gdp

The Murky Macro Picture

James Bailey2 Comments

Last June I wondered if we were seeing the peak of inflation, and by at least one major measure I called the peak exactly:

At the moment, though, I’m feeling more confused than prophetic. The big question a year ago was how long it would take the Fed to get inflation down to reasonable levels, and how much collateral damage they would do to the real economy in that effort. Today most current indicators make it look like they pulled off the miraculous “soft landing”. Inflation over the last 12 months is still high, but over the last 6 months we’re nailing the Fed’s 2% annualized target. This has hit a few sectors of the real economy hard, with housing slowing dramatically and tech doing mass layoffs, but the overall picture is great: GDP growth was around 3% the last 2 quarters, and the 3.4% unemployment is the lowest since 1969.

What’s confusing about this is that we have a hard time believing we really got this lucky. Its like your plane lost power, you diverted course for an emergency crash landing, and once you touch down and find yourself seemingly unharmed you look around and wonder if the plane is about to explode. Consumer sentiment is worse than it was in the depths of Covid; business sentiment has been falling for over a year and is almost down to March 2020 levels. Betting markets forecast a 50% chance of a recession in 2023, and the yield curve is strongly inverted (one of the best predictors of a recession, though the guy who first noticed this says it might not work this time):

Finally, M2 money supply is shrinking for the first time since at least 1960, and I believe the first time since the Great Depression. This bodes well for inflation continuing to moderate, but its also one more indicator of a potential recession.

To sum up, most of the indicators of the current state of the economy look great, while most indicators of its near-term future look awful. So which do we trust?

My guess is that we avoid recession in 2023, but honestly this is mostly the gut feeling of an optimist. There’s no one knock-down piece of data I’d point to in support; its more that things are currently going well, and usually the best prediction is that tomorrow will be like today unless you have a good reason to think otherwise. The main reason people expect a slowdown is because of the Fed’s actions to fight inflation. The Fed itself predicts that they will cause a slowdown, but not a recession. Their most recent summary of economic projections from December predicts GDP growth slowing to 0.5% in 2023 and unemployment rising to 4.6%.

I think the “so what” outlook is also murky. Stocks have already fallen a lot from their highs and a recession already seems somewhat ‘priced in’, so even if I thought one was coming I wouldn’t necessarily sell stocks. On the flip side US stocks are still quite expensive by historical standards, so I don’t want to buy more on the assumption that they’ll rise more on good economic news this year. You might want to lock in decent rates on long-term bonds if you think the Fed will cut rates in response to a recession, but the inverted yield curve shows this is already somewhat priced in. 1-year bonds yielding almost 5% seems decent in either scenario, I have some and I’ll probably buy more, but 5% returns are nothing to get excited about. I’d like to hear suggestions but to me the small direct betting market on a potential recession is the clearest “so what” for anyone who does have a confident view about this year’s macro picture.

Economic Recovery from the Pandemic

Jeremy Horpedahl3 Comments

How well have countries recovered from the declines in the pandemic? It’s actually a bit difficult to answer that question, because it depends on how you measure it. Even if we agree that GDP is the best measure, how do we measure recovery? One possibility is to simply ask whether the country has exceeded its pre-pandemic GDP level. Exactly which quarter to use as the baseline is debatable, but here is a chart that Joseph Politano made for G7 countries using the 3rd quarter of 2019 as the baseline.

But we know that absent the pandemic, most countries would have continued growing (absent a recession for some other reason), so just getting back to pre-pandemic levels isn’t necessarily a full recovery. But how much growth should we have expected? It’s a hard question, but here’s a chart along those lines from the Washington Post, using the CBO’s measure of “potential GDP” as what growth might have looked like.

Using either of these approaches, it appears that the US has recovered pretty well, although it would be nice to have a comparison across countries using the same approach as the Washington Post chart does. While there is no consistent measure similar to CBO’s potential GDP figure for all countries, a simple approach is to project growth forward using the average pre-pandemic growth rate. I have done so for a number of countries, using the average growth rate from 2017-2019. In the following charts, the blue line is actual GDP levels, and the orange line is projecting the 2017-2019 growth rate forward. Sorry that I can’t easily fit all these into one chart, so here come the charts!

