Data

Salty SALT in the OBBB

Zachary Bartsch1 Comment

The Republicans hold a majority in both chambers of congress and they are the party of the president. They want to use that opportunity to pass substantial legislation that addresses their priorities. Hence, the One, Big, Beautiful Bill (OBBB). But, just like the Democratic party, Republican congressmen are a coalition with various and sometimes divergent policy agendas. There are ‘Trump’ Republicans, who want tariffs, executive orders, and deportations. There are more liberal members who want more free markets. You can also find the odd ‘crypto bro’, blue-state representatives, and deficit hawks. Given the slim majority in the House of Representatives, they all have to get something out of the legislation. Put them together, and what have you got?* You get a signature piece of legislation that no one is happy about but everyone touts.

One example of such compromise is the State and Local Tax federal income tax deduction, or SALT deduction. The idea behind it is that income shouldn’t be taxed twice. If you pay a part of your income to your state government in the form of taxes, then the argument goes that you shouldn’t be taxed on that part of your income because you never actually saw it in your bank account. The state took it and effectively lowered your income. The state and local taxes get deducted from the taxable income that you report to the federal government.  The reasoning is that you shouldn’t need to pay taxes on your taxes.

Paying taxes on your taxes sounds bad. And plenty of people don’t like one tax, much less two. The Tax Foundation has done a lot of good work to cut through the chaff and has published many pieces on the SALT deduction over the years.**

Cut and Dry SALT Deduction Facts:

  • It’s a tax cut
  • It reduces federal tax revenue
  • It adds tax code complication
  • It is used by people who itemize rather than take the standard income tax deduction
  • Prior to the 2017 Tax & Jobs Act, there was no limit on the SALT deduction. After, the limit was $10k.
  • The current OBBB increases the SALT deduction.

Those are the basics. Everything else is analysis. The Grover Norquist Republicans never see a tax cut that looks bad, so they’d like to see the SALT limit raised or disappear. Tax think tanks that like simplicity don’t like the SALT deduction because it adds complication. Plenty of others say they don’t like complication, but often change their mind when it comes to the details (much like cutting government waste). Think tanks tend to be a bit lonely on this point.

People mostly care about the SALT deduction due to the distributional effects. Who ends up benefiting from the deduction? The short answer is people who 1) itemize & 2) have heavy state and local tax bills. Who is that? Rich people of course! They have high incomes and lots of wealth and real estate – on which they pay taxes. But not all rich people pay loads of state taxes. So the SALT deduction is a tax cut that primarily benefits rich people who live in high tax districts. Where’s that? See the below.

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LIFE Survey Comes Alive

James Bailey1 Comment

Last year I posted that the Philly Fed had started a new quarterly survey on Labor, Income, Finances, and Expectations (LIFE). I thought it looked promising but had yet to achieve its potential:

It will be interesting to see if this ends up taking a place in the set of Fed surveys that are always driving economic discussions, like the Survey of Consumer Finances and the Survey of Professional Forecasters. If they keep it up and start putting out some graphics to summarize it, I think it will. My quick impression (not yet having spoken to Fed people about it) is that it will be the “quick hit” version of the Survey of Consumer Finances. It asks a smaller set of questions on somewhat similar topics, but is released quickly after each quarter instead of slowly after each year. If they stick with the survey it will get more useful over time, as there is more of a baseline to compare to.

But a year later the survey now has what I hoped for: a solid baseline for comparisons, and pre-made graphics to summarize the results. It continues to show complex and mixed economic performance in the US. People think the economy is getting worse:

They are cutting discretionary (but not necessity) spending at record levels:

They are worried about losing their jobs at record levels:

But key areas like housing, childcare, and transportation are stabilizing:

Overall I think we can synthesize these seemingly contradictory pictures by saying that Americans’ finances are fine now, but they are quite worried that things are about to get worse, perhaps due to the tariffs taking effect. You can find the rest of the LIFE survey results (including all the non-record-setting ones) here.

Household Formation and Generational Wealth

Jeremy Horpedahl1 Comment

Last week I tried to address whether rising wealth for younger generations was primarily driven by rising home values. My analysis suggested that it was a cause, but not the only cause. Here’s another chart on that topic, showing median net worth excluding home equity for recent generations:

Two things are notable in the chart. For millennials, even excluding home equity they are well ahead of past generations, though of course their net worth is much smaller excluding this category of wealth (the total median net worth for millennials in 2022 was $93,800). But for Gen X in 2022 (last data in that chart), they are slightly behind Boomers, never having recovered from the decline in wealth after 2007 (primarily from the stock market decline, since we’re excluding housing).

