Attention as Rational Addiction

I’ve never gotten this much attention before. Which is to say, my writing receives a small sliver of attention on occasion, but that small sliver is nonetheless far more than I’ve received previously in my life. To put it in better context, I’ve had a couple posts and tweets go mini-viral, which by the standards of major pundits or celebrities amount to little more than a throwaway post, but by the standards of my life up until now they elicited tidal waves of attention.

It felt pretty good.

Those good feelings, though, morphed into something else within a couple days. First, there came the fear of saying something wrong while more people were paying attention. That fear of negative approbation is nothing new or special, but it was certainly heightened. What was more disconcerting, however, was how the anticipation of attention, or more importantly possible lack thereof, crept into the back of my mind as I sat down to write future posts and tweets.

Here’s a an interesting phenomona: once you have enough followers on twitter, the lack of likes/retweets on anything you write becomes recognizable as implicit disapproval. You know what you wrote was put in front of a couple thousand people and yet nearly none of them felt it warranted a tenth of a second click. It stings.

That sting from the absence of approbation changes the incentives in front of you, maybe for some even more than the initial serotonin-dump from previous bursts of positive attention. You feel the pull to write about the things that got attention before, to write in the same manner or mood. To give the customers what they want.

And the customer that matters most is the part of your brain that wants to re-live the thrill of thousands of strangers telling you that you are good and smart and pretty and are totally worth keeping around. This is an addiction. Now there is, of course, no shortage of people calling social media an addiction. What I would like to argue is that it is a particularly dangerous addiction because it is a perfectly rational addiction.

A Rational Addiction Model of Attention

I’ll skip any real math, but indulge me a moment of framing:

A simple model of rational addiction to attention starts with three inputs: positive approbation (P), negative approbation (N), and total attention (T), where T = P + N.

Now lets assume that your utility is increasing with P and decreasing with N, while also increasing with T. That’s all pretty uncontroversial for humans. Let’s also assume that negative attention is easier to reliably generate than positive attention (i.e. trolling is harder to ignore). To put a little structure on it, we’ll assume that they are all substitutes, but with different weights .

U = T^w1 + P^w2 – N^w3

What that means is that people have an incentive to pursue attention, but how they allocate their efforts across plays for positive and negative attention will depend on how much they weight the cost of negative attention relative to what they gain from total attention.

Here comes the twist, though.

What if T is not the absolute total attention you are receiving today, but instead T is the total attention you are receiving today relative to the average attention you have received in the past, the level of attention you have become accustomed to?

U = (T- T_mean)^w1 + P^w2 – N^w3

Well now you’re on a hedonic treadmill, but for attention instead of wealth or luxury. Your brain has grown used to a rush of serotonin from the attention of millions of strangers. You’re like an adrenaline junkie, but instead of jumping out airplanes you’re trolling public figures and latching on to “Twitter’s main character” everyday.

What’s interesting about this model of rational addiction, however, is how quickly you can find yourself pursuing negatiive attention. ostensibly producing negative utility (i.e. actively making yourself unhappy) by pursuing negative attention because the total cost of that negative attention to you is less than the even costlier option of no one paying attention at all. Would you log on to twitter everyday if if cost you a hundred dollars? You would if not logging on cost you ten thousand. Same thing for those who are rationally addicted. What started out as a positive reaction to a small number of well-received insights has created a utility monster trolling the world in a desperate plea for negative attention in the hopes that it will grant the slightest reprieve from the icy desperate loneliness inside that haunts my every moment.

I’m fine. Really. I’m making a point.

When we talk about the problems of social media for mental health, we tend to focus on bullying, dysmorphic self-images, and the creation of false standards of value. I think all of those problems are extremely real, but they also seem like things that can be addressed with policies, oversight, or cultural adaptation. What I want us to consider is that attention at this scale is something that is so baked into the construct of social media that problems emerge from perfectly rational engagement by otherwise well-intending people. I’ve previously tried to model the loneliness that can come with being extermely online, but this in some ways is actually deeper.

What if, for most of us, the only way to win at social media is not to play?

The New Econ Bloggers

On the Bretton Goods podcast, host Pradyumna Prasad asked student Trevor Chow about blogs. To start the segment, Prasad noted that there has been an increase in what he called “econ blogs” in the past 2-3 years. Will that trend continue? Prasad believes that this is not sustainable because: 1) he thinks the paid subscriber model will not support many writers, which leads to 2) bloggers writing for free will run out of time and energy.

