable. But let’s not commit the fallacy of composition. What about the categories of manufacturing? After all, the 2018 tariffs were targeted at solar panels, washing machines, and steel. Smaller or less exciting tariffs followed.
Breaking it down into the major manufacturing categories of durables, nondurables, and ‘other’ (which includes printed material and minimally processed wood products), only durable manufacturing output briefly got a bump in 2018. But we can break it down further.
A bit over 40% of current U.S. farm workers are illegal immigrants. In some regions and sectors, the percentage is much higher. The work is often uncomfortable and dangerous, and far from the cool urban centers. This is work that very few U.S. born workers would consider doing, unless the pay was very high, so it would be difficult to replace the immigrant labor on farms in the near term. I don’t know how much the need for manpower would change if cheap illegal workers were not available, and therefore productivity was supplemented with automation.
It apparently didn’t occur to some members of the administration that deporting a lot of these workers (and frightening the rest into hiding) would have a crippling effect on American agriculture. Sure enough, there have recently been reports in some areas of workers not showing up and crops going unharvested.
It is difficult for me as a non-expert to determine how severe and widespread the problems actually are so far. Anti-Trump sources naturally emphasize the genuine problems that do exist and predict apocalyptic melt-down, whereas other sources are more measured. I suspect that the largest agribusinesses have kept better abreast of the law, while smaller operations have cut legal corners and may have that catch up to them. For instance, a small meat packer in Omaha reported operating at only 30% capacity after ICE raids, whereas the CEO of giant Tyson Foods claimed that “every one who works at Tyson Foods is authorized to do so,” and that the company “is in complete compliance” with all the immigration regulations.
With at least some of these wholly predictable problems from mass deportations now becoming reality, the administration is undergoing internal debates and policy adjustments in response. On June 12, President Trump very candidly acknowledged the issue, writing on Truth Social, “Our great Farmers and people in the hotel and leisure business have been stating that our very aggressive policy on immigration is taking very good, long-time workers away from them, with those jobs being almost impossible to replace…. We must protect our Farmers, but get the CRIMINALS OUT OF THE USA. Changes are coming!”
The next day, ICE official Tatum King wrote regional leaders to halt investigations of the agricultural industry, along with hotels and restaurants. That directive was apparently walked back a few days later, under pressure from outraged conservative supporters and from Deputy White House Chief of Staff Stephen Miller. Miller, an immigration hard-liner, wants to double the ICE deportation quota, up to 3,000 per day.
This issue could go in various ways from here. Hard-liners on the left and on the right have a way of pushing their agendas to unpalatable extremes. It can be argued that the Democrats could easily have won in 2024 had their policies been more moderate. Similarly, if immigration hard-liners get their way now, I predict that the result will be their worst nightmare: a public revulsion against enforcing immigration laws in general. If farmers and restaurateurs start going bust, and food shortages and price spikes appear in the supermarket, public support for the administration and its project of deporting illegal immigrants will reverse in a big way. Some right-wing pundits would not be bothered by an electoral debacle, since their style is to stay constantly outraged, and (as the liberal news outlets currently demonstrate), it is easier to project non-stop outrage when your party is out of power.
An optimist, however, might see in this controversy an opening for some sort of long-term, rational solution to the farm worker issue. Agricultural Secretary Brooke Rollins has proposed expansion of the H-2A visa program, which allows for temporary agricultural worker residency to fill labor shortages. This is somewhat similar to the European guest worker programs, though with significant differences. H-2A requires the farmer to provide housing and take legal responsibility for his or her workers. H-2B visas allow for temporary non-agricultural workers, without as much employer responsibility. A bill was introduced into Congress with bi-partisan support to modernize the H-2A program, so that legislative effort may have legs. Maybe there can be a (gasp!) compromise.
