EconLit

Paper on Finance and Economics Women Club

Joy Buchanan1 Comment

I am one of several founders of a club with the abbreviation F.E.W. for Finance and Economics Women. This is a student organization that we have at Samford and that Dr. Darwyyn Deyo runs at San Jose State University.

Read our report here: The Finance and Economics Women’s Network (FEW): Encouraging and Engaging Women in Undergraduate Programs published in the Journal of Economics and Finance Education

Our short paper is mostly a how-to guide including a draft of a club charter document. We describe our institutions and how we use this group to engage and encourage students. Please read it for more details on how to start a club.

Like most student groups, the FEW model relies on student leaders who take initiative. Having done this for more than 6 years, we have a growing network of alumni and local business partners who connect to current students through FEW events. Personally, I am lucky that 3 faculty members total support the club at my school.

Women are often minorities in upper-division econ and finance classes. Women also have some unique challenges when it comes to choosing career paths and navigating the workplace. These events (e.g. bringing in a manager from a local bank to talk with student over lunch) allow a space for students to ask questions they might not normally ask in a classroom setting or in a standard networking environment.

We report the results of a small survey in our paper. We can’t infer causality, nor did we run any experiments. However, we did find that women were more likely to report that a role model in their chosen profession influenced their choice of major. Part of the purpose of the FEW model is to expose students to a variety of role models who they might not otherwise connect with.

Here’s a news article with a picture of the founding group at Samford. I have great appreciation and respect for our student leaders who keep it going, and I am grateful to the graduates who stay in contact with us.

Suggested citation: Buchanan, Joy, and Darwyyn Deyo, “Finance and Economics Women’s (FEW) Network: Encouraging and Engaging Women in Undergraduate Programs” (2023) Journal of Economic and Finance Education, 22: 1, 1-14.

Interpreting New DIDs

Zachary BartschLeave a comment

If you didn’t know already, the past five years has been a whirl-wind of new methods in the staggered Differences-in-differences (DID) literature – a popular method to try to tease out causal effects statistically. This post restates practical advice from Jonathan Roth.

The prior standard was to use Two-Way-Fixed-Effects (TWFE). This controlled for a lot of unobserved variation over individuals or groups and time. The fancier TWFE methods were interacted with the time relative to treatment. That allowed event studies and dynamic effects.

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The Economics of Taylor Swift

James Bailey8 Comments

Cowen’s 2nd Law states that there is a literature on everything. I would certainly expect there to be a literature on the best-selling musician in the world. And of course there is; Google Scholar returns 23,500 results for “Taylor Swift”, and we’ve done 5 posts here at EWED. But surprisingly, searching EconLit returns nothing, suggesting there are currently no published economics papers on Taylor Swift, though searching “Taylor” and “Swift” separately reveals hundreds of articles about the Taylor Rule and the SWIFT payment system. Google Scholar does report some economics working papers about her, but the opportunity to be the first to publish on Taylor Swift in an economics journal (and likely get many media interview requests as a result) is still out there.

Swift presents a variety of angles that could be worthy of a paper; re-recording her masters forcopyright reasons, her efforts to channel concert tickets to loyal fans over re-sellers, or her sheer macroeconomic impact. I’ve added a note about this to my ideas page (where I share many other paper ideas).

In the mean time, I’ll be giving a short talk on the Economics of Taylor Swift at 7pm Eastern on Monday, September 16th, as part of a larger online panel. The event is aimed at Providence College alumni, but I believe anyone can register here.

Update 10/25/24: A recording of the event is here, and a recording of a followup interview I did with local TV is here.

Leave Me Alone and I’ll Make You Rich

James Bailey2 Comments

That is the title of a 2020 book by Dierdre McCloskey and Art Carden. It attempts to sum up McCloskey’s trilogy of huge books on the “Bourgeois Virtues” in one short, relatively easy to read book. I haven’t read the full trilogy, so I can’t say how good the new book is as a distillation, but I found that it was easy to read and at least makes me think I understand McCloskey’s basic thesis for why the world got rich. I share some highlights here.