Chow replied that he thinks the recent explosion is partly due to Substack, which makes it easy to start blogging. Chow described the current climate as a “flourishing blogosphere.” He assumes that some people started during a Covid shutdown when the opportunity cost was low. Some of the younger people might shift their focus, as he did when his interests changed, but he believes that many of the blogs started in this phase are here to stay. Both young men think about longevity.

Prasad asked, “What are the qualities of the most successful bloggers across time?”

Chow replied that the only blog that has influenced him “across time” is Marginal Revolution, partly because few writers stick with blogging. Chow thinks a successful blogger over time would find a special niche. I have a similar intuition, even though MR is not about a niche topic. If everyone is checking MR for their “daily links”, then it’s unlikely that inferior new aggregator blogs will attract large numbers of readers. Also, Twitter largely fills that role now.

The fact that duration was discussed more than quality is interesting. To blog is to enter a network and join a community. Part of sticking around for a while is not just writing but also reading and paying attention to the work of others. Good writing is a necessary but not sufficient component of what would be considered a successful blog.

As an economist, I was happy to hear Prasad open this segment by talking about “econ blogs”. Econ blogging occurs when people are interesting online, even if the topic is outside of the traditional domain of economists. I think this is partly due to Tyler Cowen both being prolific and also willing to engage non-standard thinkers.

I enjoyed the podcast. It raised some questions which I posed to Tyler Cowen, the OG econ blogger. We all know that MR generates a high level of engagement, today. My first question was:

1. What was the evolution of reader engagement with MR? How long did you work before a lot of people were reading, commenting? 

Cowen: It took us 3-4 years to have a lot of readers. but I never tracked the numbers very closely. When I started, I was thrilled by the notion of 5,000 readers a day — of course we have done many times more than that.

2. The consensus is that many new people have started since 2020, which I believe is something that you called for. Do you now see the space as, in some sense, saturated, or would you encourage more people to keep joining now? 

Cowen: I don’t think it is saturated now.

 3. For bloggers who started since 2020, should they quit if the opportunity cost increases? 

Cowen: The main thing is simply whether you enjoy it and learn from it!  If so, reason to continue. That sounds trivial, but it is really the bottom line.

Should the new bloggers keep going? Yes, if you enjoy it and learn from it. Is it too late to start? No, if you will enjoy blogging and learn from it.

The blog form is better than a 280-character tweet for capturing nuance. Something I learn from blogging, which might not be obvious from the outside, is that I have some bad ideas. Sometimes trying to write out a piece teaches me that I had an unsupported thought. It would be good if more people would stop scrolling for an hour a week and try to write out an argument.  

Co-blogger Mike alerted me to this comic:

This is one frame of a long SMBC comic strip https://www.smbc-comics.com/comic/liberal-education

The comic first describes a cynical take on academia, with which I don’t fully agree. Then, the woman paints a picture of an alternative haven for intellectual conversation. Can econ blogs be an old pub where the people are always and only there in earnest? “Most people don’t even want to go in, and you certainly don’t get credentials for descending the stairs.”

In Praise of the FRED Excel Add-in

Sometimes, large entities have enough money to throw at a problem that by sheer magnitude they produce something great (albeit at too high a cost). The iPhone app from the FRED is not that thing. But the Excel add-in is something that every macroeconomics professor should consider adding to their toolkit.

Personally, I include links to FRED content in the lecture notes that I provide to students. But FRED makes it easy to do so much more. They now have an add-in that makes accessing data *much* faster. With it, professors can demonstrate in excel their transformations that students can easily replicate. The advantage is that students can learn to access and transform their own data rather than relying on links that I provide them.

The tool is easy enough to find – FRED wants you to use it. After that, the installation is largely automatic.

Installed in excel you will see the below new ribbon option. It’s very user friendly.

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Fed Dot Plot vs Markets

After their last meeting in March, the Federal Open Market Committee released the summary of economic projections. Most of the variables they project are inherently difficult to predict: GDP, unemployment, inflation. But their forecasts of the Federal Funds rate should be pretty good, since they’re the ones that get to pick what it will be. The median FOMC member thinks the the Federal Funds rate will be just under 2% by the end of 2022.

