As the presidential race finishes out the last two weeks, it’s clearly a close race. In the past I have recommended prediction markets, and right now these are giving Trump about 60% odds. There have been lately a few big bettors coming into the markets and primarily betting on Trump, so there has been speculation of manipulation, but even at 60-40 the race is pretty close to a toss-up.
Another tool many use to follow the election are prediction models, which usually incorporate polling data plus other information (such as economic conditions or even prediction markets themselves). One of the more well-known prediction models is from Nate Silver, who right now has the race pretty close to 50-50 (Trump is slightly ahead and has been rising recently).
But Silver’s model, and many like it, is likely very complicated and we don’t know what’s actually going into it (mostly polls, and he does tell us the relative importance of each, but the exact model is his trade secret). I think those models are useful and interesting to watch, but I actually prefer a much simpler model: Ray Fair’s President and House Vote-Share Models.
The model is simple and totally transparent. It uses just three variables, all of which come from the BEA GDP report, and focuses on economic growth and inflation (there are some dummy variables for things like incumbency advantage). Ray Fair even gives you a version of the model online, which you can play with yourself. Because the model uses data from the GDP report, we still have one more quarter of data (releasing next week), and there may be revisions to the data. So you can play with it (and one of the variables uses the 3 most recent quarters of growth), but mostly these numbers won’t change very much.
I don’t like to follow politics, much less politics in another country. Policy on the other hand? I’m always hooked.
Most of us have heard of President Javier Milei by now. He became Argentina’s president in December of 2023. Prior, he had been in charge of a private pension company, a university professor who taught macroeconomics, had hosted a radio show, and has written several books. See his Wikipedia entry for more.
What makes him worth talking about is that he appears a little… unique. He’s boisterous and rattles off economic stories and principles like he wants you to get up and do something about it. To anyone in the US, he looks and behaves like a weird 3rd-party candidate – sideburns and all. He’s different. Here he is bombastically identifying which government departments he would eliminate:
I’ve enjoyed the spectacle, but haven’t paid super close attention. I know that he is libertarian in political outlook, drops references to Austrian economists and their ideas by the handful, and doesn’t mince words. Here he is talking at the Davos World Forum (English & Dubbed).
So what?
Argentina has a long history of high inflation and debt defaults. Every president always says that they’ll fix it, and then they don’t. There have been periods of lower inflation, but they don’t persist. Among Milei’s stated goals was to end that cycle and bring down inflation. His plan was to substantially reign in deficit spending by eliminating entire areas of government. We’re now approaching a year since Milei took office, and I thought that I would check in. Below is the CPI for Argentina since 2018. As soon as Milei took office prices spiked, but have started coming down more recently. Similarly, the Argentine Peso has fallen in value by 50% since he’s taken office. Ouch!
Kalshi just announced that they will begin paying interest on money that customers keep with them, including money bet on prediction market contracts (though attentive readers here knew was in the works). I think this is a big deal.
First, and most obviously, it makes prediction markets better for bettors. This was previously a big drawback:
The big problem with prediction markets as investments is that they are zero sum (or negative sum once fees are factored in). You can’t make money except by taking it from the person on the other side of the bet. This is different from stocks and bonds, where you can win just by buying and holding a diversified portfolio. Buy a bunch of random stocks, and on average you will earn about 7% per year. Buy into a bunch of random prediction markets, and on average you will earn 0% at best (less if there are fees or slippage).
This big problem just went away, at least for election markets (soon to be all markets) on Kalshi. But the biggest benefit could be how this improves the accuracy of certain markets. Before this, there was little incentive to improve accuracy in very long-run markets. Suppose you knew for sure that the market share of electric vehicles in 2030 would over 20%. It still wouldn’t make sense to bet in this market on that exact question. Each 89 cents you bet on “above 20%” turns into 1 dollar in 2030; but each 89 cents invested in 5-year US bonds (currently paying 4%) would turn into more than $1.08 by 2030, so betting on this market (especially if you bid up the odds to the 99-100% we are assuming is accurate) makes no financial sense. And that’s in the case where we assume you know the outcome for sure; throwing in real-world uncertainty, you would have to think a long-run market like this is extremely mis-priced before it made sense to bet.