President Trump last week came out strongly in favor of this sort of solution, with a surprisingly positive take on the (illegal) workers who have worked diligently on a farm for years. By “put you in charge” he is seems to refer to the responsibilities that H-2A employers undertake for their employers, and perhaps extending that to H-2B employers. He acknowledges that the far-right will not be happy, but hopes “they’ll understand.” From Newsweek:
“We’re working on legislation right now where – farmers, look, they know better. They work with them for years. You had cases where…people have worked for a farm, on a farm for 14, 15 years and they get thrown out pretty viciously and we can’t do it. We gotta work with the farmers, and people that have hotels and leisure properties too,” he said at the Iowa State Fairgrounds in Des Moines on Thursday.
“We’re gonna work with them and we’re gonna work very strong and smart, and we’re gonna put you in charge. We’re gonna make you responsible and I think that that’s going to make a lot of people happy. Now, serious radical right people, who I also happen to like a lot, they may not be quite as happy but they’ll understand. Won’t they? Do you think so?”
Generally, decisions to spend federal funds come is the authority of congress. But the Trump administration has very publicly made clear that it will try to cut the things that are within its authority (or that it thinks should be within that authority). Truly, the fiscal year with the new Republican unified government won’t begin until October of 2025. So, the last quarter is when we’ll see what the Republicans actually want – for better or for worse. In the meantime, we can look past the hyperbole and see what the accounting records say. The most recent data includes 95 days after inauguration. First, for context, total spending is up $134 billion or 5.8% from this time last year to $2.45 trillion.
The Trump administration has been making news about their desire and success in cutting. Which programs have been cut the most? As a proportion of their budgets, below is a graph of were the five biggest cuts have happened by percent. The Cuts to the FCC and CPB reflect long partisan stances by Republicans. The cuts to the Federal Financing Bank reflect fewer loans administered by the US government and reflect the current bouts to cut spending. Cuts in the RRB- Misc refer to some types of railroad payments to employees. In the spirit of whiplash, the cuts to the US International Development Finance Corporation reverse the course set by the first Trump administration. This government corporation exists to facilitate US investment in strategically important foreign countries.
But some programs have *increased* spending since 2024. The five largest increases include the USDA, the US contributions to multilateral assistance, claims and judgments against the US, the federal railroad administration, and the international monetary fund. Funding for farmers and railroads reflect the old agricultural and new union Republican constituencies. The multilateral assistance and IMF spending reflects greater international involvement of the administration, despite its autarkic lip service.
Despite the nearly universal outcry, President Trump was standing firm on his massive tariffs. “No backing down”, etc., despite the evaporation of trillions of dollars in stock values. On Tuesday, April 8, White House spokesperson Karoline Leavitt affirmed: “The President was asked and answered this yesterday. He said he’s not considering an extension or delay. I spoke to him before this briefing. That was not his mindset. He expects that these tariffs are going to go into effect.” However, the next day, Wednesday, April 9, Trump announced on his social media platform, Truth Social, that for all countries but China, there would be a 90-day pause in reciprocal tariffs.
What happened here? The common explanations are that (1) the chaos and losses in the markets had finally grown intolerable, or that (2) the president had planned all along to pause the tariff hikes on April 9. I suspect there is some merit to both of these factors – -despite all the prior warnings, I think (1) Trump did not expect such market devastation (he sincerely believes that he is making the American economy great, so why should markets crash?), and also (2) that he had indeed planned to play around with tariff implementations in pursuit of deals.
But what some analysts pointed out as a further factor was the drop in the market value of U.S. Treasury bonds, which correlates directly to a rise in interest rates. The actions of the Administration have seemingly caused market participants, especially abroad, to question the risk-free status of U.S. debt. If the government has to pay higher interest on its debt, it is game over, as interest payments will spiral up and consume an ever-higher share of the federal budget. The chart below shows in orange the price movement of the TLT fund, which holds long-term T-bonds, plummeting on April 7, 8, and 9 (red arrow), as an indicator of rising rates. TLT price then shot upwards, along with stocks (the green line is S&P 500 fund SPY) late on April 9, in the relief following the tariff announcement:
As Treasury Secretary, Scott Bessent would be particularly sensitized to the interest rate issue, and able to communicate that to the boss. He has been a successful hedge fund trader and manager, so he understands the plumbing of the system, unlike some other presidential advisors. Up till then, however, economist Peter Navarro, who is ultra-hawkish on tariffs, had had the ear of the president.