But today I want to address another general objection to the wealth data found in the Fed’s SCF and DFA programs. That objection has to do with household formation. Specifically, these surveys are calculated for households, and the age/generation indicators are for the household head (or “householder” as it is now called). And we know that household formation has been declining over time, as more young people live with parents, with roommates, etc. So the Millennial data we see in the chart above is excluding any Millennials that have not yet formed their own household.

Here’s a general picture of the decline, which has been happening gradually since about 1980. Note: I use the age group 26-41, because this is the age of Millennials in 2022 (the most recent SCF survey year). The highlighted years on the chart are when the Silent, Baby Boomer, Gen X, and Millennial generations were about the same age (26-41).

What this means is that when we are looking at households in these wealth surveys (or any survey that focuses on households) we aren’t quite comparing apples to apples. Does this mean the surveys are worthless? No! With the microdata in the SCF, we can look at not only the median value, but the entire distribution. Since the household formation rate has fallen by about 11 percentage points between Boomers in 1989 and Millennials in 2022, one solution is to look up or down the distribution for a rough comparison.

For example, if we assume all of the 11 percent of non-householders among Millennials have wealth below the median, we can make a rough correction by looking at the 39th percentile for Millennials — the 39th percentile would be the median if you included all of those 11 percent of non-householders as households. Similarly, for Gen X would move down 5 percentage points in the distribution to the 45th percentile in 2007.

The household-formation-adjusted chart does paint a more pessimistic picture than just looking at the median for each generation: the 39th percentile Millennial has about 20% less wealth than the median Boomer did at roughly the same age. Seems like generational decline! Is there any silver lining?

First, you should interpret the chart above as a worst case scenario for Millennial wealth. It assumes all non-householders have low wealth. But likely not all of them do. If instead we use the 43rd percentile of Millennials in 2022, their net worth is $61,000, slightly above Boomers at the same age. (The household formation problem isn’t going away anytime soon as generations age — even if we look at Gen Xers, with a median age of 50 in 2022, their household formation is still 6 percentage points behind Boomers at that age.)

Second, my worst case scenario almost certainly overstates the problem. If all of those 11 percent fewer Millennials not yet forming households were to get married to other millennials, it would only add half of that many households to the aggregate distribution (when two non-householders get married, it becomes one household). So instead of moving down 11 percentage points to the 39th percentile, we should only move down 5 or 6 percentiles. The 44th percentile of Millennial net worth in 2022 was $63,060 — again, compare this to Boomers in the chart above.

Finally, if we combine both of the adjustments discussed in this post, looking at wealth excluding home equity and also adjusting for the decline in household formation, we get the following chart (here I once again use the 39th percentile for Millennials and the 45th percentile for Gen X, i.e., the worst case scenario):

With this final adjustment, we get a slightly different picture. The wealth of these three generations is roughly the same at the same age. No increase in wealth, but no decline either. You could read this as pessimistic, if your assumption is that wealth should rise over time, but the general vibes out there are that young people are worse off than in the past. This wealth data suggests, once again, that the kids are doing all right.

The End of Easy Student Loans

James Bailey1 Comment

The Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee is proposing to cut off student loans for programs whose graduates earn less than the median high school graduate. The House proposed a risk-sharing model where colleges would partly pay back the federal government when their students fail to pay back loans themselves. Both the House and Senate propose to cap how much students can borrow for graduate loans. Both would reduce federal spending on higher ed by about $30-$35 billion per year, cutting the size of the $700 billion higher ed sector by 4-5%. I expected that something like this would happen eventually, especially after the student loan forgiveness proposals of 2022:

While we aren’t getting real reform now, I do think forgiveness makes it more likely that we’ll see reform in the next few years. What could that look like?

The Department of Education should raise its standards and stop offering loans to programs with high default rates or bad student outcomes. This should include not just fly-by-night colleges, but sketchy masters degree programs at prestigious schools.

Colleges should also share responsibility when they consistently saddle students with debt but don’t actually improve students’ prospects enough to be able to pay it back. Economists have put a lot of thought into how to do this in a manner that doesn’t penalize colleges simply for trying to teach less-prepared students.

I’d bet that some reform along these lines happens in the 2020’s, just like the bank bailouts of 2008 led to the Dodd-Frank reform of 2010 to try to prevent future bailouts. The big question is, will this be a pragmatic bipartisan reform to curb the worst offenders, or a Republican effort to substantially reduce the amount of money flowing to a higher ed sector they increasingly dislike?

Of course, there is a lot riding on the details. How exactly do you calculate the income of graduates of a program compared to high school grads? The Senate proposal explains their approach starting on page 58. They want to compare the median income of working students 4 years after leaving their program (whether they graduated or dropped out, but exempting those in grad school) to the median income of those with only a high school diploma who are age 25-34, working, and not in school.