But now if you can get the same 4% interest by making the bet, plus the chance to win the bet, contributing your knowledge by betting in this market suddenly makes sense.
This matters not just for long-run markets like the EV example. I think we’ll also see improved accuracy in long-shot odds on medium-run markets. I’ve often noticed early on in election markets, candidates with zero chance (like RFK Jr or Hillary Clinton in 2024) can be bid up to 4 or 5 cents because betting against them will at best pay 4-5% over a year, and you could make a similar payoff more safely with bonds or a high-yield savings account. Page and Clemen documented this bias more formally in a 2012 Economic Journal paper:
We show that the time dimension can play an important role in the calibration of the market price. When traders who have time discounting preferences receive no interest on the funds committed to a prediction-market contract, a cost is induced, with the result that traders with beliefs near the market price abstain from participation in the market. This abstention is more pronounced for the favourite because the higher price of a favourite contract requires a larger money commitment from the trader and hence a larger cost due to the trader’s preference for the present. Under general conditions on the distribution of beliefs on the market, this produces a bias of the price towards 50%, similar to the so-called favourite/longshot bias.
We confirm this prediction using a data set of actual prediction markets prices from 1,787 market representing a total of more than 500,000 transactions.
Hopefully the introduction of interest will correct this, other markets like PredictIt and Polymarket will feel competitive pressure to follow suit, and we’ll all have more accurate forecasts to consult.
The November election in Florida will include 6 proposed amendments to the Florida State Constitution. They only pass if at least 60% of voters vote YES. Here are some brief takes from an economic perspective.
Amendment 1: Partisan Election of Members of District School Boards
Currently, school district boards are locally elected and they do not have a party affiliation listed on the ballot. If passed, the amendment would permit party affiliation to be on the ballot. Partisan primaries would also be introduced, reducing the number of candidates in the general elections. The argument in favor is that party affiliation itself communicates information to voters. Removing that information forces voters to abstain, vote randomly, or to vote based on other information.
An argument against is that, in Florida, only registered party members may vote in primaries. If passed, parties will endorse particular candidates according to the primary results, winnowing the field. I happen to live in a county with an overwhelming republican majority, so the party-endorsed candidate will probably win. The outcome will be that the median republican primary-voter will choose the winning candidate in the primary rather than the median voter during the election. Voting “YES” aggregates information from a smaller set of voters.
Ray Fair at Yale runs one of the oldest models to use economic data to predict US election results. It predicts vote shares for President and the US House as a function of real GDP growth during the election year, inflation over the incumbent president’s term, and the number of quarters with rapid real GDP growth (over 3.2%) during the president’s term.
Currently his model predicts a 49.28 Democratic share of the two-party vote for President, and a 47.26 Democratic share for the House. This will change once Q3 GDP results are released on October 30th, probably with a slight bump for the dems since Q3 GDP growth is predicted to be 2.5%, but these should be close to the final prediction. Will it be correct?
Probably not; it has been directionally wrong several times, most recently over-estimating Trump’s vote share by 3.4% in 2020. But is there a better economic model? Perhaps we should consider other economic variables (Nate Silver had a good piece on this back in 2011), or weight these variables differently. Its hard to say given the small sample of US national elections we have to work with and the potential for over-fitting models.
But one obvious improvement to me is to change what we are trying to estimate. Presidential elections in the US aren’t determined by the national vote share, but by the electoral college. Why not model the vote share in swing states instead?
Doing this well would make for a good political science or economics paper. I’m not going to do a full workup just for a blog post, but I will note that the Bureau of Economic Analysis just released the last state GDP numbers that they will prior to the election:
Mostly this strikes me as a good map for Harris, with every swing state except Nevada seeing GDP growth above the national average of 3.0%. Of course, this is just the most recent quarter; older data matters too. Here’s real GDP growth over the past year (not per capita, since that is harder to get, though it likely matters more):
Region
Real GDP Growth Q2 2023 – Q2 2024
US
3.0%
Arizona
2.6%
Georgia
3.5%
Michigan
2.0%
Nevada
3.4%
North Carolina
4.4%
Pennsylvania
2.5%
Wisconsin
3.3%
Still a better map for Harris, though closer this time, with 4 of 7 swing states showing growth above the national average. I say this assuming as Fair does that the candidate from the incumbent President’s party is the one that will get the credit/blame for economic conditions. But for states I think it is an open question to what extent people assign credit/blame to the incumbent Governor’s party as opposed to the President. Georgia and Nevada currently have Republican governors.
