Midterms: It’s The Economy

This is my last post before the midterms Tuesday. What will they bring?

Midterm elections are usually bad for the President’s party:

I don’t think this year will be an exception to the rule. I see many indicators pointing in the same direction.

The largest US prediction market Kalshi currently gives Democrats a 91% chance to take the House and a 66% chance to take the Senate. The international Polymarket and play-money Manifold currently give slightly higher chances, 93/67 and 94/69. Forecaster Nate Silver is higher still at 95/76.

The best odds I’m seeing for Republicans among the models I have followed for years is Ray Fair giving Dems only a 60% chance to take the House (he doesn’t forecast the Senate). In Fair’s model, the economy is working in favor of Republicans; inflation is a negative for them but economic growth is a stronger positive (including the 3.4% Q3 GDP estimate just released today).

In practice though I think economic issues are working in favor of Democrats. The economy is good in many ways, like 4.2% unemployment- but most people aren’t happy about it. Consumer sentiment is at record lows. Economic growth is solid but largely driven by the AI boom, which gives people plenty to be nervous about. Inflation is only a bit high (3.4% vs a 2% target) but easy to tie to administration policies like tariffs, war, and pressuring the Fed to lower interest rates. Ad spending indicates that politicians on both sides think tariffs have gone from a minor issue that voters have mixed feelings about to a major issue that voters don’t like:

Gas prices have long been especially salient, and are currently high because of the Iran war. I said here in March:

if the US administration wants to avoid a midterm wipeout driven by high gas prices, I see only 3 options:

  1. Get lucky and see the Iranian regime fall quickly
  2. Negotiate an end to the war quickly (which might itself be unpopular if they can’t get a good deal) or just declare victory and go home (but its not clear whether Iran would re-open the strait now just because the US stopped bombing)
  3. Restrict Exports

But they took none of those three options, and now it seems the midterm wipeout is coming.

I predicted a ‘moderate red wave’ here in 2022. I predict a blue wave for 2026 that is bigger than the red wave of 2022, though not a ‘mega tsunami‘. The main things Republicans have going for them are the Senate map (Dems need to win in multiple 2024 red states to win) and the possibility that angry anti-incumbent voters will take down some Dems too.

Is a US Oil Export Ban Coming?

The Iran regime’s military strategy seems to be that by bombing the oil infrastructure of their neighbors and neutral shipping, US gasoline prices will go so high that Americans will demand an end to the war.

How many Americans would be willing to pay $6/gallon gas for months for a ~50% chance of toppling a regime that oppresses 90 million people and destabilizes its region on the other side of the world? Probably only a minority of voters, especially when the President didn’t make the case to the American people or Congress beforehand.

But the US produces more than enough oil for its own needs. Why does the Strait of Hormuz being closed mean higher gas prices here? Only because US oil companies can sell to global markets, and they won’t choose to sell a barrel of oil to a US refiner for $60 when they could sell it to a foreign refiner for $100. If the government took away the foreign option, US oil producers would sell to US refiners at prices consistent with pre-war sub-$3/gallon gasoline.

Naturally there would be costs to an export ban. US oil producers would miss out on windfall profits, while Russian producers would benefit. Foreign customers of US oil, many of them in allied countries, would be angered by the missed shipments and global oil prices would soar further.

But if the US administration wants to avoid a midterm wipeout driven by high gas prices, I see only 3 options:

  1. Get lucky and see the Iranian regime fall quickly
  2. Negotiate an end to the war quickly (which might itself be unpopular if they can’t get a good deal) or just declare victory and go home (but its not clear whether Iran would re-open the strait now just because the US stopped bombing)
  3. Restrict Exports

I say “restrict” not “ban” because I don’t think a complete export ban is necessary to stabilize US prices. You could instead do an export tax (high enough to stop many exports but low enough to allow the buyers with the highest values / fewest alternatives to stay in the market), or you could do a ban but allow a few export waivers for favored buyers or sellers (which seems like Trump’s style), or similarly a quota limiting exports to a certain number (say, limit each company’s monthly exports to 90% of their volume in the same month last year).

This has an obvious precedent: the Biden administration stopped issuing new permits to export liquified natural gas in 2024 to prevent prices spiking here during the Ukraine war (which led to even higher prices for our European allies). But a total ban on oil exports would be a much bigger deal.

Will the Trump administration actually try something like this? It will be an interesting test of US political economy to see what happens when the interests of the military-industrial complex conflict with the interests of oil producers.