The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia just released the first report on a new survey they are conducting quarterly. Some highlights:
Respondents in January 2024 were more positive about their income prospects than respondents a year earlier; one-third believed their income will increase, compared with 29 percent in January 2023
Younger, more affluent, male, or non-White respondents report a more positive outlook, compared with one year prior. Those who are older than 55 or earn less than $40,000 report notably negative changes in their personal outlook, compared with respondents in the same demographic segments surveyed a year ago
When asked about their ability to pay all of their bills in full this month, 23.5 percent of respondents in January 2024 indicated that they could not pay some or any of their bills; this was 1.5 percentage points higher than in January 2023 (22.0 percent) and the highest rate in the last five quarters
Overall, I’d say it shows an economy with mixed performance, but leaning more positive than negative.
Source: My graph of LIFE Survey data
It will be interesting to see if this ends up taking a place in the set of Fed surveys that are always driving economic discussions, like the Survey of Consumer Finances and the Survey of Professional Forecasters. If they keep it up and start putting out some graphics to summarize it, I think it will. My quick impression (not yet having spoken to Fed people about it) is that it will be the “quick hit” version of the Survey of Consumer Finances. It asks a smaller set of questions on somewhat similar topics, but is released quickly after each quarter instead of slowly after each year. If they stick with the survey it will get more useful over time, as there is more of a baseline to compare to.
Thankfully for US consumers, grocery prices have leveled off. They haven’t fallen, of course, which will still lead to viral complaints about egg prices, etc. But over the past 4 years, wages have almost caught up with grocery prices.
Not so with fast food prices (“limited service meals”), which have definitely outpaced wages over the past 4 years, and continue to grow at an annual rate of about 5 percent (also more than wages).
Furthermore, if we go back to 2014, we see it’s not just a post-pandemic effect on fast food. Prices since 2014 are up 54 percent for fast food according to the BLS, more than the 31 percent overall CPI-U increase and more than average wages (46 percent).
An article from FinanceBuzz puts together some more specific data on a dozen fast-food chains in the US. Consumer favorites for a quick, cheap bite to eat like Taco Bell and McDonald’s have seen menu prices increase by 80 or even 100 percent!
Check out the article for even more specific food item data at each of these restaurants. For example, the most famous of fast-food sandwiches is the Big Mac, which is up from $3.99 in 2014 to $5.99 in 2024, a 50 percent increase. A Whopper meal at Burger King is up 79 percent. All the more reason to seek out deals in the apps, or just good-old in-store discounts, like the “buy one get one for $1” promo at most McDonald’s. This deal would get you two Big Macs for $7, or $3.50 each… less than in 2014! Or since today is Wednesday, you might want to head to Burger King, where Whoppers are $3 at most locations (regular price: around $6).
Price discrimination is alive and well at the drive-thru window, and if you are just ordering from the menu without any discounts, you are really going to feel the pain of inflation.
I’ve written about coffee consumption during US alcohol prohibition in the past. I’ve also written about visualizing supply and demand. Many. Times. Today, I want to illustrate how to use supply and demand to reveal clues about the cause of a market’s volume and price changes. I’ll illustrate with an example of coffee consumption during prohibition.
The hypothesis is that alcohol prohibition would have caused consumers to substitute toward more easily accessible goods that were somewhat similar, such as coffee. To help analyze the problem, we have the competitive market model in our theoretical toolkit, which is often used for commodities. Together, the hypothesis and theory tell a story.
Substitution toward coffee would be modeled as greater demand, placing upward pressure on both US coffee imports and coffee prices. However, we know that the price in the long-run competitive market is driven back down to the minimum average cost by firm entry and exit. So, we should observe any changes in demand to be followed by a return to the baseline price. In the current case, increased demand and subsequent expansions of supply should also result in increasing trade volumes rather than decreasing.
Now that we have our hypothesis, theory, and model predictions sorted, we can look at the graph below which compares the price and volume data to the 1918 values. While prohibition’s enforcement by the Volstead act didn’t begin until 1920, “wartime prohibition” and eager congressmen effectively banned most alcohol in 1919. Consequently, the increase in both price and quantity reflects the increased demand for coffee. Suppliers responded by expanding production and bringing more supplies to market such that there were greater volumes by 1921 and the price was almost back down to its 1918 level. Demand again leaps in 1924-1926, increasing the price, until additional supplies put downward pressure on the price and further expanded the quantity transacted.
