That is the title of a 2020 book by Dierdre McCloskey and Art Carden. It attempts to sum up McCloskey’s trilogy of huge books on the “Bourgeois Virtues” in one short, relatively easy to read book. I haven’t read the full trilogy, so I can’t say how good the new book is as a distillation, but I found that it was easy to read and at least makes me think I understand McCloskey’s basic thesis for why the world got rich. I share some highlights here.
Part 1 of the book aims to establish that the world did in fact get richer over recent centuries, plus give a basic explanation of liberal political thought. If you already know this you could skip this part and cut down an easy 189 page read to a very easy 106 page read (part 1 is for some reason written in a way that assumes you disagree with the authors, which grates when you don’t, or perhaps also if you do).
Part 2 gets to what I at least came for- digging into the history to solve the puzzle of why the Industrial Revolution / Great Enrichment took off when and where it did. Which means first, explaining why many things people think made 18th century England special were actually common elsewhere, like markets:
Recorded music sales peaked in 1999- then came Napster and other ways to listen to the exact music you want for free. Recorded music sales still haven’t fully recovered, but with the rapid growth of paid streaming since 2014, they have been increasing again:
Meanwhile, live music sales have exploded since the ’90s:
The latest report from Pollstar on the top live tours is positively glowing:
2023 was a colossus, the likes of which the live industry has never before seen. If 2022 was a historic record-setting year, which it was, then this year completely blew it out of the water— by double digits. Total grosses for the 2023 Worldwide Top 100 Tours were up 46% to $9.17 billion
When you combine live and recorded sales, total spending on music has now passed the 1999 peak; this is the biggest the market for music has ever been. Of course, this doesn’t mean its an easy time to be a musician; touring is hard work and, as always, record labels and others are taking a big share of the money before it gets to artists. And opinions differ about whether today’s environment is good for creating good new music.
There are dozens of songs about how the road is hard, and the more time you spend on the road, the less they sound like cliches than like a simple and sometimes stark description of your life. Sooner or later everybody spots the exit that has their name on it –John Darnielle
The BLS data is noisy but suggests that the number of musicians in the US has been fairly flat and is projected to stay that way. A lot will depend on whether live music continues to grow, how much of that is captured by a few superstars, and whether the current streaming paradigm continues, or goes in a more or less artist-friendly direction. But now that consumers are willing to pay for music again, artists at least have a fighting chance.
I just got the new Robinhood Gold credit card after 4 months on their waitlist. It offers 3% cash back on everything- except travel, which is an even better 5%. This seems to be a much better deal than the typical credit card (which offers ~0-1% back in cash or equivalents), and even better than the previous best alternative I know of (the Citi Double Cash, which pays 2% back). So, is there a catch?
As far as I can tell, there are two, but one is minor and the other is avoidable.
The minor catch is that while they advertise the Gold Card as having no annual fee, you need to be a Robinhood Gold member to get it. Robinhood Gold has a $50/year fee, though it comes with other benefits, and getting the extra 1%+ back on the credit card will itself pay for the fee assuming you spend at least $5k/yr on the card.
The potentially major catch, and the reason I assume Robinhood is offering such a good deal, is that they want to entice you to open a brokerage account and to make bad decisions with that account that make them money. Much like a casino that offers you free drinks and cheap hotel rooms in the hope that you will choose to gamble and end up losing way more than the cost of the “complimentary” things they gave you. This is a major risk, but if you know what to avoid you can still come out ahead. The last time my friends dragged me to a casino I got handed plenty of free drinks despite the fact that I never gambled. Similarly, Robinhood might nudge its users to lose money in ways large (options) and small (overtrading with market orders).
But while Robinhood’s interface might suggest these bad choices, it absolutely does not require them. You can simply choose not to enable options trading, not to over-trade (and to turn off price alerts that nudge you to do so), and to use limit orders instead of the default market orders when buying stocks. In fact, you could avoid using Robinhood to buy stocks altogether, and simply use their brokerage account as a way to earn 5% interest while using it to pay off your credit card (though on the other hand, Robinhood could benefit people if it nudges them to do stock investing at all instead of keeping everything in a checking account).
