Data

What Markets Expect From A Trump Presidency

James Bailey3 Comments

Last week I laid out my own expectations for what economic policy would look like in a Trump or Harris presidency. Now after yesterday’s market reaction, we can infer what market participants as a whole expect by roughly doubling the size of yesterday’s market moves. Prediction markets had a 50-60% change of Trump winning as of Tuesday morning’s market close, which moved to a 99+% chance by Wednesday morning. Look at how other markets moved over the same time, multiply it by 2-2.5x, and you get the expected effect of a Trump presidency relative to a Harris presidency. So what do we see?

Stocks Up Overall: S&P 500 up 2%, Dow up 3%, Russell 2000 (small caps) up 6%. My guess this is mostly about avoiding tax increases- the odds that most of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act gets renewed when it expires in 2025 just went way up. Lower corporate taxes boost corporate earnings directly, while lower taxes on households mean that they have more money to spend on their stocks and their products. Lower regulation and looser antitrust rules are also likely to boost corporate earnings.

Bond Prices Down (Yields Up): 10yr Treasury yields rose from 4.29% to 4.4%. This is the flip side of the tax cuts- they need to be paid for, and markets expect they will be paid for through deficits rather than cutting spending. The government will issue more bonds to borrow the money, lowering the value of existing bonds.

Dollar Up: The US dollar is up 2% against a basket of foreign currencies. I think this is mostly about the expected tariffs. People like the sound of the phrase “strong dollar” but it isn’t necessarily a good thing; it makes it cheaper to vacation abroad, but makes it harder to export, even before we consider potential retaliatory tariffs.

Crypto Way Up: Bitcoin went up 7% overnight, Ethereum is now 15% up since Tuesday. Crypto exchange Coinbase was up 31%. Markets anticipate friendlier regulation of crypto, along with a potential ‘strategic Bitcoin reserve’.

Single Stock Moves: Private prison stocks are up 30%+. Tesla is up 15%, mostly due to Elon Musk’s ties to Trump, but also due to tariffs. Foreign car companies were way down on the expectation of tariffs- Mercedes-Benz down 8%, BMW down 10%, Honda down 8%.

Sector Moves: Steel stocks are up on the expectation of tariffs, while solar stocks (which can’t catch a break, doing poorly under Biden despite big subsidies and big revenue increases) were down 12% in the expectation of falling subsidies. Bank stocks did especially well, with one bank ETF up 12%. This gives us one hint on what to me is now the biggest question about the second Trump administration- who will staff it? I could see Trump appointing free-market types, or wall-streeters in the mold of Steve Mnuchin, or dirigiste nationalist conservatives in the JD Vance / Heritage Foundation mold, or an eclectic mix of political backers like Elon Musk and RFK Jr, or a combination of all of the above. The fact that bank stocks are way up tells me that markets expect the free-marketers and/or the Wall-Street types to mostly win out.

Just Ask Prediction Markets: If you want to know what markets expect from a Presidency, you can do what I just did, look at moves the big traditional markets like stocks and bonds and try to guess what is driving them. But increasingly you can skip this step and just ask prediction markets directly- the same markets that just had a very good election night. Kalshi now has markets on both who Trump will nominate to cabinet posts, as well as the fate of specific policies like ‘no tax on tips‘

Big Win for Prediction Markets

Jeremy Horpedahl1 Comment

Last night was a big win for Trump, but it was also a big win for prediction markets. In January 2024, I suggested that one of the best ways to follow the election was by following prediction markets. That prediction turned out to be correct!

Before any polls had closed, prediction markets had Trump with about 60% odds of winning. That’s far from a sure thing, but it’s much better than many prediction models, which all had the race as basically a 50-50 toss-up with a very slight edge to Harris (though one simple model that I wrote about two weeks ago had Harris slightly losing the popular vote, a good call in hindsight). So going into the election results, you would have been more confident that a Trump win was a real possibility if you watched predictions markets

Last night after the results started coming in, the average over five different prediction markets from Election Betting Odds put Trump at over 90% odds by 11:00pm Eastern Time. By about 12:45am, he was already over 95%. These aren’t absolutely certain odds, but if you were watching the election night news coverage, they were still treating this as essentially a toss-up in the battleground states.

