Housing is certainly more expensive than in the past. I have written about this several times, including a post from last year showing that between about 2017 and 2022 housing started to get really expensive almost everywhere in the US, not just on the West Coast and Northeast (as had previously been the case). I don’t think the housing affordability crisis is in serious doubt anymore, and it can’t be explained over the past few years by increasing size and amenities, since those haven’t changed much since 2017 (though it is relevant when comparing housing prices to the 1970s).
But why did this happen? Knowing why is crucial, not merely to blame the causes, but because the policy solution is almost certainly related to the causes. I and many others have argued that supply-side restrictions, such as zoning laws, are the primary culprit. The policy solution is to reduce those restrictions. But a recent op-ed titled “Why your parents could afford a house on one salary – but you can’t on two,” the authors place the blame for housing prices (as well as the stagnation of living standards generally) on a different factor: Nixon’s 1971 “severing the dollar’s link to gold.” The authors have a book on this topic too, which I have not yet read, but they provide most of the relevant data in this short op-ed.
Does their explanation make sense? I am skeptical. Here’s why.
But as Jeremy often points out here, young adults have actually been doing pretty well at building wealth. So why are they so gloomy?
Since I’ve now aged out of the young adult category, I’m obligated to start by wondering if kids these days are just whinier, and need to quit doomscrolling and toughen up. But if I try to see things their way, here’s what I can come up with for why their pessimism could be rational:
It’s About The Future: Sure things have been fine, but that is about to change. The more farsighted youth know they will be the ones expected to pay back the big deficits the Federal government is running. They have student loans to pay today now that payments have fully resumed. I predicted after the 2022 student loan forgiveness that we would be back to all-time highs in student debt by 2028, but in fact we are there already. The youth unemployment rate is now 10.5%, up from 6.6% in April 2023, and could rise a lot more if AI really starts displacing jobs:
Source: Brynjolfsson, Chandar and Chen 2025.Source: Michigan Consumer Survey
2. It’s About Housing: House prices are at all time highs (far above the prices during the 2000s “bubble”). Mortgage rates remain high, and to the extent that Fed rate cuts push them down, they will likely push prices higher, leaving homes hard to afford. High credit standards post-Dodd-Frank mean younger buyers in particular find it hard to get a mortgage; homeownership rates are falling while the average age of homeowners shoots upward. Most older people already own a house, while most young people want to buy but see that as increasingly out of reach.
Good luck getting a mortgage without super-prime creditEveryone thinks it’s a bad time to buy a house, but this matters most if you’re young and don’t already own oneThe median American is 39 years old but the median homebuyer is 56
There are two main questions. Will AI companies need to pay compensation to authors they are currently training off of? Secondly, how important is it for human writing to be a paying career in the future, if AI continues to need good new material to train from?
There is more at the link but here are some quotes:
If human writing ceases to be a viable career due to inadequate compensation, will LLMs lose access to fresh, high-quality training data? Could this create a feedback loop where AI models, trained on degraded outputs, stagnate?
This case also blurs the traditional divide between copyright and patents. Copyrighted material, once seen as static, now drives “follow-on” innovation derived from the original work. That is, the copyright protection in this case affects AI-content influenced by the copyrighted material in a way that previously applied to new technology that built on patented technical inventions. Thus, “access versus incentives” theory applies to copyright as much as it used to apply to patents. The Anthropic settlement signals that intellectual property law, lagging behind AI’s rapid evolution, must adapt.
This is post coauthored with Jack Cavanaugh, Ave Maria University Graduate of 2025.
Say that you want to become a successful lawyer. What does that mean? One possible meaning is that you are well-compensated. Money is not everything, but it does give people more options for how to spend their time and resources. Law degrees are a type of graduate degree. So, what bachelor’s degree major should one choose in preparation for law school? We lack rich administrative data on college majors and LSAT scores.
Luckily, the 2023 American Community Survey (ACS) comes to the rescue. It has all of the typical demographic covariates, income, occupation, and college major. So, if we make the small leap that well-prepared law school students become high-performing lawyers who are ultimately paid more, then what college major puts you on the right path? What should your major be?
We don’t look at an exhaustive list. We place several occupations into bins and examine only a few alternative majors. Any unlisted major falls under ‘other’. Below are the raw average incomes by occupational category and college major. Note two majors in particular. First, Pre-law literally has the word ‘law’ in the name and is marketed as preparation for law school. However, it is the undergraduate major associated with the lowest paid lawyers. For that matter, Pre-law majors have the lowest pay no matter what their occupation is. Second, Economics majors are the most highly paid in all of the occupations.
