Investing

Malinvestment Produces Knowledge

Zachary BartschLeave a comment

Austrian economists rightfully have some gripes about mainstream macroeconomics – specifically about aggregation. The conventional wisdom says that a fall in output can be prevented or remedied in the short-run by an expansion of total spending (via increasing the money supply). Total output is stabilized and the crisis is averted. Even if rising spending preceded the output decline, the standard prescription is the same.

The Austrian Business Cycle theory says that, actually, the prior expansion in spending resulted in yet-to-be-realized poor investments due to easy credit. The decline in output is self-inflicted by unsustainable endeavors, and the money supply expansion response prevents the correction. The consequence is more malinvestment. The Austrians say that the focus on gross investment is a misleading aggregation and commits the fallacy of composition that all investment is the same or the same on relevant margins.

Both schools of thought are on firm ground. I don’t see them as conflicting. They both make valid points and are correct about the world. The conventional wisdom is able to paper-over short-run hiccups, and the Austrians recognize that resources are suboptimally allocated. The two sides are talking past each other to some extent.

The market process of seeking profits and satisfying consumer demands is a messy process. Prices and profits (and losses) incentivize firms with information that they use to adjust their behavior. They innovate and reallocate resources from bad projects and toward money-making projects. When firms earn negative profits (a loss) they learn that their understanding of the world was wrong and that they malinvested their scarce resources. Therefore, malinvestment is a standard and *necessary* part of the market process of identifying and serving the changing and unknown demands of individuals. Without malinvestment we lack the necessary information to distinguish success from failure.

Mal-investment is harmful insofar as it represents resources that were invested such that future output did not rise as it could have otherwise. So, while malinvestment is necessary to the market process, a preponderance of it makes us poorer in the future. Luckily, firms have incentives and finite resources such that mal-investment remains somewhat tamed. Indeed, malinvestment is the cost that we bear for innovation and identifying what works.

The issue is that the above discussion is oriented to the long-run. The conventional wisdom is oriented toward resolving the short-run threats. The two meet one another when malinvestment realizations occur in a correlated manner. It’s not that policy causes malinvestment. Rather, depressed interest rates and easy credit prevent firms from identifying which of their projects turned out to be more or less productive. Firms persist in bad investments because they can’t discriminate between the failed and successful projects ex ante.

So, when interest rates suddenly rise, low or negative productivity projects are identified and resources are reallocated. The discovery and reallocation process takes time. And if many projects are found to be failures at once, then the result is a drop in economic activity that is detectable at the aggregate level. The problem is not that malinvestment exists. The problem is that malinvestment was permitted to persist and grow such that the eventual realization of losses is correlated and has macroeconomic effects. We observe spending, output, and employment declines. That’s the ‘business cycle’ part of the Austrian Business Cycle. Interest rates rising helps to identify the bad projects. That’s good. But policy that increases the popularity of bad projects is bad. It makes us poorer in the long-run and more vulnerable to declines in the short-run.

Poland’s Electoral Catalyst

James BaileyLeave a comment

The latest Global Valuation update this week shows that Poland (along with Colombia) has some of the world’s cheapest stocks. Their overall Price to Earnings ratio is 8, compared to 28 for the US:

Does this mean Polish stocks are a good deal, or that investors are rationally discounting them as being risky or slow-growing? After all, they had a low P/E ratio last time I wrote about them too.

Stocks can rise either based on higher investor expectations (higher P/Es) or improved fundamentals (earnings rise, investors see this and bid up the price, but only enough to keep the P/E ratio roughly constant). Over the past year Polish stocks have done the latter; I bought EPOL (the only ETF I know of that focuses Poland) a year ago because its P/E was about 6. Since then its up 70% and the P/E is still… about 6.

Why haven’t investors been excited enough about this earnings growth to bid up the valuation? I think the biggest concern has been political risk, given that the ruling Law and Justice party has been alienating the EU and arguably undermining the rule of law and finding pretexts to arrest businessmen critical of the government.