We see exactly what the hypothesis and theory predicted. There are punctuated jumps in demand, followed by supply-side adjustments that lower the price. Any volume declines are minor, and the overall trend is toward greater output. The supply & demand framework allows us to image the superimposed supply and demand curves that intersect and move along the observed price & quantity data. Increases toward the upper-right reflect demand increases. Changes plotted to the lower-right reflect supply increases. Of course, inflation and deflation account for some of the observed changes, but similar demand patterns aren’t present in the other commodity markets, such as for sugar or wheat. Therefore, we have good reason to believe that the coffee market dynamics were unique in the time period illustrated above.
*BTW, if you’re thinking that the interpretation is thrown off by WWI, then think again. Unlike most industries, US regulation of coffee transport and consumption was relatively light during the war, and US-Brazilian trade routes remained largely intact.
What’s the connection between social media use and mental health, especially among young people? You’ve probably heard a lot about this recently, in the media, by politicians, and among friends chatting about their kids. Lots of assertions are made, but there is also a bit of research on this topic. As someone who frequently uses social media myself, as well as a parent of young children, and a teacher that works every week with young college students, I am particularly interested in this topic.
Jonathan Haidt and various co-authors have been trying to catalog all the research on the topic and figure out if there is a connection between the decline in teenage mental health and the rise of social media use. Haidt also has a new book on this topic, as well as the decline of “free play” among kids, which I have not yet read but I’ve looked through his documents that contain all of the underlying and summaries of the research he is citing. I’ll read the book soon, as I’m certainly part of the intended audience (see the last sentence of the above paragraph). And while this research is very much outside of my area of expertise, my training as an economist has taught me how to read academic papers and to be convinced by evidence, so once again I’m very much the intended audience on this score as well.
Please read this post as my attempt to understand the evidence and start to form conclusions and/or critique what Haidt is saying. It’s a work in progress, and I’ll write more as I read and think more about it.
Christians across the world are observing the season of Lent right now, concluding this week. This important period of religious observance involves personal sacrifice of some sort, and for Western Christians a common form of sacrifice is abstaining from consuming meat on Fridays during Lent. But there is one exception: most Christians allow consumption of fish on Fridays, in lieu of other kinds of meat.
But abstaining from meat on Fridays was not always a practice reserved for Lent. Catholics used to abstain from meat for the entire year prior to a 1966 decree by Pope Paul VI. This decree relaxed the rules on fasting and decentralized them. In the US, Catholic Bishops chose to eliminate meatless Fridays, except during Lent.
No doubt this was an important religious change, but it was also an important economic change. And the first question an economist would ask is: how did this impact the price of fish? In our simple supply and demand framework, this should result in a decrease in demand, which would lower the price of fish. Did that happen?
In 1968, economist Frederick Bell asked just that question in an article published in the American Economic Review titled “The Pope and the Price of Fish.” The short answer is that yes, the price of fish did indeed decline!
Lately on Twitter this chart has been going around:
The chart comes from Bloomberg journalist Justin Fox, who always puts together interesting economic data. You can read his interpretation of the data at Bloomberg, but the folks posting it on Twitter all seem to have the same shock and awe: Detroit was the richest big city in 1949. And of course we all know that today it isn’t. Still, the Detroit MSA has done OK since 1949, even though it is no longer anywhere near the top.
How well has Detroit done? Despite industrial decline and many other major problems, median household income of the Detroit MSA was around $71,000 in 2022 according to the Census Bureau. How does this compare to the $3,627 median income in 1949? It’s about double in real terms: you can multiply it by about 10 using the Census’ preferred inflation adjustment for household incomes since 1949 (the C-CPI-U since 2000, and the R-CPI-U-RS before that).
Interest rates communicate the value of resources over time. For example, if you take out a loan, then the interest rate tells you how much you must to pay in order to keep that money over the life of the loan. The interest rate also reflects how much the lender will be compensated in exchange for parting with their funds. On the consumer side, the interest rate reflects the price that the borrower is willing to pay in order to avoid delaying a purchase.
When a business borrows, the interest rate reflects the minimal amount of value that they would need to create in order to make an accounting profit. For example, if a business borrows $100 for one year at an interest rate of 5%, then they need to earn $105 by the time that they repay the loan in order to break even with zero profit. The business would need to earn more than 5% in order to earn a profit on their borrowing and investment venture.
The longer the business takes to repay their loan, the more interest that accrues. And, the higher the interest rate, the more they need to earn in order to repay their loan.