So, what did Bessent do? (This is the part that only came to my attention a few days ago, even though technically this is old news). It seems he enlisted the support of Commerce Secretary Lutnick, and adroitly chose a time when Navarro was tied up in a meeting, and barged in on the president in an unscheduled meeting so they could get him alone. And it worked! Evidently, they persuaded him that now was the time to do the clever deal-making thing and issue a pause. It’s a mark of how readily the president can change his mind that his own press spokespeople were unaware of this volte-face, and had to scramble to make sense of it. It is also interesting that cabinet members are resorting to cloak-and-dagger tactics to get policy done.
Bessent naturally gave all the credit to the president for the decision, but he and Lutnick had photos taken to show who saved the financial world – for now:
Scott Bessent (standing, left) and Howard Lutnick (right) with President Trump as he signs 90-day pause in reciprocal tariffs. Source: Daily Mail.
The president’s recent musings about trying to fire the supposedly independent Fed chairman have since contributed to interest rates going back up again, but that is another story.
Last week I laid out my own expectations for what economic policy would look like in a Trump or Harris presidency. Now after yesterday’s market reaction, we can infer what market participants as a whole expect by roughly doubling the size of yesterday’s market moves. Prediction markets had a 50-60% change of Trump winning as of Tuesday morning’s market close, which moved to a 99+% chance by Wednesday morning. Look at how other markets moved over the same time, multiply it by 2-2.5x, and you get the expected effect of a Trump presidency relative to a Harris presidency. So what do we see?
Stocks Up Overall: S&P 500 up 2%, Dow up 3%, Russell 2000 (small caps) up 6%. My guess this is mostly about avoiding tax increases- the odds that most of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act gets renewed when it expires in 2025 just went way up. Lower corporate taxes boost corporate earnings directly, while lower taxes on households mean that they have more money to spend on their stocks and their products. Lower regulation and looser antitrust rules are also likely to boost corporate earnings.
Bond Prices Down (Yields Up): 10yr Treasury yields rose from 4.29% to 4.4%. This is the flip side of the tax cuts- they need to be paid for, and markets expect they will be paid for through deficits rather than cutting spending. The government will issue more bonds to borrow the money, lowering the value of existing bonds.
Dollar Up: The US dollar is up 2% against a basket of foreign currencies. I think this is mostly about the expected tariffs. People like the sound of the phrase “strong dollar” but it isn’t necessarily a good thing; it makes it cheaper to vacation abroad, but makes it harder to export, even before we consider potential retaliatory tariffs.
Crypto Way Up: Bitcoin went up 7% overnight, Ethereum is now 15% up since Tuesday. Crypto exchange Coinbase was up 31%. Markets anticipate friendlier regulation of crypto, along with a potential ‘strategic Bitcoin reserve’.
Single Stock Moves: Private prison stocks are up 30%+. Tesla is up 15%, mostly due to Elon Musk’s ties to Trump, but also due to tariffs. Foreign car companies were way down on the expectation of tariffs- Mercedes-Benz down 8%, BMW down 10%, Honda down 8%.
Sector Moves: Steel stocks are up on the expectation of tariffs, while solar stocks (which can’t catch a break, doing poorly under Biden despite big subsidies and big revenue increases) were down 12% in the expectation of falling subsidies. Bank stocks did especially well, with one bank ETF up 12%. This gives us one hint on what to me is now the biggest question about the second Trump administration- who will staff it? I could see Trump appointing free-market types, or wall-streeters in the mold of Steve Mnuchin, or dirigiste nationalist conservatives in the JD Vance / Heritage Foundation mold, or an eclectic mix of political backers like Elon Musk and RFK Jr, or a combination of all of the above. The fact that bank stocks are way up tells me that markets expect the free-marketers and/or the Wall-Street types to mostly win out.
