Context and age and soft skills

It is hard to know when oneself does not have enough context to appreciate a piece of art. When someone else lacks context, it is easier to see.

Consider my children watching last week’s Super Bowl halftime show. Snoop Dogg was performing on a stylized urban-themed stage. My kids could see the same thing I could see. They did not, remotely, “get it”.

You better lose yourself in the music…

“Lose Yourself” performed by Eminem

Children have little context for anything. But this half time show was a cultural moment. Millennials and Gen X experienced an awakening, or perhaps a collective crisis.

The following tweet got 60 thousand likes about how old the performers are. Everyone was calculating how many years had gone by since this hip hop and rap music was new. Decades have passed and now we who have the context to understand this music are feeling old.

In some nursing home in the year 2070, school children will trudge in and sing “Lose Yourself” because it makes the old people happy. The kids will not understand the appeal.

Matt and Ben are tweeting about music in code, but it happens to be a code I know. There are many codes that I do not know. I think that is part of what Tyler means in his latest posts about how “context is scarce”.

The real reason for writing about context this week is not the Super Bowl. I was reading yet more articles about tech skills and labor demand.* Once again, I came across the issue of soft skills. Could we say, “Soft skills are that which is scarce”?

When workers lack hard skills, it seems straight-forward to pack them off to a bootcamp. Teach them, for example, some functions in a programming language. The solution to a lack of soft skills is less clear, although maybe that is what decades of modern education is for. Corporate workers today need to know when to apply their skills and what tone to use in their email communication. They must not embarrass the company.

If a manager tells a worker to do “X task,” they cannot explain every detail. The worker needs to have the context to carry out the work on their own. Workers need to know the code.**

Could that be why so many employers desire a bachelor’s degree? Tyler wrote:

9. So much of education is teaching people context.  That is why it is hard, and also why it often does not seem like real learning.

Does this explain why there is simultaneously age discrimination and the ubiquitous “5 years of experience” hurdle for good jobs? Managers are looking for the sweet spot of current technical savvy and institutional context.

* I was reading a report by Quinn Burke. Here’s a published paper on soft skills and STEM. Here’s a blog of mine in which I wrote, “Trust falls and Tolkien is the prescription for this workforce.”

**funny Elf clip on The Code and dating

Asymmetric Liability, Common Law, & Urbanization

Tort law is interesting. You can argue that someone harmed you, and you can cite almost no legislation in the process. Torte law in the US uses case law – the precedent set by previous rulings in the context of social norms. But, what cases did the early cases cite? They also cited earlier cases and social norms, though we may no longer have a record. The beauty of tort law it allows for changing relative costs in prudence and negligence.

Can you imagine a legislature attempting to codify the appropriate amount of neglect by, say, a painter? The standards would quickly go out of date. The relative cost of resources including labor, communications, materials, and the price differences among competitors of differing quality all change over time. Multiply these factors by 20 and then again by the number of occupations and regions in a country. You will quickly see that legislating the appropriate degree of prudence and neglect through congress is a fool’s errand. The challenge is too complicated and the world changes too quickly. In fact, attempting to legislate definitions for neglect and prudence could even backfire and result in regulatory arbitrage, which occurs when firms comply with de jur rules while avoiding them de facto.*

Externalizing Costs

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Health Insurance Benefit Mandates and Health Care Affordability

My article on benefit mandates was published today at the Journal of Risk and Financial Management. It begins:

Every US state requires private health insurers to cover certain conditions, treatments, and providers. These benefit mandates were rare as recently as the 1960s, but the average state now has more than forty. These mandates are intended to promote the affordability of necessary health care. This study aims to determine the extent to which benefit mandates succeed at this goal

I began my research career by writing about these mandates, and my goal with this article was to tie up that whole chapter. I realized that all my articles on benefit mandates, as well as most of what other economists write about them, simply try to measure their costs- how much they raise health insurance premiums, raise employee contributions to premiums, lower wages, lower employment, or harm smaller businesses. Its good to know their costs, but to really evaluate a policy we should learn about its benefits too so that we can compare costs and benefits.

One key benefit that had yet to be measured was how much a typical mandate lowers out-of-pocket health care costs. In this article, I estimate that the average benefit mandate lowers costs by 0.8%-1%. I argue that combining this with a measure of how mandates affect total health spending by households could provide a sufficient statistic for the net benefits of mandates for households. I’m not totally confident this works in theory though, and it has a big challenge in practice- one of my empirical strategies finds that mandates reduce total spending, but the other finds they don’t. So I think the main contribution of the article ends up being the first estimate of how the average state health insurance benefit mandate affects out-of-pocket costs.