The Fed has had an official inflation target of 2% since 2012, a commitment they reaffirmed just last month after their policy review:
The Committee reaffirms its judgment that inflation at the rate of 2 percent, as measured by the annual change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures, is most consistent over the longer run with the Federal Reserve’s statutory maximum employment and price stability mandates.
But since 2020, they haven’t been acting like it. Lets look at their preferred measure of inflation, the annual change in the PCE price index:
The last time annual inflation was at or below 2.0% was February 2021. The Fed just cut rates despite inflation being at 2.6%. If you didn’t know about their 2% target and were trying to infer their target based solely on their actions, what would you guess their target is?
Considering the post-Covid period, I see their actions as being more consistent with a 3% target than a 2% target. They stopped raising rates once inflation got below 3.4%, and started cutting them again once inflation got below 2.4%. The Fed’s own projections show more rate cuts coming despite the fact that they don’t expect inflation to get back to 2.0% until 2028! Bloomberg’s Anna Wong does the math and infers their target is 2.8%:
Perhaps the Fed’s target should be higher than 2%, but if they have a higher target, they should make it explicit so as not to undermine their credibility. Or at least make explicit that their target is loose and they’d rather miss high than low, if that is in fact the case. This is what Greg Mankiw would prefer:
I feel strongly that a target of 2 percent is superior to a target of 2.0 percent….. It would be better if central bankers admitted to the public how imprecise their ability to control inflation is. They should not be concerned if the inflation rate falls to 1.6. That comfortably rounds up to 2. And they should be ready to declare victory in fighting inflation when the inflation rate gets back to 2.5. As the adage goes, that is good enough for government work. Maybe the Fed should even ditch a specific numerical target for inflation and instead offer a range, as some other central banks do. The Fed could say, for example, that it wants to keep the inflation rate between 1 and 3. Doing so would admit that the Fed governors are notquite as godlike as they sometimes feign.
The Fed seems to have taken Mankiw’s approach to heart, except with a preferred range of 2.0-3.5%. I take Mankiw’s point about not being able to fine-tune everything, but given the bigger picture I think the Fed should if anything err on the low side of 2.0%. The Federal deficit is in the trillions and rising, inflation has been above target since 2021, and consumers never got over the Covid-era increase in the price level:
Source: Michigan Consumer Survey
The Fed let inflation stay mostly below 2% during the 2010s, to the detriment of the labor market. They updated their policy framework in 2020 to allow for “Flexible Average Inflation Targeting”, where they would let inflation stay above 2% for a while to make up for the years of below 2% inflation. This is part of why they let inflation get so out of hand in 2022. This made up for the 2010s and then some- our price level is now 3-4% higher than it would be if we’d had 2.0% inflation each year since 2007. But the sudden big burst of inflation in 2022 led the Fed to abandon this flexible targeting idea in the 2025 framework. The lack of “make up” policy latest framework means that they don’t see themselves as needing to do anything to repair their 2022 mistake- “just don’t do it again”.
We’re certainly being stuck with permanently higher prices as a result, and I worry we will be stuck with higher inflation too.
This is from the latest Census release of CPS ASEC data, updated through 2024 (see Table F-23 at this link). In 1967, only 5 percent of US families earned over $150,000 (inflation adjusted).
Addendum: Several comments have asked how much of these trends can be explained by the rise of dual-income households. The answer is some, but not all of it, which I have written about before. Dual-income households were already the most common family structure by the 1980s. There hasn’t been an increase in total hours worked by married households since Boomers were in their 30s. You can explain some of the increase up until the Boomers by rising dual-income households, but this doesn’t explain the continued progress since the 1980s. And as Scott Winship and I have documented, even if you look just at male earnings, there has been progress since the 1980s.
Tax holidays are when some set of goods are tax-free for a period of time. These might be back-to-school supplies for a week or a weekend, or hurricane supplies for several months. These policies tend to be popular among non-economists.
There are practical reasons for anyone to decry tax holidays. Usually, there is a particular type of good that qualify for tax-free status. These are often selected politically rather than by an informed and reasoned way with tradeoffs in mind. Sometimes, there is a subpopulation that is intended to benefit. However, the entire population gets the tax holiday and those with the most resources, who often have higher incomes, are best able to adjust their consumption allocations and enjoy the biggest benefits. A tax holiday weekend is no good to a single-mom who can’t get off work during that time.
Getting more economic logic, these holidays also concentrate shopping on the tax-free days, causing traffic and long lines that eat away at people’s valuable time – even if they aren’t purchasing the tax-free items. Furthermore, retailers must comply with the law. This means ensuring that all items are taxed correctly, making neither mistakes in over-taxing or under-taxing. Given the variety of goods and services out there, this is a large cost for individual firms.