This logic applies to all production because all production takes time. If production takes very little time, then the impact of the interest cost is miniscule. But, if production takes longer, then interest rates become increasingly relevant. These kinds of products include trees, cheese, wine, livestock, etc. Anything that ages, ferments, or has a lengthy production process will be more sensitive to the cost of borrowing.
How?
The growth pattern for most (all?) goods looks similar. Below-left is a growth chart for dairy cows . Notice that calves grow quickly at first, and their growth slows over time. For the sake of argument, let’s say that the change in value of a cow mimics the change in weight (Yes, I know that dairy and beef cows are different, but the principle is the same). Below-right is the monthly percent change. Even at an age of 25 months a cow is still growing in value at 2.4% per month or 33% per year.
Of course, there is a risk that some cows don’t survive to slaughter, lowering the expected growth rate. Since most cattle are slaughtered between 18 and 24 months of age, their growth rate at the time of slaughter is 4.4%-2.7% per month. As the interest rate at which farmers borrow rises, the optimal age at slaughter falls. Otherwise, the spread between the growth rate and the interest rate could go negative. Even so, what an investment! If you can borrow at, say, 8% per year, then you’ll make money hand-over-fist on the spread.
Except… Cows cost money to raise, and most of that cost is feed. According to the production indicators and estimated returns published by the USDA, the cost of feed in February of 2023 was $158.11 per hundred pounds of beef. The selling price of beef was $161.07. That leaves $2.96 or a profit of 1.87% earned over the course of 1.5-1.75 years. That investment is starting to look a lot less good, especially since it doesn’t include the cost of maintaining facilities, insurance, etc. It’s no wonder that farmers and ranchers are serious about their subsidies. Clearly, with such tight margins, farmers and ranchers are going to look good and hard at the interest rates that they pay on their debt. And, they do have debt.
However, the recent increase in beef prices is not caused by higher interest rates.
That 1.87% profit margin is at prices and costs from February 2023. Since 2020, the price of cattle feed ingredients (grain, bean, and oil) peaked in the summer of 2022 and are still substantially more expensive than pre-Covid (see below). That means that cows getting slaughtered right now were raised on more expensive feed. This February 2024, the cost of feed per 100lb. of cattle was $191.80. But the cattle selling price was only $180.75. That’s a $11.05 loss for cattle raising. Wholesale prices of cattle might be up recently, but the cost of feed is up by more. It’s not the cattle farmers who are benefiting from the high beef prices. In fact, they’re getting squeezed hard.
There is good news. The cost of feed ingredients has been falling recently, which means that beef farmers should begin to see some relief if the recent trend continues. For Consumers, the price of beef is already down from its 2023 peak.
The Fed made two mistakes during the Great Recession of 2007-2009: being too slow and weak in their initial reaction to the financial crisis, and being too hurried in their attempts to return to a ‘normal’ policy stance. The first mistake turned what could have been a minor road bump into the worst recession in decades, and the second mistake meant it took a full decade from the start of the crisis in 2007 for unemployment to return to pre-crisis levels.
The rapid recovery from the Covid recession shows that the Fed learned from its first mistake in 2007. In 2020, the Fed acted quickly and decisively, so that despite the worst pandemic in a century the US experienced a recession that lasted only months, and it took unemployment barely 2 years to return to pre-Covid levels. But the Fed’s talk about cutting rates this year makes me worry they did not learn the second lesson. Despite all their talk of being “data driven”, I don’t see how a dispassionate look at current inflation, labor market, or financial data could lead them to be considering rate cuts; if anything it currently suggests rate hikes.
Why then is the Fed talking rate cuts? Of course you can dig and find a few data points to support cuts, but I think the driving factor is simply a feeling that interest rates are currently above “normal”. They are digging to find data points to support cuts because they want to return rates to “normal”, just as in the early to mid 2010’s they were digging for reasons to raise rates to “normal”. Rather than being consistently too hawkish or too dovish, they are consistently too eager to return rates to “normal” when circumstances are still abnormal.
This is not simply out of a social and political desire to avoid appearing “weird”, though that is definitely a factor. There is also a long academic tradition of measuring the stance of monetary policy by comparing current interest rates to a neutral, “natural” rate of interest, r*. But this tradition has problems. The “natural” rate of interest is always changing, and at any given time we can’t really know for sure what it is. The current Fed Funds rate may be higher than it has been in recent years, but that doesn’t necessarily mean it is above the current natural rate of interest; the natural rate itself could have risen too. This is why interest rates aren’t a great way to measure the stance of monetary policy. At times Chair Powell himself has made the same point, saying that trying to set policy by comparing to the “natural” rate of interest r* is like “navigating by the stars under cloudy skies”.
