There is a narrative about US history that goes like this: “Historical racism was really bad and limited opportunities for blacks. Blacks were not allowed to participate in a set of occupations and other civic life. The absence of blacks from typically higher income occupations reduced the number of competitors in those sectors. Not only did blacks have fewereconomic opportunities, the whites who were insulated from competition earned monopoly rents. Therefore, if blacks were excluded, the whites who were in exclusive sectors earned profits at the expense of blacks.”
The logic is neat. Are there any holes in it?Let’s see.
If a scientific finding is really true and important, we should be able to reproduce it- different researchers can investigate and confirm it, rather than just taking one researcher at their word.
Economics has not traditionally been very good at this, but we’re moving in the right direction. It is becoming increasingly common for researchers to voluntarily post their data and code, as well as for journals (like the AEA journals) to require them to:
This has certainly been the trend with my own research; if you look at my first 10 papers (all published prior to 2018) I don’t currently share data for any of them, though I hope to go back and add it some day. But of my most recent 10 empirical papers, half share data.
This sharing allows other researchers to easily go back and check that the work is accurate. This could mean simply checking that it is “reproducable”, i.e., that running the original code on the original data produces the results that the authors said. Or it could mean the more ambitious “replicability”, i.e., you could tackle the same question with different data and still find basically the same answer. Economics does generally does well at reproducability when code is shared, but just ok at replication.
Of course, even when data and code are shared, you still need people to actually do the double-checking research; this is still relatively rare because it is harder to publish replications than original research. But more replication journals are opening, and there are now several projects funding replications. The trends are all in the right direction to establish real, robust findings, with one exception- the rise of restricted data.
Traditionally most economics research has been done using publicly available datasets like the Current Population Survey. But an increasing proportion, perhaps a majority of research at top journals, is now done using restricted datasets (there’s a great graph on this I can’t find but see section 3.3 here). These datasets legally can’t be shared publicly, either due to privacy concerns,licensing agreements, or both. But journals almost always still publish these articles and give them an exemption to the data sharing requirement. One the one hand it makes sense not to ignore this potentially valuable research when there are solid legal reasons the data can’t be shared. But it does mean we can’t be as confident that the data has been analyzed correctly, or that it even really exists.
One potential solution is to find people who have access to the same restricted dataset and have them do a replication study. This is what the Institute for Replication just started doing. They posted a list of 100+ papers that use restricted data that they would like to replicate. They are offering $5000 for replications of most of the papers, so I think it is worthwhile for academics to look and see if you already have access to relevant datasets, or if you study similar enough things that it is worth jumping through the hoops to get data access.
For everyone else, this is just one more reason not put too much trust in any one paper you read now, but to recognize that the field as a whole is getting better and more trustworthy over time. We will be more likely to catch the mistakes, purge the frauds, and put forward more robust results that at least bear a passing resemblance to what science can and should be.
Last week my post was about a new article I have with Scott Winship on the “cost of thriving” today versus 1985. That paper has gotten quite a bit of coverage, including in the Wall Street Journal, which is great but also means you are going to get some pushback. Much of it comes in the form of “it just doesn’t feel like the numbers are right” (see Alex Tabarrok on this point), and that was the conclusion to the WSJ piece too.
Here’s a response of that nature from Mish Talk: “There’s no way a single person is better off today, especially a single parent with two kids based on child tax credits that will not come close to meeting daycare needs.”
He mentions daycare costs, but never comes back to it in the post (it’s mostly about housing costs). Daycare costs are undoubtedly an important cost for families with young children (though since Cass’ COTI is about married couples with one earner, they may not be as relevant). And in the CPI-U, daycare and preschool costs only getting a weight of 0.5%. Surely that’s not reality for the families that actually do pay daycare costs! If only there was an index that applied to the costs of raising children.