Just Ask Prediction Markets: If you want to know what markets expect from a Presidency, you can do what I just did, look at moves the big traditional markets like stocks and bonds and try to guess what is driving them. But increasingly you can skip this step and just ask prediction markets directly- the same markets that just had a very goodelection night. Kalshi now has markets on both who Trump will nominate to cabinet posts, as well as the fate of specific policies like ‘no tax on tips‘
Ray Fair at Yale runs one of the oldest models to use economic data to predict US election results. It predicts vote shares for President and the US House as a function of real GDP growth during the election year, inflation over the incumbent president’s term, and the number of quarters with rapid real GDP growth (over 3.2%) during the president’s term.
Currently his model predicts a 49.28 Democratic share of the two-party vote for President, and a 47.26 Democratic share for the House. This will change once Q3 GDP results are released on October 30th, probably with a slight bump for the dems since Q3 GDP growth is predicted to be 2.5%, but these should be close to the final prediction. Will it be correct?
Probably not; it has been directionally wrong several times, most recently over-estimating Trump’s vote share by 3.4% in 2020. But is there a better economic model? Perhaps we should consider other economic variables (Nate Silver had a good piece on this back in 2011), or weight these variables differently. Its hard to say given the small sample of US national elections we have to work with and the potential for over-fitting models.
But one obvious improvement to me is to change what we are trying to estimate. Presidential elections in the US aren’t determined by the national vote share, but by the electoral college. Why not model the vote share in swing states instead?
Doing this well would make for a good political science or economics paper. I’m not going to do a full workup just for a blog post, but I will note that the Bureau of Economic Analysis just released the last state GDP numbers that they will prior to the election:
Mostly this strikes me as a good map for Harris, with every swing state except Nevada seeing GDP growth above the national average of 3.0%. Of course, this is just the most recent quarter; older data matters too. Here’s real GDP growth over the past year (not per capita, since that is harder to get, though it likely matters more):
Region
Real GDP Growth Q2 2023 – Q2 2024
US
3.0%
Arizona
2.6%
Georgia
3.5%
Michigan
2.0%
Nevada
3.4%
North Carolina
4.4%
Pennsylvania
2.5%
Wisconsin
3.3%
Still a better map for Harris, though closer this time, with 4 of 7 swing states showing growth above the national average. I say this assuming as Fair does that the candidate from the incumbent President’s party is the one that will get the credit/blame for economic conditions. But for states I think it is an open question to what extent people assign credit/blame to the incumbent Governor’s party as opposed to the President. Georgia and Nevada currently have Republican governors.
Overall I see this as one more set of indicators that showing an election that is very close, but slightly favoring Harris. Just like prediction markets (Harris currently at a 50% chance on Polymarket, 55% on PredictIt) and forecasts based mainly on polls (Nate Silver at 55%, Split Ticket at 56%, The Economist / Andrew Gelman at 60%). Some of these forecasts also include national economic data:
Gelman suggests that the economy won’t matter much this time:
We found that these economic metrics only seemed to affect voter behaviour when incumbents were running for re-election, suggesting that term-limited presidents do not bequeath their economic legacies to their parties’ heirs apparent. Moreover, the magnitude of this effect has shrunk in recent years because the electorate has become more polarised, meaning that there are fewer “swing voters” whose decisions are influenced by economic conditions.
But while the economy is only one factor, I do think it still matters, and that forecasters have been underrating state economic data, especially given that in two of the last 6 Presidential elections the electoral college winner lost the national popular vote. I look forward to seeing more serious research on this topic.
Economist Writing Every Day 