Overall I see this as one more set of indicators that showing an election that is very close, but slightly favoring Harris. Just like prediction markets (Harris currently at a 50% chance on Polymarket, 55% on PredictIt) and forecasts based mainly on polls (Nate Silver at 55%, Split Ticket at 56%, The Economist / Andrew Gelman at 60%). Some of these forecasts also include national economic data:
Gelman suggests that the economy won’t matter much this time:
We found that these economic metrics only seemed to affect voter behaviour when incumbents were running for re-election, suggesting that term-limited presidents do not bequeath their economic legacies to their parties’ heirs apparent. Moreover, the magnitude of this effect has shrunk in recent years because the electorate has become more polarised, meaning that there are fewer “swing voters” whose decisions are influenced by economic conditions.
But while the economy is only one factor, I do think it still matters, and that forecasters have been underrating state economic data, especially given that in two of the last 6 Presidential elections the electoral college winner lost the national popular vote. I look forward to seeing more serious research on this topic.
Where would you expect Federalism to occur? In other words, where would expect a government to devolve authority to a lower government. Importantly, this is different from freedom vs authoritarianism. The lower government might choose to be more or less free. For example, right now in Florida there is a state-wide constitutional amendment on the ballot that would enshrine each individual’s right to hunt and fish. Ignoring the particulars of what that means, it’s clearly a step toward centralizing policy rather than decentralizing it. Central governments can be strong and protect citizens, or they can strip us of rights. Either way, being small players and far-removed, it’s difficult for us to affect the policy decisions.
That concern is philosophical, however. Maybe my opinion shouldn’t matter (one could easily argue). Even as a matter of prudence, one-size-fits all sets a standard, but the standard may not be a good fit for every locality and circumstance. There is a trade-off between ease of navigating a uniform policy across the land and customized policies that are particular to local priorities. Given that Americans can vote, is there a way for us to think about when a policy will be (should be?) centralized vs decentralized?
There is a great case study by Strumpf & Oberholzer-Gee* on the matter of alcohol policy after the end of national prohibition. The US has a dizzying array of liquor laws across the country and even across states. Some states have a central policy of dry or wet, while others devolve the authority to lower governments. How should we think about that policy? What determines the policy of central versus devolved authority?
Are you better off than you were four years ago? That question was asked at the Presidential debate last night. But more importantly, we also got a massive amount of new data on income and poverty from Census yesterday. That data allows us to make that just that comparison, although somewhat imperfectly.
The Census data is excellent and detailed, but it’s annual data, meaning that the release yesterday only goes through 2023. We won’t have 2024 data for another year. Such is the nature of good data. (Note: I’ve tried to address this same question with more real-time data, such as average wages). Still, it’s a useful comparison to make. It’s especially useful right now because the new 2023 data on income are (for most categories) the highest ever with one exception: 4 years ago, in 2019.
A reasonable read of the data on income (whether we use households, families, or persons) is that in 2023 the median American was no better off than in 2019, after adjusting for inflation. In fact, they were probably slightly worse off. I fully expect this will no longer be true when we have 2024 data: it will certainly be above 4 years prior (2020) and likely above 2019 too (more on this below). But we can’t say that for sure right now.
So let’s do a comparison of “are you better off than 4 years ago” for recent Presidents that were up for reelection (treating 2024 as a reelection year for Biden-Harris too), using the 4-year comparison that would have been available at the time using real median family income. Notice that this data would be off by one year, but it’s what would have been known at the time of the election.
The headlines often read with the criminal threats that illegal/undocumented immigrants pose to the US native population. The story usually includes a heart wrenching and tragic story about a native minor who was harmed by an immigrant and a politician to help propose a solution. There’s also usually a number cited for how many such crimes happened in the most recent year with data. Stories like this are designed to provoke feelings – not to provoke thinkings.
First, the tragic story is probably not representative. Even if it is, the citation of a raw count of crimes is not communicative in a helpful way. Sometimes politicians will say something like “one victim of a crime by an illegal immigrant is too many”. But that seems like a silly argument to make *if* immigrants reduce the probability of being a victim of a crime.