Nationally I calculate that this would make for a floor of $31,000. That is, the median student who is 4 years out from your program and is working should be earning at least $31k. In practice the bill would implement a different number for each state. This seems like a low bar in general, though you could certainly quibble with it. For instance, those 4 years out from a program may be closer to age 25 than age 34, but income typically rises with age during those years. If you compare them to 26 year old high school grads, the national bar would be just $28k.

What sorts of programs have graduates making less than $31k per year?

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The Growth in Wealth is Not Primarily Driven by Rising Home Prices

Jeremy Horpedahl3 Comments

As I have discussed in many previous blog posts, young people today have a lot more wealth than past generations at the same point in their life. But we also know that housing prices have increased dramatically in recent years, and that for most families their home is their largest source of wealth.

Does this imply that the increase in wealth young Americans have seen is primarily driven by increased housing prices? If so, this would paint a less optimistic picture of the wealth of young people today, since the value of your home that you usually can’t easily convert into other consumption.

If we look at the past 5 years (2019Q4 to 2024Q4), the total wealth US households under the age of 40 increased by $5 trillion, in nominal terms. That’s not adjusted for inflation, but we don’t need to do so because we can look at how much each asset class increased in nominal terms as well. The total value of assets for households under age 40 increased by $5.86 trillion.

Here’s how the various classes of assets have increased since 2019Q4:

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Papers about Economists Using LLMs

Joy BuchananLeave a comment
  1. The most recent (published in 2025) is this piece about doing data analytics that would have been too difficult or costly before. Link and title: Deep Learning for Economists

Considering how much of frontier economics revolves around getting new data, this could be important. On the other hand, people have been doing computer-aided data mining for a while. So it’s more of a progression than a revolution, in my expectation.

2. Using LLMs to actually generate original data and/or test hypotheses like experimenters: Large language models as economic agents: what can we learn from homo silicus? and Automated Social Science: Language Models as Scientist and Subjects

3. Generative AI for Economic Research: Use Cases and Implications for Economists

Korinek has a new supplemental update as current as December 2024: LLMs Learn to Collaborate and Reason: December 2024 Update to “Generative AI for Economic Research: Use Cases and Implications for Economists,” Published in the Journal of Economic Literature 61 (4)

4. For being comprehensive and early: How to Learn and Teach Economics with Large Language Models, Including GPT

5. For giving people proof of a phenomenon that many people had noticed and wanted to discuss: ChatGPT Hallucinates Non-existent Citations: Evidence from Economics

Alert: We will soon have an update for current web-enabled models! It would seem that hallucination rates are going down but the problem is not going away.

6. This was published back in 2023. “ChatGPT ranked in the 91st percentile for Microeconomics and the 99th percentile for Macroeconomics when compared to students who take the TUCE exam at the end of their principles course.” (note the “compared to”): ChatGPT has Aced the Test of Understanding in College Economics: Now What?

References          

Buchanan, J., Hill, S., & Shapoval, O. (2023). ChatGPT Hallucinates Non-existent Citations: Evidence from Economics. The American Economist, 69(1), 80-87. https://doi.org/10.1177/05694345231218454 (Original work published 2024)

Cowen, Tyler and Tabarrok, Alexander T., How to Learn and Teach Economics with Large Language Models, Including GPT (March 17, 2023). GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 23-18, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4391863 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4391863

Dell, M. (2025). Deep Learning for Economists. Journal of Economic Literature, 63(1), 5–58. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20241733

Geerling, W., Mateer, G. D., Wooten, J., & Damodaran, N. (2023). ChatGPT has Aced the Test of Understanding in College Economics: Now What? The American Economist, 68(2), 233-245. https://doi.org/10.1177/05694345231169654 (Original work published 2023)

Horton, J. J. (2023). Large Language Models as Simulated Economic Agents: What Can We Learn from Homo Silicus? arXiv Preprint arXiv:2301.07543.

Korinek, A. (2023). Generative AI for Economic Research: Use Cases and Implications for Economists. Journal of Economic Literature, 61(4), 1281–1317. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20231736

Manning, B. S., Zhu, K., & Horton, J. J. (2024). Automated Social Science: Language Models as Scientist and Subjects (Working Paper No. 32381). National Bureau of Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w32381

Per Capita Consumption: 1990 Vs 2024

Zachary Bartsch1 Comment

This is an update to a previous post that I did on per-capita real consumption in 1990 vs 2021. As of 2021, we still weren’t sure after the pandemic what was transitory vs structural, and it was unclear whether incomes would keep up with inflation. We now have three more years of data through 2024. News flash: We’re even richer.

I like to use the BEA real quantity indices. Those track what is actually consumed in volumes rather than by deflating total spending by price indices. Divided by population, we can calculate the real quantities of goods and services that people actually consumed per capita.

