In Praise of the FRED Excel Add-in

Sometimes, large entities have enough money to throw at a problem that by sheer magnitude they produce something great (albeit at too high a cost). The iPhone app from the FRED is not that thing. But the Excel add-in is something that every macroeconomics professor should consider adding to their toolkit.

Personally, I include links to FRED content in the lecture notes that I provide to students. But FRED makes it easy to do so much more. They now have an add-in that makes accessing data *much* faster. With it, professors can demonstrate in excel their transformations that students can easily replicate. The advantage is that students can learn to access and transform their own data rather than relying on links that I provide them.

The tool is easy enough to find – FRED wants you to use it. After that, the installation is largely automatic.

Installed in excel you will see the below new ribbon option. It’s very user friendly.

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Fed Dot Plot vs Markets

After their last meeting in March, the Federal Open Market Committee released the summary of economic projections. Most of the variables they project are inherently difficult to predict: GDP, unemployment, inflation. But their forecasts of the Federal Funds rate should be pretty good, since they’re the ones that get to pick what it will be. The median FOMC member thinks the the Federal Funds rate will be just under 2% by the end of 2022.

I said in my last post that the Fed is under-reacting to inflation. Markets seem to agree, but they also think that the Fed will change. Kalshi runs prediction markets on what the Fed Funds rate will be, which they recently started to summarize using this nice curve:

So traders think that the Fed will raise rates faster than the Fed thinks they will, with rates getting to 2.5% by year end. Traders at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange see an even bigger change, with rates at 2.75% by year end, and 3.5% by July 2023 (the longest-term market they offer).

I lean toward the markets on this one; if they are wrong there is plenty of money to be made by betting so.

How to Get People Vaccinated for 93 Cents

We’ve talked a lot about vaccines on this blog, including both the benefits of vaccines and how to get people vaccinated. For example, last month I posted about Robert Barro’s estimate on the number of additional vaccines needed to save 1 life. Barro put it at about 250 vaccines. Using some reasonable assumptions, I further suggested that each person vaccinated has a social value of about $20,000. That’s a lot!

But how do we convince people to get vaccinated? Lotteries? Pay them? In addition to just paying them (the economist’s preferred method), another good old capitalist method is advertising (the marketer’s preferred method). And a new working paper tries just that, running pro-vaccine ads on YouTube with a very specific spokesman: Donald Trump.

Running ads on YouTube is pretty cheap. For $100,000, the researchers were able to reach 6 million unique users. And because they randomized who saw the ads across counties, they are able to make a strong claim that any increase in vaccinations was caused by the ads. They argue that this ad campaign led to about 104,000 more people getting vaccinated, or less than $1 per person (the actual budget was $96,000, which is how they get 93 cents per vaccine — other specifications suggest 99 cents or $1.01, but all of their estimates are around a buck).

Considering, again, my rough estimate that each additional vaccinated person is worth $20,000 to society (in terms of lives saved), this is a massive return on investment. Of course, we know that everything runs into diminishing returns at some point (they also targeted areas that lagged in vaccine uptake). Would spending $1,000,000 on YouTube ads featuring Trump lead to 1 million additional people getting vaccinated? Probably not quite. But it might lead to a half million. And a half million more vaccinated people could potentially save 2,000 lives (using Barro’s estimate).

I dare you to find a cheaper way to save 2,000 lives.

Musk, Twitter, and Poison Pills

It has been all over the financial news that Elon Musk made an offer last week to buy out Twitter for $54.20 per share, which is well above its recent stock price. And also, that the board quickly stiff-armed Musk by adopting a “poison pill” provision. What are poison pills, are they a good thing, and how does this particular one work?

Major decisions for a corporation are made by its board of directors. In theory, they are supposed to direct operations for the benefit of the company’s shareholders, who are considered the actual owners of the corporation. The members of the board are elected by the shareholders in annual meetings.