The Associated Press hadn’t even called Georgia, the second of the battleground states, by the time prediction markets were over 95% for the overall race! Decision Desk HQ, which is a very good source for calling races in real time, didn’t declare Trump the winner until 1:21am, when they called Pennsylvania (they also have a nice explanation of how they made the call). The AP didn’t declare Trump the winner until 5:34am, when they called Wisconsin.

Polymarket is the largest of the five markets in the Election Betting Odds average, and they are also a good source because they have markets for all of the battleground states (here’s the market for Michigan, which still hasn’t been called as of 11:30am on Wednesday by most news sources!). This table shows when the 90% and 95% thresholds were permanently crossed on Polymarket odds for each of the 5 early battleground states, in comparison with the DDHQ and the AP.

Notice that the 90% threshold consistently beats DDHQ by at least an hour (the one exception is North Carolina, where DDHQ called it very early — they are very good at what they do!). And the 90% threshold is consistently beating the AP by at least 3 hours.

None of this should be read as a criticism of the Associated Press. They should be cautious about predictions! But if you want to know things fast (or, before your bedtime in this case), prediction markets are clearly worth following.

How can prediction markets be so far ahead of media sources? Because there is a strong incentive to be right early: that’s how you make money in these markets! How exactly this is done is unclear, since the traders are all anonymous and we generally can’t ask them. But likely they are doing a similar analysis of counties results compared to the 2020 election, as DDHQ told us they did after the fact, just quicker (indeed, if you were watching news coverage, they were doing the same thing, just in an ad hoc way, and much more slowly).

Federal Spending in 2024 was $2.3 Trillion More Than 2019

Jeremy HorpedahlLeave a comment

In Fiscal Year 2019, the US federal government spent $4.45 trillion dollars. In Fiscal Year 2024, spending was $6.75 trillion, or an increase of $2.3 trillion dollars. If you adjusted the 2019 number for inflation with the CPI, it would only be about $1 trillion more. Where did that additional $2.3 trillion go?

It will probably not surprise you that most of the increase in spending went to the largest categories of spending. Historically these have been health, Social Security, and defense, but now we must also include interest spending (roughly equal in size to defense and Medicaid in 2024). Indeed, with these areas of spending, 72 percent of the increase is accounted for. Add in the next three functions, and we’ve already accounted for over 90 percent of the increase.

Importantly, most of these categories are outside of the annual federal budget process, meaning that Congress does not need to approve new spending each year (Congress could change them, just as it could change any law, but it’s not part of the annual budgeting process). The “mandatory” categories, as they are called in federal law, are shaded red. I’ve striped with red and blue the health and income security functions, because some of this is subject to the annual budget process, but most of it is not. For example, Medicaid is not subject to the budget process (biggest part of the “health” function) and SNAP is not subject to the budget process (a big part of income security — it is set by the Farm Bill, usually on a five-year cycle).

So, when we talk about the $2 trillion increase since 2019, or the roughly $2 trillion cuts that would be needed to balance the budget, keep in mind that most of this is not subject to the annual budget process. It would require Congress to consider them specifically to enact cuts — though some big categories, such as Social Security, would be automatically cut under current law once their trust funds are exhausted (coming up on about a decade for the Social Security Old-Age Trust Fund).

Can researchers recruit human subjects online to take surveys anymore?

Joy BuchananLeave a comment

The experimental economics world is currently still doing data collection in traditional physical labs with human subjects who show up in person. This is still the gold standard, but it is expensive per observation. Many researchers, including myself, also do projects with subjects that are recruited online because the cost per observation is much lower.

As I remember it, the first platform that got widely used was Mechanical Turk. Prior to 2022, the attitude toward MTurk changed. It became known in the behavioral research community that MTurk had too many bots and bad actors. MTurk had not been designed for researchers, so maybe it’s not surprising that it did not serve our purposes.

The Prolific platform has had a good reputation for a few years. You have to pay to use Prolific but the cost per observation is still much lower than what it costs to use a traditional physical laboratory or to pay Americans to show up for an appointment. Prolific is especially attractive if the experiment is short and does not require a long span of attention from human subjects.

Here is a new paper on whether supposedly human subjects are going to be reliably human in the future: Detecting the corruption of online questionnaires by artificial intelligence   

Continue reading →

Real Time Crime Index

James BaileyLeave a comment

If you want to know how many pigs were killed in the United States yesterday, the USDA has the answer. But if you want to know how many humans were killed in the US this month, the FBI is going to need a year or two to figure it out. The new Real Time Crime Index, though, can tell you much sooner, by putting together the faster local agency reports:

Trends currently look good, though murders still aren’t quite back to pre-2020 levels.