The fact that Robinhood Gold brokerage accounts pay 5% interest on uninvested cash is its other big advantage. You can find savings accounts elsewhere paying 5% or a bit more, but many won’t maintain that rate, and they have transaction limits. Robinhood also pays a 1% bonus on cash transferred in if you keep it there.
Someone moving to the Robinhood ecosystem from a bad setup (paying with cash, or debit cards, or credit cards with no rewards that are paid off from a checking account that earns 0%) could in theory increase their real spending power by 8%+. Even someone in a more common situation (has a 1% rewards card but most of their spending is on things like mortgages that aren’t credit-card-eligible, pays the credit card from a 0% interest checking account but sweeps excess cash to a high-yield savings account paying 4%) could still increase their total spending power 1-3%. Not huge, but a big deal for something that can be set up for less than a days work.
This is now the best single-account setup I know of- assuming you can stay out of their casino. Churning through different accounts can get you a better return, but it is also a lot more work and has its own risks. If you want to up your returns some without the fees or risk of the Robinhood ecosystem, then something like the Citi Double Cash paid from a high-yield (4%+) savings account is probably the way to go.
Disclaimer: I might be wrong about this but if so I am honestly wrong; this post is not sponsored and I’m not even using referral links when I easily could. Still, do your own research and let me know if I’ve missed anything
Update: Robinhood CEO Vlad Tenev did an interview on Invest Like the Best this week where, reading between the lines, he confirms both the positive and negative things I say here. They make most of their money overall on options and active traders; 3% cash back exceeds the interchange fees they get from merchants, but they expect the card to be profitable because some users will carry a balance (and pay interest) and because it will push people to sign up for Gold (so pay fees and perhaps trade more). He notes that there is another card that offers 3% cash back, but it is only available to those with at least $2 million managed by Fidelity.
Despite its many flaws*, I always like to checkinon what the Taylor Rule suggests for the Fed. Its virtues are that it gives a definite precise answer, and that it has been agreed upon ahead of time by a variety of economists as giving a decent answer for what the Fed should do. Without something like the Taylor Rule, everyone tends to grasp for reasons that This Time Is Different. Academics seek novelty, so would rather come up with some new complex new theory of what to do instead of something undergrads have been taught for years. Finance types tend to push whatever would benefit them in the short term, which is typically rate cuts. Political types push whatever benefits their party; typically rate cuts if they are in power and hikes if not, though often those in power simply want to emphasize good economic news while those out of power emphasize the bad news.
The Taylor Rule can cut through all this by considering the same factors every time, regardless of whether it makes you look clever, helps your party, or helps your returns this quarter. So what is it saying now? It recommends a 6.05% Fed funds rate:
Fed Funds Rate Suggested by the Bernanke Version of the Taylor Rule Source: My calculation using FRED data, continually updated here
I continue to use the Bernanke version of the Taylor Rule, which says that the Fed Funds rate should be equal to:
Core PCE + Output Gap + 0.5*(Core PCE – 2) +2
*What are the flaws of the Taylor Rule? It sees interest rates as the main instrument of monetary policy; it relies on the Output Gap, which can only really be guessed at; and it incorporates no measures of expectations. If I were coming up with my own rule I would probably replace the Output Gap with a labor market measure like unemployment, and add measures of money supply shifts and inflation expectations. Perhaps someday I will, but like everyone else I would naturally be tempted to overfit it to the concerns of the moment; I like that the Taylor Rule was developed at a time when Taylor had no idea what it might mean for, say, the 2024 election or the Q3 2024 returns of any particular hedge fund.