I said in my last post that the Fed is under-reacting to inflation. Markets seem to agree, but they also think that the Fed will change. Kalshi runs prediction markets on what the Fed Funds rate will be, which they recently started to summarize using this nice curve:

So traders think that the Fed will raise rates faster than the Fed thinks they will, with rates getting to 2.5% by year end. Traders at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange see an even bigger change, with rates at 2.75% by year end, and 3.5% by July 2023 (the longest-term market they offer).

I lean toward the markets on this one; if they are wrong there is plenty of money to be made by betting so.

How to Get People Vaccinated for 93 Cents

We’ve talked a lot about vaccines on this blog, including both the benefits of vaccines and how to get people vaccinated. For example, last month I posted about Robert Barro’s estimate on the number of additional vaccines needed to save 1 life. Barro put it at about 250 vaccines. Using some reasonable assumptions, I further suggested that each person vaccinated has a social value of about $20,000. That’s a lot!

But how do we convince people to get vaccinated? Lotteries? Pay them? In addition to just paying them (the economist’s preferred method), another good old capitalist method is advertising (the marketer’s preferred method). And a new working paper tries just that, running pro-vaccine ads on YouTube with a very specific spokesman: Donald Trump.

Running ads on YouTube is pretty cheap. For $100,000, the researchers were able to reach 6 million unique users. And because they randomized who saw the ads across counties, they are able to make a strong claim that any increase in vaccinations was caused by the ads. They argue that this ad campaign led to about 104,000 more people getting vaccinated, or less than $1 per person (the actual budget was $96,000, which is how they get 93 cents per vaccine — other specifications suggest 99 cents or $1.01, but all of their estimates are around a buck).

Considering, again, my rough estimate that each additional vaccinated person is worth $20,000 to society (in terms of lives saved), this is a massive return on investment. Of course, we know that everything runs into diminishing returns at some point (they also targeted areas that lagged in vaccine uptake). Would spending $1,000,000 on YouTube ads featuring Trump lead to 1 million additional people getting vaccinated? Probably not quite. But it might lead to a half million. And a half million more vaccinated people could potentially save 2,000 lives (using Barro’s estimate).

I dare you to find a cheaper way to save 2,000 lives.

Musk, Twitter, and Poison Pills

It has been all over the financial news that Elon Musk made an offer last week to buy out Twitter for $54.20 per share, which is well above its recent stock price. And also, that the board quickly stiff-armed Musk by adopting a “poison pill” provision. What are poison pills, are they a good thing, and how does this particular one work?

Major decisions for a corporation are made by its board of directors. In theory, they are supposed to direct operations for the benefit of the company’s shareholders, who are considered the actual owners of the corporation. The members of the board are elected by the shareholders in annual meetings.

In practice, the board largely does what it wants, and has an outsized influence on who gets elected. The board sets the agenda of the annual meetings, and proposes successor directors. In theory, shareholders can propose resolutions and alternative board candidates at an annual meeting, but it usually takes a determined effort by some activist shareholder group to actually push through some measure that is not approved by the existing board. The outside board members are often executives of other companies, and so are naturally attuned to the interests of the managerial class.  Thus, the members of this Old Boys (and Girls) Club tend to vote each other generous pay:  board members are typically paid very handsomely for what is often a fairly undemanding, part-time job.

Big corporate mergers and takeovers became a thing in the 1980’s. Some outside investor would make an offer to buy up company shares for more than the current market price. Often,  management would resist this offer, since it might entail them losing their cushy jobs. The delicate matter for management in such cases was to convince shareholders that rejecting the buyout offer was in their best long-term interest.

As in so many matters, “where you stand depends on where you sit.” Management would argue that “short-termism” is bad for the company and for the nation as a whole; the “corporate raiders” would just fire people, break up the company, and sell off the pieces, and generally create misery. The outside investors would reply that their new management would “unlock value” better than the current management was doing, by making operations more efficient and competitive and innovative.

A variety of measures might be implemented by the board to make it less attractive or less feasible for a change in control. The terms of the board of directors might be staggered, so that it would be impossible for the existing board to be totally changed out in less than say 3 years, even if someone controlled 100% of the shares. A company I was associated with in the 1990’s implemented a policy that provided for generous severance packages for upper employees in the event of change of control. (Again, management looking out for themselves).