In practice, the board largely does what it wants, and has an outsized influence on who gets elected. The board sets the agenda of the annual meetings, and proposes successor directors. In theory, shareholders can propose resolutions and alternative board candidates at an annual meeting, but it usually takes a determined effort by some activist shareholder group to actually push through some measure that is not approved by the existing board. The outside board members are often executives of other companies, and so are naturally attuned to the interests of the managerial class.  Thus, the members of this Old Boys (and Girls) Club tend to vote each other generous pay:  board members are typically paid very handsomely for what is often a fairly undemanding, part-time job.

Big corporate mergers and takeovers became a thing in the 1980’s. Some outside investor would make an offer to buy up company shares for more than the current market price. Often,  management would resist this offer, since it might entail them losing their cushy jobs. The delicate matter for management in such cases was to convince shareholders that rejecting the buyout offer was in their best long-term interest.

As in so many matters, “where you stand depends on where you sit.” Management would argue that “short-termism” is bad for the company and for the nation as a whole; the “corporate raiders” would just fire people, break up the company, and sell off the pieces, and generally create misery. The outside investors would reply that their new management would “unlock value” better than the current management was doing, by making operations more efficient and competitive and innovative.

A variety of measures might be implemented by the board to make it less attractive or less feasible for a change in control. The terms of the board of directors might be staggered, so that it would be impossible for the existing board to be totally changed out in less than say 3 years, even if someone controlled 100% of the shares. A company I was associated with in the 1990’s implemented a policy that provided for generous severance packages for upper employees in the event of change of control. (Again, management looking out for themselves).

The term “poison pill” typically refers to some measure that  targets share prices, in a way to discourage a hostile takeover. The most common form is the “flip-in” approach: 

A flip-in poison pill strategy involves allowing the shareholders, except for the acquirer, to purchase additional shares at a discount. Though purchasing additional shares provides shareholders with instantaneous profits, the practice dilutes the value of the limited number of shares already purchased by the acquiring company. This right to purchase is given to the shareholders before the takeover is finalized and is often triggered when the acquirer amasses a certain threshold percentage of shares of the target company.

This is what the Twitter board has pulled on Musk. If he acquires more than 15% of Twitter shares without board approval, the company will allow any shareholder (except Musk) to purchase additional shares at a 50% discount. Yes, this dilution would tend to lower the value of the shares, but if a lot of shareholders bought into this offer, his share of control would shrink. If he tried to buy yet more shares to get back to more than 15% ownership, the company would issue yet more discounted shares to everyone except him.

Is the Twitter board acting in their own interests, or the interests of the shareholders? Investment adviser Larry Black noted, “Let me point out something obvious: If Elon Musk takes Twitter private, the Twitter board members don’t have jobs any more, which pays them $250K-$300K per year for what is a nice part-time job. That could explain a lot.”

Musk hinted at a “Plan B”, and tweeted provocatively, “Love Me Tender”. He might be considering trying to bypass the board altogether and make a “tender offer” to the shareholders at large to sell their shares to him, at some attractive price. Typical conditions for such an offer would be that he only has to make good on his purchase offer if some large plurality of the shareholders take him up on it. It turns out that in practice this approach can be messy and complicated and delayed, probably not something the fast-moving Musk might have patience with. Also, even if he captured 100% of the shares, he could not replace all the existing board members for something like three years, so they could remain sitting there,  making anti-Musk decisions all along.

Musk’s offer has now put Twitter “in play” as a takeover target. You know that lots of wealthy people and entities are consulting their investment bankers about becoming a white (or black) knight here. Anyway, it makes for great theater. Popcorn, anyone?

Dressed for Recess(ion)

In my previous post, I decomposed consumer expenditures to figure out which service sectors experienced the largest supply-side disruptions due to Covid-19. I illustrated that transportation & recreation services were the only consumer service to experience substantial and persistent supply shocks. Health, food, and accommodation services also experienced supply shocks, but quickly rebounded. Housing, utility, and financial services experienced no supply disruptions whatsoever.

What about non-durables?

Total consumption spending is the largest category of spending in our economy and is composed of services, durable goods, and non-durables. Services are the largest portion and durable goods compose the smallest portion. So, while there were plenty of stories during the Covid-19 pandemic about months-long delivery times for durables, they did not constitute the typical experience for most consumption.