That said, people have now created enough different versions of the Taylor Rule that they can produce quite a range of answers, undermining one of its main virtues. The Atlanta Fed maintains a site that calculates 3 alternative versions of the rule, and makes it easy for you to create even more alternatives:
Two of their rules suggest that Fed Funds should currently be about 4%, implying a major cut at a time that the Bernanke version of the rule suggests a rate hike. On the other other hand, perhaps this variety is a virtue in that it accurately indicates that the current best path is not obvious; and the true signal comes in times like late 2021 when essentially every version of the rule is screaming that the Fed is way off target.
Venezuela held an election this week; President Maduro says he won, while the opposition and independent observers say he lost. Disputed elections like this are fairly common across the world, but where Venezuela really stands out is not how people vote at the ballot box- it is how they vote with their feet.
Reuters notes that “A Maduro win could spur more migration from Venezuela, once the continent’s wealthiest country, which in recent years has seen a third of its population leave.”
I don’t think we emphasize enough how crazy the scale of this is. After every US Presidential election, you hear some people who supported the losing side talk about leaving the country, but they almost never do. Leaving your home country behind is a dramatic step, one people only want to take if they think things are much better elsewhere. The US, even with a party you don’t like in power, has generally stayed a good place to live. The total number of Americans who have moved abroad for any reason (I would guess most feel more pulled by the host country rather than pushed by the US) is about 3 million. That is less than 1% of all Americans; by contrast more than 46 million people have immigrated to the US from other countries, and many more would come if we allowed it.
Even in poor countries, seeing anything like one third of the population leave is dramatic, especially when almost all the migration happens in only 10 years as in Venezuela:
Source. Note this only goes through 2020, and emigration has grown since
This makes Venezuela the largestrefugee crisis in the history of the Americas, and depending on how you count the partition of India, perhaps the largest refugee crisis in human history that was not triggered by an invasion or civil war.
Instead, it has been triggered by the Maduro regime choosing terrible policies that have needlessly and dramatically impoverished the country:
I hope that the Venezuelan government will soon come to represent the will of its people. I’m not sure how that is likely to happen, though I guess positive change is mostly likely to come from Venezuelans themselves (perhaps with help from Colombia and Brazil); when the US tries to play a bigger role we often make things worse. But what has happened in Venezuela for the past 10 years is clearly much worse than the “normal” bad economic policies and even democratic backsliding that we see elsewhere. People everywhere complain about election results and economic policy, but nowhere else have I seen such a case of people going past simple cheap talk, taking the very expensive step of voting against the regime with their feet.
I’ve often heard that before modern water treatment, it was safer to drink beer; but I’ve also heard people call this a historical myth. A new paper in the Journal of Development Economics by Francisca Antman and James Flynn comes down strongly on the side of “beer really was safer”:
This paper provides the first quantitative estimates into another well-known water alternative during the Industrial Revolution in England.
Although beer in the present day is regarded as being worse for health than water, several features of both beer and water available during this historical period suggest the opposite was likely to be true. First, brewing beer requires boiling the water, which kills many dangerous pathogens often found in drinking water. As Bamforth (2004) puts it, “the boiling and the hopping were inadvertently water purification techniques”. Second, alcohol itself has antiseptic qualities. Homan (2004) notes that “because the alcohol killed many detrimental microorganisms, it was safer to drink than water” in the ancient near-east.
They use several identification strategies to establish this, for instance when a tax on malt was increased and mortality went up:
But did this mean people were drunk all the time? Probably not:
beer in this period was generally much weaker than it is today, and thus would have been closer to purified water. Accum (1820) found that common beers in late 18th and early 19th century England averaged just 0.75% alcohol by volume, a fraction of the content of the beers of today. Beer in this period was therefore far less harmful to the liver. Taken together, these facts suggest that beer had many of the benefits of purified water with fewer of the health risks associated with beer consumption today.
In fact, people at the time didn’t necessarily know that beer was healthier:
Thus, even though people did not recognize beer as a safer choice, drinking beer would have been an unintentional improvement over water, and thus may have contributed to improvements in human health and economic development over the period we investigate
Though as usual, Adam Smith was ahead of his time. Here’s what he had to say in his 1776 Wealth of Nations, in a chapter on malt taxes:
Spirituous liquors might remain as dear as ever, while at the same time the wholesome and invigorating liquors of beer and ale might be considerably reduced in their price.