In addition to graphing top-line state and national trends, the Real Time Crime Index also offers the option to download a CSV with city-level data going back to 2018. This seems like a great resource for researchers, worthy of adding to my page of most-improved datasets.

Un Poco Loco, But Effective? Almost 1 Year of President Milei

Zachary BartschLeave a comment

I don’t like to follow politics, much less politics in another country. Policy on the other hand? I’m always hooked.

Most of us have heard of President Javier Milei by now. He became Argentina’s president in December of 2023. Prior, he had been in charge of a private pension company, a university professor who taught macroeconomics, had hosted a radio show, and has written several books. See his Wikipedia entry for more.

What makes him worth talking about is that he appears a little… unique. He’s boisterous and rattles off economic stories and principles like he wants you to get up and do something about it. To anyone in the US, he looks and behaves like a weird 3rd-party candidate – sideburns and all. He’s different. Here he is bombastically identifying which government departments he would eliminate:

I’ve enjoyed the spectacle, but haven’t paid super close attention. I know that he is libertarian in political outlook, drops references to Austrian economists and their ideas by the handful, and doesn’t mince words. Here he is talking at the Davos World Forum (English & Dubbed).

So what?

Argentina has a long history of high inflation and debt defaults. Every president always says that they’ll fix it, and then they don’t. There have been periods of lower inflation, but they don’t persist. Among Milei’s stated goals was to end that cycle and bring down inflation. His plan was to substantially reign in deficit spending by eliminating entire areas of government. We’re now approaching a year since Milei took office, and I thought that I would check in. Below is the CPI for Argentina since 2018. As soon as Milei took office prices spiked, but have started coming down more recently. Similarly, the Argentine Peso has fallen in value by 50% since he’s taken office. Ouch!

Continue reading →

Where Are The 7 Million Missing Men?

Jeremy HorpedahlLeave a comment

You may have heard that there are roughly 7 million men of working age that are not currently in the labor force — that is, not currently working or looking for work. The statistic has been produced in various ways using slightly different definitions by different researchers, but the most well-known is from Nicholas Eberstadt who uses the age cohort of 25-55 years old and gets about 7 million (in 2015). More recently and perhaps more prominently is from Senator JD Vance, and as with almost all issues he has tied this to illegal immigration.

The 7-million-men statistic is true enough, and if we limit it to native-born American men with native-born parents (I assume this is the group Vance is concerned about), we can get right at 7 million non-working men in 2024 by expanding the age cohort slightly to 20-55 year olds.

Why are these men not working? According to what they report in the CPS ASEC, here are the reasons broken down by 5-year age cohort (I drop 55-year-olds here to keep the group sizes equal, which shrinks the total to 6.7 million men):

By far the largest reason given for not working is illness or disability, which is 42% of the total for all of these men, the largest reason for every age group except 20-24 (who are mostly in school if they aren’t working), and it’s the majority for workers ages 30-54 (about 56% of them report illness or disability). Slightly less than 10% report “could not find work” as the reason they weren’t working, which is about 650,000 men in this age group (and are native-born with native-born parents). And over half of those reporting that they couldn’t find work are under age 30 — for those ages 30-54, it’s only about 7% of the total.

More men report that they are taking care of the home/family (800,000) than report not being able to find work (650,000). And a lot more report that they are currently in school — almost 1.5 million, and even though they are mostly concentrated among 20–24-year-olds, about one-third of them are 25 or older.

It’s certainly true that the number of working age men in the labor force has fallen over time. In 1968, 97% of men ages 20-54 had worked at some point in the past 12 months (that’s for all men regardless of nativity, which isn’t available back that far in the CPS ASEC). In 2024, that was down to about 87%. But even if we could wave a magical wand and cure all of the men that are ill or disabled, this would add less than 3 million people to the labor force, not nearly enough to make up for all of the immigrants that Vance and others are suggesting have taken the jobs of native-born Americans.

Interest Rates & Wining

Zachary BartschLeave a comment

There’s so much to say about interest rates. Many people think about them in the context of whether they should refinance or in terms of their impact on borrowing. But interest rates also matter for production beyond impacting loans for new productive projects. Interest rates aren’t just a topic for debtors.