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Norway is a Wealthy Country (even after making the appropriate adjustments)

Jeremy HorpedahlLeave a comment

I have previously wrote about living standards in Ireland, and how GDP per capita overstates typical incomes because of a lot of foreign investment.

This is not to say that foreign investment is bad — to the contrary! But standard income statistics, such as GDP, aren’t particularly useful for a country like Ireland.

Norway has a similar challenge with national income statistics, but a different reason: Oil. Norway has a very large supply of oil revenues relative to the size of the rest of its economy, and oil revenues are counted in GDP. But those oil revenues don’t necessarily translate into higher household income or consumption.

Using World Bank data, Norway appears to be very rich: GDP per capita in nominal terms was about $90,000 in 2021. Compare that with $70,000 in the US, which is a very rich country itself. Sounds extremely wealthy!

Of course, by that same statistic, average income in Ireland is $100,000. But after making all the proper adjustments, as we saw in my prior post, Ireland is right around the EU average in terms of what individuals and households actually consume.

What if we make similar adjustments for Norway?

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GDP Growth and Inflation in G7 Countries

Jeremy HorpedahlLeave a comment

Back in April I wrote about GDP growth rates and inflation rates in G7 countries and the OECD broadly. James also wrote about a broader set of countries (182!) using these two measures. Since the economic scene is evolving so quickly, and we now have 6 more months of data, I wanted to provide an update on the US and our other large peer nations.

Here’s the data, showing cumulative real GDP growth and cumulative core inflation since the right before the pandemic (please note that I flipped the x- and y-axis from the previous post — sorry for the confusion, but this way makes more sense).

The picture looks roughly the same, but here are a few notable changes:

  • Despite the slight slowdown in GDP growth in the first half of 2022, the US still clearly has the highest rate of economic growth
  • UK, Italy, and Canada have now moved into positive territory for cumulative economic growth (yes, it’s all inflation adjusted)
  • But Japan and Germany still have had no net economic growth during the pandemic — and even worse for Germany, they have had a healthy dose of inflation too

The US once again stands out as having both the best economic performance and the worst inflation performance in the G7. Are these two things connected? That’s a question that is unanswerable from a simple scatterplot, and may be unanswerable completely. But I think it’s fair to say that the US hasn’t taken an obviously inferior economic path relative to other countries, even if our path has been inferior compared to some ideal policy. But don’t commit the Nirvana Fallacy!

Finally, we should recognize that the GDP is not the only important measure of how an economic is performing. For example, the US labor market has not recovered as well as some other peer nations have. Still, GDP is one of the important broad measures to look at, even if it is not ideal for diagnosing recessions.

Recession or not, the biggest GDP political football is 3 months away

James BaileyLeave a comment

US GDP fell for the second straight quarter according to statistics released this week by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. This means that by one common definition we’re now in a recession, which has ignited a debate about whether “two consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth” is the best definition (as opposed to ‘when the NBER says there’s one’, like I generally teach and Jeremy argued for here, or something else).

Naturally this debate has political overtones, since the party in power would be blamed for a recession, so we’ve seen the White House CEA argue that we’re not in a recession, many on the other side argue that we are, and plentiful hypocrisy from people who should know better.