In fact, there already is. Since 1960, the USDA has been keeping track of the cost of raising a child. Daycare costs are definitely given much more weight: 16% of the expenditures on children got to child care and education. And much of that USDA index (recently updated by Brookings) looks similar to what COTI includes: housing, food, transportation, health care, education, but also clothing and daycare. I wrote about it in a post last year and compared that cost to various measures of income (including single-earner families and median weekly earnings). But what if we compared it to Oren Cass’ preferred measure of income, males 25 and older working full-time? Here’s the chart.
One of Warren Buffet’s most famous quotes (channeling the venerable Benjamin Graham) is: “Price is what you pay; value is what you get.” He thus rationalizes buying top-quality companies or stocks, even if their price is not beaten down. So, allow me to explain why I put over $100 into a single, not-very-large raspberry plant.
In various earlier homes I have lived in, I have grown raspberries. To my way of thinking, this is an ideal crop for a home gardener. You can get maybe five bare-root dormant plants from a gardening supply house like Burpee in the early spring, plant them in the ground, and by that fall have a crop of sweet, flavorful berries you can eat right off the bush. And then you have a perennial bed that will fill in with even more canes each year. The “everbearing” (“fall-bearing” or primocane) varieties like Heritage or Caroline can produce from June through early October, depending on your climate zone. Not many pests attack raspberries, and the only maintenance needed is pruning, fertilizing, and watering during droughts. They do need nearly full sun, and well-drained soil.
I now live in a townhouse, However, I did want to grow raspberries, partly for the fun of growing my own food, partly out of nostalgia, and partly to give my grandson the experience of picking food from a plant instead of from a grocery store shelf.
The townhouse I live in now only gets nearly-full sunlight at one corner of the house. There is no appropriate garden bed there, so I need to use a container. Raspberries normally grow 3-4 feet tall, with roots that go down maybe two feet. I did not really have the space for a two-foot high/two-foot diameter container, and such a large container would be hard to move around. So last year I tried to grow a regular raspberry (Glencoe variety) in maybe a 14-inch x 14-inch pot. It was a total fail. The root space was just too small for this large a plant, I think.
So this year I regrouped, dug deep in my wallet, and bought a special dwarf raspberry called “Raspberry Shortcake.” This variety is bred to grow in small spaces. This plant is mostly supplied in a #1 size pot (nominally 1 quart, but actually smaller). I was impatient and wanted a larger plant that would bear fruit this year, so I spent more and bought a larger (# 2 pot) plant from Plant Addicts. It arrived in late April, and I transplanted it to a 16” x 16” (40 cm x 40 cm) plastic pot from Better Homes and Gardens. This pot is white, which I hope will reflect some of the sun’s heat during the summer.
This is a summer-bearing (floricane) raspberry, so it will only bear fruit for a few weeks in June-July. However, there is a new Asian fly pest spreading in the U.S. that attacks raspberries later in the season, so it may be best to avoid the fall-bearing varieties now anyway.
The plant had been pruned back to several slender, woody stems about ten inches high. Each of these stems has since put out several side shoots, most of which have now borne clusters of berries at their tips. I have enjoyed several dozen berries, and they are still coming. Also, I have had the pleasure of seeing my grandson pick and eat berries off the bush. I am a satisfied customer. Photos:
And close-up on the berries:
This plant cost me $72 ($57 plus $15 shipping). We got lucky with the pot, paying only about $22, when you can easily pay twice that for this sized pot. Potting soil was another $15. So about $109 all-in.
Obviously, I could have bought many little cartons of raspberries in the store instead for $109. I paid a high price for my plant, but got a value that I am satisfied with.
POSTSCRIPT: Just for completeness, to inform other would-be buyers of this plant – – it’s berry production peaked in mid-June here in U.S. growing zone 7a. It continued to produce a few berries a day till the end of the month. Since about July 1, it still produces perhaps an average of one berry a day, with 6-7 visible on the bush at any one time, but they are not ripening properly. Sometimes they just fall off before they are ripe, but most often they ripen very unevenly: some of the little “drupes” turn dark red (and then sometimes fall off) while the rest are still whitish. This may be a reaction to the heat, it is sunny and has hit 90 degrees F nearly every day, so the soil around the roots in the pot is way hotter than it would be for an in-ground planting . Anyway, none of this takes away from the satisfactory performance in June.