The recent Polish election promises to change all this. A coalition of ‘centrist’ opposition parties won enough votes to oust the current government, and Washington, the EU, and business seem relieved:

As Europe’s sixth-largest economy, a revitalised pro-EU attitude in Poland would be particularly welcome.

“It will be a positive development for sure because it will unlock the (EU) money that has been withheld and reduce a lot of the tension that has been created with Brussels,” said Daniel Moreno, head of emerging markets debt at investment firm Mirabaud.

Some 110 billion euros ($116 billion) earmarked for Poland from the EU’s long-term budget and the post-pandemic Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) remain frozen due to PiS’ record of undercutting liberal democratic rules.

The case for optimism is an influx of EU funds, less risk for business, and an appetite for higher valuations among Western investors who no longer dislike the government.

Being an economist I also have to give you the “other hand”, the case for pessimism: the new government hasn’t actually formed yet, meaning the current one still has the chance for shenanigans; population growth has been strong recently with the influx of Ukrainian refugees, but it is likely to go negative again soon; and EPOL is almost half financial services, which have relatively low P/E even in the US right now.

Nothing is guaranteed but this is my favorite bet right now. I find it amusing that this “risky” emerging market has had a great year while “safe” US Treasury bonds are having a record drawdown (easy to be amused when I don’t own any long bonds and they have done surprisingly little damage in terms of blowing up financial institutions so far). I emphasize the investing angle here but hopefully this signals a bright future for the Polish people.

Disclaimers: Not investment advice, I’m talking my book (long EPOL), I’ve never been to Poland and I’m judging their politics based on Western media reports

Why Is Stock Market Volatility ( VIX ) So Low?

Scott Buchanan1 Comment

What is the VIX and why should you care? The CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) is a measure of the expected near-term price swings in the S&P 500 stock index (SPX). The VIX value is derived from the prices that market participants are willing to pay for options that expire roughly 30 days in the future. Typically, movements upward in VIX correspond to movements downward in broad market averages, since price volatility is usually associated with some “problem” cropping up. During market turbulence, the VIX can shoot up very high, very fast, with a percentage of change far higher than for stock prices.

The VIX is know as the “fear gauge,” since it provides a standardized measure of market volatility expectations. It is thus a number that conveys significant information about the attitudes of market participants. Also, it provides opportunities for investors to make (or lose) a lot of money quickly. You cannot invest directly in the VIX (it is just a calculated number), but you can buy/sell VIX futures and options on those futures. Also, there are convenient funds that buy (e.g., VXX) or short (e.g., SVIX) the VIX futures. Because the VIX makes much bigger percentage moves than stock themselves, you can make a killing with a modest investment, providing you get the timing right.

For instance, over the past twelve months, the SPY S&P 500 fund has gone up by about 18%, so $10,000 would have gone to $11,800. That’s pretty nice. But in that same period, SVIX went up by 143%, which would take $10,000 to $24,300 (see below).  (Nerdy notes: (a) SVIX shorts the VIX, so it generally goes up when VIX goes down, i.e., when stocks go up. (b) There is another factor with SVIX called the monthly roll, when tends to make it rise something like 2-4% a month on average. This monthly roll factor is layered on top of the rise and fall in SVIX value based on VIX level. So even if VIX is flat, SVIX may go up something like 30% in a year. )

SVIX and SPY share prices for the past year. Source: Seeking Alpha

Of course, the price swings on SVIX cut both ways. It is down hugely from its highs a month ago, as VIX has increased from roughly 14 to 20. You can go even more crazy by purchasing/shorting VIX-related funds like UVXY that are leveraged at more than 1.0X.

Even you were even more clever, you could have made even more, much more, by working VIX options. Also, if you just want to hedge your stock portfolio against sudden drops, it is often more economical to do that by buying (call) options on the VIX, than by buying (put) options on the stocks (e.g., SPX, SPY) themselves.