The term “poison pill” typically refers to some measure that  targets share prices, in a way to discourage a hostile takeover. The most common form is the “flip-in” approach: 

A flip-in poison pill strategy involves allowing the shareholders, except for the acquirer, to purchase additional shares at a discount. Though purchasing additional shares provides shareholders with instantaneous profits, the practice dilutes the value of the limited number of shares already purchased by the acquiring company. This right to purchase is given to the shareholders before the takeover is finalized and is often triggered when the acquirer amasses a certain threshold percentage of shares of the target company.

This is what the Twitter board has pulled on Musk. If he acquires more than 15% of Twitter shares without board approval, the company will allow any shareholder (except Musk) to purchase additional shares at a 50% discount. Yes, this dilution would tend to lower the value of the shares, but if a lot of shareholders bought into this offer, his share of control would shrink. If he tried to buy yet more shares to get back to more than 15% ownership, the company would issue yet more discounted shares to everyone except him.

Is the Twitter board acting in their own interests, or the interests of the shareholders? Investment adviser Larry Black noted, “Let me point out something obvious: If Elon Musk takes Twitter private, the Twitter board members don’t have jobs any more, which pays them $250K-$300K per year for what is a nice part-time job. That could explain a lot.”

Musk hinted at a “Plan B”, and tweeted provocatively, “Love Me Tender”. He might be considering trying to bypass the board altogether and make a “tender offer” to the shareholders at large to sell their shares to him, at some attractive price. Typical conditions for such an offer would be that he only has to make good on his purchase offer if some large plurality of the shareholders take him up on it. It turns out that in practice this approach can be messy and complicated and delayed, probably not something the fast-moving Musk might have patience with. Also, even if he captured 100% of the shares, he could not replace all the existing board members for something like three years, so they could remain sitting there,  making anti-Musk decisions all along.

Musk’s offer has now put Twitter “in play” as a takeover target. You know that lots of wealthy people and entities are consulting their investment bankers about becoming a white (or black) knight here. Anyway, it makes for great theater. Popcorn, anyone?

We can’t leave internal affairs to the police anymore

There are three open questions regarding police abuse and corruption:

1) How much is there?

2) What are the mechanisms underlying it?

3) What are the policy options for mitigating it?

This is a subject I have much interest in and have been researching for over a decade. I am still interested in the first two questions, but it’s increasingly difficult to invest in any conversation that doesn’t immediately contribute to how we are going to mitigate the problem.

This story of Hamilton County, Tennessee is a pure, unadulterated nightmare. We don’t want to make policy off a single nightmarish department or event, but there is nothing isolated or unique about this story. Bad officers migrate to other departments or are simply re-hired by their old one. Bad departments are rarely shut down. Bad sheriffs get re-elected. For large departments, “internal affairs” serve as the de facto monitors, but they are both part of larger social network of law enforcement and also shunned by the an insular sub-network of street officers. Both municipal police and sheriffs’ unions work tirelessly to solve the collective action problem for their members, but in doing so also provide the institutional capital that ensures that members are insulated from any form of accountability. Police take care of their own.

None of this is a new problem – “Who will watch the watchmen” has been a political puzzle since the advent of political thought. What is increasingly clear, though, is that the institutions we have in place for monitoring local law enforcement are largely impotent, either because they’ve always have been or because they’ve become obsolete. Internal and mutual monitoring i.e. “the watchmen watch themselves” only works when the individuals in question are unable to solve their collective action problem, in this case collectively preventing the reporting of misconduct by fellow officers. I regret to inform you that the police have solved their collective action problem.


There is arguably (and I would argue it) no one in our society less likely to be punished for committing an act of violence against another human being than a police officer. I don’t view that as an inflammatory or even particularly normative claim. That’s a reality, and it may in fact even be a welfare enhancing one i.e. maybe someone has be endowed with additional coercive force relative to most citizens. But I think the specific power of police is something well beyond simple “coercion”.

I am hard pressed to think of any occupation with more unwitnessed discretionary power than police officers. Judges may have more power, but they sit on benches in public courtrooms in front of an audience when they exercise their power. All regulatory power occurs via documentation. Political power eventually has to pass through the prism of public governance. Economic power comes via reward and deprivation, but is always constrained by the opportunity of individuals to exit the relationship. You can always move out on a bad landlord or quit a terrible job, but there’s no swapping out for the better officer when one’s got you pinched.