Even though it’s not the largest category, many people think of non-durables when they think of consumption. Below is the break-down of non-durable spending in 2019. The largest singular category of non-durable spending was for food and beverages, followed by pharmaceuticals & medical products, clothing & shoes, and gasoline and other energy goods. Clearly, the larger the proportion that each of these items composes of an individual household budget, the more significant the welfare implications of price changes.

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The Fed is Still Under-Reacting to Inflation

In March the Federal Reserve raised rates for the first time since Covid began:

They also began to shrink their balance sheet:

Hard to see but its already down $25 billion from a peak of $8.962 trillion

These moves are in the right direction, but represent a slow start to tackling inflation that is the highest of my lifetime, with the CPI up 8.5% over the last year. While temporary supply constraints are contributing to this, it seems clear to me that excessive aggregate demand is a major driver of this inflation. The labor market has already recovered, with unemployment at 3.6% like it was in late 2019. The Covid-induced output gap is fully eliminated by one standard measure:

But market-based measures of inflation expectations remain high. The TIPS spread predicts that inflation rates over the next 10 years will be much closer to 3% than to the Fed’s target of 2%:

My preferred measure, the NGDP gap, is at 3% (i.e., 3% over the ideal level of 0)

Source: https://www.mercatus.org/publications/monetary-policy/measuring-monetary-policy-ngdp-gap

Overall, its seams clear that Fed policy is currently too loose. The harder question is, what exactly to do about it? How much should they raise rates? The simplest way to answer this is to use the Taylor Rule. Using the version of the rule that Bernanke describes here and using core PCE as the inflation measure (currently just 5.4% yoy, vs 8.5% for headline CPI) implies that the Fed Funds rate should be:

5.4% + 0.5*0% + 0.5*(5.4%-2) + 2 = 9.1%

As Bernanke and many others have explained, you don’t want to take the Taylor rule literally, and the Fed raising rates to 9.1% Volcker-style at their next meeting would be a terrible idea. But keeping the Fed Funds rate under 0.5% would also be a terrible idea. Markets do expect the Fed to keep raising rates this year, but slowly, so that they would be around 2.25% by December. I’ll go on record as worrying that this is too slow, and recommending that they raise rates by at least 0.5% at their next meeting, and continue doing so until market-based measures of medium-run inflation are down to 2%.

Disclaimer: I’m a microeconomist whose last post on inflation was at best only directionally right. Consider this the view of one “insider-outsider” and then go read smarter people like Scott Sumner.

Inflation During the Pandemic in the OECD

Inflation is definitely here. The latest CPI release puts the annual inflation rate in the US at 8.5% over the past 12 months, the highest 12-month period since May 1981. That’s bad, especially because wages for many workers aren’t keeping up with the price increases (and that’s true in other countries too).

But what about other countries? Many countries are experiencing record inflation too. The same day the US announced the latest CPI data, Germany announced that they also had the highest annual inflation since 1981.

Using data from the OECD, we can make some comparisons across countries during the pandemic. I’ll use data through February 2022, which excludes the most recent (very high!) months for places like the US and Germany, but most countries haven’t released March 2022 data quite yet.

Let’s compare inflation rates and GDP growth (in real terms, also from the OECD), using the end of 2019 as a baseline. We’ll compare the US, the other G-7 countries, and several broad groups of countries (OECD, OECD European countries, and the Euro area). The chart below uses “core inflation,” which excludes food and energy (below I will use total inflation — the basic picture doesn’t change much).

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The Congress That Berated Oil Companies for Producing Oil Is Now Berating Them for Not Producing Oil

Oil production is a difficult, risky business even under favorable regulatory regimes.  For instance, here is a chart of cumulative bankruptcy filings of exploration and production (E&P) companies for 2015-2021:

A few companies go bust every year, but there are some years like 2015-2016 and 2019-2020 when a lot of companies go bust. That happens when the oil industry collectively has overproduced and driven the price of oil below the effective cost of production. Even the mighty ExxonMobil ran deep in the red in 2020, losing an eye-watering 22.4 billion dollars. With all that in mind, shareholders since 2020 have been pressuring companies to show “financial discipline”, which means “drill less”.