Interest rates impact all production that takes time. That’s the same as saying that interest rates affect all production – but the impact is easier to see for products that require more time to produce.

There’s this nice model called ‘Portfolio Theory’. Taken literally, it says that everything you own can be evaluated in terms of its liquidity, the time until it will be sold, its expected returns, and the volatility and correlation of those returns. Once you start to look at the world with this model, then it’s much easier to interpret. Buying a car? That’s usually a bad investment. It’s better to tie up a smaller amount of money into that depreciating asset rather than to let a larger sum of money experience dependably negative returns. Of course, this assumes that there are alternative uses for your money and alternative places to invest your resources – hopefully in assets with growing rather than decaying value. People often recommend purchasing used cars rather than new cars. Both new and used cars are bad investments and you can choose to invest a lot or a little.

Producers make a similar calculation. All kinds of things motivate them: love, tradition, excellence…  But everyone responds to incentives. Consider vintners. They might be a farmer of grapes and a manufacturer and seller of wine. They might like to talk about nostalgia, forward notes, a peppery nose, and other finer things. But even they respond to prices and opportunity cost.

Continue reading →

Forecasting Swing States with Economic Data

James Bailey1 Comment

Ray Fair at Yale runs one of the oldest models to use economic data to predict US election results. It predicts vote shares for President and the US House as a function of real GDP growth during the election year, inflation over the incumbent president’s term, and the number of quarters with rapid real GDP growth (over 3.2%) during the president’s term.

Currently his model predicts a 49.28 Democratic share of the two-party vote for President, and a 47.26 Democratic share for the House. This will change once Q3 GDP results are released on October 30th, probably with a slight bump for the dems since Q3 GDP growth is predicted to be 2.5%, but these should be close to the final prediction. Will it be correct?

Probably not; it has been directionally wrong several times, most recently over-estimating Trump’s vote share by 3.4% in 2020. But is there a better economic model? Perhaps we should consider other economic variables (Nate Silver had a good piece on this back in 2011), or weight these variables differently. Its hard to say given the small sample of US national elections we have to work with and the potential for over-fitting models.

But one obvious improvement to me is to change what we are trying to estimate. Presidential elections in the US aren’t determined by the national vote share, but by the electoral college. Why not model the vote share in swing states instead?

Doing this well would make for a good political science or economics paper. I’m not going to do a full workup just for a blog post, but I will note that the Bureau of Economic Analysis just released the last state GDP numbers that they will prior to the election:

Mostly this strikes me as a good map for Harris, with every swing state except Nevada seeing GDP growth above the national average of 3.0%. Of course, this is just the most recent quarter; older data matters too. Here’s real GDP growth over the past year (not per capita, since that is harder to get, though it likely matters more):

RegionReal GDP Growth Q2 2023 – Q2 2024
US3.0%
Arizona2.6%
Georgia3.5%
Michigan2.0%
Nevada3.4%
North Carolina4.4%
Pennsylvania2.5%
Wisconsin3.3%

Still a better map for Harris, though closer this time, with 4 of 7 swing states showing growth above the national average. I say this assuming as Fair does that the candidate from the incumbent President’s party is the one that will get the credit/blame for economic conditions. But for states I think it is an open question to what extent people assign credit/blame to the incumbent Governor’s party as opposed to the President. Georgia and Nevada currently have Republican governors.

Overall I see this as one more set of indicators that showing an election that is very close, but slightly favoring Harris. Just like prediction markets (Harris currently at a 50% chance on Polymarket, 55% on PredictIt) and forecasts based mainly on polls (Nate Silver at 55%, Split Ticket at 56%, The Economist / Andrew Gelman at 60%). Some of these forecasts also include national economic data:

Gelman suggests that the economy won’t matter much this time:

We found that these economic metrics only seemed to affect voter behaviour when incumbents were running for re-election, suggesting that term-limited presidents do not bequeath their economic legacies to their parties’ heirs apparent. Moreover, the magnitude of this effect has shrunk in recent years because the electorate has become more polarised, meaning that there are fewer “swing voters” whose decisions are influenced by economic conditions.

But while the economy is only one factor, I do think it still matters, and that forecasters have been underrating state economic data, especially given that in two of the last 6 Presidential elections the electoral college winner lost the national popular vote. I look forward to seeing more serious research on this topic.