I’m currently planning to move on from writing about mandates- other topics are catching my eye, state policymakers don’t seem to particularly care what the research says about mandates, and changes in how economists use difference-in-difference methods are making it harder to publish articles like this that study continuous treatments. But I think there are still big opportunities here for anyone who wants to take up the torch. First, the ACA Essential Health Benefits provision changed the game for state mandates in a way that I have yet to see the empirical literature grapple with. Second, there are more than a hundred separate types of state benefit mandates; in most of my articles I aggregate them but they should really be studied separately. A handful have been, such as mandates for autism treatments, infertility treatments, and telemedicine. But the vast majority appear to be completely unstudied.

P.S. Writing this article gave me two wildly varying opinions of our federal bureaucracy. I tried to get both data and funding from the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality for this article. The data side worked well- they were surprisingly fast, efficient and reasonable about the process of accessing restricted data. On the other hand, I applied for funding from AHRQ in March 2019 and still have yet to officially hear back about it (it is “pending council review” in NIH Commons). This sort of thing is why nimble organizations like Fast Grants can do so much good despite having much smaller budgets.

P.P.S. This article is part of a special issue on Health Economics and Insurance that is still accepting submissions. I’m the guest editor and would handle your submission, though my own got handled by other editors and put though multiple rounds of revisions.

Is Global Capitalism Increasing Poverty?

A few days ago on Twitter, Nathan Robinson made the claim that global capitalism wasn’t reducing poverty. In fact, it appears that poverty, using the threshold of $10/day (rather than the usual lower numbers) has increased from 1981 to 2017:

While there were a lot of critical responses to him on Twitter, he’s not wrong about the data: in 2017, there were 1.3 billion more people living on less than $10 per day (we’re going to assume in this post that the underlying data is basically correct, and correctly adjusted for inflation and purchasing power). It’s also true that at lower thresholds, such as $1.90 and $3.20, the absolute number of poor people has declined. And as a proportion of the world population, fewer people are under $10 per day. But in absolute terms there are more people under $10 per day. And not just a few: over a billion! There are also a lot more people above $10/day in the world than in 1981 (1.7 billion more!), but I agree that we should be concerned if there are more poor people too.

So how should we think about these numbers? Here’s what I think is the fundamental problem with Robinson’s claim: he asserts that the entire world has experienced something called “global capitalism” during this time period. But there has been considerable variation in the extent to which countries have experienced something we would call “capitalism,” and the degree to which it has increased in the past 40 years (I wrote a series of Tweets on this too).

The easiest way to see this is to break down that 1.3 billion people into different countries. Where were the biggest increases? Also, did any countries experience decreases in poverty? (Spoiler alert: YES!)

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Half of Deliberately Exposed Unvaccinated Volunteers in UK Study Did Not Get COVID; Why?

A British study by Ben Killingley and 31 co-authors recently appeared in pre-print form, where 36 (heroic) healthy young adult volunteers were deliberately exposed to the Covid virus by nasal drops. These volunteers then went into quarantine for 14 days, and logged their symptoms and were subjected to various tests for a total of 28 days.


Of the 36 subjects, only 18 (53%) became infected with the virus, as determined by PCR testing (the gold standard for Covid tests) and by direct counting of viral loads in mucus cells by FFA.

The study found that viral shedding (as estimated by mucus viral loads) begins within two days of exposure and rapidly reaches high levels, then declines. Viable virus is still detectible up to 12 days post-inoculation. This result supports the practice of people quarantining for at least 10 days after they first exhibit symptoms of infection. There were significant higher viral loads in the nose than in the throat,  which supports the practice of wearing masks that cover the nose as well as the mouth.


The cheap, fast, LFA rapid antigen test method (used in home tests) performed fairly well. Because it is less sensitive, it did not it did not yield positive results for infected individuals until an average of four days after infection, or about two days after viral shedding may have begun. But from four days onward, the LFA method was sensitive and reasonably accurate which supports the ongoing use of these quick, cheap tests.