Part 1 of the book aims to establish that the world did in fact get richer over recent centuries, plus give a basic explanation of liberal political thought. If you already know this you could skip this part and cut down an easy 189 page read to a very easy 106 page read (part 1 is for some reason written in a way that assumes you disagree with the authors, which grates when you don’t, or perhaps also if you do).

Part 2 gets to what I at least came for- digging into the history to solve the puzzle of why the Industrial Revolution / Great Enrichment took off when and where it did. Which means first, explaining why many things people think made 18th century England special were actually common elsewhere, like markets:

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Sticky Prices as Coordination Failure Working Paper

Joy BuchananLeave a comment

“Sticky Prices as Coordination Failure: An Experimental Investigation” is my new paper with David Munro of Middlebury, up at SSRN.

We ask whether coordination failures are a source of nominal rigidities. This was suggested in a recent speech by ECB President Christine Lagarde. She said, “In the recent decades of low inflation, firms that faced relative price increases often feared to raise prices and lose market share. But this changed during the pandemic as firms faced large, common shocks, which acted as an implicit coordination mechanism vis-à-vis their competitors.”

Coordination failure was suggested as a possible cause of price rigidity in a theory paper by Ball and Romer (1991). They demonstrated the possibility for multiple equilibria, and we perform the first laboratory test to observe equilibrium selection in this environment.

We theoretically solve a monopolistically competitive pricing game and show that a range of multiple equilibria emerges when there are price adjustment costs (menu costs). We explore equilibrium selection in laboratory price setting games with two treatments: one without menu costs where price adjustment is always an equilibrium, and one with menu costs where both rigidity and flexibility are possible equilibria.

In plain language, for our general audience, the idea is that the prices you set might depend on what other people are doing. If other people are responding to a shock (for example, Covid driving up labor costs all over town might cause retail prices to rise) then you will, too. If every other store in town is afraid to raise prices, then there is a certain situation where you might resist adjusting your prices, too (price rigidity).

Results: First, when there is only one theoretical equilibrium, subjects usually conform to it. When cost shocks are large, price adjustment is a unique equilibrium regardless of the presence of menu costs, and we see that subjects almost always adjust prices. When cost shocks are small and there are menu costs rigidity is a unique equilibrium and subjects almost never adjust. Conversely, with small cost shocks subjects almost always adjust when there are no menu costs.

The more interesting cases are when the parameters allow for either rigidity or flexibility to be selected. We find that groups do not settle at the rigidity equilibrium. Rather, depending on the specific nature of the shock, between half and 80% of subjects adjust in response to a shock. The intermediate levels of adjustment are represented here in this figure as the red circles that fall between the red and green bands where multiple equilibria are possible.

In the figure above, the red circles are higher when the production cost shock gets further from zero in absolute value. We see that the proportion of subjects adjusting prices is proportional to the size of the cost shocks. This is consistent with the interpretation that the large post-COVID cost shocks acted as an implicit coordination mechanism for firms raising prices. Our results provide a number of interesting insights on nominal rigidities. We document more nuance in the paper regarding heterogeneity and asymmetry. Comments and feedback are appreciated! If it’s not clear from the EWED blog how to email me (Joy), find my professional contact info here. 

A Continually Updated Bernanke-Taylor Rule

James Bailey4 Comments

Despite its many flaws*, I always like to check in on what the Taylor Rule suggests for the Fed. Its virtues are that it gives a definite precise answer, and that it has been agreed upon ahead of time by a variety of economists as giving a decent answer for what the Fed should do. Without something like the Taylor Rule, everyone tends to grasp for reasons that This Time Is Different. Academics seek novelty, so would rather come up with some new complex new theory of what to do instead of something undergrads have been taught for years. Finance types tend to push whatever would benefit them in the short term, which is typically rate cuts. Political types push whatever benefits their party; typically rate cuts if they are in power and hikes if not, though often those in power simply want to emphasize good economic news while those out of power emphasize the bad news.