Post-PostScript: After watering the plant more frequently to let it transpire like crazy in the heat, and also after I loosely wrapped a 14-inch high strip of aluminum flashing around the pot to deflect some of the sun’s rays, the berries seem to be ripening better…getting 1-2 berries a day, though July 15, though they really are petering out now.
I’m not going to make the case against Lina Khan’s FTC lawsuit against Amazon (and by all accounts I’ve come across, it is very much her lawsuit). I’ll leave that to people who know a lot more about monopoly and antitrust than me. What I would like to humbly suggest, however, is that there is something kafkaesque about dedicating significant resources and political capital to pursue a case that is at least not unreasonable to say is wrong-headed while an obvious cartel that spent decades enforcing a zero-wage policy on labor in physically dangerous occupations is at this very moment actively lobbying for legislation to create a legal firewall ensuring that billions of dollars never suffer the ignomius fate of falling into the hands of their employees.
Yes, I know, I just wrote the same paragraph twice, but it’s just that flabbergasting, a “too-on-the-nose” political cartoon come to life. I’m not even sure that else to write.
I could talk about the pure powers of rationalization and cognitive dissonance. Nothing will lead to a more clear-eyed, full-hearted, open-throated defense of the purity of amateur sports and the inevitable destructive powers of wages than the $1.14 billion cut in rents the NCAA receives each year. And that’s just the NCAA, the governing body that oversees the cartel. The chief participants earned $3.3 billion in revenue from sports. You don’t have to be a sociopath sincerely spouting bald-faced lies with those kinds of incentives. The human capacity for narrative internalization and rationalization will do the trick for you, no sweat.
I could delve into classic the capture theory of regulation, how monopolies and cartels are often the only people sufficiently informed and motivated on niche issues to tilt the balance of democratic forces in their favor. I could reference the classic prisoner’s dilemma/collective action problems that plague even the most successful cartels. The network-structure of competitive sports leagues allowed the NCAA to successfully monitor and enforce the rules of their cartel (no compensation for players other than in-kind tuition, room, and board), but even such a successful cartel was still on borrowed time against the incentives facing top programs combined with the march of innovation and the rival collective of players.
No, what disappoints me is our regulatory institutions ignoring low-hanging fruit. I get it, political appointees are political animals, as well as just standard humans trying to make a secure living. Any FTC chair that sues Amazon, successful or not, will never want for law school appointments for the rest of their career. More than 70% of US adults are in households subscribed to Amazon Prime, which is affects a lot of voters and will lead to a lot of thinkpieces. For a $139 a year they get a bundle of goods and services, including the rough equivalent of Netflix. Is that too high? Is exit from the service too costly? Even if the answer is yes, what is the preferred outcome? A $7 lower price? Three-clicks fewer to unsubscribe? Even spread across the entirety of the US adult population, the costs seem fairly trivial, and added up in aggregate that’s not that much either. If it’s suppression of competition, well that’s a far tougher argument to win, which is why they aren’t making it.
The NCAA, on the other hand, has extracted a) enormous rents, likely > 50% of the marginal product of labor, b) from employees in physically dangerous and demanding jobs, many of whom c) are engaged in the task for which they have the peak marginal revenue product of their entire career. That last part is often under-appreciated. Very few of us, myself included, will ever have a marginal revenue product from our labor that compares to a starter on a Division I sports team that is regularly televised. They’re literally being denied earnings in what should be the highest 1 to 4 years of their career earning power. Maybe that doesn’t add up to as much in the aggregate of shaving $7 off of Amazon Prime, but the the number of households for whom Prime fees are salient to the trajectories of their lives is absolutely trivial compared to the NCAA cartel.