Peter Lynch was one of the most successful investors of the 1970’s and 1980’s as the head of the Fidelity Magellan Fund. In 1989 he explained how he did it and why he thought retail investors could succeed with the same strategies in the bestselling book “One Up on Wall Street”. Given the meme stock exuberance of retail investors in the past few years, I thought the book might be due for a comeback.
Instead interest seems flat, and when I do hear Peter Lynch mentioned it is by institutional investors more than retail. But the book seems to me like it is still valuable, so I’ll share some highlights here. This one could easily have been written this year:
Where did the Dow close? I’m more interested in how many stocks went up versus how many went down. These so-called advance/decline numbers paint a more realistic picture. Never has this been truer than in the recent exclusive market, where a few stocks advance while the majority languish. Investors who buy “undervalued” small stocks or midsize stocks have been punished for their prudence. People are wondering: How can the S&P 500 be up 20 percent and my stocks are down? The answer is that a few big stocks in the S&P 500 are propping up the averages.
I see why the book hasn’t caught on with meme stock traders:
Nobody believes in long-term investing more passionately than I do… I think of day-trading as at-home casino care.
I’ve never bought a future nor an option in my entire investing career, and I can’t imagine buying one now. It’s hard enough to make money in regular stocks without getting distracted by these side bets, which I’m told are nearly impossible to win unless you’re a professional trader.
So where does he think retail investors have a chance to get “One Up on Wall Street”?
During the peak of the Covid inflation in 2022 I speculated that food inflation was worst for the cheapest products:
a typical McDouble now costs well over $2 in most of the US, while a typical Big Mac is still well under $6. You used to be able to get 4-5 McDoubles for the price of a Big Mac; now you typically get less than 3 and sometimes, as in Keene, less than 2.
What’s going on here? First, the McDouble was always absurdly cheap. Second, prices rise most quickly where demand is inelastic, and demand is less elastic for goods that are cheaper and goods that are more like “necessities” than “luxuries”.
We use micro price data for food products sold by 91 large multi-channel retailers in ten countries between 2018 and 2024. Measuring unit prices within narrowly defined product categories, we analyze two key sources of variation in prices within a store: temporary price discounts and differences across similar products. Price changes associated with discounts grew at a much lower average rate than regular prices, helping to mitigate the inflation burden. By contrast, cheapflation—a faster rise in prices of cheaper goods relative to prices of more expensive varieties of the same good—exacerbated it. Using Canadian Homescan Panel Data, we estimate that spending on discounts reduced the change in the average unit price by 4.1 percentage points, but expenditure switching to cheaper brands raised it by 2.8 percentage points….
The prices of cheaper brands grew between 1.3 to 1.9 times faster than the prices of more expensive brands—and only when inflation surged, not before or after.
Last Friday the Supreme Court overturned the doctrine of Chevron deference as part of its ruling in Loper Bright Enterprises v Raimondo. This might not have even been their most discussed ruling of the past week, but in my (non-lawyerly) opinion, there is a good chance it will be their most economically impactful ruling of the past decade. SCOTUSblog explains the basics:
the Supreme Court on Friday cut back sharply on the power of federal agencies to interpret the laws they administer and ruled that courts should rely on their own interpretation of ambiguous laws. The decision will likely have far-reaching effects across the country, from environmental regulation to healthcare costs.
By a vote of 6-3, the justices overruled their landmark 1984 decision in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, which gave rise to the doctrine known as the Chevron doctrine. Under that doctrine, if Congress has not directly addressed the question at the center of a dispute, a court was required to uphold the agency’s interpretation of the statute as long as it was reasonable. But in a 35-page ruling by Chief Justice John Roberts, the justices rejected that doctrine, calling it “fundamentally misguided.”