The Taylor Rule can cut through all this by considering the same factors every time, regardless of whether it makes you look clever, helps your party, or helps your returns this quarter. So what is it saying now? It recommends a 6.05% Fed funds rate:

Fed Funds Rate Suggested by the Bernanke Version of the Taylor Rule
Source: My calculation using FRED data, continually updated here

I continue to use the Bernanke version of the Taylor Rule, which says that the Fed Funds rate should be equal to:

Core PCE + Output Gap + 0.5*(Core PCE – 2) +2

*What are the flaws of the Taylor Rule? It sees interest rates as the main instrument of monetary policy; it relies on the Output Gap, which can only really be guessed at; and it incorporates no measures of expectations. If I were coming up with my own rule I would probably replace the Output Gap with a labor market measure like unemployment, and add measures of money supply shifts and inflation expectations. Perhaps someday I will, but like everyone else I would naturally be tempted to overfit it to the concerns of the moment; I like that the Taylor Rule was developed at a time when Taylor had no idea what it might mean for, say, the 2024 election or the Q3 2024 returns of any particular hedge fund.

That said, people have now created enough different versions of the Taylor Rule that they can produce quite a range of answers, undermining one of its main virtues. The Atlanta Fed maintains a site that calculates 3 alternative versions of the rule, and makes it easy for you to create even more alternatives:

Two of their rules suggest that Fed Funds should currently be about 4%, implying a major cut at a time that the Bernanke version of the rule suggests a rate hike. On the other other hand, perhaps this variety is a virtue in that it accurately indicates that the current best path is not obvious; and the true signal comes in times like late 2021 when essentially every version of the rule is screaming that the Fed is way off target.

When Beer is Safer than Water

James BaileyLeave a comment

I’ve often heard that before modern water treatment, it was safer to drink beer; but I’ve also heard people call this a historical myth. A new paper in the Journal of Development Economics by Francisca Antman and James Flynn comes down strongly on the side of “beer really was safer”:

This paper provides the first quantitative estimates into another well-known water alternative during the Industrial Revolution in England.

Although beer in the present day is regarded as being worse for health than water, several features of both beer and water available during this historical period suggest the opposite was likely to be true. First, brewing beer requires boiling the water, which kills many dangerous pathogens often found in drinking water. As Bamforth (2004) puts it, “the boiling and the hopping were inadvertently water purification techniques”. Second, alcohol itself has antiseptic qualities. Homan (2004) notes that “because the alcohol killed many detrimental microorganisms, it was safer to drink than water” in the ancient near-east.

They use several identification strategies to establish this, for instance when a tax on malt was increased and mortality went up:

But did this mean people were drunk all the time? Probably not:

beer in this period was generally much weaker than it is today, and thus would have been closer to purified water. Accum (1820) found that common beers in late 18th and early 19th century England averaged just 0.75% alcohol by volume, a fraction of the content of the beers of today. Beer in this period was therefore far less harmful to the liver. Taken together, these facts suggest that beer had many of the benefits of purified water with fewer of the health risks associated with beer consumption today.

In fact, people at the time didn’t necessarily know that beer was healthier:

Thus, even though people did not recognize beer as a safer choice, drinking beer would have been an unintentional improvement over water, and thus may have contributed to improvements in human health and economic development over the period we investigate

Though as usual, Adam Smith was ahead of his time. Here’s what he had to say in his 1776 Wealth of Nations, in a chapter on malt taxes:

Spirituous liquors might remain as dear as ever, while at the same time the wholesome and invigorating liquors of beer and ale might be considerably reduced in their price.

“Cheapflation”: Inflation Really Does Hit the Bottom Harder

James Bailey1 Comment

During the peak of the Covid inflation in 2022 I speculated that food inflation was worst for the cheapest products:

a typical McDouble now costs well over $2 in most of the US, while a typical Big Mac is still well under $6. You used to be able to get 4-5 McDoubles for the price of a Big Mac; now you typically get less than 3 and sometimes, as in Keene, less than 2.

What’s going on here? First, the McDouble was always absurdly cheap. Second, prices rise most quickly where demand is inelastic, and demand is less elastic for goods that are cheaper and goods that are more like “necessities” than “luxuries”.