During long periods of market stability, the VIX tends to slowly drift downward, to an asymptote  somewhere in the 12-13 range. For example, in the five-year plot below, VIX spend much of 2019 around 13, then shot up over 80 within a month when the scope of the COVID pandemic became apparent. It then drifted downwards (with many spikes along the way, especially during the big bear market of 2022), getting down to around 14 for much of June-September of this year.

VIX Level for past five years. Source: Seeking Alpha.

It is notable for VIX to be this low, considering a number of serious current market concerns (the relatively high valuation of the stock market, stubborn inflation, hawkish fed, gridlock in Washington, etc.). And now with serious conflict in the Middle East resulting from the massive attacks on Israeli civilians, the VIX has so far only risen to 20.

A number of market commentators have noted the seemingly anomalously low level of the VIX, and have proffered various explanations. They observe that macroeconomic outlook continues to look probably OK. They also point to some fundamental changes in the stock market operations. One factor is the rise of zero-day options, very short-term stock options that expire within one day. More of the speculative action has gone to those options, with proportionately less in the month-out options that drive the VIX.

Also, the stock exchanges have implemented various “circuit-breakers,” which halt trading for specified time periods, if swings in stock prices get out of hand. This gives participants a chance to cool off and recalibrate, and not have to make frantic, quick (possibly losing) trades in order to protect themselves. Here is a diagram illustrating these circuit breakers, which are triggered by big moves in the broad S&P 500 stock average:

 Source: Seeking Alpha, article by Christopher Robb

There are also Limit Up/Limit Down (LULD) rules in place that temporarily halt trading in an individual stock if its price swings exceed some designated band.  is designed to stop excess volatility in a single stock.  With these protective circuit-breakers in place, market participants seem less worried about huge price swings coming at them, and hence may feel less of a need to “buy insurance” by purchasing options. This suppression of stock option prices in turn leads to a lower calculated VIX.

As usual, this blog post is not meant to be advice to buy or sell any security. (And seriously, the “never bet more than you can afford to lose” rule applies doubly with the high-volatility products discussed here).

Bond King Doesn’t Like Bonds

James Bailey1 Comment

Bill Gross grew PIMCO into a trillion dollar company by trading bonds, earning the epithet “Bond King“. But in an interview with Odd Lots this week, he disclaims both bonds and his title. He wasn’t the king:

My reputation as a bond king was first of all made by Fortune. They printed a four page article with me standing on my head doing yoga, and I was supposedly the bond king, and that was good because it sold tickets. But I never really believed it. The minute you start believing it, you’re cooked.

Who is the real bond king? The Fed:

The bond kings and queens now are are at the Fed. They rule, they determine for the most part which way interest rates are going.

Who still isn’t the bond king? Any other trader, especially Jeff Gundlach:

To be a bond king or a queen, you need a kingdom, you need a kingdom. Okay, Pimco had two trillion dollars. Okay, DoubleLine’s got like fifty five billion. Come on, come on, that’s no kingdom. That’s like Latvia or Estonia whatever. Okay, and then then look at his record for the last five, six, seven years. How does sixtieth percentile smack of a bond king? It doesn’t.

Why he doesn’t believe in long-term bonds right now:

We have a deficit of close to two trillion. The outstanding treasury market is about 33 trillion… about thirty percent of the existing outstanding treasuries, so ten trillion have to be rolled over in the next twelve months, including the two trillion that’s new. So that’s that’s twelve trillion dollars. Where the treasuries that have to be financed over the next twelve months, and who’s going to buy them at these levels? Well, some people are buying them, but it just seems to be a lot of money. And when you when you add on to that, Powell is doing quantitative tightening, as you know, and that theoretically is a trillion dollars worth of added supply, I guess. And so it just seems like a very dangerous time based on supply, even if inflation does comedown.