Justice Elena Kagan dissented, in an opinion joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson. Kagan predicted that Friday’s ruling “will cause a massive shock to the legal system.”
When the Supreme Court first issued its decision in the Chevron case more than 40 years ago, the decision was not necessarily regarded as a particularly consequential one. But in the years since then, it became one of the most important rulings on federal administrative law, cited by federal courts more than 18,000 times.
The most common reaction I’ve seen is that people expect this to reduce the power of executive branch agencies, both in general and relative to courts and businesses, likely resulting in deregulation. Thus those on the economic left have been mostly decrying the decisions, while free–marketers and businesspeoplehave mostly beencelebrating:
The Fed has now almost landed the plane, bringing us down from 9% inflation during the Covid era to something approaching their 2% target today. But it is not yet clear how hard the landing will be. Back in March I thought recurrent inflation was still the big risk; now I see the risk of inflation and recession as balanced. This is because inflation risks are slightly down, while recession risk is up.
Inflation remains somewhat above target: over the last year it was 3.3% using CPI, 2.7% by PCE, and 2.8% by core PCE. It is predicted to stay slightly above target: Kalshi estimates CPI will finish the year up 2.9%; the TIPS spread implies 2.2% average inflation over the next 5 years; the Fed’s own projections say that PCE will finish the year up 2.6%, not falling to 2.0% until 2026. The labels on Kalshi imply that markets are starting to think the Fed’s real target isn’t 2.0%, but instead 2.0-2.9%:
The Fed’s own projections suggest this to be the somewhat the case- they plan to start cutting over a year before they expect inflation to hit 2.0%, though they still expect a long run rate of 2.0%. In short, I think there is a strong “risk” that inflation stays a bit elevated the next year or two, but the risk that it goes back over 4% is low and falling. M2 is basically flat over the last year, though still above the pre-Covid trend. PPI is also flat. The further we get from the big price hikes of ’21-’22 with no more signs of acceleration, the better.
But I would no longer say the labor market is “quite tight”. Payrolls remain strong but unemployment is up to 4.0%. This is still low in absolute terms, but it’s the highest since January 2022, and the increase is close to triggering the Sahm rule (which would predict a recession). Prime-age EPOP remains strong though. The yield curve remains inverted, which is supposed to predict recessions, but it has been inverted for so long now without one that the rule may no longer hold.
Looking through this data I think the Fed is close to on target, though if I had to pick I’d say the bigger risk is still that things are too hot/inflationary given the state of fiscal policy. But things are getting close enough to balanced that it will be easy for anyone to find data to argue for the side that they prefer based on their temperament or politics.
To me the big wild card is the stock market. The S&P500 is up 25% over the past year, driven by the AI boom, and to some extent it pulls the economy along with it. The Conference Board’s leading economic indicators are negative but improving overall this year; recently their financial indicators are flat while non-financial indicators are worsening.
Overall things remind me a lot of the late ’90s: the real economy running a bit hot with inflation around 3% and unemployment around 4%; the Fed Funds rate around 5%; and a booming stock market driven by new computing technologies. Naturally I wonder if things will end the same way: irrational exuberance in the stock market giving way to a tech-driven stock market crash, which in turn pushes the real economy into a mild recession.
Of course there is no reason this AI boom has to end the same way as the late-90’s internet boom/bubble. There are certainly differences: the Federal government is running a big deficit instead of a surplus; there are barely a tenth as many companies doing IPOs; many unprofitable tech stocks already got shaken out in 2022, while the big AI stocks are soaring on real profits today, not just expectations. Still, to the extent that there are any rules in predicting stock crashes, the signs are worrying. Today’s Shiller CAPE is below only the internet and Covid meme-stock bubble peaks:
Again, this doesn’t mean that stocks have to crash, or especially that they have to do it soon; the CAPE reached current levels in early 1998, but then stocks kept booming for almost two years. I’m not short the market. But the macro risk it poses is real.
Economist Writing Every Day 