Police officers often exercise their power one-on-one, away from prying eyes, in settings where they themselves serve as the primary witness of record. They have the discretion to not just bear witness to a crime, but to establish its very event, and in doing so start a chain of events that will change how every institution in society treats a person for the rest of their life. They have the power to constrain a person physically, the power to kill, all in a context absent any external monitoring.

You might be imagining a story in an alley or in the back of a squad car, but a holding cell or interrogation room can be a far lonelier place when the only other potential witnesses are other officers. What little doubt a single officer’s testimony may carry is completely washed away by the matching depositions of multiple officers. If the story comes down to you versus them, you’re going to lose.

So I’ll say it again: police officers are endowed with more unobserved discretionary power than any other occupation in our society.


It’s time for significant resources to be invested in monitoring local law enforcement, and it needs to be made permanent. This can’t a be priority that lives at the whim of the Presidential election cycle. This can’t just be an ad hoc prioritization that manifests case-by-case and is largely driven by news coverage. Monitoring of local law enforcement needs to become a permanent feature of our federal bureaucracy. Whether that means creating an independent agency, a subset of the FBI, or a reappropriation of the labor in capital currently being wasted in the Drug Enforcement Agency, I don’t know.

Trust in local police is so low that “Defund the police”, an idea whose foolishness is only matched by its political naivete, actually got off the ground as an idea. That’s where we are at as a society: we have so little trust in the providers of law and order, a core good so central to the very idea of government it shows up in frontier towns before just about anything else, that people were open to appeals to simply live without law enforcement. That’s…that’s not good.

There is all kinds of really good research into what can be done to restore trust in the police. Training reforms, procedural justice, body-worn cameras, (ahem) public finance reforms, just to name a tiny few. These are all good ideas, but maybe we should also consider recommitting to our core belief that policing works, that monitoring and punishing people who break the law deters others from doing so. If we really believe it works for private citizens, then it might just work for the police.

In fact, I think already nailed it two paragraphs ago. Let’s rename the DEA the Department of External Affairs. We’re legalizing narcotics one drug at a time and these people will need jobs, right (I’m only 41% kidding)? We can have a Watchman “Czar” (they watch the watchmen, get it?). They can have tip lines. There can be informants in bad police departments, court ordered wire taps. They can seize resources from corrupt departments. They can keep doing all the things they’ve been doing, but instead of drug smugglers they can track abusive officers skipping across state lines from job to job, bust corrupt sheriffs, and occasionally seize the odd speed boat. If you’re going to be endowed with a badge and a gun, with the ability to pull a person out of their life and threaten to render moot every plan they ever had, then it seems only fair that you know someone might be watching you.

To add a bit a self-important context to this suggestion, please know that advocating for the establishment of federal agencies is far from my default solution. I know that the US government is littered with departments and agencies that do little but drag down the efficient expenditure of resources, inch by inch eroding the credibility of the public enterprise. Part of the promise of federalism is not just pushing local goods down the government hierarchy, but pushing national goods up. Not since the Civil Rights Movement has it been more clear that local law enforcement is in crisis. The Hamilton County Sheriff’s office, the Ferguson police department, these are no longer local problems. Each story of tragedy and abuse chips away at the broader reputation of law enforcement across the country and we are all less safe for it. Nor are they dependent on tacit local knowledge or relationships– quite the contrary, local relationships are likely to inhibit proper monitoring through either personal loyalty, collective intimidation, or being outright complicit.

The law enforcement crisis has been become a national problem. A federal problem. It’s time to treat it like one.

John List, Dramatist

As someone who has dabbled in lab experiments for over a decade, I’m familiar with complaints about external validity. If an experiment is run with only college students, then how can we know if the finding will generalize to other populations? It’s a question worth asking, but many questions are worth asking and it doesn’t mean that controlled experimentation can’t add value to the economics literature. In the age of general suspicion of small studies, people say that replications are needed. We should only trust a conclusion that is supported by multiple studies. The thing about replications is that the process has to start somewhere. Empirical work has to get read and published. Replications are composed of individual studies.