Beyond these basic business realities, there is a whole new set of pressures to inhibit petroleum production. Environmental activists have pushed banks to withhold funding from petroleum companies, to strangle further oil production. It was big news in 2020 when activists, alarmed by ExxonMobil’s plans to actually (gasp) increase its oil production, successfully elected several alternative members to the board of directors with the specific goal of curtailing further drilling.

There have been attacks on the oil industry on the political front, as well. Joe Biden ran on a platform of banning drilling on public lands, and one item he checked off his to-do list on his first day in office was to issue an executive order killing a pipeline that would have facilitated imports of oil from the abundant reserves in Canada. One of his nominees for a top financial regulatory post remarked regarding oil producers that “we want them to go bankrupt if we want to tackle climate change”. All these are the sorts of things that make execs less willing to commit capital for expensive drilling programs that may take years to pay back. (The counter-claim by the administration that the U.S. oil industry is just sitting on thousands of unused oil leases is a red herring).

There is only a finite amount of oil in the ground, so it makes sense to move with all deliberate speed toward renewable and nuclear energy (which emits little or no CO2). However, our European friends who have installed lots of solar panels and windmills have discovered  that the sun does not shine at night (!) and the wind does not always blow strongly (!!) , and so during their energy transition they need to maintain an adequate supply of fossil fuel power in order to keep the lights on. They elected to let their own oil and gas production dwindle, and rely instead on gas and oil purchased from Russia. We warned back in September that this European policy would give Russia leverage for harassing Ukraine, but apparently not enough EU leaders read this blog. Anyway, even back in the fall of 2021, Russia had restricted natural gas deliveries to Europe, causing sky-high prices there for gas and power.

The European experience ought to have been a cautionary tale for America, but political attacks on oil production continued in the halls of Congress itself. In an October 2021 hearing over climate change prevention, Carolyn Maloney (D-NY) and Ro Khanna (D-CA) insisted that Big Oil commit to reducing US oil and gas production by 3-4% annually (50-70% total by 2050). In a follow-up February 8, 2022 hearing,  the two legislators again demanded concrete commitments from oil companies to reduce their domestic production (although, strangely, Mr. Khanna supported President Biden’s call for other regions, such as OPEC and Russia to increase production).

With oil drilling having been curtailed for the past several years (as desired by environmentalists), the world has now flopped from an oil surplus to an oil shortage, exacerbated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and subsequent sanctions. And of course world oil prices (which are not under the control of U.S. companies) have gone up in response. Oil companies are actually making money again instead of going bankrupt like two years ago

In 2021 Apple had a 26% net profit margin and an effective tax rate of only 13%, while the oil industry had an average profit margin of 8.9% and an effective tax rate of 26.9%.   Yet Congress (mainly Democrats) “investigates” price gouging every time gas prices go up, without hauling in Tim Cook to grill him over the price of each new iPhone model. Repeated previous investigations have shown that domestic gasoline prices are mainly a function of world oil prices, which are not under the control of U.S. companies. Nevertheless, after berating oil execs for increasing oil production,  here come the grandstanding Congressional attack dogs, holding a hearing last week titled (wait for it…) “Gouged at the Gas Station: Big Oil and America’s Pain at the Pump”.

The oil producers patiently explained that “We do not control the price of crude oil or natural gas, nor of refined products like gasoline and diesel fuel,” and “”It [the U.S. oil industry] is experiencing severe cost inflation, a labor shortage due to three downturns in 12 years, shortages of drilling rigs, frack fleets, frack sand, steel pipe, and other equipment and materials.” But it is not clear that anyone was listening to the facts.