That post was just based on a couple anecdotes from my personal experience, but a new NBER working paper by Alberto Cavallo and Oleksiy Kryvtsov confirms that this really was a general trend:

We use micro price data for food products sold by 91 large multi-channel retailers in ten countries between 2018 and 2024. Measuring unit prices within narrowly defined product categories, we analyze two key sources of variation in prices within a store: temporary price discounts and differences across similar products. Price changes associated with discounts grew at a much lower average rate than regular prices, helping to mitigate the inflation burden. By contrast, cheapflation—a faster rise in prices of cheaper goods relative to prices of more expensive varieties of the same good—exacerbated it. Using Canadian Homescan Panel Data, we estimate that spending on discounts reduced the change in the average unit price by 4.1 percentage points, but expenditure switching to cheaper brands raised it by 2.8 percentage points….

The prices of cheaper brands grew between 1.3 to 1.9 times faster than the prices of more expensive brands—and only when inflation surged, not before or after.

Meme Generator for Econ Papers

Joy BuchananLeave a comment

I’m exploring whether the meme generator by Glif could be a way to introduce an econ paper. What if you identify a main character in your research project for GLIF to drag? (BTW, I have learned that the Wojack Meme Generator will re-write the name of the person you put in if your phrase is too long but that does not mean that the phrase is not used for content. So, you can put a longer phrase into the meme generator.)

I’m going to re-print here the prompt I actually used to get the Glif meme. As a warning, this approach is obviously not appropriate for more professional audiences. But sometimes you have a chance to quickly show your paper to a more informal audience either in a presentation or online. Having a way to wake up the audience in that situation could be helpful.

I’m not sharing all of these because I like them. I’m trying to give readers a chance to decide if they’d want to try it themselves. I think some of these prompts don’t work well and the cartoons either aren’t funny or are not true to life. However, I do find them interesting if the assignment is to scrape the internet for the maximally negative sentiment about a certain thing.

The prompt I used: “Pay Transparency Advocate” / “Effort Transparency and Fairness,” with Elif Demiral and Umit Saglam (under review)

Prompt: “Person Who Trusts ChatGPT” / “Do People Trust Humans More Than ChatGPT?” (2024) with William Hickman. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 112: 102239. 

Prompt: “Undergraduate Computer Science Major” / “Willingness to be Paid: Who Trains for Tech Jobs?” (2022) Labour Economics, Vol 79, 102267. 

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Real and Nominal Rigidities Research

Joy BuchananLeave a comment

This week, I’m doing some review for a macro-related project. In economics, the concepts of real and nominal rigidities help explain why prices and wages do not always adjust quickly in response to shocks. These rigidities create frictions that affect how markets function. A well-known rigidity is downward nominal wage rigidity (I have an experimental paper on that).

“Nominal rigidities” refer to the stickiness of prices and wages in their nominal (monetary) terms. These rigidities prevent immediate adjustment of prices and wages to changes in the overall economic environment.

Examples of Nominal Rigidities

  • Menu Costs: The costs associated with changing prices, such as reprinting menus or reprogramming point-of-sale systems. For instance, a restaurant might avoid changing its menu prices frequently because of the costs involved in printing new menus and the risk of confusing or losing customers.
  • Nominal Wage Contracts: Many workers are employed under contracts that fix their wages for a certain period, such as a year. This means that even if the demand for labor changes, wages cannot adjust immediately. For example, a factory might have a one-year wage contract with its workers, preventing it from lowering wages even during a downturn.
  • Price Stickiness Due to Psychological Factors: Prices may remain rigid because businesses fear that frequent changes might upset customers or erode their trust. A classic example is a retail store keeping prices stable to maintain a reputation for reliability, even when costs fluctuate.

Side note: Lars Christensen predicts less nominal rigidity in our future. Menu costs are getting smaller and customers could become accustomed to, for example, watching the price of milk fluctuate in real time in response to statements by the Fed. Click here for related Twitter joke.

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