These direct inclusions from the paper are helpful, but not earthshaking. The elephant in the room, which the paper did not seem to directly address, is why nearly half of the people who were exposed did NOT become infected. This raises all kinds of issues about what mechanisms the human body may have to naturally fight off COVID or similar viral infections. Gaining insight on this could lead to breakthroughs in preventing or mitigating this pernicious virus.

An article by Eileen O’Reilly at Axios probes these questions. There is nothing conclusive out there, but four ideas that are under investigation are:

1. Cross-immunity from the four endemic human coronaviruses is one hypothesis. Those other coronaviruses cause many of the colds people catch and could prime B-cell and T-cell response to this new coronavirus in some people.

2. Multiple genetic variations may make someone’s immune system more or less susceptible to the virus.  Some 20 different genes have been identified which affect the likelihood of severe infection, and a genetic predisposition to not getting infected is seen in other diseases where people have one or multiple factors that interfere with the virus binding to cells or being transported within.

3. Mucosal immunity may play an underrecognized role in mounting a defense.

This suggests nasal vaccines might have a chance at stopping a virus before it invades the whole body.

4. Where the virus settled on the human body, how large the particle was, the amount and length of exposure, how good the ventilation was and other environmental circumstances may also play a role.

These considerations support continuing with the usual recommendations of social distancing, wearing facemasks, and ventilating buildings, especially when caseloads are peaking. Also, the doses administered to the volunteers in the study were considered quite small by clinical standards. It was surprising that such a low dose was effective as it was in causing full-blown infections; and the particular strain used in the experiment was not necessarily one of the more recent highly virulent variants. After reading these results,  it is more understandable to me why so many reasonably careful friends and family members of mine (nearly all vaccinated, fortunately) have come down with (presumably) omicron COVID in the past two months. Just a little dab will do ya.

We’re all paying the Karen tax

Headlines have moved on from the The Great Resignation to the The Return of Inflation, which is completely normal as far as news trends go. But I think it’s worth reflecting on how the two can be related.

I was privy to a conversation with a local food+retail business owner yesterday where she revealed she was no longer comfortable hiring teenagers for summer and after-school jobs. Not because they were inadequate to the task, but because they had to endure too much abuse from customers eager to take advantage of young people in a service position. She was confronted with a decision: either operate understaffed, increase prices to cover the cost of older employees, or completely reorganize her business model.

Behind the wave of Great Resignation articles and opinion pieces, there has been a subcurrent of related articles about increasing customer predilection for abusing employees. Whether the rate has increased or simply its observation is hard to say, but the phenomenon itself appears to be real and non-trivial. Working in retail and food service jobs has in many ways deteriorated in job quality. The first line of investigaton and blame is always management, but it looks like customers are on the hook this time as well. Karen-wants-to-speak-to-the-manager memes didn’t emerge from nothing, folks.

No shortage of ink has been spilled about stagnating wages, particularly for workers without college degrees. Such discussions, however, always exist within a framework that holds the work, and what it entails, constant. If the quality of life on the job declines without an increase in compensating wage differentials, then the true (net) wage compensation has actually decreased even when nominal or real wages remain ostensibly constant. Combined with a pandemic that made service industry work more dangerous, the precipitous increase in wages necessary to maintain a labor supply sufficient to production demands makes all the more sense. Did we really think we could live in a world where McDonald’s is offering $20/hr to start but prices would stay the same?

Now, let’s be clear, I’m not suggesting that current inflation is being driven by crappy customers eager to abuse anyone they can in a fit of narcisstic rage. But I am suggesting that it, and factors similar to it, is a non-trivial part of the recipe. The market is very good about pricing-in everything associated with the supply of a good, but that doesn’t mean there aren’t frictions and associated lags along the way. Employees and their lives are sticky, and sometimes it takes an exogenous shock to dislodge them from one equilibrium to the next. If we were so eager to accept the hypothesis that the stimulus checks and health concerns were sufficient to get people to quit, we should be no more surprised that they are returning with higher reservation wages than previously, and that these new reservation wages are getting priced into the market. Combined with an utterly flummoxed set of global supply chains and growing geo-political uncertainty, all on top of nearly $2 trillion in stimulus spending, growing prices seem a fairly natural outcome.

Returning to the original thesis: compensating wage differentials are as unavoidable as every other economic phenomenon borne of people making rational decisions given the information at hand. A generation of employees have discovered that bosses may be dour, insensitive, and obsessed with bottom lines at the expense of their employees well-being, but at least they need you. They have to see you at work tomorrow and reap the relationship they’ve sowed. There is an equilibrium of mutual respect and shared objectives to be reached there that is best for everyone, even if a lot of bosses can’t seem to get out of their way when building it.