Even after the pandemic policies have settled down, we are still SO MUCH RICHER – and even richer than we were with all of the pandemic-related stimulus. The worst consumption category since the pandemic has been food and beverage for off-premise consumption, and that is *up* 4.6% since 2020, increasing 31% since 1990. So, while I understand that people can’t enjoy the the low prices of yesteryear, we are still better off in that category than pre-pandemic. In the other categories, everything is awesome.

Since 1990, our consumption of communication services has risen 332%, our houses are 254% better furnished, and we have 118% greater quality-adjusted clothing consumption. All of this is already adjusted for inflation and is per-capita. Since the pandemic, these numbers are still up by 20.4%, 9.8%, and 31.1% respectively. People didn’t like the post-pandemic inflation. I get that. But these improvements in average consumption are mind boggling.

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The Average Teaching Load of US Professors

James BaileyLeave a comment

“One of the closest guarded secrets in American higher education is the average teaching loads of faculty.” -Richard Vedder

I saw this quote in a recent piece arguing that US professors should teach more. I thought it sounded extreme, but as I look into it, it is surprisingly difficult to find data on this compared to other things like salaries:

Since 1996, for instance, the University of Delaware has administered the annual National Study of Instructional Costs and Productivity, surveying faculty and teaching assistants about course loads and enrollment. The data, though, are “only available to four-year, non-profit institutions of higher education.”[7] This secrecy, needless to say, is not the norm for surveys collected by publicly supported institutions. Tellingly, this study is being discontinued because the number of participating institutions “has slowly declined to unsustainable levels.”[8] *

There are some decent older studies that are public, like this 2005 survey of top liberal arts colleges showing that almost all have teaching loads between 4 and 6 courses per year. But in terms of recent data that is publicly available, the best I’ve found is the Faculty Survey of Student Engagement. It still isn’t great, since their 2024 survey only covers 54 of the 2000+ bachelor’s degree granting colleges in the US, and their tables show that these 54 aren’t especially representative. They make nice graphics though:

The graphics show exact percentages if you hover over them on the original Tableau site. Doing this shows that the median professor teaches 4 undergraduate courses per year. Knowing the full distribution would require the underlying data they don’t share, but from these graphics we can at least compute a rough average (rounding 4+ graduate courses to 4 and 9+ undergraduate courses to 9).

This shows that the average professor teaches 4.43 undergraduate courses and 0.75 graduate courses, for a total of 5.18 courses per academic year. If I restrict the data to full-time tenured or tenure-track professors, they teach an average of 4.72 undergraduate courses and 0.91 graduate courses, for a total of 5.63 courses per academic year.

Overall these loads are higher than I expected, especially since the survey sample is skewed towards research schools. But its still lower than the standard 3-3 load at my own institution, and low enough that it makes for a great job, especially compared to teaching K-12.

Overall though I don’t know why we need to rely on one-off surveys to get data on teaching loads, it seems like data the US Department of Education should collect from all accredited schools and share publicly.

*The Delaware Cost study is not just discontinuing new surveys, they plan to pull down existing data by December 15th 2025. Only schools that participate in their survey get access, so I can’t get the data, but perhaps some of you can.

Change in Homicide Rates from Pre-Pandemic in Large US Cities

Jeremy Horpedahl1 Comment

We all know that homicides spiked in the US in 2020 and we all (hopefully) know that homicides have been falling across most of the country dramatically since the end of 2021. But have homicides started to get back to, or even below, pre-pandemic levels? Or is it merely reversing the 2020 increases?

The answer depends on the city and the pre-pandemic baseline! The chart below shows the 10 largest cities (with Fort Worth instead of Jacksonville, because the Real-Time Crime Index doesn’t include the latter) in the US, using a base of either January 2018 (the first month in the RTCI) or December 2019 (just before the pandemic, and murders had fallen nationally between these two dates):

The murder data comes from the Real-Time Crime Index, and it is a 12-month total so we shouldn’t have to worry about seasonality even though the months are different. I use Census annual city population estimates to calculate the rates (and estimate 2025 based on the growth from 2023-24).

As you can see, depending on the base timeframe used, about half of the cities saw declines, a few were roughly flat, and some definitely saw increases. New York, Houston, and Fort Worth are definitely still elevated. Los Angeles, Philly, Phoenix, and San Diego are definitely down. The others are either close to even or mixed depending on your baseline.

Keep in mind these data are only through March 2025. As both Billy Binion at Reason and Jeff Asher have both recently emphasized, if we use the most recent data for many cities, it’s entirely possible that 2025 will end up having some of the lowest homicide rates ever recorded for many US cities. The declines in early 2025 have definitely been big, but mostly they are just a continuation of the post-2021 decline.

Again, for clarification, all of these cities are down from their 2020-21 peaks: using September 2021 as the base (when the national murder rate roughly peaked), these 10 cities are down between 31% and 58%. Big improvements!