One of the big questions in governance is what do we want out of our regulatory agencies? A not unreasonable school of thought is to say we want a counterbalance toscale. Government forces with enough heft that they can bring the mightiest companies to heel. A reasonable person might say we want to maximize welfare, which could mean targeting cartels and monopolies of any size, looking strictly at the bottom line for consumers. A third might say the world is noisy and constantly changing. Cases are confusing and take years to adjudicate. What we should pursue are the most obvioustransgressions, where we can operate with a high degree of confidence that government action will lead to better outcomes in contexts that matter.
If you count yourself in that third camp, as I do, then let me suggest there is no easier antitrust case to make than when a multi-billion dollar entity comes to you hat in hand begging for an antitrust exemption. Legal rhetoric and economic evidence are great, but nothing beats an old-fashioned confession.
I don’t agree with Elizabeth L. Cline on everything, but she’s written a reasonable book for Americans today. The Conscious Closet has some good advice for everyone.
A decade ago, Cline wrote Overdressed: The Shockingly High Cost of Cheap Fashion which investigated the environmental toll of clothes and the labor controversies. Since then, she has been working on what consumers can do differently.
Not every American household has practical knowledge of laundry and sewing anymore. Cline offers suggestions on how to economically maintain clothes longer by making sensible home repairs or washing them less. (Don’t wash a pair of jeans after just one wear. I don’t.) The Conscious Closet came out in 2019, so it’s up-to-date concerning chemicals and certifications and websites that operate today.
The way we wash and dry our clothes uses a lot of water and energy. If a person was looking for a way to lower their environmental footprint, then a marginal reduction of laundry loads might be a relatively easy way to do it. Since almost every American has an electric dryer, we have lost the tacit knowledge of how to air dry clothes. She gives the practical reminder, for example, that dark color clothes will fade if exposed to extended sunlight.
I feel like Cline could be even more conscious about the opportunity cost of time. She does explicitly acknowledge that in her chapter about re-selling your unwanted clothes.
I watched the Chapman Economic Forecast Update for 2023 live on June 22 (you can watch the whole thing free here). Go to their website for free videos and links. They have an excellent track record for being correct.
This time, Dr. Jim Doti believes we are headed for a recession by the third quarter of 2023 or at least what he conservatively calls a “slowdown”. He hates to make dramatic predictions or deliver bad news, but he saw the inflation brewing back in 2021, and I remember him correctly predicting what was to come.
For one thing, the dramatic growth in the money supply at the beginning of the pandemic has been corrected into a sharp contraction of the money supply.
People have been joking about how the recession isn’t happening.
The middle segment of the forecast, which I recommend watching, is about investing. Fadel Lawandy cautions that stocks are not a good bet right now, with a likely recession looming.
The third segment is focused on the economy of California. I didn’t finish that part, since I don’t live there anymore.
My wife makes this great chili recipe. She called me yesterday as I departed from work and asked me to grab some beer on the way home (it’s the secret ingredient in case you need to zhuzh up your version). So, I went to my local overpriced grocer. The options were dire. All the good 6-packs were way overpriced. The 12-packs, though a lower unit price, weren’t much better.
Luckily a ‘fine’ beer was on sale at an OK price ($17.49 for 12). Not what I wanted, but fine. I did self check-out and noticed that the price that I paid was not the sale price – by a healthy $2. A ‘fine’ beer at an ok price is one thing. But a ‘fine’ beer at a ‘great’ beer price is no bueno. After check-out, I made a b-line for the beer aisle in order to double check myself. Me making a mistake is often a good first approximation. But nuts – I was mischarged.
I took a photo of the ‘correct’ price and headed to the customer service desk.