Finally, as economists know, there is a deadweight loss anytime that there is a tax. As a consequence, you might think that economists would love anytime that taxes are low. But, holding total tax revenue constant, a tax break on a tax holiday implies that there must be greater tax revenues on the other non-holidays. In particular, economists also know that losses in welfare increase quadratically with changes in tax rates. Therefore, higher tax rates on some days and lower rates on other days causes more welfare loss than if the tax rate had been uniform the entire time. In the current context, such welfare loss manifests as forgone beneficial transactions. These non-transactions are hard for non-economists to understand because we can’t see purchases that don’t happen, but would have happened in the absence of poor policy.
The Federal Reserve will probably cut rates next week:
I can’t advise them on the complexpolitics of this, but based on the economics I think cutting would be a mistake. I see one good reason they want to cut: hiring is slow and apparently has been for a year. But that could be driven by falling labor supply rather than falling demand, and most other indicators suggest holding rates steady or even raising them.
Most importantly, inflation is currently well above their 2% target, 2.9% over the past year and a higher pace than that in August. Inflation expectations remain somewhat elevated. Real GDP growth was strong in Q2 and looks set to be strong in Q3 too, and NGDP growth is still well above trend.. The Conference Board’s measure of consumer confidence looks bad, but Michigan’s looks fine.
Financial conditions are loose, with stocks at all time highs and credit spreads low. Its only September and we’ve already seen more Initial Public Offerings than in any year since 2021 (when the last big bout of inflation kicked off):
Crypto prices are back near all time highs and crypto is becoming more integrated into public stocks through bitcoin treasury companies and IPOs from Gemini and Figure.
The Taylor Rule provides a way of putting all this together into a concrete suggestion for interest rates. Some versions of the rule say rates are about on target, while others including my preferred Bernanke versionsuggest they should be closer to 6%. To me this is what the debate should be- do we keep rates steady or raise them? I see good arguments each way, but the case for a cut seems very weak.
I look forward to finding out in a year or two whether I or the FOMC is the crazy one here.
* The Usual Disclaimer, hopefully extra obvious in this case: These views are mine and I’m not speaking for any part of the Federal Reserve System.
Are you tired of hearing about revisions to jobs data? Well, there was another hot one released by BLS yesterday. Known as the “preliminary estimate of the Current Employment Statistics (CES) national benchmark revision to total nonfarm employment,” this change isn’t yet incorporated into the official jobs data. But it will, possibly slightly modified, be included with the January 2026 jobs release, altering jobs data back to April 2024. It is part of the normal annual process of reconciling the monthly, survey-based jobs data with the near-universe data from unemployment insurance records. Normally, this is a quiet affair, especially the preliminary estimate which is just giving a heads up to researchers about what will be coming in a few months.
I wrote about these preliminary figures last year, when the initial estimate was a negative revision 818,000 jobs. When revised and actually incorporated into the data, it was a somewhat smaller 598,000 jobs, which I then used in a post just last month to show that BLS hasn’t been getting worse at estimating jobs. If anything, they have been getting better. Yesterday’s report showed that the revision could be negative again, this time 911,000 jobs. That’s a little bigger than last year, but maybe it will end up being smaller in the final number. So, no big deal again?
Maybe not. The 911,000 jobs revision would actually be much larger than last year’s revisions because it’s coming on top of a slower growing labor force already. The initial report for March 2024 showed 2.9 million jobs added in the past year, so the 818,000 revision was a much smaller share than this most recent data, since the March 2025 initial report showed just 1.9 million jobs added in the prior year. And the March 2025 jobs numbers have already been revised down by over 100,000 jobs since the initial report, meaning that potentially half or more of the initially reported job gains would be lost due to the revision, as opposed to about 20 percent last year.
Is losing half of the job gains large? Yes. In fact, almost unprecedented:
(note: I am trying out a new chart template. Let me know what you think!)
I’m piggy-backing off of the FRED blog and off of Jeremy’s post with yet more data. Let’s set the stage.
FRED blog, using BLS data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), shows that the labor force participation rate (LFPR) fell by about 1.4pp for people 55 years and older between 2017 & 2023. CPS data is released quickly, but the sample sizes are not massive. There are 3.4 million people in the 7 years of monthly data (so, a little over 40k people age 55+ per monthly observation).
Also using CPS data, Jeremy shows that FRED commits the fallacy of composition because there are very different people who are 55 and older. Specifically, he illustrates that the LFPR for people ages 55-64 have experienced about a 1.3pp *higher* LFPR in 2023 vs 2017. The implication is that something is happening to the people older than 64.
I use annual CPS instead. Why? Because it can be corroborated with the annual American Community Survey (ACS) data for 2017-2023.
Economist Writing Every Day 