By revealed preference I agree with Gross, in that I don’t own any long-term bonds. Their yields are way up from 2 years ago, making them somewhat tempting, but I can get higher yields on short-term bonds, some savings accounts, and some stocks. So I see no reason to go long term, especially given the factors Gross highlights. If he’s right, better long-term yields will be here in a year or two. If he turns out to be wrong, I think it would be because of a severe recession here or in another major economy, but I don’t expect that. So what is Gross buying instead of bonds? He likes the idea of real estate:

 All all my buddies at the country club are in real estate, and they’ve never paid a tax in their life…. I’ve paid a lot of taxes.

He landed on Master Limited Partnerships, common in the energy sector, as an easier way to avoid taxes, and has 40% of his wealth there. Those are yielding more like 9% and have the tax benefits, though they are risker than treasury bonds. The rest of his portfolio he implies is in stocks, describing some merger arbitrage opportunities. I am a bit tempted by bonds because they’ve done so badly recently (and so have gotten much cheaper), but like Gross I think we’re still not to the bottom.

Everyone Happy? Student Loan Repayment

Zachary Bartsch3 Comments

I like a good lump sum tax. People *must* pay the tax without exception and the advantage over current progressive marginal income taxes is that the marginal wage received doesn’t fall with greater earnings. Employment rises and output rises. To the extent that college students fail to understand their student loans, the indebted graduates essentially pay a lump sum tax each period.

Of course, the exception is income based repayment (IBR) – especially with forgiveness after X years. IBR adjusts the incentives substantially. Under the standard system, your wages are garnished if you fail to make loan payments. Under IBR, lower earnings trigger lower monthly payments. Clearly, in contrast to the standard method, IBR incentivizes more leisure, less income, more black market activity, and higher loan balances. Indeed, all the more so if there is a forgiveness horizon. Someone just has to have low enough income for say 15 years, and their past debt is forgiven (with caveats & conditions).

My principal objection to IBR policy is the resulting malinvestment in human capital. Defaulting on loans is a sign that some investment was inadequately productive to repay the resources consumed by its endeavor. We call that a loss. Real resources of time, attention, and goods and services were consumed in order to produce capital that failed to serve others more than the opportunity cost of those resources.

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US Stocks Are Expensive, These Countries Are Not

James Bailey7 Comments

While we have stepped back from the meme stock craziness of 2021, US stocks remain quite expensive by historical standards, with our Cyclically Adjusted Price to Earnings (CAPE) ratio at almost twice its long-run average:

Source

Even at a high price, US stocks could still be worth it, and I certainly hold plenty. But I also think it it a good time to consider the alternatives. US Treasury bond yields are the highest they’ve been since 2007. But there are also many countries where stocks are dramatically cheaper than the US- and not just high-risk basket-cases, but stable “investable” countries.

There are several reasonable ways to measure what counts as “expensive” for stocks in addition to the CAPE ratio I mention above. The Idea Farm averages out four such measures to determine how expensive different “investable” (large, stable) country stock markets are. Here is their latest update:

MSCI Investable Market Indices:

Source: The Idea Farm Global Valuation Update

You can see that US stocks are expensive not only relative to our own history, but also relative to other countries, lagging only India and Denmark. That means that much of the world looks like a relative bargain, with the cheapest countries being Colombia, Poland, Chile, Czech Republic, and Brazil.

Of course, sometimes stocks, just like regular goods and services, are cheap for a reason: they just aren’t that good. They might be cheap because investors expect slow growth, or a recession, or political risk. But if you don’t share these expectations about a cheap stock (or country), that’s when to really take a look. I certainly did well buying Poland after I saw they were the cheapest in last year’s global valuation update and thought there was no good reason for them to stay that cheap.

I like that the chart above provides a simple ranking of investable markets. But if you wish it included more valuation measures, or small frontier markets, you can find that from Aswath Damodaran here. Some day I hope to provide a data-based, rather than vibes-based, analysis of which countries are “cheap/expensive for a reason” vs “cheap/expensive for no good reason”, featuring measures like industry composition, population growth, predictors of economic growth, and economic freedom. For now you just get my uninformed impression that Poland and Colombia seem like fine countries to me.