As we have gone through our education and training and changed jobs, my wife and I have been in every sort of relative income situation, with each one sometimes vastly or slightly out-earning the other. Currently she slightly out-earns me, which I thought was unusual, as I remembered this graph from Bertrand, Kamenica and Pan in the QJE 2015:
The paper argues that the big jump down at 50% is driven by gender norms:
this pattern is best explained by gender identity norms, which induce an aversion to a situation where the wife earns more than her husband. We present evidence that this aversion also impacts marriage formation, the wife’s labor force participation, the wife’s income conditional on working, marriage satisfaction, likelihood of divorce, and the division of home production. Within marriage markets, when a randomly chosen woman becomes more likely to earn more than a randomly chosen man, marriage rates decline. In couples where the wife’s potential income is likely to exceed the husband’s, the wife is less likely to be in the labor force and earns less than her potential if she does work. In couples where the wife earns more than the husband, the wife spends more time on household chores; moreover, those couples are less satisfied with their marriage and are more likely to divorce.
But when I went to look up the paper to show my wife the figures, I found that the effect it highlights may no longer be so large. Natalia Zinovyeva and Maryna Tverdostup show in their 2021 AEJ paper that the jump down in wives’ income at 50% is quite small, and is largely driven by couples who have the same industry and occupation:
They created the figure above using SIPP/SSA/IRS Completed Gold Standard Files, 1990–2004. I’d be interested in an analysis with more recent data. Much of their paper uses more detailed Finnish data to test the mechanism for the remaining jump down at 50%. They conclude that gender norms are not a major driver of the discontinuity:
We argue that the discontinuity to the right of 0.5 can emerge if some couples tend toward earnings equalization or convergence. To test this hypothesis, we exploit the rich employer-employee–linked data from Finland. We find overwhelming support in favor of the idea that the discontinuity is caused by earnings equalization in self-employed couples and earnings convergence among spouses working together. We show that the discontinuity is not generated by selective couple formation or separation and it arises only among self-employed and coworking couples, who account for 15 percent of the population.
Self-employed couples are responsible for most observations with spouses reporting identical earnings. When couples start being self-employed, both sides of the distribution tend to equalize earnings, perhaps because earnings equalization helps couples to reduce income tax payments, facilitate accounting, or avoid unnecessary within-family negotiations. Large spikes emerge not only at 0.5 but also at other round shares signaling the prevalence of ad hoc rules for entrepreneurial income sharing in couples. Self-employment is associated with a fall of household earnings below the level predicted by individuals’ predetermined characteristics, but this drop is mainly due to a decrease in male earnings, with women being relatively better off.
In the case of couples who work together in the same firm, there is a compression of the earnings distribution toward 0.5 both on the right and on the left of 0.5. As a result, there is an increase both in the share of couples where men slightly outearn their wives and in the share of couples where women slightly outearn their husbands. Since the former group is larger, earnings compression leads to a detection of a discontinuity.
So, concerns about relative earnings aren’t causing trouble for women in the labor market. But do they cause trouble at home? Perhaps yes, but if so its not in a gendered way and not driven by the 50% threshold:
Separation rates do not exhibit any discontinuity around the 0.5 threshold of relative earnings. Instead, the relationship between the probability of separation and the relative earnings distribution exhibits a U-shape, with higher separation rates among couples with large earnings differentials either in favor of the husband or in favor of the wife.
62 weeks. That’s how long the median male worker would need to work in a year to support a family in 2022, according to the calculations of Oren Cass for the American Compass Cost-of-Thriving Index released this year. Not only is 62 weeks longer than the baseline year of 1985 (when it took about 40 weeks, according to COTI), but there is a big problem: there aren’t 62 weeks in year. It is, by this calculation, impossible for a single male earner to support a family.
Is this true? In our new AEI paper, Scott Winship and I strongly disagree. First, we challenge the 62-week figure. With a few reasonable corrections to Cass’ COTI, we show that it is indeed possible for a median male earner to support a family. It takes 42 weeks, not 62 as reported in COTI.
But wait, there’s more. Much more. In our paper, we provide a range of reasonable estimates for how the cost of thriving has changed since 1985. In the COTI calculation, the standard of living for a single-earner family has fallen by 36 percent since 1985. In our most optimistic estimate, the standard of living has risen by 53 percent. The chart below summarizes our various alternative versions of COTI. How do we get such radically different results? Is this all a numbers game?
Economist Writing Every Day 