Lacking such celestial guidance, I can only hope the Fed will make good on their promise to be data-driven and navigate by the guideposts they can see around them: measures like current inflation and unemployment, or market-based forecasts of such measures.
Let me start by saying high rates of inflation, especially unexpected inflation, is bad. Still, it is useful to have some historical context. We’ve experienced the highest inflation rates in a generation lately, especially in 2022, but past generations experienced inflation too. How to compare?
Here’s one approach. Using the latest CPI-U data, we can see that prices on average approximately doubled between March 1996 and February 2024. That’s 335 months to double, or just shy of 28 years. How long did it take prices to double if we keep moving backward in time from March 1996?
It only took 194 months for prices to double from January 1980 until March 1996, just a little over 16 years. Prior to January 1980, prices doubled even quicker, this time taking less than 10 years! Prior to that, it took 24 years for prices to double between WW2 and 1970, and before that you have to go back 31 years to 1915 for another doubling. Judged by this, our recent history doesn’t look so bad.
That doesn’t mean everything is OK. As I said above, unexpected inflation is the worst kind, since individuals and businesses aren’t planning for it. And we’ve had 20% inflation in the past 4 years — something not seen since 1991 over a 4-year time period. A 20%+ inflation rate is unusual to us today, but it certainly wasn’t in the past: basically all of the 1970s and 1980s had 20%+ inflation every 4 years, sometimes more than 40% or even 50%.
Finally, while unexpected inflation is bad, we also care about the relationship between wage increases and price increases. We can rightfully bemoan rapid, unexpected price inflation, but if wages are increasing faster than inflation, we are still better off (on average). The BLS average hourly wage series for production and non-supervisory workers only goes back to 1964, so we can’t do a full comparison with the CPI-U, but we can compare the three most recent doublings of prices.
Keep in mind with the chart above that prices (as measured by the CPI-U) increased by 100% for each of these time periods. So, for the 1970s and 1980-1996 periods, wages actually rose by less than rate of inflation — wage stagnation! If we used the PCE price index instead, those time periods still don’t look good: PCE prices increased by 88% for 1970-1980, 85% from 1980-1996, and 78% since 1996. With either price index, the 1996-2024 period is clearly the best of these three, and it’s not even really close.
Let me finish where I started: the recent inflation is bad. I don’t want to downplay that. But some historical perspective is also useful.
Everyone else keeps asking when the Fed will cut rates, and yesterday Chair Powell said they will likely cut this year. Either they are all crazy or I am, because almost every indicator I see indicates we are still above the Fed’s inflation target of 2% and are likely to remain there without some change in policy. Ideally that change would be a tightening of fiscal policy, but since there’s no way Congress substantially cuts the deficit this year, responsibility falls to the Federal Reserve.
Lets start with the direct measures of inflation: CPI is up 3.1% from a year ago. The Fed’s preferred measure, PCE, is up 2.4% from a year ago. Core PCE, which is more predictive of where inflation will be going forward, is up 2.8% over the past year. The TIPS spread indicates 2.4% annualized inflation over the next 5 years. The Fed’s own projections say that PCE and Core PCE won’t be back to 2.0% until 2026.
The labor market remains quite tight: the unemployment rate is 3.7%, payroll growth is strong (353,000 in January), and there are still substantially more job openings than there are unemployed workers. The chattering classes underrate this because they are in some of the few sectors, like software and journalism, where layoffs are actually rising. Real GDP growth is strong (3.2% last quarter), and nominal GDP growth is still well above its long-run trend, which is inflationary.
I do see a few contrary indicators: M2 is still down from a year ago (though only 1.4%, and it is up over the past 6 months). The Fed’s balance sheet continues to shrink, though it is still trillions above the pre-Covid level. Productivity rose 3.2% last quarter.
At least over the past year I think fiscal policy is more responsible than monetary policy for persistent inflation. But I can’t see Congress doing a deficit-reducing grand bargain in an election year; the CBO projects the deficit will continue to run over 5% of GDP. That means our best chance for inflation to hit the target this year is for the Fed to tighten, or at least to not cut rates. If policy continues on its current inflationary path, our main hope is for a deus-ex-machina like a true tech-fueled productivity boom, or deflationary events abroad (recession in China?) lowering prices here.
Economist Writing Every Day 