Disclosure: I’m long stocks or indices in several countries mentioned, including EPOL, FRDM, PBR.A, CIB, and SMIN. Not investment advice.

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Perma-Bear Jeffrey Snider: The Job Market Is Rolling Over, the Slide Into Recession Is Inevitable  

Scott Buchanan1 Comment

A stopped clock is occasionally right. And so are perma-bears, those commentators or analysts who continually predict that GDP and stocks will plunge – perhaps in the next quarter, but more often say six months from now. (And that deadline keeps getting pushed back every six months).

When I was first getting started investing, I was overly influenced by these seemingly cautious and sober souls, and I consequently lost out considerably compared to my colleagues who blithely stayed fully invested. So I hold my native pessimism in check when investing, and stay mainly in the market, but with a little cash in reserve just in case The Big One hits.

All that said, I do try to sample various points of view. If I have been mainly seeing positive chatter, I turn to my favorite perma-bear, an analyst named Jeffrey Snider. His YouTube channel is called Eurodollar University, and he runs a subscription service as well.

Jeff seems like a genuinely nice guy, who believes that his dire readings of the macroeconomic tea leaves are helping folks avoid disaster. His demeanor is more like an earnest teacher, not a huckster trying to sell something. I should add that he offers meaningful insights on the Eurodollar scene, which is globally significant and which most analysts do not understand or even recognize.

But Jeff’s bias is nearly always toward the negative, and it is something of a good-natured joke among his viewers. Typical comments: “ The market can remain irrational longer than Jeff can stay pessimistic” and “Jeff is the best on Youtube. I watch his videos every night right before I go to bed. In less than 5 minutes, I’m in a semi-conscious coma. Its better than any sleeping pill. That smooth soothing voice extoling the virtues of a collapsing economy works wonders. A++”.

Well, what is the bear-meister saying now? He claims that the seemingly red-hot employment numbers that have been reported in recent months are less hot than they appear. I will paste in a few snips from his recent YouTube, It Just Happened…The JOB MARKET JUST BROKE!! .

One point he makes is that there has been a persistent, inaccurate bias to the upside in the payroll numbers reported by the BLS. These big numbers are what gets reported; what does not get reported so much is, month after month, these monster payroll increases are quietly revised downwards, often by substantial amounts:

Even with the adjustments, these still seem like large increases in employment. Undaunted, Jeff pokes holes in the hot labor market scenario by claiming that full time employment is actually stagnant; it is the rise in part-time workers that creates the seemingly large army of the newly employed. The fact that total hours worked has plateaued seems to support his case here:

Another factor is worker hoarding. Employers were so burned trying to scramble for workers during the 2022 reopening-from-Covid that they are keeping their workers on payroll (even part-time), just in case the economy picks up and they need to pull them in full-time. A case in point is manufacturing. New orders are down considerably this year, and headed even lower, yet manufacturers have not cut their workforces appreciably:

If orders stay low for a long enough time, however, the manufacturers will have no choice but to start massive layoffs.

As another indicator of labor market softness, temporary workers may be a leading indicator of employment trends. They are not such a core part of a company, so there is less hoarding of them. And temporary help services have been in a steady decline this year, which is consistent with a cooler economy:

Sell Everything??

As I said, it is worth considering all sides. I think the specific points mentioned above are all valid ones. I would add that if students actually start payments on all those loans which taxpayers and the Fed have subsidized for the past three years, that will finally put a crimp in the spending. Also, the surprise downgrade of U.S. federal debt by the Fitch rating agency , and resulting jump in interest rates, has finally gotten people talking about out-of-control government spending, for one week anyway.   Also, the great China-reopening that was supposed to jump-start the global economy seems to be pretty flat.

However, a couple of counter-points to the bearish narrative:

First, even if manufacturing is rolling over, in the U.S.  it is fairly small relative to services. At least in some geographical areas, my anecdotal reports say that it is still a challenge to get good workers to do services.