Customer are a different beast altogether. It’s hard for us coordinate and there’s little we can individually do to punish those who opt to abuse the people serving us. We’ve got a common pool resource problem – a subset get all their gross benefit of being jerks while the cost is spread across everyone. Whether it’s refusing to wear masks, threatening violence, or verbally abusing young people, each and every one of those incidents gets steadily priced in, until one day we’re all just staring in shock at $6 hamburgers and asking what happened. I tell you what happened: the Karen Tax, and we’re all paying it.

I’m not delusional. I know we can’t boycott our family, co-workers, and acquaintences who abuse service workers. But maybe we can all agree to give them just a little more sideeye. Invite them to fewer lunches. Leave them out of the will. Because that’s the price that really needs to increase.

It’s time they paid the Karen Tax.

Vaccine persuasion is cheaper

Canadians are blocking a bridge. For Americans who like to engage in stereotypes about Canadians, this is inexplicable (even though the practice of blocking things in Canada is not new by any means). However, for me as an economist, it is entirely explicable.

Consider what vaccine mandates/passports (which is what initiated the current mayhem) do in pure economics terms: they raise costs for the unvaccinated. They do not alter the benefit of being vaccinated. All they do is raise costs. People could be more or less inelastic to this cost, but the fact that many are willing to spend time and resources (fuel, wear and tear of trucks etc.) to prevent such policies from continuing suggest that their behavior is not perfectly inelastic.

How elastic is it then? Well, we can see that by looking at what happens when we alter the benefit of being vaccinated. This is the case with vaccine lotteries. The “extra” benefits associated with a lottery is that the unvaccinated obtains the value of the vaccine plus the expected value (i.e. the probability) of winning a particular prize. One recent paper in Economics Letters finds that for $55, you can convince an extra person to be vaccinated. That is basically the cost of administering a lottery plus the prizes themselves. That is a relatively cheap way to increase the benefit for the unvaccinated in order to have them change their mind. Another paper, in the American Journal of Health Economics, finds a similar results by concentrating on the Ohio vaccine lottery. The difference is that the amount is $75 instead of $55. Still, pretty cheap for an extra vaccinated person and the generally high social benefit of a vaccine in terms of avoided costs of infections/hospitalizations/deaths.

Thus, we can say that behavior is quite elastic. But this is where the rub comes. When you raise the benefits in this case, the story is over. There is nothing else that happens after that. When you raise the costs, people might resist and adopt other measures to avoid the costs. This includes blocking bridges on the US-Canada border. And what is the social cost of that attempt at avoiding the cost of the coercive private-cost-increasing policy? Pretty high. Probably higher than the cost of a lottery system or other voluntary programs that play with the marginal private benefit of being vaccinated.

The point I am trying to get across to you is quite simple: persuasion works because it essentially increases the perception of benefits from doing X or Y activity. Coercion is impose a private cost of not doing X or Y with the potential downside that people respond in ways that create socially detrimental outcomes. Yup, coercion isn’t cheap.

Did we repeat the Christmas Covid Wave?

The year is 2021

Around January of 2021, hospital staff and other select personnel received the first vaccines meant for the public. As a classroom teacher, I was designated important enough in the state of Alabama to get a Pfizer vaccine as early as February 2021.

Imagine what could have happened next

Americans grew antsy in May of 2021, because less than half of the population had been able to get a vaccine. It was frustrating to see the vaccine winners carrying on with life without fear of the virus while supply constraints made it impossible for everyone to join them at once.

An unintended consequence of the gradual vaccine rollout was that Americans who were initially concerned about vaccine safety had months to observe their family members and neighbors who got in line first. By July of 2021, most Americans personally knew of someone who died from Covid, and almost no one had witnessed a bad vaccine outcome.

By the end of the summer of 2021, over 90% of the American public was fully vaccinated. The economy roared back to life and working parents did not have to worry about school closures anymore.  

Americans felt proud to have invented and implemented the world’s best Covid vaccine. Considering that Trump has started the research and Biden had overseen the distribution, it was one thing that red and blue Americans could unite over.