I argue that (1) immigrants who commit crimes at a lower probability than the native population cause the native population to be safer and, counterintuitively, (2) immigrants who commit crimes at a *higher* probability than the native population cause the native population to be safer.
I’ve been traveling. Here are some things I noticed (on the internet, not on my travels). (On my travels I learned that rental golf carts are as fun as they look.)
2. This is a poastmodern election. “Campaigners use the internet medium to dunk on their opponents instead of offer solutions to problems.”
“deeply online left wing instagram women are meeting, for the first time ever, deeply online right wing twitter guys. both have developed intricate, sacred language foreign to the other. both are waging war they thought already won. fyi in case you’re wondering about the meltdown”
deeply online left wing instagram women are meeting, for the first time ever, deeply online right wing twitter guys. both have developed intricate, sacred language foreign to the other. both are waging war they thought already won. fyi in case you're wondering about the meltdown
4. This woman who gave up professional dancing and now has 8 kids.
I don’t think people understand just how insane it is that #ballerinafarm left julliard to start a family. They chose 12 female dancers a year to be accepted into that program. She would’ve gone so far.
One does wonder if the skills that get a person into Julliard relate to the ability to turn family into an Instagram sensation. Is this Ambitious Parenting?
Hannah Neeleman, the mom at Ballerina Farm, has told her story in what appears to be her own words here: https://ballerinafarm.com/pages/about-us Neeleman says that when she was living in Brazil, she would vacation at, “farms and ranches. A place where you could eat farm fresh cheeses and meats, learn about animals, watch chores being done, etc. We were hooked.” I’m tempted to say that it’s weird to say she was into watching other people do chores. But maybe the word “weird” just has lost all meaning after this week.
Jeremiah Johnson points out that, “It doesn’t matter that their farm isn’t a very productive farm, because the husband’s family founded JetBlue.” My take is that these are rich people who are taking a reality-show approach to their lives like wholesome Kardashians. The Neelemans are into watching people do farm chores. (Yes, they do chores themselves, too, but clearly a large professional staff runs the place.) Good for them. As I said at the beginning, I’m into renting golf carts now.
Venezuela held an election this week; President Maduro says he won, while the opposition and independent observers say he lost. Disputed elections like this are fairly common across the world, but where Venezuela really stands out is not how people vote at the ballot box- it is how they vote with their feet.
Reuters notes that “A Maduro win could spur more migration from Venezuela, once the continent’s wealthiest country, which in recent years has seen a third of its population leave.”
I don’t think we emphasize enough how crazy the scale of this is. After every US Presidential election, you hear some people who supported the losing side talk about leaving the country, but they almost never do. Leaving your home country behind is a dramatic step, one people only want to take if they think things are much better elsewhere. The US, even with a party you don’t like in power, has generally stayed a good place to live. The total number of Americans who have moved abroad for any reason (I would guess most feel more pulled by the host country rather than pushed by the US) is about 3 million. That is less than 1% of all Americans; by contrast more than 46 million people have immigrated to the US from other countries, and many more would come if we allowed it.
Even in poor countries, seeing anything like one third of the population leave is dramatic, especially when almost all the migration happens in only 10 years as in Venezuela:
Source. Note this only goes through 2020, and emigration has grown since
This makes Venezuela the largestrefugee crisis in the history of the Americas, and depending on how you count the partition of India, perhaps the largest refugee crisis in human history that was not triggered by an invasion or civil war.
Instead, it has been triggered by the Maduro regime choosing terrible policies that have needlessly and dramatically impoverished the country:
I hope that the Venezuelan government will soon come to represent the will of its people. I’m not sure how that is likely to happen, though I guess positive change is mostly likely to come from Venezuelans themselves (perhaps with help from Colombia and Brazil); when the US tries to play a bigger role we often make things worse. But what has happened in Venezuela for the past 10 years is clearly much worse than the “normal” bad economic policies and even democratic backsliding that we see elsewhere. People everywhere complain about election results and economic policy, but nowhere else have I seen such a case of people going past simple cheap talk, taking the very expensive step of voting against the regime with their feet.
Economist Writing Every Day 