Second, the tidal wave of cash from pandemic giveaways that washed into our collective bank accounts is still not depleted. Consumer confidence is high, and we are spending freely. This economy is a big, big ship, and it is still steaming full ahead, brushing aside high interest rates and yield curve inversions. The  recession seems to continually recede. There will inevitably be a downturn someday, of course, but absent some geopolitical event, I think it may take some time for it to arrive.

And finally, even if the long-awaited recession does arrive, it may not necessarily be so bad for stocks. Since the 2008-2009 Great Financial Crisis, the Fed has taken a very active role in supporting the markets. Wall Street has been conditioned to expect the Fed to flood the system with money if a serious downturn occurs. Also, the Street is betting that there will be enough howls of pain over the high interest being paid on the federal debt that unbearable pressure will be brought on the Fed to loosen up; the vaunted independence of that institution will be put to the test, with Congressional threats to alter their charter if they don’t cave to pressure. And so, “[economic] bad news is [investing] good news”, in contrast to the pre-2008 world. Furthermore, federal deficit spending ramps up during recessions, and as noted in The Kalecki Profit Equation: Why Government Deficit Spending (Typically) MUST Boost Corporate Earnings , this deficit spending tends to boost earnings.

And so even if Jeff Snider is correct that the economy is rolling over and will soon slide downward, this may not give investors a very useful signal. As another one of his YouTube viewers has commented, “This channel is a masterclass in learning that knowledge about the macro environment does not provide an edge in markets.” 

Knowing When To Sell: Portfolio Review

James Bailey2 Comments

90 plus per cent of people, they spend all their time on the buy decision and then they figure it out as they go along on when to sell and we say that’s crazy. You need to establish sell criteria, even if it’s just rebalance, even if it’s a trailing stop, whatever it may be on all your public market positions, because otherwise it gets emotional and that creates huge problems.

Meb Faber

Last week I explained why I buy individual stocks. This week I’ll share how I think about when to sell individual stocks, as I go through my portfolio and decide what to hold and what to sell. This is the first time I’m doing this exercise, though I should have done it long ago; until now I’ve unfortunately been on the wrong side of the above Meb Faber quote.

I actually think that most people are correct not to put much thought into what to sell, because I still agree with Buffett and most economists that most people should just buy and hold diversified index funds. Thinking about selling too much might lead people to sell everything whenever they get worried, sit in cash, and miss out on years of gains. But the important truth in Faber’s point is that if you are buying stocks or active funds for any reason other than “its a great company/idea that I’d like to hold indefinitely”, it makes sense to put as much thought into when/whether to sell as when/whether to buy.

People buy stocks all the time based on short-term arguments like “this banking crisis is overblown”, or “I think the Fed is about to cut rates”, or “this IPO is going to pop”, or “I think the company will beat earnings expectations this quarter”. These might be good or bad arguments to buy but they are all arguments about why it makes sense to hold a certain stock for weeks or months, not for years or indefinitely.

But people often buy a stock for short-term reasons like these, then hold on to it long term- either out of inertia, or because they grow attached to it, or because it lost money and they want to hold until it “makes it back” (sunk cost fallacy). None of these reasons really make sense; they might work out because buying and holding often does, but at that point you might as well be in index funds. If you’re going to be actively trading based on ideas, it makes sense to sell once you know whether your idea worked or not (e.g., did the company you thought would beat earnings actually do it) to free up capital for the next idea (unless you genuinely have a good new idea about the same stock, or you think it makes sense to hold onto it a full year to hit long-term capital gains tax). Its also always fair to fight status quo bias and ask “would I buy this today if I didn’t already own it?” (especially if its in a non-taxable account).