The internet as a concept was vindicated because anyone who wanted to understand vaccines could do their own research. Scientific knowledge is no longer the domain of a select elite. Anyone can see the Covid death rates for vaccinated versus unvaccinated people. Amateurs can create data visualizations to share. Information on mRNA technology is free to all.

Speech remained free with regard to vaccine dialogue, but those who tried to discourage Americans from getting Covid vaccines were shouted down in all forums or accused of being foreign trolls.

The first Covid wave in April of 2020 was terrible and the second big event around Christmas of 2020 resulted in thousands of deaths per day lasting for months. No one wanted to repeat that.

Of course, that is not what happened.

Now I have the answer to the question I asked two months ago when I wrote https://economistwritingeveryday.com/2021/12/18/will-we-repeat-the-christmas-covid-wave/

The number of Americans who died from Covid in January 2022 is available from the CDC website.

Number of Covid deaths in January 2022, CDC 59367
Number of Covid deaths in January 2021, CDC 97866

We came fairly close (60%) to repeating the tragedy after the Christmas of 2020. The exponential rise and fall of a new Covid variant and the ensuing pattern of deaths is something we have been through several times. We knew this would happen.

Would every one of those deaths have been prevented by higher vaccine take-up? No. But the death rates among vaccinated people are much lower. Charles Gaba, a data analyst, estimates that about 143,000 Americans have died since the summer of 2021 who would have lived if we had a higher vaccine uptake rate.

Ezra Klein also engaged in some wishful thinking this week, so I’m not the only one.

My best explanation for this is that people want to feel like they are in control of their own lives. Due to a variety of factors, a large number of adults have a different concept of being in control than I do.* Something that shaped my personal attitude toward the vaccine was reading about the research and development process in real time, which I largely did by keeping up with Marginal Revolution.

Unrelatedly, Jeffrey Clemens has given our blog a label this week that I’m happy with: “speculative but engaging”

* According to Andrew Sullivan, “There’s something about masking … and vaccines themselves, that some men seem to find feminizing.”

Mises’s Bureaucracy, a Recap

My favorite two economists are Ludwig Von Mises and Milton Friedman. They might consider one another from very different schools of thought, though there is reason to think that they are not so different. As an undergraduate student, I liked them both, but I became more empirics-minded in graduate school and as a young assistant professor.

As I progressed through graduate school and conducted empirical research, my opinions and policy prescriptions changed and were refined from what they once were. In graduate school, I didn’t study Austrian Economics, though it was certainly in the water at George Mason University. Recently, as an assistant professor with a few years under my belt, I picked up Bureaucracy (1944) and read it as a matter of leisure.

One word:

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What Proportion of Journalists Live in NYC?

Michael’s post this week on the dangers of high-status, low wage jobs opened by citing this tweet:

Michael presents a fascinating model that applies well beyond journalism. But when his post went viral, some commenters asked how accurate Josh Barro’s claim about half of young journalists living in Brooklyn was. Clearly Michael’s post doesn’t depend on it being true, and I’m not even sure Barro meant it literally, but it got me wondering- just what proportion of all young journalists do live in NYC?

For a first pass, we can look at the BLS Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics for the category “News Analysts, Reporters, and Journalists“. Their latest data (May 2020) shows 41,580 workers employed in those occupations nationwide. It also shows that the NYC metro has by far the most journalists with 5,940, more than twice as many as the second place metro (DC). This implies that 14.2% of all journalists in America live in the NYC metro. Since only 6% of all Americans live in the NYC metro, journalists are clearly clustering there, though clearly well over half of journalists still live elsewhere.

But, this doesn’t quite get at Barro’s claim, which is about journalists under 40 concentrating in Brooklyn. I don’t know of any data source that would let me really test the Brooklyn part, but I can get at the under-40 claim using Microdata from the American Community Survey, which also zooms us in a bit closer to Brooklyn since it tells us who is in NYC proper (not just the metro area).

The 2019 ACS shows that 10% of all “news analysts, reporters, and journalists” are in NYC proper, rising to 14% if I only consider journalists under 40 years old. This is quite concentrated (only 2.5% of all Americans live in NYC proper), but still a lot less that half of all journalists.

As Michael suggested, the vast majority of young NYC journalists are white (77%) with a college degree (91%), though English was only their second most common major after Communications.

The data confirm the last part of Michael’s post quite well- as journalists get older they are likely to move out of NYC and switch to more lucrative fields like PR. Only 5% of all “public relations specialists” are in NYC.