I just met John List at the Alabama stop on his epic national book tour. He directed me to his work of art: Ungated Link. He wrote a play in response to the attacks on his work concerning external validity. He employs a rhetorical strategy of making your critics look obtuse. Even though the play is absolutely silly (thoroughly entertaining), he builds a strong defense for doing experiments. It is literally presented as the arguments of a defense lawyer. Before the trial begins, a “reporter” summarizes the conflict that has created the need for a formal trial:

Court Reporter Clifton Hillegass: Thank you Judge Learner. While it is never easy to convey succinctly the key points of a debate, this dispute has crystallized in a manner that leaves no middle ground. The prosecution, led by Mr. Naiv Ete, argues that all empirical work in economics must pass a set of necessary external validity conditions before being published in academic journals or used by policymakers. To date, in this courtroom no empirical work has passed his conditions, effectively rendering the question of generalizability beyond dispute, or as Livius Andronicus reminded us, Non est Disputandum de Generalizability. Ms. Minerva, Lead Defense, has argued that this line of reasoning leaves only theoretical exercises and thought experiments to advance science and guide policymaking, an approach that she fears will return us to the dark ages.

The paper is called “NON EST DISPUTANDUM DE GENERALIZABILITY?” It’s a good refresher on the history of science, not just economics.

Maybe the first best is for you to spend your weekend reading dense technical papers. But if you aren’t feeling up to that, then this play will make you feel like you learned something without even trying.

I’ll link this up to some of the posts I wrote last year about experiments and critics:

Calling Behavioral Economics a Fad

Behavioral Economist at Work

Dressed for Recess(ion)

In my previous post, I decomposed consumer expenditures to figure out which service sectors experienced the largest supply-side disruptions due to Covid-19. I illustrated that transportation & recreation services were the only consumer service to experience substantial and persistent supply shocks. Health, food, and accommodation services also experienced supply shocks, but quickly rebounded. Housing, utility, and financial services experienced no supply disruptions whatsoever.

What about non-durables?

Total consumption spending is the largest category of spending in our economy and is composed of services, durable goods, and non-durables. Services are the largest portion and durable goods compose the smallest portion. So, while there were plenty of stories during the Covid-19 pandemic about months-long delivery times for durables, they did not constitute the typical experience for most consumption.

Even though it’s not the largest category, many people think of non-durables when they think of consumption. Below is the break-down of non-durable spending in 2019. The largest singular category of non-durable spending was for food and beverages, followed by pharmaceuticals & medical products, clothing & shoes, and gasoline and other energy goods. Clearly, the larger the proportion that each of these items composes of an individual household budget, the more significant the welfare implications of price changes.

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The Fed is Still Under-Reacting to Inflation

In March the Federal Reserve raised rates for the first time since Covid began:

They also began to shrink their balance sheet:

Hard to see but its already down $25 billion from a peak of $8.962 trillion

These moves are in the right direction, but represent a slow start to tackling inflation that is the highest of my lifetime, with the CPI up 8.5% over the last year. While temporary supply constraints are contributing to this, it seems clear to me that excessive aggregate demand is a major driver of this inflation. The labor market has already recovered, with unemployment at 3.6% like it was in late 2019. The Covid-induced output gap is fully eliminated by one standard measure:

But market-based measures of inflation expectations remain high. The TIPS spread predicts that inflation rates over the next 10 years will be much closer to 3% than to the Fed’s target of 2%:

My preferred measure, the NGDP gap, is at 3% (i.e., 3% over the ideal level of 0)

Source: https://www.mercatus.org/publications/monetary-policy/measuring-monetary-policy-ngdp-gap

Overall, its seams clear that Fed policy is currently too loose. The harder question is, what exactly to do about it? How much should they raise rates? The simplest way to answer this is to use the Taylor Rule. Using the version of the rule that Bernanke describes here and using core PCE as the inflation measure (currently just 5.4% yoy, vs 8.5% for headline CPI) implies that the Fed Funds rate should be:

5.4% + 0.5*0% + 0.5*(5.4%-2) + 2 = 9.1%

As Bernanke and many others have explained, you don’t want to take the Taylor rule literally, and the Fed raising rates to 9.1% Volcker-style at their next meeting would be a terrible idea. But keeping the Fed Funds rate under 0.5% would also be a terrible idea. Markets do expect the Fed to keep raising rates this year, but slowly, so that they would be around 2.25% by December. I’ll go on record as worrying that this is too slow, and recommending that they raise rates by at least 0.5% at their next meeting, and continue doing so until market-based measures of medium-run inflation are down to 2%.

Disclaimer: I’m a microeconomist whose last post on inflation was at best only directionally right. Consider this the view of one “insider-outsider” and then go read smarter people like Scott Sumner.