Maybe this is obvious to you all, and writing it out it sounds obvious to me, but until now I haven’t actually done this. For instance, I bought Coinbase stock at their IPO because I thought it would trade up given the then-ongoing crypto / meme stock mania. I was correct in that the $250 IPO started trading over $300 immediately; but then I just held on for years while it fell, fell, fell to below $100. The key difference I’m trying to get at here is the one between ideas and execution: its not that I thought Coinbase had such good fundamentals that it was a good long term buy at $250 and my idea was wrong; instead I had a correct short-term idea of what would happen after the IPO, but incorrectly executed it as if it were a long-term idea (mostly through inertia, not paying attention, and not putting in an immediate limit sell order at a target price after buying).

So if you buy stocks for short- or medium-term reasons, it makes sense to periodically think about which to sell. I’ll show how I I think about this by going through some examples from my own current portfolio below (after the jump because I think the general point above is much more important that my thinking on any specific stock, which by the way is definitely not investment advice):

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80% Efficient Markets: Why I Buy Individual Stocks

James Bailey5 Comments

The conventional wisdom among economists is that large, liquid asset markets like the US stock market are incredibly informationally efficient. The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) means that these markets near-instantly incorporate all publicly available information, making future prices essentially impossible to predict (a random walk with drift). As a result, economists’ investment advice is that you shouldn’t try to beat the market, because its impossible except through luck; instead you should aim to tie the market by owning most all of it via diversified low-fee index funds (e.g. SPY or VT).

This idea usually sounds crazy when people first hear it, but it works surprisingly well. You’d think that at least half of participants would beat the market average each year, but active strategies can generate such high fees that its actually much less than that. Further, people who beat the market one year aren’t more likely than average to beat it the next, suggesting that their winning year was luck rather than skill. Even Warren Buffet, who economists will sometimes concede is an exception to this rule, thinks that it is best for the vast majority of people to behave as if the EMH is true:

In 2008, Warren Buffett issued a challenge to the hedge fund industry, which in his view charged exorbitant fees that the funds’ performances couldn’t justify. Protégé Partners LLC accepted, and the two parties placed a million-dollar bet.

Buffett has won the bet, Ted Seides wrote in a Bloomberg op-ed in May. The Protégé co-founder, who left in the fund in 2015, conceded defeat ahead of the contest’s scheduled wrap-up on December 31, 2017, writing, “for all intents and purposes, the game is over. I lost.”

Buffett’s ultimately successful contention was that, including fees, costs and expenses, an S&P 500 index fund would outperform a hand-picked portfolio of hedge funds over 10 years. The bet pit two basic investing philosophies against each other: passive and active investing.

This has been the approach I’ve taken for most of my life, but over the last 3 years I’ve gone from ~99% believing in efficient markets to perhaps ~80%. Missing on crypto felt forgivable, since it was so new and unusual; I recognized that in the early days of a small, illiquid market the EMH might not apply, I just misjudged what counted as “early days” (I figured that by 2011 “everyone” knew about it because Bitcoin had been discussed on Econtalk; its up ~1000x since).

But with the Covid era the anomalies just kept piling up. All through February 2020, the smart people on Twitter were increasingly convincing me that this would be a huge pandemic; the main thing reassuring me was that stocks were up. But by late February they finally started crashing; instead of trusting the markets, I apparently should have trusted my own judgement and bought puts. Then investors starting buying the “wrong” Zoom instead of the one whose business benefitted from Covid:

Then we saw “meme stock mania” with many stocks spiking for reasons clearly unconnected with their fundamental value. Many at Wall Street Bets were clear that they were buying not because of business fundamentals, or even because they thought the price would go up, but because they liked the company, or wanted to be part of a movement, or wanted to send a message, or “own the shorts”.

Anecdotes got me to start taking some of the anti-EMH economics literature more seriously. For instance, Robert Shiller’s work showing that while it might be near-impossible to predict what a single stock will do tomorrow better than chance, predicting what the overall market will do over the longer run is often possible.