But in political terms, the fight over the binary “are we in a recession” call won’t be the big economic factor in November’s elections- that will be inflation and GDP, especially 3rd quarter GDP. One of the oldest and best predictors of US elections is the Fair Model, which uses inflation and the number of recent “strong growth quarters”. Fair’s update following the recent Q2 GDP announcement states:

the predicted vote share for the Democrats is 46.70, which compares to 48.99 in October. The smaller predicted vote share for the Democrats is due to two fewer strong growth quarters and slightly higher inflation

By Election Day we’ll have 3 more months of economic data making it clear whether inflation is getting under control and whether economic activity is picking back up or continuing to decline. Monthly data releases on inflation and unemployment will be closely watched, but the most discussed release will likely be third quarter GDP. It will summarize 3 months instead of just one, it will be of huge relevance to the debate over how severe the recession is or whether we’re even in one, and it will likely be released less than two weeks before election day. The NBER almost certainly won’t weigh in by then; they tend to take over a year to date recessions, not adjudicate debates in real time.

So when BEA does release their Q3 GDP estimate in late October, what will it say? Markets currently estimate at least a 75% chance it will be positive (they had estimated a 36% chance of positive Q2 GDP just before the latest announcement). That sounds high to me, the yield curve is still inverted and I bet investment will continue to drag, but forecasting exact GDP numbers is hard. Its a much easier bet that whatever the number turns out to be will loom large in political debates just before the elections. Perhaps we’ll get the Q3 GDP growth number that would make for the most chaotic debate: 0.0%.

Are We in A Recession?

Jeremy Horpedahl3 Comments

The truth is, we don’t know. But let’s be clear: whether we are or not doesn’t depend on the 2nd quarter GDP report. Though two consecutive quarters of declining GDP is often cited as the definition of a recession, it’s not the definition economists use. And with good reason.

Instead, the NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee uses this definition: “a significant decline in economic activity that is spread across the economy and that lasts more than a few months.” And they explain why GDP is not their preferred measure, which includes several reasons but this one seems most germane to our current moment: “[the] definition includes the phrase, ‘a significant decline in economic activity.’ Thus real GDP could decline by relatively small amounts in two consecutive quarters without warranting the determination that a peak had occurred.”

If not GDP, what do they look at? I’ll get into more detail later, but in short, they look at monthly measures of income, consumption, employment, sales, and production (a direct measure of production, which GDP is not — it’s a proxy).

However, the American public seems convinced that we are in a recession. The most recent poll I can find on this is from mid-June, which is useful because (as we’ll see below) we have most of the relevant measures of the economy for June 2022 already. In that poll, 56% of Americans say we are in a recession. And while there is some partisan bent to the responses, even 45% of Democrats seem to think we are in a recession. For those that say we are in a recession, 2/3 cite inflation as the primary indicator that we are in a recession.

Already here we can see the difference between the general public and NBER: the rate of inflation is not one of the measures that NBER considers when defining a recession. So, what are the measures they use?

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GDP Growth and Excess Mortality in the G7

Jeremy Horpedahl1 Comment

Two weeks ago my post looked at GDP growth during the pandemic. But of course, economic growth isn’t the only important outcome to look at in the pandemic. Health outcomes are important too, and indeed I have posted about those in the past alongside GDP data.

Today, my chart looks at the G7 countries (representing roughly half of global wealth and GDP), showing both their economic performance (as measured by real GDP growth) and health performance (as measured by excess mortality through February 2022).

The US has clearly had the best economic performance. But the US also had the highest level of excess deaths per capita (not all of this is from COVID — US drug overdoses are also way up — but even using official COVID deaths, the US still tops this group).

Japan had the best health performance, in fact amazingly no cumulative excess deaths through February 2022 (this has risen very slightly since then, but I stopped in February so all countries had complete data). However, Japan also had slightly negative economic growth.

Which country ends up looking the best? Canada! Very low levels of excess deaths, and at least some positive economic growth. Not as much growth as the US, but Canada is the second best performer in the G7.

To give some context of just how low the level of deaths have been in Canada, first recognize that the US had 1.1 million excess deaths in the pandemic through February 2022. If instead our excess deaths had been roughly equal to Canada on a per capita basis, we would have only had 180,000 excess deaths in the US, saving over 900,000 lives.