It’s Still Hard to Find Good Help These Days

Consumption is the largest component of GDP. In 2019, it composed 67.5% of all spending in the US. During the Covid-19 recession, real consumption fell about 18% and took just over a year to recover. But consumption of services, composing 69% of consumption spending, hadn’t recovered almost two years after the 2020 pre-recession peak.  For those keeping up with the math, service consumption composed 46.5% of the economic spending in 2019.

We can decompose service consumption even further. The table below illustrates the breakdown of service consumption expenditures in 2019.

I argued in my previous post that the Covid-19 pandemic was primarily a demand shock insofar as consumption was concerned, though potential output for services may have fallen somewhat. When something is 67.5% of the economy, ‘somewhat’ can be a big deal. So, below I breakdown services into its components to identify which experienced supply or demand shocks. Macroeconomists often get accused of over-reliance on aggregates and I’ll be a monkey’s uncle if I succumb to the trope (I might, in fact be a monkey’s uncle).

Before I start again with the graphs, what should we expect? Let’s consider that the recession was a pandemic recession. We should expect that services which could be provided remotely to experience an initial negative demand shock and to have recovered quickly. We should expect close-proximity services to experience a negative demand and supply shock due to the symmetrical risk of contagion. Finally, we should expect that services with elastic demand to experience the largest demand shocks (If you want additional details for what the above service categories describe, then you can find out more here, pg. 18).

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Highlights from EAGx Boston

Last weekend I was at Effective Altruism Global X Boston, a great conference that worked very differently from the academic ones I usually attend. The attendees were younger and the topics were different, but the big innovation was the use of Swapcard to encourage 1-on-1 meetings. At academic conferences I spend most of my time listening to formal presentations or talking to people I already know, but here I talked to 13 new people for a half hour each, and many others more briefly.

That said, the talks I did attend were excellent. Alvea is a 3-month-old company that already has a novel DNA-based Omicron-targeted Covid vaccine in Phase 1 trials. My notes on co-founder Ethan Alley’s talk:

Learning by doing is the way to go. I learned more in 3 months as a founder than 12+ months as an MIT grad student. Like that you have to pay a company $125k to randomize your clinical trial, and they take 8 weeks to do it

Richard Cash talked about the Oral Rehydration Therapy he helped develop that has saved tens of millions of lives. In short, many people who died of diarrheal diseases like Cholera were simply dying from dehydration, and he realized that this can be prevented cheaply and easily in most cases by having them drink a solution of water, glucose, and certain salts (basically Gatorade). He noted that much of the basic research behind this had been done in the US well before it was applied in the developing countries where it has helped most, so it was crucial to simply notice how important and broadly applicable the findings were. On the other hand, some things really did work differently in developing countries; here the medical conventional wisdom was that people shouldn’t eat while they had diarrhea, but if kids are already malnourished it turns out they are better off eating anyway.

Wave is a mobile payment company that is hugely successful in Senegal but has been slow to expand elsewhere. I asked their Chief Technical Officer Ben Kuhn why this was, and his answer made perfect economic sense:

Fixed costs plus local network effects. Fixed costs: need to get approval of a country’s central bank to operate, need to hire local staff, et c. Network effects: our system gets more valuable as more of the people you send money to/from use it, and these are usually within-country. Makes more sense to keep expanding within a country until its nearly totally saturated, and only then move to the next country. There’s also a limit of how much $ we have to expand, especially since we don’t want VCs to control the company.

(My notes, not a verbatim quote)

As I talked to people I was trying to narrow down my post-tenure plans. This didn’t really work, because people gave me good new ideas without convincing me to abandon any of my old ideas. Although I talked to several senior researchers at NGOs, the ideas that stuck with me most came from talking to undergrads, and were all things that sound obvious in hindsight but that I hadn’t actually been planning to do. The one I’ll mention here as a commitment device is to post my research ideas on my website. I have many more paper ideas than I have time to write about them, and I no longer care much about whether I get credit/publications for them or someone else does. This summer I’ll post a list of ideas there, and perhaps a series of posts fleshing them out here.

P.S. If you identify at all with Effective Altruism, I recommend trying to attend a conference. I’m planning to go next to the one in DC in September.