By revealed preference, is still mostly buy the EMH. About 80% of my net worth (not counting my home) is in diversified low-fee index funds. But that means 20% isn’t; its in individual stocks or actively traded ETFs with more-than-minimal fees. Why do this? I see 4 reasons buying individual stocks isn’t crazy:

  1. Free trading: Buying a bunch of individual stocks used to incur huge fees. Now, many brokerages offer free trading. Even if the EMH is true, buying a bunch of individual stocks won’t lose me money on average, just time.
  2. Still diversified: Buying into active funds instead of passive ones does tend to mean higher fees, and that is a real concern, but they do still tend to be quite diversified. Even buying individual stocks can leave you plenty diversified if you buy enough of them. Right now I hold about 45, with none representing more than 0.5% of my portfolio; one of them going bankrupt causes no problems. If anything I’m starting to feel over-diversified, and that I should concentrate more on my highest-conviction bets.
  3. Learning: Given the above, even if the EMH is 100% true, my monetary losses due to fees and under-diversification will be tiny. The more significant cost is to my time- time spent paying attention to markets and trading. This is a real cost, enough that I think anyone who finds this stuff boring or unpleasant really should take the conventional econ advice of putting their money in a diversified low-fee index fund and forgetting about it. But I’m starting to find financial markets interesting, and I think keeping up with markets is a great way to learn about the real economy- they always suggest questions about why some companies, sectors, factors, or countries are outperforming others. In some EMH models, the return to trading isn’t zero, but instead is just high enough to compensate traders for their time. In this case, people who find markets interesting have a comparative advantage in trading.
  4. Outperforming Through New Information: All but the strongest version of the EMH suggests that those with “private information” can outperform the market. Reading about the very top hedge funds I think they really are good rather than lucky, and the reason is that they have information that others don’t. Sometimes this is better models but often it is simply better data; Jim Simons got historical data on markets at a frequency that no one else had, and analyzed it with supercomputers no one else had. That’s a genuine information advantage, and I don’t think it’s a coincidence that he wound up with tens of billions of dollars. This should be incredibly encouraging to academics. We can’t all be Jim Simons (who was a math professor and codebreaker before starting Renaissance Technologies; Ed Thorpe was another math prof who got rich in markets), but discovering and creating private information is exactly what we do all day as researchers. My hard drive and my head are full of “private information” that others can’t trade on; of course right now most of it is about things like “how certificate of need laws affect self-employment” that have no obvious connection to asset prices, and there is a lot more competition from people trying to figure out markets than from people trying to figure out health economics. But discovering new information that no one else knows is not only possible, it is almost routine for academics, and its not crazy to think this can lead to outperforming the market.

Overall I think economists have gone a bit too far talking themselves and others out of the idea that they could possibly beat the market. I’ll discuss some more specific ideas in the next few weeks, but for now I leave you with 3 big ideas: you can’t win if you don’t try; winning is in fact possible; and if you are smart about it (avoid leverage, options, concentration) then defeat is not that costly.

Disclaimer: This is not investment advice. I say this both as a legal CYA, and because I don’t (yet?) have the track record to back up my big talk

Chapman University Economic Forecast Update 2023

Joy Buchanan5 Comments

I watched the Chapman Economic Forecast Update for 2023 live on June 22 (you can watch the whole thing free here). Go to their website for free videos and links. They have an excellent track record for being correct.

This time, Dr. Jim Doti believes we are headed for a recession by the third quarter of 2023 or at least what he conservatively calls a “slowdown”. He hates to make dramatic predictions or deliver bad news, but he saw the inflation brewing back in 2021, and I remember him correctly predicting what was to come.

For one thing, the dramatic growth in the money supply at the beginning of the pandemic has been corrected into a sharp contraction of the money supply.

People have been joking about how the recession isn’t happening.

We’ll see who’s laughing in 2024.

The middle segment of the forecast, which I recommend watching, is about investing. Fadel Lawandy cautions that stocks are not a good bet right now, with a likely recession looming.

The third segment is focused on the economy of California. I didn’t finish that part, since I don’t live there anymore.