Some of Canada’s COVID policy have been overly restrictive, such as the vaccine mandates that sparked protests in February 2022. But by then, Canada had already largely achieved it’s COVID victory over the US and most other G7 nations. Compare excess mortality in Canada with the US: the only big wave in Canada that came close to the US was the Spring 2020 wave. After that, Canada was always much lower.

The Latest GDP Data: First Quarter 2022 in the OECD

Jeremy Horpedahl2 Comments

Today two data releases for Gross Domestic Product were released. The first release was for the United States, giving us the third and “final” release for first quarter 2022 data. It was down 1.6% from the prior quarter (though we knew this two months ago — not much has changed since the “advance” estimate). That’s not good (but see this great Joseph Politano newsletter for some more detail).

The second release was the annual 2021 GDP data for the European Union. The release showed strong growth in 2021 (+5.4%), but that’s relative to the bad year of 2020. So compared to the pre-pandemic level of 2019, the EU was still about 0.8% below this more accurate baseline. Comparatively, the US was already 2% above 2019 with the annual 2021 release (everything in these two paragraphs is adjusted for inflation). Of course, within the EU, there is a lot of variation, but overall the US looks comparatively well.

Let’s break down that variation in the EU and include the first quarter of 2022 data to make the best comparison with the US. To bring in some more relevant comparison countries, I’ll use data from the OECD for a complete comparison. Note: I’ve excluded Ireland, because their GDP is weird. I’ve also excluded Turkey, because even though all the data here is adjusted for inflation, Turkey is in a highly inflationary environment, making the data a little difficult to interpret.

Here is the chart, which shows the change in real GDP from the 4th quarter of 2019 up through the 1st quarter of 2022 (I use the volume index, which is similar to adjusting for price inflation). I have highlighted in orange the largest economies in the OECD (anything with about $2 trillion of GDP or larger, with Spain and Canada at about that level).

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Covid-19 Didn’t Break the Supply Chains. You Did.

Zachary Bartsch4 Comments

This is my last post in a series that uses the AS-AD model to describe US consumption during and after the Covid-19 recession. I wrote about US consumption’s broad categories, services, and non-durables. This last one addresses durable consumption.

During the week of thanksgiving in 2020, our thirteen-year-old microwave bit the dust. NBD, I thought. Microwaves are cheap, and I’m willing to spend a little more in order to get one that I think will be of better quality (GE, *cough*-*cough*). So, I filtered through the models on multiple websites and found the right size, brand, and wattage. No matter the retailer, at checkout I learned that regardless of price, I’d be waiting a good two months before my new, entirely standard, and unexceptional microwave oven would arrive. I’d have to wait until the end of January of 2021.

¡Que Ridiculo!

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AS-AD: From Levels to Percent

Zachary Bartsch9 Comments

The aggregate supply & aggregate demand model (AS-AD) is nice because it’s flexible and clear. Often professors will teach it in levels. That is, they teach it with the level of output on one axis, and the price level on the other axis. This presentation is convenient for the equation of exchange, which can be arranged to reflect that aggregate demand (AD) is a hyperbola in (Y, P) space. Graphed below is the AD curve in 2019Q4 and in 2020Q2 using real GDP, NGDP, and the GDP price deflator.

The textbook that I use for Principles of Macroeconomics, instead places inflation (π) on the vertical axis while keeping the level of output on the horizontal axis. The authors motivate the downward slope by asserting that there is a policy reaction function for the Federal Reserve. When people observe high rates of inflation, state the authors, they know that the Fed will increase interest rates and reduce output. Personally, I find this reasoning to be inadequate because it makes a fundamental feature of the AS-AD model – downward sloping demand – contingent on policy context.

At the same time, I do think that it can be useful to put inflation on the vertical axis. Afterall, individuals are forward looking. We expect positive inflation because that’s what has happened previously, and we tend to be correct. So, I tell my students that “for our purposes”, placing inflation on the vertical axis is fine. I tell them that, when they take intermediate macro, they’ll want to express both axes as rates of change. I usually say this, and then go about my business of teaching principles.

But, what does it look like when we do graph in percent-change space?

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